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The purpose of this thesis was to study the events of the Muhäjirat 
and the National Government of Kermanshah from summer 1915 to winter 
1917. These events could be considered as a nationalistic movement of 
the Iranian people for protecting the independence and integrity of 
Iran during the First World War. 
It commenced with the formation of Mustaufl ul-Mamälik's cabinet 
and his failure to maintain the proper neutrality of Iran in the war, 
which had already been violated by the belligerent countries from both 
political and military aspects. 
Due to the harshness of Russian and British policy in Iran, 
public opinion was totally against them and the Central Powers' propa- 
ganda inflamed this attitude intensively. 
The revision in 1915 of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 had 
made the British and Russian Governments reluctant to assist the 
Iranian Government. This attitude caused the Iranian Government to 
incline towards the opposition. 
The increase of the Central Powers' influence put the Russian 
and British interests in Iran and its neighbouring countries in jeopardy. 
Therefore, the Russian troops advanced towards Tehran and caused the 
Muhäjirat, an exodus of Iranian nationalists from Tehran to Qom in 
protest against the Allied intentions in Iran. 
They organised a committee for the defence of the country's 
independence and believed that the Shah and government in Tehran were 
under Allied pressure and not able to take any decision; therefore, 
they formed a government in Kermanshah to control the country's affairs 
and to conclude agreements with the Central Powers. 
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They also formed an army which, with the assistance of the 
Germans and Turks, confronted Russian troops a few times but were 
defeated and retreated to Turkish territory, They returned to Iran 
in company with Turkish troops and ruled in the western part of Iran 
until the occupation of Baghdad by British forces, 
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Most dates in this thesis are given according to the Christian 
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it is designated by the letters H. S. after the date; shähanshähi 
dates are indicated by Sh. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES 
In the modern history of Iran, the First World War can particularly 
be considered one of the richest periods from the aspect of documentary 
materials. The direct involvement of belligerent countries in Iran 
during the years 1914-1918 created numerous volumes of official 
documents in those countries. 
For detailed research in this period, one needs a knowledge of 
many languages other than Persian: English, Russian, German and 
Turkish, the tongues of the belligerent countries directly involved 
in Iran's affairs; French, which was the official language of the 
Iranian Foreign Office in communicating with other countries and 
vice versa; and even Swedish, as the reports and memoirs of the 
Swedish officers who advised the Iranian gendarmerie forces are of 
great value, especially those which deal with the war in Iran. 
In this thesis I have attempted to study and cover as many 
different materials on the subject as possible. Apart from the 
Iranian and British documents and sources, some German and Russian 
documents, and translations of them, have been used. Unfortunately,, 
it was not possible to discuss the subject of this thesis from the 
Turkish, Russian, Swedish, and to some extent, German points of view. 
However, this is meant to be a beginning for further study. 
The British documents are available in London at the Public Record 
Office, India Office, War Office and Central Register of Archives, 
the last dealing with the private papers of British officials. 
Regarding the documents in the first three offices, most of the 
reports are usually copies of each other, but often with different 
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numbers, titles, dates and sometimes varied language, although the 
sense is the same, which has taken a considerable time to sort out 
and often led to great confusion. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
have generally relied on the documents in the Public Record Office 
for matters relating to all three organisations. 
It is well-lmown that the British Public Record Office is not 
allowed to publish many of the documents it holds, even after thirty, 
fifty or even one hundred years. Due to the fact that the percentage 
of unpublished documents is not known, one cannot estimate how much 
of the subject one has covered according to the British documents. As 
to the reports, in many cases some parts or sentences have been omitted, 
and this sometimes produces ambiguity of meaning or contents of the 
reports. However, the documents do indicate the British policy on 
political, economic and military matters in Iran and the various 
attitudes of the British authorities dealing with Iranian affairs. 
Although they are most useful and offer a vast vision of the situation 
in Iran at the time, it is obvious that they indicate and express the 
British point of view. 
Generally speaking, the British press represented and supported 
their government's views and policy regarding its foreign relations, 
particularly during the war. "The Times" and "The Near East" are no 
exceptions. However, they are very helpful in offering a general idea 
of the war, particularly the latter, the main intention of which was 
concerned with the situation in the Middle East and Iran. Its 
commentaries on Iranian affairs are sometimes very interesting and 
useful. 
Regarding the British published sources., two authors are very 
important. The first is Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador 
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in Russia during the war and the author of MT Mission to Russia, in 
two volumes. Although there is not much about Anglo-Russian relations 
concerning Iran in his memoirs., it is nevertheless of great importance 
when dealing with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1915. Buchanan has 
made clear the intentions of Russia and Britain toward Iran. 
Sir Percy Sykes, the general officer commanding the South Persian 
Rifles from 1916-1921, could be considered an important witness 
concerning the situation in Iran during the war. He is the author of 
A History of Persia in two volumes. Although he concentrates on the 
southern part of Iran, he offers a rather well-described vision of the 
general situation of the country at the time. As to the Muhäjirat and 
the National Government of Kermanshah, he neither considers the move- 
ment from the Iranian point of view, nor gives a balanced account of 
it. As he was acting against the anti-Allied movements in Iran, it 
should not be surprising that he considers the Iranian movement against 
the Allies simply as a German plot. Although Sykes could not conceal 
the public hatred of the Russians and British in Iran, he blamed this 
on the Russians for their maltreatment and left unsaid the British 
mispolicy in Iran. 
There are a large number of other publications in English about 
the First World War in the Middle East, and particularly in Mesopotamia, 
which inevitably refer to the events in Iran, such as The Great War by 
H. W. Wilson and J. A. Hammerton; Mesopotamia Campaisn by F. J. Moberly; 
Loyalties Mesopotamia by Sir Arnold Wilson. The Middle East in World 
Affairs by George Lenczowski is very useful concerning general events 
in the Middle East and particularly about the events in Iran. Modern 
Iran by Peter Avery contains a more sympathetic view of the Iranian 
movement during the war. 
4 
Two volumes of documents edited by Ulrich Gehrke under the title 
Persien in der Deutschen Orientpolitik während des Ersten Weltkrieges 
are totally devoted to official reports, documents and letters of 
German diplomats and military advisors in Iran during the war. It is 
a splendid work, with many entries relevant to the Muhäjirat and the 
National Government of Kermanshah. It offers a considerable number of 
official documents concerning German and Iranian relations and the 
attitudes and policy of the Germans and Turks in Iran. 
Zeitenwende in Iran is the memoirs of Wipert von Blücher, the 
German officer who served as an advisor in Iran and later became the 
secretary of the German Ambassador in Kermanshah during the period of 
the National Government in Kermanshah. He gives an important account 
of the situation in Kermanshah from political and military aspects 
and of the relations between Turkey, Germany and Iran. 
As to Russian sources, I have had access only to some newspapers 
published during the war and to translations of some articles from 
Russian newspapers concerning Iranian affairs, both from the Iranian 
Foreign Office Archives. 
Some lectures read at Harvard University in November 1962, by 
L. I. Miroshnikov, under the title Iran in World War I, represents a 
Russian source devoted to the subject of Iran during the war. The 
author offers a useful introduction concerning the sources about the 
war in Iran and comments on some of them. He discusses the Russian 
and British imperialistic policy towards Iran. He expresses his 
opinion about the anti-Allied movement, saying that not all anti-British 
and anti-Russian uprisings were the result of intrigues and propaganda 
by Germany and Turkey. He strongly criticises Sir Percy Sykes, who 
paid little attention to Russian efforts during the war in Iran, and 
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points out that the British had mistrusted the Russians 
despite 
their alliance and friendly relations. 
The Iranian sources can be classified in three categories, the 
first of which, primary sources, may be further subdivided into the 
following three groups: 1) the Iranian Foreign Office Archives; 
2) the memoirs and diaries of those who took part in the movement or 
were witnesses; 3) the newspapers and pamphlets published in Iran 
during the time. The second category includes books and articles 
concerning Iran during the war, and the third a series of interviews 
of twenty-four people who had participated in the MuhAjirat and the 
National Government of Kermanshah or were witnesses to these events, 
which I conducted in Iran during 1977-78. 
The foundation of the historiography of the modern period is 
often based on the papers and documents which are released after a 
certain length of time'by a government and are accessible to the 
public through special administration. There is no such administration 
in Iran. In spite of recent moves to improve the situation, there 
are only a few persons who actually deal with the archives. As a 
matter of fact, the Archives and Record Office of the Iranian Foreign 
Office are located in the same place. Therefore, it is difficult to 
receive permission to study these documents. Admission is totally 
dependent on the circumstances. 
The documents have never been properly classified and catalogued. 
However, each year has been divided into 66 subjects, each of which 
deals with the Foreign Office's relations with the other Iranian 
ministries and foreign countries. Each subject contains some cartons 
and each carton many files. The files usually contain up to 60 letters 
each, the subject of which is briefly mentioned on the files. But 
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even with this arrangement, documents are often mixed up and not 
filed properly. It is a matter of great disappointment to see the 
most precious documents of the country turning to dust. It is hoped 
that in the very near future some measures will be taken on this matter. 
The years 1914-1915 could be considered as a period of remarkable 
freedom of speech and publication in Iran. About thirty-seven news- 
papers with various political attitudes were published1, eighteen of 
them in Tehran and the rest in other cities, They inveighed against 
and criticised vigourously political parties, politicians and authorities, 
either foreign or Iranian. The day of the Muhäjirat was the end of 
freedom and except for a very few, mostly pro-Allied publications, the 
rest were suspended. However, they offer a rather well-conceived idea 
of the political and economic situation of the country and a great 
deal of information about the current events of the time, particularly 
the period during which they had freedom. They are very useful and 
helpful in understanding the condition of Iran during the time with 
which this study is concerned. 
Unfortunately, from the nineteen newspapers published in other 
cities, almost nothing survives but their names and occasionally an 
article which was reported or quoted in the books. As for the news- 
papers published in Tehran, a search of the Majlis, Milli, Malik and 
University of Tehran Libraries failed to turn up a complete series 
of nearly all of them, including the famous one "Naubahär". 
Fortunately, most of the Muhäjiria were educated people and had 
the freedom and tendency to write; in fact many of them were editors 
of newspapers, writers, poets or politicians. They produced a 
1. Sipihr, 229. 
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considerable number of memoirs and diaries about their lives and the 
situation in the country; in comparison with other periods of Iranian 
history, this is an unique collection and provided this study with a 
vast wealth of source material. But one must exercise great caution 
in dealing with their attitudes; although they expressed their personal 
opinions, political attitudes and interests, many contradictory views 
about these matters arise. Of course most of them were very careful 
and wise in their writing so that there would not be any problems 
later on. 
Ir-in dar Jang-i Buzurg, by Ahmad "Ali Sipihr, Muvarrikh ud-Daulah, 
is a collection of his diaries and memoirs of some Iranian and foreign 
diplomats. The most important point of this work is that the author 
had access to many documentary papers at the time, Sipihr was working 
as the first secretary in the German Embassy at Tehran and had close 
relations with most of the Iranian politicians. His attitudes and 
opinions are very interesting and offer a conception of the situation 
in the country and the policy in Iran of the belligerent countries, 
particularly the Germans. Although it is a very useful work, his 
tendency towards the Germans is noticeable. 
'All Muhammad and Yahyl Daulatäbädi, two brothers who took part 
in the Muhäjirat, are two famous Iranian politicians of the time. The 
memoirs of the former, who was a leader of the Moderate Party, have 
been published in "Vapid" magazine. He offers a view of the general 
political condition of the country at the time and the activities of 
the Moderate Party. His main attention concentrates on the friction 
between the Moderate and Democrat Parties and the rivalry between 
politicians. 
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Yahyä, whose sympathy lay with the Democrat Party, has written 
four volumes of memoirs which offer a vast vision of the history of 
Iran from the reign of Näsir ud-Din Shah Qijär to the rise of the 
Pahlavi dynasty. Regarding the Muhijirat and the National Government 
of Kermanshah, he was involved from the beginning and was one of the 
most influential politicians. 
The memoirs and diaries of 4usain Sami'1, Adib us-Salianah, and 
Arran Allih Ardalin, `Izz ul-Mamilik, who were members of the Majlis 
and had participated in the Muhijirat and become ministers of the 
National Government of Kermanshah, have been published in a book under 
the title Avvalln Qiyäm Mugaddas-i Milli dar Jans-i Bann ul-Milan 
A=. The memoirs of the former consist of about thirty-two pages, 
with a very brief description of events. Ardalän's memoirs occupy the 
rest of the book, about 86 pages, with rather more detail than his 
friend. His memoirs have also been published in books by Sipihr and 
I'zäm Qudsi and in "Thätirät-i Vahid". Ardalän refers to some 
articles of constitutional law and a full debate of a session of the 
Majlis on the Russian ultimatum of 1911. There is. no notion about 
any agreement between the parties and Germany, or the National 
Government and the Turks and Germans. Ardalän obtained a list of 
about 122 persons who had taken part in the Muhijirat and the National 
Government of Kermanshah. This list includes the members of the 
Majlis, `ul_, government authorities, nationalists and gendarmerie 
officers. 
Safar-i MuhAj1rat. by RijA 'All Divänbaygl, concentrates on the 
writer's activities during the MuhAjirat and the National Government 
of Kermanshah. He worked in the Iranian Foreign Ministry as secretary 
I 
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in the section on Russian affairs. He joined the Muhäjirin and was 
appointed envoy to Kurdestan and then Kermanshah, fron which he gives 
an idea of events. 
Kitäb-i Khätirät-i Man yä Raushan Shudan-i Tärikh Sad Sä1ah, by 
Husain I4zäm Qudsi, Ifzäm ul Vuzära", gives full details on the current 
situation of the country and his daily memoirs during the Muhäjirat 
and the National Government of Kermanshah. He has included the 
memoirs of Ardalän and Navväb Rgavi, a member of the Majlis from 
Yazd. He has expressed his views and criticised and commented on 
the matter. 
Tärikh-i Nihzat by Mudir Halläj and Tärikh-i Vatän Parastän 
Isfahän va Bakhtiyäri by Dänishvar, Mujähid us-Sullän, are both written 
by men who took part in the Muhäjirat and record their experiences 
and memoirs during the time. 
VacA'i'-i Gharb-i Irän dar Janes-i Avval-i Jahäni az Sha'bän 1333 
tä Sha'bän 1334, by Riýäqü1i Qä'immagimi, as the title indicates, is 
concerned with the events in the west of Iran during the First World 
War from June 1915 to June 1916. He was a gendarmerie officer in the 
Burajird division in Lüristän in the west of Iran and acted as 
interpreter for the Swedish officers in the force. He also had access 
to information about the organisation of the gendarmerie and took 
part in many events, especially battles such as Bid-i Surkh. He 
offers a rather story-like interpretation of events. As he was in 
the west and away from the central part of the country he has made 
some rather big errors about events in the central part of Iran; for 
instance, the fight of Rubij Karim, according to him, happened several 
days before the Muhäjirat, on 25th Zi Hijjah 1333/4 November 1915; in 
fact, the Rubil Karim battle had happened almost 37 days after the 
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day of the Muhäjirat, which would be 14 afar 1333/22 December 1915. 
He also recorded the day of the Huhäjirat as 4th Muharram instead of 
the 7th, but he received this date from a memoir of Ya'qüb Anvär, one 
of the members of the Majlis, which was published years later in 
"Iltalä'ät-i Haftagi", a Tehran magazine. However, his book, with 
some caution, is useful on general points. 
Tärikh-i Zhändärmari-vi Irän, by Lieutenant-Colonel Parviz 
Afsar, offers information about the foundation of the gendarmerie force 
in Iran and describes the system and administration of the force and 
its divisions in the country. He also gives the names of Swedish and 
Iranian officers and a general outline of each division. 's activities, 
particularly during the war against rebels, tribes and the Russian 
forces. 
The other very important sources which should be mentioned as of 
great value are Tärikh-i Hiidah Sälah-i Azarbayiän, by 4mad Kasravi, 
who can undoubtedly be considered as the only Iranian historian at 
the time dealing with the events in the country; Khätirat va Kha arät 
by Mukhbir us-Saltanah and Fürs dar Janes-i Bavn ul-Milal by Rulai 
ud Din Ädamiyyat can also be considered as primary sources. 
It had been planned to follow the trace of the Muhäjirin and to 
try to meet any persons still living in the cities through which the 
Muhäjirin had passed who had witnessed the events. In 1978 this 
intention took place and the result of this journey, with all its 
difficulties and problems (which could be a separate story and report), 
was twenty-four interviews, and many photographs, slides and films. 
It was a fine experience and a very useful journey. The most important 
part of this journey was the opportunity to meet two ministers of the 
National Government of Kermanshah. Mr. 'Izz ul-Mamilik Ardalän (a 
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senator at the time of the interview) was the Minister for Trade and 
Public Utilities in the National Government of Kermanshah. His 
memoirs have frequently been published. He kindly granted me a visit 
and spoke about the past and his activities during the events of the 
Muhäjirat and the National Government of Kermanshah. In answer to 
the question why he had not mentioned anything about the treaty between 
the National Government of Kermanshah and Germany, he stated that he 
could not remember that there was any; neither did he have any idea 
about the attempts on Nizam us-Saltanah's life. Due to the circum- 
stances, he did not wish to say more than he had already written in 
his memoirs about the policies of Russia, Britain, Turkey and Germany 
in Iran during the war. 
Mr. Muhammad , All Mäf1, the son of Nizam us-Saltanah, who regret- 
fully died in the late months of 1979, very kindly granted me several 
visits to meet him and offered details on his memoirs and assisted 
with some sources on the subject. He was the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in the cabinet of the National Government of Kermanshah. He 
offered an account of his father's life and some of his father's 
letters concerning his life during that time. 
Details of other persons who were interviewed are listed in 
Appendix II. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Iranian uprising as a national movement occurred at the end 
of the nineteenth century in the Tobacco event. It was also the first 
general agitation against foreign influence in Iran. The union and 
participation of the people against the concession of tobacco gave the 
Iranian people a great and magnificent experience. They realized that 
there was no power greater than the unification of the people through 
which they would be able to control the fate and future of themselves 
and their country. They had been observing the gradual foreign domina- 
tion over political, economic and administrative affairs of the country. 
They were witnessing the resources of the country being put up to 
auction by the conclusion of agreements, conventions and concessions. 
When there was nothing left, the other sources of the country's income, 
such as customs duties, were mortgaged in order to obtain some loans 
for the expenses of Muzaffar ud-Din Shah's journey to European countries, 
which was in fact completely wasteful. 
The British and Russian competition, aiming at extending their 
domination, had increased rapidly. They received all their privileges 
from the Iranian Government by using force, threatening and bribing the 
corrupt but influential people in the country. The British and Russian 
policy in Iran was based on one obtaining more privileges than the 
other, and consequently the collision between the two powers' interests 
in Iran and their activities and propaganda against each other offered 
the Iranians a clear vision of both powers' intentions towards Iran. 
The Iranian governments had always endeavoured to balance the British 




The progress of political awareness in Iran led the people to the 
Constitutional Revolution. Although the movement was against the 
despotic system of government which was in fact considered to be the 
main reason for foreign interference in the economic and political 
affairs of the country, in spite of all the nationalists' efforts, the 
result of the Constitutional Revolution had little impact on the 
economic grip of the British and Russians on Iran. Consequently, 
the political measures against both powers' domination could not 
achieve a desirable result. 
The Convention of 1907, between the British and Russian Governments, 
in which the territory of Iran was divided into sphres of influences 
brought both powers to friendly co-operation. It was an ominous event 
and a great alarm to the Iranian people, particularly to the nationalists, 
which indicated that the independence and future of Iran was in serious 
jeopardy. 
The Convention was like a nightmare to the Iranian people. In 
spite of the fact that according to the Convention both powers had 
undertaken to respect the integrity and independence of Iran, never- 
theless, thenceforth the strangling of Iran had begun. The Iranians 
strongly protested against the agreement and the British and Russian 
policy in Iran, but to no avail. Both powers' bargaining over Iran 
continued. The more they increased their pressure on the country, the 
nationalists' fight became harder. They were too weak to stand against 
two superior powers in the world at that time; nevertheless, they 
desperately continued to fight against them in any possible way. 
The Iranian Government's and nationalists' efforts for improving 
the situation of the country were neutralised by both powers' inter- 
ference, conspiracy and threatening; for instance, the return of 
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Muhaamiad 'Ali Shah and the revolt of Samad Khan in Azarbaijan are 
examples of two plans to weaken the Iranian Government. 
Once more, the nationalists tried their utmost to loosen the 
economic yoke of the British and Russians by reorganising the country's 
financial administration, but this led to Shuster's event and ended 
in the Russian ultimatum of 1911. This Russian action suspended the 
second Majlis and nullified all the nationalists' endeavours by 
dismissing Shuster and his mission. 
The Russians thenceforth openly took over the northern part of 
Iran and followed a policy of colonisation in their sphere of influence. 
The entrance of Russian troops into the Iranian provinces of Azarbaijan, 
Gilan, Mazandaran and Khurasan, down to Qazvin, by no means indicated 
a friendly attitude of the Russians towards Iran. They occupied Tabriz 
and hanged several nationlists, among them Sigat ul-Isläm, one of the 
'u=. The harshness of the Russians in Khurasan went beyond 
expectation. The bombardment of Imäm Re; ä's Shrine, from the Iranian 
people's point of view, was the worst violation of Iranian dignity. 
In addition to all these actions, hundreds of Russian subjects 
emigrated to the north of Iran, disregarding Iranian authority, in 
order to settle as landowners, The Russian consuls in fact ruled in 
the cities; they collected taxes, discharged or appointed governors 
and officials in the cities, The British representatives frequently 
acknowledged and reported that the Russians had gone too far, 
But the British policy in Iran was based on receiving privileges., 
if not more, at least as many as the Russians had gained by political 
pressure or military operations and which caused the Russians a great 
deal of expense, casualties and of course extreme Iranian hatred. If 
the British Government did not actually encourage the Russians to take 
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some measures, they would certainly not desire to irritate them. 
Therefore, they sometimes supported the Russian demands from the Iranian 
Government, or otherwise kept silent about the Russians' activities in 
Iran. On some occasions when the Russians aroused British public 
opinion against their actions in Iran, or when British interests would 
probably be damaged, the British Government reminded the Russian 
Government of their convention of 1907. 
Ahmad Shäh's Coronation 
Iran's situation at the commencement of the great war indicated 
a state of complete turmoil. The country had been ruled by the regency 
of Nasir ul-Mulk because Ahmad Shäh was too young to reign. Since 
the Russian ultimatum in 1911, which caused the closure of the Majlis, 
Nagar ul-Mulk had governed the country; Kasravi described him as "a 
touchy man who had done nothing during his few years' regency but 
compromise with two neighbours and limit the people's freedom and 
activities. "1 Nair ul-Mulk was in fact one of the Iranian politicians 
who had no hope in a future for Iran. In the summer of 1914, he was in 
Europe and he despatched a telegram to the prime minister, stating that 
by then the Shah was 18 years old and the government should execute 
chapter 36 of the Iranian Constitution, in which the Shah, at the age 
of 18, would be entitled to take power in the country. 
2 
Although there 
were some ideas that the Shah was only 17 years old3, it was announced 
that the coronation would take place in a few days. 
1. Kasravi, 590. 
2. Sipihr, 19. 
3. I_., 19-20. 
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A hasty preparation for celebrating the young Shah's coronation 
started all over the country. In spite of tremendous difficulties 
with both the Iranian Government and the people involved, nevertheless 
they did their utmost to celebrate the coronation as splendidly as 
possible. On 21st July, 1914, the Shah was crowned in the audience of 
foreign representatives and the Iranian 'ulamä', nobles, politicians 
and other notables. It was considered to be a demonstration of the 
integrity and independence of Iran. Three days of celebration took 
place in the cities. Due to the occupation of Tabriz by the Russian 
troops, the celebration at Tabriz was magnificent and lasted six days. 
The people tried passionately to show the spirit of nationalism and 
their determination to stand against foreign domination. 
The Great War in Iran 
On 2nd August 1914, the Great War boke out. The belligerent 
countries in Europe, one after another, declared war on each other. 
It was obvious that the war would extend to other continents. In 
Asia, the crucial area was the Middle Eastern countries, of which 
Iran was one. The condition of Iran at the time was described by 
Sir Percy Sykes as: 
No power was less prepared to meet the obligation 
and sacrifices imposed by the world war than Persia 
and no power exhibited such impotence in protecting 
its boundaries and its subjects. 1 
Nevertheless, the commencement of the First World : dar was delightful 
news for Iranian people, particularly the nationalists, It brought 
hope for the nation to rise once more for freedom from the Russian 
1. Sir Percy Sykes, Persia (Oxford, 1922), 154. 
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and British yoke and to protect the country's independence. Although 
there were many people from all classes in Iranian society, especially 
nobles, politicians, merchants and tribal chiefs, who had already 
changed their nationality to Russian or British, or were thinking of 
doing so, the nationalists had been desperately struggling to continue 
the national spirit and to protect their homeland. They were well 
aware that if they did not take the opportunity which the European 
war had produced, there would be no chance for Iran's independence 
in the future. 
Concerning the situation in Iran, the Iranian Government took 
under consideration various positions which Iran might choose in the 
war. 'Ali' us-Saltanah's cabinet was replaced by that of Mustaufi 
ul-Mamälik. He was charged with declaring Iran's policy in the war. 
The lowest expectation of the Iranian nationalists from the government 
was that the independence of the country would be guaranteed and 
foreign interference be prevented. 
Mustaufi ul Mamälik, on 18th August 1914, introduced his cabinet 
to the Shah and brought about the means for the election of the third 
Majlis. The main purpose of Mustaufi's programme was to declare the 
neutrality of Iran in the war. Therefore he opened a series of 
negotiations with belligerent legations at Tehran to find out the 
reaction of their governments to the neutrality of Iran. The Iranian 
Government had to confront a great number of difficulties in order to 
maintain this policy. The most important obstacle was the presence 
of Russian troops on Iranian territory, especially in Azarbaijan, 
which, in the case of a declaration of war between Russia and Turkey, 
would be a battleground. The prospect of a disaster was imminent in 
the region of Azarbaijan. The Turks had already concentrated considerable 
is 
troops on the Irano-Turkish border. Among the Kurdish tribes in the 
region a movement of tension had appeared. On the other hand, the 
Russians also had increased their troops in Azarbaijan and backed 
the Armenians. The Iranian Government was well aware of the delicacy 
of the situation and was determined to delay a collision between 
both sides on Iranian territory; therefore, through diplomatic 
connections with the Turks, it was understood that they would respect 
the neutrality of Iran, but this did not conceal their anxiety about 
the presence of Russian troops in Iran, particularly in Azarbaijan, 
which was so close to the Turkish border. 
1 The government was perfectly 
aware that the key point of Iran's neutrality was in the hands of the 
Allies, particularly the Russians; therefore, in the continuation of 
negotiations with Russian and British ministers in meetings in Tehran 
concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran, Mustaufi 
ul-MamAlik explained the situation and drew the ministers' attention 
to the point that the government was determined to maintain neutrality 
and indicated that the situation in the region of the Turkish border 
was very critical. The Prime Minister appealed that it was time for 
the Russians to fulfil their frequent promises and to recall their 
troops from Iran. He added that the government intended to despatch 
the Crown Prince to escort some forces to Tabriz in order to appease 
the tension in AzarbaiJan. When the Russian Minister expressed his 
doubts about the Turkish intention to respect the neutrality of Iran, 
the Prime Minister assured them that the government would by no means 
tolerate any foreign troops entering into Iran. Mustaufi ul-Mamälik 
pointed out that it was to the benefit of both powers as well as 
1. Kitab-i Sabz bi-tarafi-vi Irin (Tehran, 1336), 1. 
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Iran if the Russian troops withdrew at that very time and this would 
show a friendly attitude towards Iran. Otherwise Iran would face a 
catastrophe, 
1 
The Russian Government almost ignored the Iranian Government's 
request for the withdrawal of their troops from Azarbaijan. As 
Miroshnikov wrote, "the problem of their evacuation was not even 
discussed in Russian diplomatic and-military circles. "2 On the contrary, 
they were instructed to fight against any Turkish troops which passed 
through Iranian territory. However, the Russian Government's reply 
to the Iranian Government's appeal was totally disappointing. On 
7th October 1914, they informed the Iranian Government that the 
"Summoning of the Russian troops at the present from Azarbaijan was 
impossible", the reason being that the Russian troops were only able 
to maintain security of Russian subjects and other foreigners, and 
the Iranian Government was not able to make any guarantees. 
3 On this 
matter the British Minister expressed his view that: 
There is very little to prove the Russian contention 
that there would be disorders if the Russian troops 
were withdrawn, and Persia has not been allowed to 
take any steps to prepare for preservation of order 
in the country. 4 
It was not surprising when even the Russian Minister, Korostovitz, 
confessed that: 
Strategic necessities and not the maintenance of order, 
and not the protection of Russian interests, have made 
it imperative to keep Russian troops in North Persia 
for the last two years. 5 
1. Ibid., 3. 
2. L. I. Miroshnikov, Iran in World War I (Moscow, 1963), 31. 
3. Kitäb-i Sabz, op. cit., 5. No. 5. 
4. F. O. 800-70. Tehran, Jan. 18,1915. Townley to Grey. 
5, Ibid. 
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The news from Azarbaijan indicated a serious crisis. The Kurdish 
tribes had been receiving arms and ammunition from Turkey and Turkish 
officers were supervising them. On the other hand, the Russian troops 
were on alert to take action against any opposition; they had also 
mobilised the Armenians in the region. The collision between the two 
sides was inevitable, fights broke out, killing, destruction, massacres, 
homelessness and emigration of the inhabitants started in the region. 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, however, had to declare Iran's policy. On 
12th ft Hijjah 1332/1st November 1914, the Shah's decree was issued, 
in which was expressed his regret for the occurrence of the war and 
indications were made that there was a possibility that the European 
war would reach Iran's borders. It was pointed out that Iran had 
friendly relations with belligerent countries, therefore Mustaufi 
ul-Mamälik, the Prime Minister, was instructed to inform the governors 
and Iranian authorities that: 
Our Government has chosen the policy of neutrality and 
will maintain its friendly relations with the belligerent 
countries as before- therefore, the Government authorities 
must be aware and should by no means to assist or oppose, 
by land and sea, any one of the belligerent countries ... 1 
The Iranian Government also informed foreign legations in Tehran 
of Iranian policy on the war. On 2nd November 1914, the Russian Legation 
in Tehran informed the Iranian Government that although war had not 
yet broken out between Russia and Turkey, in case of its happening, 
the Russian Government ought to take some military precautions in 
Azarbaijan. The Russians had indicated that they neither would act 
against the Iranian Government nor had any intention of annexing 
1. Kitäb-i Sabz, op. Cit., 20, No. 37. 
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Azarbaijan as Russian territory. It was added that a Russian military 
operation should not be considered as an action against Iran) The 
Iranian Government interpreted the Russian decision as regretable and 
expressed its attitude that the government was against any foreign 
military operation in Iran. The Iranian Government, through diplomatic 
connections with some neutral countries, appealed for their support 
to ask the belligerent countries to respect the neutrality of Iran. 
The United States was one of them. In replying to the Iranian Govern- 
ment's request, on 11th November 1914, the United States Legation at 
Tehran informed the Iranian Government that "The Government of the 
United States will lend its good office to assist in doing whatever 
it may properly do to alleviate the conditions resulting from the 
situation existing in Europe. "2 But no effective measures were taken 
by the United States' Government. 
The growth of German's power in Europe, on one hand, brought 
some rival European powers to compromising attitudes against Germany. 
On the other hand some others built up friendly relations with the 
Germans. The German menace was one of the reasons for the British 
and Russian Governments' concluding the convention of 1907. In 
respect to Iran, the Germans had been endeavouring for some years to 
extend their influence towards the Persian Gulf; but the British and 
Russians had left almost no space for other countries to have any 
economic or political influence in Iran. They had overall control of 
Iranian affairs. The Iranian Government had been tightened up by 
1. Ibid., 22, No. 44. 
2. Papers relativ to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 
1914. SupplementWashington, D. C., 1928); 129. 
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various conventions, ultimatums, demands, being the stipulation of 
British and Russian loans, and finally military operations. 
The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 from Germany's point of 
view was the best opportunity for its propaganda to increase their 
influence in Iran. The Iranian nationalists used to have sympathy 
with the British against the Russians but since then the British had 
become allies of the Iranian nationalists' enemy. The increase in 
Germany's power attracted the Iranian nationalists, as it could be 
used against the Russians and the British, and the Germans welcomed 
their inclination. Simultaneously, in neighbouring Turkey, the 
Germans' influence was considerable and the conclusion of the Potsdam 
convention between Russia and Germany on 19th August 1911, indicated 
further German influence over the East through Iran and Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, as much as the Russian and British pressure on the Iranian 
Government increased, the Germans' influence developed. 
By the commencement of the war, one of the main concerns of 
German policy in Asia was India, the vital resource of the British 
Empire. Particularly from a military point of view, India was an 
inexhaustible source of man-power for the British in the war. There- 
fore, the Germans planned to stir up the Indian nationalists and 
encouraged the Afghans to invade India. Consequently the Germans 
would be able to paralyse the British military forces in Europe. The 
only way that it was possible for the Germans to achieve this aim was 
through the territory of Iran and through the assistance of the 
Iranian people and Government. 
The Germans were perfectly aware of the British and Russian policy 
in Iran and the attitude of Iranian people towards them. Therefore, 
the Germans offered what the Iranian people desired. They would help 
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the Iranians to defend and protect the independence and integrity of 
their country and to release them from the British and Russian yoke. 
On the other hand, the Turks, also in the name of Islam, called 
for the unification of all Muslims in the world against the British 
and the Russians. This was combined with the proclamation of a 'i ihFLd 
by the fatwä of Mufti A'zam and the 'ulamA' of the Shiite sect in 
Najaf and Karbala'. 
On these bases, the Germans and Turks had started a campaign of 
propaganda in Iran against the Allies. It was clear that they would 
be welcomed in Iran. The nationalists, especially the members of 
the Democrat Party, fully co-operated with the Germans. Tagizädah, 
a leader of the Democrats, was invited from the United States to 
Berlin. He gathered other Iranians, mostly students, from other 
European countries to go to Germany, such as Iränshahr, Qazvi, 
Jamälzädah, Pürdavid, and Amir khizi. They formed an organization to 
act against the Russians and British in Iran. The members divided into 
groups and were despatched to contact the nationalist groups in various 
parts of Iran, for example, Tehran, Shiraz, Qom and Kermanshah. 
Tagizädah published the famous newspaper "KAvah" in Berlin and 
Pürdavid also published the newspaper "Rastakbiz" in Kermanshah. 
As a matter of fact nothing assisted the growth of German and 
Turkish influence in Iran so much as the Russian and British policy. 
As irustaufi ul-ManAlik told the Allied representatives, "recent 
Russian action in Azarbayijan had done more to irritate public opinion 
than any propaganda. "1 Townley was told by some of "Russia's most 
faithful adherents" that: 
1. F. O. 371-2427. No. 287. Tehran, Dec. 23,1914. Townley to Grey. 
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Russia appears to ignore the existence of public opinion 
at the present critical moment, and does nothing to try 
and win over the good will of Persian people ... 
... of course the Turks and the Germans are working 
day and night to stir up the people against you but the 
result of their combined efforts is as nothing compared 
with the feeling that is being roused by Russia's 
continual high-handed action in Azarbayijan. 1 
'Abd Alläh Mustaufl wrote that the people would gather at the 
shrine of Shah 'Abd al-'Azim and curse the Russians and British in 
the prayer. 
2 Mr. Ma-fl described the Iranian people's attitude towards 
both powers as "The knife had reached into their bones. "3 In other 
words they could no longer tolerate the Russian and British humiliation. 
The outbreak of the war had caused the British and Russian 
Governments to try to modify their harsh attitude towards Iran; 
nevertheless, there were not many changes, particularly in their 
policy. The inclination of Iran towards the Central Powers would 
damage the British much more than the Russians. Mesopotamia, India 
and especially the oil fields, which at that time were absolutely 
vital to the British Navy, would be in serious jeopardy. Though the 
Russians did not have such an important weakness, they were by no 
means willing to change their attitude towards Iran, but to some 
extent became more extreme. The British were so anxious, just before 
and during the first few months of the war, that they endeavoured to 
modify the Russian activities. Townley reported, "As Russia's ally 
we suffer proportionately. "4 The Iranian attitude towards the British 
1. Ibid. 
2. 'Abd A11äh Mustaufi, Sharh-i ZandaRäni-vi Man (Tehran, 1324), 462. 
3. Interview with Mr. NAfi, see Appendix II. 
4. F. O. 416-62. Tele. No. 1. Tehran, Jan. 3,1915. Townley to Grey. 
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was expressed by a British Minister: "We are rapidly coming to be 
considered as false friend, who is no more than an accomplice of 
Russian spoliator in disguise. "1 Sir Percy Sykes had the same 
opinion: "We suffered much odium through being allies of the detested 
Russians. "2 The Russians did not care much about respecting interna- 
tional regulations in diplomatic relations, as Townley in a letter to 
Sir Edward Grey wrote about the attitude of the Russian Minister, 
Korostovitz, at Tehran: "Not much to be wondered at, seeing that he 
is studiously rude to them as to everybody also both on official and 
social occasions. "3 
In the northern provinces of Iran, Russia took some measures which 
indicated the complete violation of neutrality. In Mashhad a German 
businessman was attacked by some Russian troops. They cut off one of 
his hands and wounded him several times. He died two days later. In 
Urumiyah and Tabriz the Turkish, Austrian and German Consulates were 
occupied by Russian forces. The staff of the consulates and subjects 
of the Central Powers were arrested and later on were despatched to 
Russia. In spite of the fact that the Germans had obtained the United 
States' protection for German companies in Tabriz, the Russians 
confiscated their properties. They practically ignored the Iranian 
regional authorities' rights. The British Minister expressed his 
opinion on the Russian activities in Iran as: "No-one cares a jot 
1. F. O. 416-62. Tele. No. 5. Tehran, Jan. 3,1915. Townley to Grey, 
2. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (3rd ed., London, 1930), 
II, 435. 
3. F. O. 800-70. Tehran, Jan. 3,1915. Townley to Grey. Concerning 
the attitude of Russian diplomats towards Iranian authorities, 
Tagizädah mentioned two occasions when they did not respect 
diplomatic regulations and sometimes were insulting (Khatäbahä- 
Tagizädah (Tehran, 1338 H. S. ) 30. ) Ri; ä Divänbaygi also had 
complained about this matter 
(Safar-i 
Muhä irat dar Nukhustin 
Jan, -i Jihäni [Tehran, 1351 H. S. ], 4). 
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what happens to this miserable country so long as it remains 
in a 
subservient condition and can be trampled under foot as each consul 
sees fit. "1 
Meanwhile, on December 5th, 1914, during the inauguration of the 
third Majlis, the Shah announced once more the neutrality of Iran in 
the war and asked the Majlis to support his government's programmes. 
Of 127 members of the Majlis, 93 took their seats. Three parties had 
representatives in the Majlis: Democrat, Moderate and 'Ilmiyyah; 
there was also a neutral group. In spite of all the pressure on the 
Democrats and the strong propaganda against them by both powers they 
were able to win about 30 seats in the Majlis; it was considered a 
victory for anti-Allied groups. The Majlis approved the government 
policy and the cabinet, with more effort, persuaded the belligerent 
countries to leave Iran alone with her problems. The government 
repeatedly asked for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran. 
From the Allied Ministers' point of view, under these circumstances, 
the Iranian request seemed wise. The British Minister reported: 
"I would venture to put on record my firm conviction that withdrawal 
of Russian troops is only measure that can now save the situation. "2 
The Russian Minister also agreed with the idea, but the Russian 
Government apparently never considered the Iranian request seriously. 
On the other hand, the Turks announced that they had come to assist 
the Iranian people against the Russians. The Turkish Ambassador at 
Tehran, in replying to the constant protests of the Iranian Government, 
complained that the government had just kept the Turks under pressure 
1. F. O. 800-70. Tehran, Jan. 18,1915. Townley to Grey, 
2. F. O. 416-62. Tele. No. 5. Tehran, Jan, 3,1915. Townely to Grey. 
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while the Russians freely acted in Iran, even against foreign diplomats. 
However, he indicated that 
He could only submit request of Persian Government for 
withdrawal of Turkish troops to the Porte when Russian 
Minister had officially announced that Russian troops 
would be withdrawn from all Persia ... that Turks had 
only come to Persia in order to rid the country of hated 
Russians. 1 
The Iranian Government constantly received protests from belligerent 
countries against which the government had no alternative but to do the 
same and keep them responsible for violating the neutrality of Iran. 
The United States Legation at Tehran strongly protested against the 
Russians, who had taken over a German company at Tabriz, which was 
under the protection of the United States, but the Iranian Government 
was unable to take any measures, The situation went from bad to worse. 
In the south of Iran, the British had also taken some measures 
which in some ways overshadowed the Iranian Government's problems. 
The British Navy in the Persian Gulf disembarked troops at Bushire, 
which caused the Turkish Government to protest to the Iranian Govern- 
ment. Later on they arrested the German Consul at Bushire and a 
representation of the German company of Wonkhaus. 
On 10th March 1914, Mustaufi ul-Mamälik resigned and Mushir 
ud-Daulah was instructed to form his cabinet. Three days later he 
introduced his cabinet to the Shah. The Majlis also approved his 
programme. Concerning internal problems, he asked the Majlis to 
dissolve the law of 23rd Jauza 1332, in which the Belgians, who had 
full power over Iranian finance, thereafter would act under the 
1. Ibid. 
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Minister for Finance. This was considered a curb on the Russian and 
British influence in Iran. From the foreign point of view, Mushir 
udDaulah expressed his opinion to the Allied Ministers at Tehran, 
that there were three alternatives along which Iran might proceed: 
first, join the Allies, which, considering public opinion, was 
impossible; second, join the Central Powers, but the government was 
strongly against this; third, maintain neutrality, which Mushir 
ud-Daulah asked to be seriously considered. He soon understood that 
the Allies did not have any intention of withdrawing Russian troops 
from Iran and were thinking of bringing Iran onto their side. Mean- 
while, the Allied Ministers were replaced in Tehran. Townley, who 
had some sympathy with Iran, was replaced by Marling, and M. Etter 
came instead of Korostovitz. These changes indicated a tougher policy 
by both powers in Iran. On 22nd April 1915, Mushir ud-Daulah resigned. 
The Allies nominated Sa'd ud-Daulah änd put the Shah under pressure 
to appoint him as Prime Minister, but the Majlis rose against him and 
he was not able to form his cabinet. Therefore, 'Ayn ud-Daulah 
became Prime Minister. 
Revision of Ang1o-Russian Convention of 1907 
For many years the British had been acquainted with the Russian 
attitude towards Iran. Sir George Buchanan, the British Minister at 
Petrograd, in an audience with the Russian Emperor, Nicholas II, 
discussed the British and Russian relations with Iran. Buchanan wrote 
about the Emperor's opinion on the subject, "He personally thought 
that our relationship would be far more friendly and satisfactory were 
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there no Persia between us. "1 From the Emperor's point of view the 
reason for not doing so was that "the British public opinion was 
hardly yet prepared to see England and Russia neighbours , It2 
As a matter of fact, although the Anglo-Russian convention of 
1907 brought both governments to friendly relations and "Framed with 
the immediate aim of preventing Persia becoming an apple of discord 
between them"3, they had never settled the dispute between the two 
powers. Grey wrote to Buchanan that the British and Russians "were 
friends over whom still hung the shadow of past differences and 
misunderstandings. "4 However, Iran remained the most sensitive part 
of both governments' problems in the Middle East. Therefore, they 
had always intended to settle the problems, Sazonoff, in a meeting 
with Grey, indicated that the Russians would like to have freedom of 
activity in the north of Iran and that they were willing to allow the 
British to have the same in the south. He also pointed out that "the 
time had come for what would virtually have amounted to the partition 
of the neutral Zone and that the clause relating to it should be 
modified by an exchange of secret noteso"5 
The First World War overshadowed everything in the world and 
from both powers' point of view it was the best opportunity to end 
their differences over Iran. As to the convention of 1907, both 
governments had in fact practically ignored their undertakings 
concerning the independence and integrity of Iran. The Russian attitude 
towards Iran and their activities in this country had been well 
1. Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia (London, 1923), Is 169. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., I, 91. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., Is 114. 
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described by Sir George Buchanan, who had been instructed to ask 
Russia for a modification of their policy in Iran. At the end of 
June 1914, in an audience with the Emperor, in frank and rather 
strong language, he complained that Russia acted as though "North 
Persia was now to all intents and purposes a Russian province. "1 He 
continued: 
We did not ... for a moment doubt His Majesty's assurance that he would not annex any portion of Persian territory. 
We were but recording actual facts. Unforeseen events 
had led to the occupation of certain districts in North 
Persia by Russian troops, and, little by little, the whole 
machinery of the administration had been placed in the hands 
of the Russian consuls. The Governor-General of Azerbaijan 
was a mere puppet who received and carried out the orders 
of the Russian consul-general, and the same might be said 
of the Governors at Resht, Kazvin and Julfa. They were one 
and all agents of the Russian Government and acted in entire 
independence of the central government at Tehran. Vast 
tracts of land in North Persia were being acquired by 
illegal methods, large numbers of Persians were being 
converted into Russian-protected subjects, and the taxes 
were being collected by the Russian consuls to the exclusion 
of the agents of the Persian financial administration. The 
above system was being extended to Ispahan and even to the 
neutral Zone ... 2 
With regard to the British policy in Iran, the Government of 
India expressed its point of view: 
Most of the difficulties that have since arisen have been 
due to the fact that His Majesty's Government having 
abdicated in theory, found themselves quite unable in 
practice ... 3 
It was continued that since the conclusion of the agreement of 1907, 
"we have been endeavouring to evade the consequences by constantly 
1. Ibid., I, 115. 
2. I bid. 
3. F. O. 371-2426. C. 142. Oct. 8,1915. Memorandum by Political 
Department, India Office. 
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interfering with Russia in her sphere and by treating the neutral 
sphere as though it were our own. "' 
Although the Potsdam Convention had undesirable effects on 
Anglo-Russian relations, nevertheless the British Government by no 
means desired to see the Russians and Germans on friendly terms; 
therefore, they were quite prepared to offer the Russians considerable 
privileges in order to restrain their inclination towards Germany. 
At the beginning of the war, the British realised that it was necessary 
to take action on the matter. Buchanan had commented on this point: 
"His Majesty's Government had however to take into account ... and to 
give some satisfaction to the wishes and aspirations of the Russian 
people. "2 
Secret diplomatic negotiations in London and Petrograd were in 
progress; in a meeting in London, the Russian Ambassador and, 
simultaneously in Petrograd, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
were informed that "in the event of our defeating Germany the fate of 
Constantinople and Straits would be decided in conformity with 
Russia's needs. "3 This had been the dream of Russian Emperors for 
many years, and it might come true. On 13th November 1914, the 
British Government's proposal was confirmed when, in an audience of 
King George V, at Buckingham Palace, the King suddenly changed the 
subject and addressed the Russian Minister, saying, "As far as 
Constantinople is concerned it is clear that this city must be yours. "4 
1. Ibid. 
2. Buchanan, op. cit., Is 224. 
3. Ibid., Is 225. 
4. C. Jay Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power. 1 1d-1917 
(New York, 1956), 86. 
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Petrograd welcomed the British proposal and opened direct 
negotiations on the matter. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
in a meeting with the British Minister at Petrograd, showed signs of 
willingness that the Russians were prepared to offer some advantages 
in return and mentioned that they did not wish to extend their present 
possessions in Iran although they were quite willing to agree to an 
extension of the British spheres1 On 13th March 1915, Buchanan was 
instructed to inform the Emperor personally that 
His Majesty's Government were prepared to give this 
assurance on certain condition ... the revision of the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and recognition of the 
neutral zone as a British sphere would have to be conceded 
by Russia ... The nature of that arrangement in general 
terms would make a great step in advance towards a final 
and friendly settlement of Persian question. 2 
Buchanan received the Emperor's consent in principle. Sazavof remarked 
that "Russia must in return be allowed complete liberty of action in 
her own sphere. "3 Not surprisingly, Buchanan confessed that the 
maintenance of Iranian integrity 
was more likely to be attended were ambitious Russian 
consuls to be precluded as they would be under the new 
arrangement, from pursuing a forward policy contrary to 
the wishes of their Government. 4 
On 20th March 1915, the British and Russian governments concluded 
an agreement concerning Constantinople, the Straits and Iran, which 
was recognised by France and later Italy. In summary the treaty was: 
1. F. O. 416-62. Tele. No. 91. Petrograd, Jan. 26,1915. 
2. Buchanan, op. cit., I, 226. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., I, 227. 
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Britain consents - to the annexation by Russia the straits 
and Constantinople, in return for a similar benevolent 
attitude on Russia's part towards the political aspiration 
of Britain in other parts. The neutral zone in Persia to 
be included in British sphere of influence. The districts 
adjoining Ispahan and Yezd to be included in Russian 
sphere, in which Russia is to be granted "full liberty 
of action. " 1 
The treaty contained some other conditions which could be understood 
from Sazonoff's letter to the Russian Minister at London, dated 
March 20,1915: 
Referring to the Memorandum of British Government 
(? Embassy) here on March 12, will you please express to 
Grey the profound gratitude of the Imperial Government for 
the complete and final assent of Great Britain to the 
solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, 
in accordance with Russia's desires. The Imperial Government 
fully appreciated the sentiments of the British Government 
and feels certain that a sincere recognition of mutual 
interests will secure for ever the firm friendship between 
Russia and Great Britain. 
Having already given its promise respecting the 
conditions of trade in the Straits and Constantinople, 
the Imperial Government sees no objections to confirming its 
assent to the establishment (1) of free transit through 
Constantinople for all goods not proceeding from or 
proceeding to Russia, and (2) free passage through the 
Straits for merchant vessels. 
..... 00000.00909 
The Imperial Government completely shares the view of the British Government that the holy Moslem places must 
also in future remain under an independent Moslem rule. 
It is desirable to elucidate at once whether it is con- 
templated to leave those places under the rule of Turkey, 
the Sultan retaining the title of Caliph, or to create new 
independent States, since the Imperial Government would 
only be able to formulate its desires in accordance with 
one or other of these assumptions. On its part the Imperial 
Government would regard the separation of the Caliphate 
from Turkey as very desirable. Of course the freedom of 
pilgrimage must be completely secured. 
1. P. Seymour Cocks, The Secret Treaties (2nd ed., London, 1918), 15. 
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The Imperial Government confirms its assent to the 
inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia in the British 
sphere of influence. At the same time, however, it regards 
it as just to stipulate that the districts adjoining the 
cities of Ispahan and Yezd forming with them one inseparable 
whole, should be secured for Russia in view of the Russian 
interests which have arisen there. The neutral zone now 
forms a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and 
comes up to the very frontier line of Russia at Zulfagar. 
Hence a portion of this wedge will have to be annexed to 
Russian sphere of influence. Of essential importance to 
the Imperial Government is the question of railway 
construction in the neutral zone, which will require 
further amicable discussion. 
The Imperial Government expects that in future its 
full liberty of action will be recognised in the sphere of 
influence allotted to it, coupled in particular with the 
right of preferentially developing in that sphere its 
financial and economic policies. 
"""" 0-9 """""""""" 
Signed 
Sazonoff" 1 
The words "full liberty of action" were described from the British 
authorities' point of view as "it means eventual complete Russification 
of Northern Persia, and eventual establishment of Russian province ... "2 
It was an incredible event in Russian history. Although the 
Russians had always endeavoured to achieve this purpose, due to being 
opposed by the British and French, it was considered too ambitious. 
The Russians had kept their allies under pressure for this purpose; 
once Sazanoff complained that 
The Emperor .. felt that after all the sacrifices which he had imposed on his people he could no longer delay 
asking his allies for a definite assurance of their 
consent to incorporation of Constantinople in the 
Russian Empire when once the war had been won. 3 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 371-2426. No. 5. From Viceroy, June 12,1915. 
3. Buchanan, op_cit., I, 225. 
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Now here they were. They had received what they had dreamed of for 
many years. The Russian ministers and diplomats were not able to 
conceal their astonishment when they received the British assent to 
their aims. In spite of the strict secrecy and confidentiality of 
the treaty which was supposed to be enacted after the war, nevertheless, 
on 2nd December, 1916, somehow the Russian Prime Minister, M. Trpoff, 
revealed the agreement in the session of the Duma and stated: 
An agreement which we concluded with Great Britain and 
France, and to which Italy has adhered established in 
the most definite fashion the right of Russia to the 
Straits and Constantinople .. I repeat that absolute 
agreement as this point is friendly established among 
the Allies. 1 
This indicated a radical change in the British and French policy 
concerning the Middle East, over which they had fought during the 
Crimean War. The British public was kept ignorant and even in the 
House of Commons, on 30th May 1915, the British Foreign Minister 
refused to make any comment on the question which related to the 
aspirations of the Russians to Constantinople. 
2 
Regarding Iran, the fate and future of the country and its 
people was evident, as far as the Allies were concerned. Some British 
diplomats who had connections with Iranian affairs showed some 
sympathy with Iran; as the Viceroy of the Persian Gulf wrote: 
We wish it clearly understood that we put forward 
partition as an unwelcome necessity in the event of 
Persia forsaking her neutrality ... partition and spheres 
of influence are two entirely different propositions, and 
we sincerely trust that former may be avoided. 3 
1. Cocks, on. cit., 17. 
2. Ibid., 16. 
3. F. O. 371-2426. Appendix A. No. 3. From Viceroy, April 19,1915. 
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But it was too late; when they were informed of the actual treaty, 
they expressed their opinion: "we cannot help thinking that the 
proposed great concessions to Russia in Constantinople and Straits are 
by no means balanced by an advantage to us which we can discern in 
these proposals. "' However, they asked for similar freedom of action 
in the British sphere. The Government of India's explanation 
clarified the matters to the British diplomats: 
... the consequences of giving Russia a free hand in her 
own sphere. It will become virtually a Russian province, 
and the capital will always be under Russian control. 
But those conditions really exist already, and I venture 
to think that it is better to face the facts, and make 
our own arrangements in our own sphere, than to attempt 
to impose restrictions which Russia, even if she keeps 
them in the letter, will (as we shall think) break in the 
spirit. Surely we know enough now to realize that it is 
idle to talk of "making revival of Persia possible. " 
The happiness and prosperity of the people of that 
unfortunate country depend, so far as can be foreseen, 
upon administration which only outside control - whether 
directly or indirectly exercise - can secure. A scheme 
for such control ought to be part of our settlement not 
only in the interest of the people, but as a means of 
obviating friction between ourselves and Russia. 2 
From the British point of view, besides the neutral zone in Iran, 
they gained "the maintenance of British absolute supremacy in the 
Persian Gulf"3, Anglo-Persian oil-fields and of course the safety of 
India. It would not perhaps be an exaggeration to say that the 
Anglo-Persian oil-fields were as important to the British as 
Constantinople and the Straits were to Russia. 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 371-2426. C. 142. Memorandum by Political Department, India 
Office, Oct. 8,1915. 
3. Ibid. 
CHAPTER I 
THE NEUTRALITY OF IRAN 
Mustaufi ul-MarAlik's Cabinet 
In the summer of 1915, Iran was faced with one of its most critical 
periods in the First World War. In fact, the country had actually been 
without a government for fifty-four days. At last, on Tuesday, 
17th August 1915, Mustaufl ul-Mamälik was able to organise his cabinet 
and presented them to the Shah; the following day they were introduced 
to the Majlis as follows1: Mustaufi ul-Mamilik, Prime Minister and 
Minister of the Interior; Muhamad Valt Khan Sipahdär 'Azam, Minister 
of War; Prince Muhammad 'Ali Shan 'Aläl us-Saltanah, Minister of 
Justice; Nlrzä Hasan Khän Vusüq ud Daulah, Minister of Finance; M1rzä 
Hasan KbAn Muhtashim us-Saltanah, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Muhammad ýAdiq KhAn Mustashär ud-Daulah, Minister of Post and Telegraphs; 
Mirzä Ibrähim KhAn Hakim ul-Hulk, Minister of Education and Pious 
Foundations; Prince Asadulläh MirzA Shihäb ud-Daulah, Minister of 
Commerce and Utilities. 
As a matter of fact, this government seemed to be the only viable 
group'which could take control. The cabinet contained members of all 
the opposition parties; for example, Vusüq ud-Daulah and Sipahdär were 
considered Russophiles and 'A19L' us-Saltanah and Shihäb ud-Daulah were 
known as pro-British. 
2 Some members of the cabinet belonged to the 
1. Sipihr, 197. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 111. Tehran, Sept. 1,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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political parties: Hakim ul-Mulk and Mustashär ud-Daulah represented 
the Democrats and Muhtashim us-Salttanah was a member of I'tidäl (the 
Moderates). The organisation of such a cabinet was not easily arranged; 
although Mustaufi ul-Mamilik was aware of the general support and 
sympathy of the Majlis, press and people for him., he had to confront 
tremendously complicated difficulties: first of all, the continuation 
of the country's critical affairs; second, the Majlis deputies who 
were very concerned about the membership of the cabinet; third, his 
need to frame the unlimited foreign interferences in the country's 
economic and political matters and administration; and the most 
important point, to receive their agreement to withdraw their forces 
from Iranian territory, He was well-informed that the Russians and 
British were by no means satisfied with his leadership; as the 
pro-Democratic newspaper "Naubahär" wrote: 
On one hand, they and their supporters have arranged some 
meetings inside and outside the city and concluded that 
the last alternative to set back Mustaufl ul-Mamllik is 
the arrival of the Russian forces; and immediately they 
have prepared the means for their entrance ... On the 
other hand, they have met the persons who might join the 
cabinet and threatened them in order to prevent accepting 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's proposals. 1 
The country's, and particularly Tehran's, atmosphere had become a 
subject of anxiety and reached a highly convulsive condition. "Shürä", 
a Tehran newspaper, wrote: 
We do not imagine that there is anyone who can conceal 
the intensity of the deplorable condition in which the 
country has recently been involved ... every hour 
annihilation and disappearance threaten our lives, 
political freedom and national independence ... today, there is no peril to the Constitution or to freedom 
1. "Naubahär", No. 64, Aug. 10,1915/Ramagän 28,1333. 
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which you can imagine; the liberals united is a necessity 
... The country with all integrity is in 
danger ... 1 
The newspaper asked for an alliance between the Majlis and people to 
support the government. Mr. Marling was not certain that Mustaufi 
ul-Mamilik would be able to form a cabinet; he reported that: 
Mustufi-ul-Mamalik is trying to form a cabinet, but even 
if he should succeed filling various offices the combi- 
nation would be too weak and too much under democrat 
influence to be of any use ... 2 
The tension of the political parties reached its apex in the 
Majlis. There were many discussions and arguments among the parties 
about the election of, ministers, either in common meetings or in 
private ones. However, the disturbance of the country's affairs, the 
lack of a responsible government and fear of the possibility that both 
powers might take action and despatch the Russian force at Qazvin to 
occupy the capital - as they maneuvered with such intention on 5th 
August 1915 - and to attempt a coup d'etat; therefore, on Sunday, 
8th August 1915, after a meeting in the Majlis, the deputies of all 
the parties concluded an agreement in which they agreed to leave 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik alone with his decision and not to interfere in 
the formation of his cabinet. All Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's efforts 
gathered to form a cabinet to ease Russian and British embarrassment, 
in order to prevent any scheme of occupation of Tehran and, meanwhile, 
assured the Germans and especially the Turks that if Iran had no 
intention of joining them, at least it was determined to maintain. its 
neutrality. He also wanted to obtain the deputies' votes of confidence 
1. "Shürä", No. 82, Aug. 13,1915/Shavväl 1,1333. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 270. Tehran, Aug. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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and, most importantly, to appease public agitation and to end disorder 
in the country. Some of the ministers' desire increased the problems 
of forming the cabinet. Sipahdär wished to be installed as Minister 
of the Interior, but Mustaufi ul-Mamälik preferred to have this position 
himself in order to prevent the protest of any opposition; therefore, 
Sipahdär was appointed as War Minister. He accepted the position 
reluctantly but resigned after being introduced to the Shah, having 
accepted the position only at the insistence of Mustaufi ul-Mamälik 
and under condition that all Iranian forces should be under the War 
Minister's commaad. 
1 Vusüq ud-Daulah declared that he had accepted 
his post for the same reason; furthermore, he felt that his refusal 
would have been considered in public opinion as an acknowledgement 
of Russian sympathies. 
In spite of the fact that Mustaufi ul-Mamälik was backed by 
general support, the announcement of the cabinet members in the Majlis, 
parties and press raised various reactions and he was vehemently 
criticised by some of the newspapers and opposition groups because 
of some of his cabinet's ministers, particularly those who were 
well-known as pro-Russian, A Tehran newspaper, "Parvardin", inveighed 
against Vusüq ud-Daulah and wrote: "... [the name of] Vusüq ud-Daulah 
is a proverb for treachery to the country and malevolence for Iran ... "3 
It then mentioned some of his faults in the past and concluded that 
"This is the fault of those who call themselves liberals and support 
Vusüq ud-Daulah ... Pie upon our liberality. "4 
1. According to Sipihr, 198, Sipahdär had been told by the interpreter 
of the Russian Embassy to refuse membership in the cabinet. 
2. Sipihr, 197. 
3. "Parvardin" , No. 57, Aug. 20,1915/Shaw5. l 8,1333. 4. Ibid. 
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"Raid", a Tehran newspaper, quoted the view of the French news- 
paper "Echo du Paris" on 2nd September 1915, about the cabinet, that 
it "had been heard that the new cabinet is a pro-German one", and about 
Vusüq ud Daulah it wrote: "The Finance Minister is one of the distin- 
guished and well-known Russian adherents ,,. 111 
"Shihäb-i Sägib", another Tehran newspaper, wrote: 
... Whatever has been said about the members of the 
cabinet, the honesty and patriotism of the Prime Minister 
is not in doubt ... However we hold a good opinion of this cabinet ... 2 
"'Aqr-i Jadid", in an article, received the cabinet with an embrace 
and compliment and had a comment on the ministers: "... without any 
exaggeration one can say that Mr. Mustaufi ul-Mamälik is the most 
popular politician in Iran ... " and continued its opinion about the 
members of the cabinet, thanking Sipahdär for accepting the War Ministry, 
and stated that it would have declared its regret if Vusfiq ud-Daulah 
had not accepted membership in the cabinet, adding that "We cannot 
forget some of his endeavours and activities in the past ... " The 
newspaper wrote about the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Muhtashim 
us-Saltanah: "We do not think there is any diplomat more suitable 
for Foreign Affairs than His Highness ... Indeed one can say he is 
the Talleyrand of Iran. "3 
In fact Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's cabinet was undesirable to both 
powers, but all British and Russian efforts had failed to set up a 
favourable one. For instance, Sa'd ud Daulah had the support of both 
powers and the Shah was under pressure from the British and Russian 
1. "Raid", No. 8, Oct. 23,1915/ft I; i j jah 13,1333. 
2. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 78, Aug. 19,1915/Shavväl 7,1333. 
3. "'Aqr-i Jadid", No. 56, Aug. 21,1915/Shawäl 9,1333. 
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Ministers at Tehran for Sa'd ud-Daulah's appointment as Prime Minister, 
to form a cabinet. On the other hand, none of the Iranian politicians 
liked or dared to accept the membership of his cabinet. That was 
considered as a great victory for the Majlis, parties and nationalists 
and a failure for British and Russian influence in Iran. The following 
cabinet was composed under 'Ayn ud Daulah's leadership, and the 
Democrats' interpellation of Farmära Farmä caused the resignation of 
the cabinet and this indicated the development of the Democrat power. 
A Russian newspaper, "Novoye Vremya", wrote: "The Democrats have 
dismissed Farmän Farmä and [although] our friends have done whatever 
[they could], [they] were not successful in bringing him back. "1 
"Risski Slov", another Russian newspaper, attacked the Democrats and 
offered a suggestion: 
Our supporters and also the Moderates of the Majlis have 
been out of patience because of the Democrats' stubborn- 
ness, expecting that Russia and Britain will exercise 
their power to relieve the present situation. 2 
There was a strong probability that a pro-German government might 
be able to form a cabinet which would be undesirable to the Allies. 
Mr. Marling hastily requested reinforcements for the Russian troops at 
Qazvin and explain that "Arrival of troops is only measure which will 
put an end to present Cabinet crisis and give us a Government on which 
we can use pressure for protection of our consuls and colonies. "3 The 
gravity of Iran's situation had attracted considerable attention from 
the British. Sir Edward Grey asked Sir George Buchanan to negotiate 
1. "Novoye Vremya", quoted in "Naubahär", No. 64, Aug. 10,1915/ 
Ramadan 28,1333. 
2. "Rusks S1ov", quoted in "Naubahär" , No. 64, Aug. 10,1915/Ramaän 28,1333. 
3. F. O. 416-63. No. 258. Tehran, July 23,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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with the Russian Foreign Minister to explain the importance of the 
conditions in Iran and the necessity of despatching Russian troops to 
Iran. He anxiously wrote: "I earnestly hope that Minister for Foreign 
Affairs will be able to give satisfactory answer to my telegram, "' 
Mr. Marling, in his next report, again emphatically asked for 
immediate despatch of Russian troops and if possible in greater number 
and he frankly pointed out that "if they do not appear, influence of 
the two Powers in Persia will be most seriously shaken. "2 
The Russians' reaction appeared in the speech of Mr. Sazanov, the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the August lst inauguration 
of the Duma, about Russian foreign policy; he referred to Iran and 
explained the situation in the country, which his government had been 
considering very carefully, confessed his anxiety about the Russian 
interest in Iran and added that if the crisis continued the Russian 
Government would have to take serious measures. 
3 This was a warning 
to Iran and was followed by a letter from the Russian Legation at 
Tehran on 4th August to the Iranian Foreign Office, which stated that 
because the Iranian Government had not been able to pay the instal- 
ments of its debt to the Russian Government, therefore, according to 
the convention, they had the right to take control of Iranian Customs. 
4 
The British and Russian Ministers in Tehran realised that they should 
act immediately and believed that "only a demonstration of military 
force can restore our influence"5 in Iran, especially in the capital. 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 1563. F. O., July 24,1915. Grey to Buchanan. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 261. Tehran, July 26,1915. Marling to Grey, 
3. "Shürä", Aug. 15,1915/Shavval 3,1333; Sipihr, 193. 
4. Sipihr, 193; "Irshäd", No. 98, Aug. 5,1915/23 Ramaýä 1333. 
5. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 276. Tehran, Aug. 10,1915; "Naubahar", 
No. 65, Aug. 13,1915/Shavväl 1,1333. 
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Mr. Marling in his report expressed his anxiety: "Whatever they may 
be, it seems to me imperative that we should get an end put to 
intolerable position ... and this can only be achieved by appearance 
of Russian troops ... 111 
Consequently, on the evening of 4th August about one thousand men 
of the Russian force at Qavin left the city for Tehran and on the 
following day their advance guard was at Qishlaq, a village between 
Qazvin and Karaj. The news of the Russian advance produced great 
panic in the capital. The people assembled at the Majlis and ministries, 
protesting against the Russian action and asking what they should do; 
some politicians, deputies, and people were preparing to leave the 
city. There was an opinion that the capital should be transferred 
to Isfahan. The legations of countries hostile to the Allies were 
hastily made ready to evacuate the capital. The German Minister in 
Tehran asked the American Embassy for protection and Mr. Caldwell, 
the American Ambassador in Tehran, accepted to undertake protection 
of the German Embassy, subjects and interests in Tehran. Mustaufi 
ul-Mamälik, who had been involved in the problems of the formation of 
his cabinet, ordered the Iranian Foreign Office to ask the Russian 
Legation for an explanation of the action of the Russian troops and 
also communicated Iranian anxiety to the British Legation at Tehran. 
The Allies had no intention of occupying the capital. They were 
well-informed that it might cause the transferrence of the capital 
and consequently let the Shah and Iranian Government be pushed under 
anti-Allied influence completely. Therefore, on the evening of the 
same day (5th August) the force withdrew to gazvin and the Russian 
Minister, in reply to the Iranian Foreign Office, answered that the 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 268. Tehran, Aug. 3,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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force had just been on a maneuver. However, it seemed that a 
"demonstration of military force"' had affected Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's 
decision on the formation of his cabinet. 
On the other hand, the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran 
understood that it would be better to assist the Iranian Government 
in order to prevent them from any further inclination towards the 
anti-Allied countries. The British Government was agreeable to the 
suggestion, as Grey wrote to Buchanan, to draw the Russian Government's 
attention to the point that "if no assistance is forthcoming from 
the two legations the Persian cabinet will turn with some justification 
to the German quarters, which would be most undesirable at present 
juncture. "2 However, the Russian Government refused any financial 
assistance and replied that it "would be inopportune at the present 
moment. "3 The harshness of Russian policy in Iran, as exemplified 
in Mr. Sazanov's speech, produced a furious reaction in the political 
societies of Iran. 
"Shürä", a Tehran newspaper, criticised Russian policy in Iran 
and attacked Mr. Sazanov, whom it held responsible for the disturbances 
in Iran: ".., all the disturbances and disorders in the recent years 
are the result of the Russian diplomats and representatives, conspiracies 
and intrigues ... "4 It referred to the revolt of Samad Khin 
(ShujAd 
ud-Daulah) and others under Russian protection, and bloodshed, 
destruction and disorder in Azarbaijan, the north and north-east of 
Iran, and named all the incidents which the Russians had taken part 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 276. Tehran, Aug. 10,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63, Tele. No. 1676. F. O., Aug. 3,1915. Grey to Buchanan. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 1135. Petrograd, Aug. 10,1915. Buchanan 
to Grey. 
4. "Shura', No. 83, Aug. 15,1915/Shavval 15,1333. 
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in directly. The newspaper concluded that "We do not imagine what 
could be more serious than it is now ... "1 
"Naubahir" also had the same opinion about Russian policy and 
received Mr. Sazanov's speech with astonishment; it stated that the 
Turks and Germans had been disappointed in Iranian policy, so that 
the former entered the country in force and the latter contacted the 
tribes directly and in answering the Iranian question, it would say 
that the Iranian Government were in favour of the Russians and 
British. On the other hand, the British and Russians were of the same 
opinion and had performed graver actions in Iran than countries hostile 
to them. The writer then referred to a part of Mr. Sazanov's speech 
in which he stated that he believed the reason for the prolongation 
of Iran's crisis was due to disagreement between the government and 
the Democratic Party. 
2 In the conclusion of the article, the news- 
paper stated that in fact both powers were preventing the formation 
of a cabinet and the maintenance of order and security in Iran. In 
the next issue, it was stated: "Iran in the battle of political life 
should either die or live ... "3 
A commentator in "The Near East" on Iranian affairs and their 
reaction to Russian policy in Iran during the last few decades wrote: 
"This sentiment is not difficult to explain. Many Persians will tell 
you that Persia has suffered too much at the hands of Russia not to 
feel a deep-seated hatred against her. "4 
1. Ibid. 
2. "Naubahär", No. 65, Aug. 13,1915/Shavväl 1,1333. 
3. Ibid., No. 66, Aug. 16,1915/Shavväl 4,1333. 
4. "The Near East", Aug. 13,1915. 
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At any rate, Mustaufi ul-MamAlik was able to form a cabinet which, 
according to Mr. Marling, was "as heterogenous a Ministry as ever sat 
at the same Council table"1; he was also of the opinion that Mustaufi 
ul-Mamälik's cabinet was "likely to stand long, "2 From the Russian 
point of view, Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's cabinet would prove that "the 
anti-Russian tendencies were increasing and that it would not be easy 
to overcome theni'3; nevertheless, his cabinet was better than a 
Democrat one, which would have been unbearable to both powers. 
4 However, 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, well aware of the critical condition of the 
country and his responsibility for its future, tried to stop the 
situation from becoming worse and hoped to improve it. Both the Allies 
and the Germans tried to induce the Iranian Government to follow a 
policy favourable to them. The British and Russians expected that the 
Iranian Government would at least assemble a reliable force composed 
of the Cossack Brigade and the Bakhtiyäri savars in Tehran, and then 
close the Majlis and suppress the pro-German press a5 On the other 
hand, the Turkish Government's intention was to bring about a rupture 
of relations between Iran and the two powers so as to enable the two 
Islamic nations to announce a union against the Allies. The Germans 
were planning to foment general feeling against their opposition to 
rouse the southern tribes to attack the British forces in Bushire and 
to encourage the government to follow a policy which would help German 
propaganda in Afghanistan. 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 111. Tehran, Sept. 1,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 297. Tehran, Aug. 26,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. "The Near East", Aug. 13,1915. 
4. F. O. 416-63. No. 111. Tehran, Sept. 1,1915. Marling to Grey. 
5, Ibid. 
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The Cabinet and Neutrality 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik declared the neutrality of Iran in the war 
and emphatically announced that the government intended to maintain 
this policy at all costs. As a commentator in "The Near East" wrote: 
The Persian Government so long ago as last November 
proclaimed its neutrality, and has done everything in 
its power to maintain a correct attitude. Its task is 
all the more difficult becuase it has to struggle against 
the feelings of the people, who, ignoring facts, and 
stirred up by the paid agents of Germany, loudly proclaim 
their hatred of Russia. 1 
Although this policy had been violated since the beginning of the war, 
the declaration of its being followed by Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's cabinet 
was not surprising, but attracted the attention of foreign countries, 
the Iranian Majlis, press and people who were curious as to how he 
intended to implement the violated policy. 
"The Hablul Matin", published in India, believed that "Iranian 
neutrality should be followed by the government and in order to achieve 
that, it should organize an army to withdraw foreign forces out of the 
country. "2 "1Asr-i Jadld" recommended that "... if the Iranian govern- 
ment wants to keep its neutrality firmly, it should say to everyone 
that they must evacuate its territory .o and each one who refuses, to 
declare war against it or to join the opposition, "3 
"BAmdäd-i Raushan", another Tehran newspaper, was of the opinion 
that in principle the declaration of neutrality had not been studied 
properly from the beginning of the war, and Iran had already missed 
some chances. The newspaper considered the announcement of the policy 
1. "The Near East". Aug. 13,1915. 
2. "The Hablul Matin", quoted in "Irshid". No. 103, Aug. 29,1915/ 
ShavvAl 17,1333. 




as the first success for the British and Russians and stated: "Having 
a reputation for neutrality was just a way to prevent Iran receiving 
any advantages ... nevertheless they had already violated Iran's 
neutrality. "1 The writer was not disappointed; although he believed 
that the country's condition was worse than the year before, "There is 
still a chance, on condition that our policy dives out from under the 
ambiguity and uncertainty ... at least about neutrality we have to 
follow a way to keep a neutral policy which is our legal and indisputable 
right. "2 
As a matter of fact, the government attempted to take the oppor- 
tunity to engage the Russians and British in the war, which seemed 
the last chance for Iran to survive; from "The Near East"'s point of 
view, "Under the pretext of profiting by the chance of the European 
conflagration, to free Persia from the fetters that bind her .. 0"3 
Therefore, concerning Iran's condition, Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, the 
nationalists, and the Majlis would rather have had a fair treaty with 
the two powers than with the Germans or Turks. Amir Aishmat, who had 
finished his military education in Turkey and was one of the Turkish 
military attachö's companions and was presented to the Shah by him, 
subsequently became the commander of the national forces in Qom and 
Kermanshah. He told Kasravi: 
I came from Turkey and knew it would be vain to have 
a tendency toward the Germans and Turks, and war with 
the Russians. Because ... Germany is far away from 
us and any help or assistance from them would be 
achieved by the Turks ... and I was well aware that 
we would not be able to coordinate with them ... On 
the other hand, considering the Iranian situation, it 
would be very difficult for the Iranian Government to 
1. "BAmdäd-i Rauchaa", No. 82, Aug. 30,1915/Shavväl 18,1333. 
2. Ibid. 
3. "The Near East", Aug. 13,1915. 
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be engaged in a war with the Russians. Therefore it 
would be better for the Iranian Government to take 
the opportunity of the involvement of the two great 
powers in the war to conclude a fair agreement with 
them and to follow a policy which could prevent the 
German and Turkish agents' activities in Iran. This 
was my idea and that of my friends. 1 
A commentator for "The Near East" had the same opinion: "The Persian 
situation convinces me that not only the Government but the whole 
nation are determined to maintain their neutrality with all means at 
their disposal. "2 
But not only had the British and Russians no intention of coming 
to terms with the Iranian Government in order to formulate a treaty, 
they had already concluded a new and secret convention to complete the 
1907 Anglo-Russian convention, which has been mentioned earlier. 
However, the activities of the opposition and the antipathy of the 
Iranian people against Russia increased day by day, and this attitude 
also included the British, mostly because of their cooperation with 
Russia, but also due to their violation of Iranian neutrality by their 
occupation of the southern part of Iran, particularly Bushire. 
Bushire under British Occupation 
On Sunday, 8th August 1915, British troops landed on Iranian soil 
with no declaration of war against Iran or any notification to the 
Iranian Government; they occupied Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf 
and other southern ports as well as Bushire, the most important 
Iranian port on the Persian Gulf. It was the centre of transportation 
for Iranian imports and exports to India, European countries (especially 
1. Kasravi, 637. 
2, "The Near East", Aug. 20,1915. 
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Britain) and other continents. By 5 a. m. on that day the city was 
under the control of the British forces. The slight resistance by 
the gendarmerie had been ended by the governor's instruction; he was 
considered extremely pro-British and had been told by the British 
representative at Bushire to do so; he ordered the gendarmerie 
commander-in-chief to be disarmed, then surrounded their station, 
impounded their munition and ordered them to leave the city. So 
they obeyed and left the city on the road to Shiraz. The governor's 
residence, the Customs office, the Post and Telegraph building and the 
anti-Allied consulates were seized; the anti-British elements in the 
city were arrested and the Customs' gunboat "Muzaffar" and two armed 
launches, "Azarbayjän" and "Mäzandarän", were seized. Lowering the 
Iranian flag, hoisting the British one and printing "Bushire under 
British occupation"1 on stamps were among the first British actions, 
According to the Reuter Agency's report in "The Times", the occupation 
of Bushire was the consequence of the killing of two British officers 
on 12th July 1915, and the Iranian Government's failure to punish 
the tribal chiefs who were responsible for the incident. 
2 
For a more complete account of this event, we should go back a 
few months. The Indian Viceroy in the Persian Gulf at Bushire had 
been anxious about the increase in activities by German agents in 
the southern provinces of Iran; therefore, he ordered the arrest of 
the German Consul and businessmen at Bushire and other southern 
Iranian ports and despatched them to India. There was no effective 
or immediate action, not even a protest, from the Iranian authorities; 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 31, No. 117.1333 H. Q. or 1293 H. S. Shavväl 18, 
1333; 2'Iukhbir us-Saltanah, 270. 
2, "The Times", Sept. 10,1915. 
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but the people, especially in the southern provinces and the tribes, 
protested strongly against the British. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, the 
Governor of Shiraz at the time, wrote: " ... not only had they broken 
the neutrality but trampled on it. "' He believed that the German 
Consul and Wassmuss were able to do nothing, but the British action 
provoked the people and "fastened my hands". 
2 However, the German 
agents, and particularly Wassmuss, found this the best opportunity to 
increase their activities and propaganda to encourage and induce any 
persons who had power or influence over the people to inflame 
anti-British feeling among the people; they also co-operated with all 
anti-Allied political societies in the south, by distributing a great 
number of pamphlets and broadsheets. Some contained the 4ul's 
proclamation for holy war ihäd) against the British and Russians3, 
others referred to Russian bad policy and maltreatment in Iran, such 
as the Russian occupation of northern Iran, the hanging of some of 
the 4ulamä' at Tabriz, the bombardment of the shrine of Imäm Rizä and 
also the British exploitation of India and the Anglo-Russian convention 
of 1907. In addition, the Germans were spending a great deal of 
money for a campaign against the British in the south. 
The German Minister in Tehran, Prince Reuss, in an interview 
with the editor of 11 'Asrii Jadid"., said: 
The British have arrested our consul at Bushire and 
accused him of rising against the Allies. I will ask 
how the British allowed themselves to do such an action 
in a neutral country ... why they do not prevent their 
consuls who openly stir up trouble against Germany, 
Austria and Turkey throughout the country ... 4 
1. Tiukhbir us-Saltanah, 270. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Sipihr, 72-73. 
4. "'Asr-i Jadid", quoted in Ahmad Ahrar, Tüfän dar Iran (Tehran, 







Then the Prince referred to British activities in some tribes against 
Germany and its allies. Since the beginning of the war, some an umans 
had been organised in the southern cities against British policy in 
Iran. The members of these an omens came from all classes of Iranian 
society, including the tribal chiefs, the 'ulamä' and the parties, who 
shared an anti-British feeling. The union of the aniumans produced a 
confederation which opened communications with the Indian Viceroy in 
the Persian Gulf. They spoke of friendship between the two countries, 
offered some advice and asked for each other's requests, Later they 
warned and threatened each other; for instance, Shaykh xusayn Muhammad 
Tangistäni, one of the 'ulamä', received a letter from the viceroy 
which explained the friendly relations between Britain and Iran for 
years, blamed the Germans and Turks for violating Iran's neutrality 
and added that "Britain is the greatest ruler over Muslems"1 and 
had done a lot to help them. He then referred to the German Consul 
at Bushire, who had attempted to incite the Tangistäni people to invade 
Bushire; therefore, it had been necessary to prevent them and the 
Viceroy informed Shaykh Husayn that they had some letters from the 
German Consul which indicated that the German Minister in Tehran, 
with assistance from the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie, had 
planned to raise the south against the British Government, which had 
no malicious intention, only friendship for Iran. 
2 
At the end he 
warned the Shaykh that any anti-British action would have a serious 
consequence. The Shaykh answered: 
1. I. P. O., C. 66, f. 5, No. 32.1333 H. Q. 
2. Ibid.; Mukhbir us-Salttanah, 273. 
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... although as an honest subject of the Iranian 
Government, I have no right to have direct communication 
with you ... under the circumstances, I am obliged to 
reply to your letter ... The Iranian Government has 
chosen the policy of neutrality ... in spite of the 
fact that the nation's feeling is obvious; but they 
have followed the government and done nothing ... The 
British and Russians have had no respect for our 
neutrality and the interference of your government and 
Russia in the Persian Gulf and the north of Iran is 
good evidence in this matter ... 1 
Shaykh Fiusayn referred to a sentence in the Viceroy's letter ("Britain 
is the greatest ruler over Muslem countries") and advised him that 
such words hurt Muslim feelings. He then warned the Viceroy that if 
they continued their present policy, it would be impossible to appease 
the people's excitement and to prevent their actions. 
2 The consequence 
of all these communications was the request by the confederation of 
tribal chiefs for the release of the German Consul, which was rejected 
by the Viceroy. There was a rumour that the tribes had planned to 
attack Buchire. On 12th July the British Viceroy at Bushire despatched 
Major Oliphant and Captain Ranking with a mixed patrol to reconnoitre 
outside of Bushire. They were ambushed by a group of tribesmen under 
the command of Ra'is 'Ali, Khin of Dilvar, who apprently acted without 
instructions from the confederation's commander; as soon as the confed- 
eration received the report of Ra'is 'All's attack, they ordered him 
to withdraw ,. but fighting had already occurred and two British 
officers and four sepoys were killed and several wounded. "Jäm-i Jam", 
a Shiraz newspaper, after reporting the occurrence of fighting between 
the tribes and the British force, first praised Ra'is 'All and then 
1. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, 274. 
2. Ibid., 
3. F. O. 371-2436. No. 1588. Bushire, Aug. 31,1915. Sub-enclosure No. 
4. Trevor to F. S. of I. G.; F. O. 416-63. Tele. 244. Tehran, July 14, 
1915. Marling to Grey, 
k 
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referred to casualties: on the British side, two dead and several 
wounded, and on the other side no casualties at all. 
' 
The British Ministers in London, Tehran and India believed that 
it was time to take strong action against the Iranian Government; 
there had been some interchanges of view among them about terms which 
Britain should demand of the Iranian Government, The Indian Govern- 
ment was of the opinion that the terms might be as follows: 
(1) to take definite steps for punishment of khans who 
were concerned in outrage at Bushire; (2) to pay 
compensation at the rate of 5,000 1. in the case of 
each of the British officers killed in the outrage, 
and 500 1. and 100 1. in the case of each sepoy killed 
and wounded respectively; (3) to take definite action 
regarding Germans who are at present in Persia by 
causing them to be arrested, disarmed, and either 
interned or handed over to British for deportation; 
(4) to recall the present Governor-General of Fars, 2 
But Mr. Marling felt that these conditions were not harsh enough and 
suggested that more be added, including a threat to the Iranian Govern- 
ment that if it failed to fulfill their demands they would take their 
own measures. His terms were as follows: 
1. Written official apology for the outrage. 
2. Dismissal of Governor of Shiraz and nomination of 
successor approved by us. 
3. Punishment of tribes concerned and deposition and 
out-laving of their chiefs. 
4. Selection by us of gendarmerie officers in Kerman, 
Bushire, and Fars. 
5. Arrest and expulsion of 'Massmuss, disarmament and 
recall of all unrecognised German agents and emissaries 
and their followers throughout Persia. 
6. Internment of escaped Austrian prisoners of war. 
7. Indemnity of 20,000L. for murder of Officers. 3 
1. "Jäm-i Jam', No. 17, July 20,1915/Ramazän 7,1333. 
2. P. O. 416-63. Enc. No. 17. July 17,1915. Government of India to 
Mr. Chamberlain. 
3. F. O. 416-63. No. 253. Tehran, July 17,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Even Mr. Marling confessed that some of the terms, such as Nos. 5 and 
6, were not within the power of the Iranian Government. 
1 Simultaneously 
the cabinet crisis in the capital and the lack of a responsible govern- 
ment resulted in no attention being paid to the British demands. The 
Indian Government considered that it would not be desirable to seize 
the southern ports of Iran such as Bushire, Bandar $Abbäs, Langah 
and Hurmiz, especially the first, which would involve the Shaykh of 
Muhamarah and "the estrangement of a valuable friend who has deserved 
well of British Government"2, and the possibility of stirring up the 
tribes along the pipeline; but in the case of necessity that should be 
done without notification to the Iranian Government to show the British 
intentions were serious. 
3 However, "His Majesty's Government have 
considered it is necessary to assume temporary occupation of the port 
in order to safeguard British interests and lives and property of 
British subjects there. "4 Therefore, on 8th August 1915, the British 
military operation to occupy Bushire was successful and on the 
following day a proclamation was issued at Bushire: 
Proclamation 
The Government of His Britannic Majesty has issued 
instructions that His Majesty's forces now at Bushire 
shall immediately occupy the town and Island, assume the 
administration of Bushire and take control of the Customs 
House. 
This action has been taken by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, owing to the conviction which has been unwillingly 
forced upon them, that the Persian Government can no 
longer maintain order in Bushire and the neighbourhood, 
a conviction which has received fresh confirmation from 
1. Ibid. 
2. P. O. 416-63. Enc. No. 17. July 17,1915. Government of India to 
Mr. Chamberlain. 
3. Ibid. 
4. "The Times", Sept. 10,1915. 
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the recent regrettable attack by tribesmen on Bushire 
in which two British officers were killed and three 
sepoys killed and wounded. 
The situation is thus one which cannot be tolerated 
by His Majesty's Government who have therefore been 
compelled to take such measures as may be considered 
necessary in their own interests and will continue to 
occupy Bushire until such time as the Persian Government 
undertake to exact full reparation from the guilty 
parties for the recent attack and to comply with the 
other demands of the British Government. 
No hostile action will be taken against the officials 
and people of Bushire unless they themselves take hostile 
measures. 
In compliance with the orders of the exalted (British 
Government) the people of the Island of Bushire and all 
concerned should therefore take note that from this day 
I have taken over all Government of Bushire on behalf of 
the British Government. 
A. P. Trevor, Major, 
Governor on behalf of the British Military 
Government. 1 
The British Military Governor at Bushire issued many proclamations 
and notices containing various instructions to the people of Bushire 
and the surrounding regions; he also determined to punish the khans 
who were responsible for the incident. The first one was Ra'is 'Ali, 
the Khan of Dilvar; therefore, a proclamation was published addressing 
him. 
To 
Rais Ali and the inhabitants of Dilwar. 
Whereas acting in concert with other khans hostile to 
the British Government, Rais Ali of Dilwar and certain 
of his followers and some of people of Dashti invaded 
the Island of Bushire with hostile intention the British 
Residency, and shot two British officers and wounded 
three secoys out of a patrol passing near-by and sub- 
sequently attacked the British outposts; the said Rais 
Ali is hereby informed that his village will be 
bombarded and the Towers and houses and a portion of 
1. F. O. 371-2434. No. 1459. Aug. 16,1915. Major Trevor to F. S. India. 
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the date gardens destroyed on the 10th day of August 
1915 as a partial retribution for the offence. 
By order of the High British Government, 
A. P. Trevor, Major, 
Civil Administrator of Bushire. 1 
On the other hand, the 'ulamä''s declaration for a holy war against 
the British had been proclaimed throughout the south; they also took 
advantage of publishing the correspondence between the British Viceroy 
and Shaykh Husayn. The parties, especially the Democrats, and some 
an umans were highly active and inflamed the feelings of the people 
and tribes in Shiraz, Kazirun and the south-west regions against the 
British. The confederation of khäns were preparing to face the 
British force at Dilvar. On 10th August, the village of Dilvar was 
under British naval bombardment and later on troops were landed. 
There was heavy fighting between tribesmen and the British force. 
According to the report from the gendarmerie at Barazjän to Major 
Pousette, Dilvar had been bombarded for three days and they estimated 
that there were 500 casualties on the British side and 400 from the 
tribes, which seemed exaggerated, 
2 However, it seems that the result 
was not satisfactory from the British point of view, because later, 
on 9th September, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in 
the Foreign and Political Department, criticised the issuing of the 
warning proclamation to the people of Dilvar, and in replying to 
the t"Silitary Governor of Bushire, who had explained that it had been 
the custom to give a warning before any bombardment, he wrote: 
1. F. O. 371-2434. No. 1466. Enclosure No. 20. Trevor to F. S. of I. 0. 
2. I. F. O. 9 C. 66, f. 31, No. 114 1333 A. Q. Asad 31. 
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I am to explain that in the Hague Convention dealing 
with combardment by naval forces it is laid down that - 
"Unless military exigencies render it 
impossible, the commander of a naval 
attacking force will warn the authorities 
before commencing the bombardment. " 
This admits of wide discretion in deciding whether 
any notice of bombardment should be given, but 
since the Convention in question has not been 
acceded to by the Government of Persia its provisions 
are in no way legally binding in the Persian Gulf on 
His Majesty's Government ... although it may in the 
past have been the custom to give ample warning, under 
present circumstances it is considered that this is 
very undesirable since it allows the inhabitants to 
make all preparations to meet the attack and largely 
reduces the effect which it. is intended to produce ... 1 
The reaction of the Iranian Court - in the absence of a responsible 
government -, the Majlis, people and press towards the occupation of 
Bushire by the British force, produced protests, demonstrations and 
hostile actions. On 15th August, the Iranian Foreign Office submitted 
a letter of protest to the British Legation at Tehran: 
According to the reports received by the Imperial Persian 
Government British troops have been landed at Bushire, 
all government departments have been taken possession of 
and the gendarmes have been forced to evacuate two of 
their posts ... I am bound to protest against the above 
mentioned measures which are entirely against the 
proprietary rights and independence of the Imperial 
Persian Government from taking these measures which 
may lead to serious consequences. 
Ali Kuli, Moshavariu1-Mamalik. 2 
In reply to the Iranian protest, Mr. Marling was of the opinion 
that "in the absence of a cabinet no official cognizance could be 
taken of the attack on H. M. 's Residency at Bushire, it seemed to me 
1. F. O. 371-2436. No. 1629. Simla, Sept. 9,1915. F. S. of I. G. to 
Cox. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. No. 116. Gulhak, Oct. 2,1915. Marling to F. O. 
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useless to take any notice of this protest at the time. "1 There was 
preparation in Shiraz for a campaign to be carried out against the 
British force at Bushire. British subjects were threatened and ready 
to leave the city. Mr. Marling reported that "occupation of Bushire 
and other operation have caused considerable excitement at Shiraz 
where consul describes situation as critical. "2 Mukhbir us-Saltanah 
wrote that there was no doubt that all the people were totally dejected 
about Bushire3 and "Bämdäd-i Raushan", in an article entitled "The 
Living Fars", after supporting the agitation of the people of Fars 
against British violations in the south, believed that the British 
would not have any benefit from the new policy and wrote: 
Bushire would not be easy to swallow ... Must it not be 
admitted, the opinion of those acknowledged persons 
who firmly have said and say that the British are worse 
than the Russians for Iran? ... The Russians during 
their anti-Iranian activities have not acted as the 
British did in Bushire ... 4 
"The Near East", a year or so later, commented on the Bushire 
incident: 
Turco-German intrigues received a sudden stimulus 
from the occupation of Bushire by British troops, 
when an unfortunate mistake in connection with 
Persian flag provided an opportunity for misrepresenting 
the action of the Allies. 5 
Sykes wrote: "The temporary occupation of Bushire by the British, 
[was] a step that afforded German propaganda a real chance, which 
was fully exploited. "6 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 288. Tehran, Aug. 19,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, 278. 
4. "B9Lmdäd-i Raushan", No. 80, Aug. 29,1915/Shavväl 17,1333. 
5. "The Near East", Oct. 20,1916, 




In the other cities the conditions were by no means better. In 
Tehran, the opposition had been trying to rouse popular feeling against 
the Russians and British by means of street preaching and distributing 
leaflets. In Isfahan some of the clergy took the lead in rousing 
the people, proclaiming a holy war and preparing them for war, The 
Governor-General was almost powerless and the city was under the 
control of the clergy and anti-Allied people; but the Bakhtiyäri 
khäns kept quiet and apparently were friendly to the British. In 
Kermanshah the German interference in the anti-Allied movement was 
open and direct and resulted in the conflict at Kangavar. 
The Conflict at Kaneavar 
Kangävar is a small town situated on the road from Hamadan to 
Kermanshah, forty-four miles from the former and fifty-seven from the 
latter, in a district of the same name in the east of Kermanshah Province. 
It is necessary to look at the background of the conflict which 
took place between two opposing sides in the First World War in a 
neutral country, Considering that Kermanshah's geographical location 
was of strategic importance from the German point of view during the 
war, because it was the nearest and main city on the road to the 
Turkish frontier, it is surprising that it had not been occupied by 
either the Russian or British forces. Therefore, all German 
communications and transport through the rest of Iran, Afghanistan 
and India had to pass through this city. The German Legation in Tehran 
intended to despatch a consul to Kermanshah because of its vital 
importance to the Germans. Herr Schunemann had been appointed as the 
German Consul at Tabriz; he arrived in Kermanshah from Baghdad because 
Tabriz was under Russian occupation, and stayed in Kermanshah and 
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started successful propaganda for German influence and anti-Entente 
activities. There had occurred a few collisions between the Iranian 
tribes and Turkish forces under the command of ! usayn Ra'üf Bayg on 
the Turkish-Iranian frontier in the western part of Kermanshah Province 
during the year 1915. The Turkish force passed over the Iranian 
border and occupied Qa7r-i Shirin, Sarpul-i Zahäb, Kerend and 
Hirünäbäd (now called Shähibäd). 
' There was heavy fighting between 
the Kerendis and the Turkish force, which resulted in many Kerendis 
dead and wounded and in the destruction of the town; the people were 
homeless, had fled or scattered in the mountains around the town. 
This incident caused twenty Democrat deputies in the Majlis to 
interpelate Farm-in Farma, Minister for the Interior at the time, and 
to claim that he had no intention of soothing the discord between the 
Iranian tribes and Turkish forces and consequently would bring both 
Muslim neighbours to a stage of war against each other. The inter- 
pellation resulted in the resignation of 'Ayn ud-Daulah's cabinet. 
However, the threat of the Turkish force to Kermanshah and the activities 
of the German consul, who was strongly supported by the Democrat 
Party's members in the city, caused the British and Russian Consuls 
and residents to move from Kermanshah to Hamadan, leaving the city in 
the hands of the Germans and anti Entente people, The Iranian 
Government protested the Turkish force's advance into Iranian territory 
and caused a great deal of negotiation between representatives of the 
two countries. Schunemann succeeded in becoming the mediator between 
Ijusayn Ra'üf Bayg and the Iranian authorities, and a sort of agreement 
was arrived at, whereby the Turkish force would withdraw to Sarpul-i 
1. On the road to Baghdad, west of Kermanshah: Qasr-i Shirin to 
Kerianshah, 177 km.; Sarpul-i Zahäb to Kermanshah, 147 km.; Kerend 




2ahäb and later to the Turkish frontier. Consequently, the region 
came under German influence. 
In August 1915, the Russian and British Legations in Tehran, 
after the withdrawal of the Turkish force, in order to repress German 
influence in Kermanshah Province, decided to despatch their consuls 
back to Kermanshah, with an escort of Iranian and Russian Cossacks and 
private forces; they also asked the Iranian Government to order the 
Kermanshah authorities to welcome them with a special ceremony, with 
representatives of the 'u=, the authorities and the people to meet 
them and with entertainment of a march and music. 
On the other hand, Schunemann had celebrated the fall of Warsaw 
in Kermanshah and invited all classes of people to join him. The 
next day leaflets were issued in the city: 
We thought that this was a neutral country. When we 
arrived, our enemy representatives had sent an official 
notice which stated that "if you enter the city, you will 
be arrested. We shall not let any German enter this 
city. ", as if they considered this country belonged to 
them. However, we came without taking any action or 
coming into collision with them; they fled ... We helped 
you people when we could and tried to prevent the people 
of this province from coming to any harm ... They want to return to the city in company with private and 
Russian forces ... inevitably we have to collect a force in order to oppose them ... unfortunately, we see that their entrance and use of arms damages the helpless 
people of the city; besides that, the Turkish force .,, 
which you would naturally not like to arrive in the 
city, (will come) to oppose them ... We asked them as 
friends not to enter and they did not, but at this time 
their enemies obliged them to move in this direction ... 
Under these circumstances, we have to declare ,.. we 
shall not let them enter the city ... we ask respect- 
fully that the people do not panic and remain neutral ... 
we assure that we will not let the people sustain one 
dinär's damage. 1 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 6, No. 62.26 Ramazän/16 Asad 1333. 
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On Sunday, 8th August, the British and Russian Consuls, who were 
escorted by seventy Iranian and Russian Cossacks and thirty professional 
savars, proceeded from Hamadan to Kermanshah. They arrived at Kangävar 
and received the news of Schunemann's force approaching towards 
Kangavar. Therefore they remained in the town and the consuls stayed 
at the residence of the governor, Mirzä Faraj A11äh Khan, son of Sari 
Aglän, the khan of Kangavar. 
Meanwhile, Schunemann had been preparing a force to prevent the 
consuls from entering Kermanshah. The city was in a panic because 
not only had the people been afraid of the imminent collision between 
the German and Entente forces, but there was also a rumour that the 
Turkish force would enter the city very soon. In the capital the 
reports from Kermanshah were unsatisfactory. "The Governor's admini- 
stration was hopeless; pro-German and pro-Entente were acting and 
planning against each other ... The German gold and British lirah are 
prevalent. "' Mr. McDouall, the British Consul at Kermanshah, reported 
that 
Most of the people are much annoyed at the Democrats 
helping the Germans and several meetings have been 
held at Jilli-ed-Daulah's house which had resulted 
in over a thousand Democrats joining the Moderate 
party ... these say they will not assist foreigners but most of them are secretly ready to help us. 2 
At Kermanshah some of the local representatives visited Schune- 
mann and expressed their anxiety about the imminent conflict between 
the two forces; they asked him not to prevent the consuls' arrival 
in the city and professed their fear of the Turkish force's interference. 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 248-1112. No. 48. Camp Hamadan, Sept. 1,1915. McDouall. 
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Schunemann disagreed with the first request, but took note of the 
second and said that he would not ask for the help of Husayn Ra'üf 
Bayg, the commander of the Turkish force. 
On 7th August Schunemann, in company with five hundred savars 
from the tribes of Sanjäbi, Kalhur and Nazar 'Ali Khän, left Kerman- 
shah for Bisitün and §ahnah. Mr. McDouall, the British Consul, who 
was in Kangavar at the time, believed that Schunemann's forces 
consisted probably of two hundred men and two Maxims, comprised of 
men from the tribes of Nazar 'Ali Khin, Lür, Kürän and also K&Uvand 
and Khizil. 
1 Schunemann camped at Sehnah and opened correspondence 
with the governor of Kangavar. He received a letter from the governor 
that he had been ordered by the Iranian Government to prevent him 
from approaching Kangävar. The location of Kangävar, from a strategic 
point of view, is an important military point in the west of Iran; 
it is surrounded by many hills and mountains. To the west, on the 
road to Kermanshah, there is a pass named Bid-i Surkh. The safety of 
the town depended on possessing and defending the pass. The governor's 
savars, which have been estimated at about fifty men, were guarding 
that pass. 
The British and Russian Ministers in Tehran wrote a letter to 
Igbäl ud-Daulah, the Kermanshah Governor-General, who was in Tehran 
at the time, asking him to prevent the German Consul's action and 
wanting him to ensure the safety of their consuls' arrival in Kerman- 
shah. 
2 The governor communicated the matter to the government and the 
Iranian Government ordered Major Edwal, in command of two hundred 
1. "Shurä", No. 88, Aug. 19,1915/Shawäl 7,1333. There were some 
reports that the Shunemann force consisted of 1,000 men. 
2. "Irshäd", No. 101, Aug. 24,1915/Shavväl 12,1333. 
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gendarmes, to proceed to Kangävar, also the Cossack Brigade in 
Sanandaj had received a command to advance to Kangävar to escort the 
British and Russian Consuls to Kermanshah. The latter force was the 
nearest viable Iranian force to aid the consuls, but it would take 
four days to reach Kangavar. Schunemann had anticipated that; there- 
fore, on 25th August, his forces set out from gahnah for Kangävar and 
after some brief shooting in the early morning of the next day, were 
able to occupy the hills and pass and his force was able to command 
the approaches to the town and the Hamadan road. According to Mr. 
McDouall's report, the Kangävar Governor, in replying to his question 
about surrendering the hills to Schunemann's force, said "He could not 
now depend on anyone but his household servants, °1 In fact Schunemann's 
force had some supporters in the town because later on the Iranian 
Cossacks complained that there had been some shots from the town. Mr. 
McDouall believed that the people of Kangavar might be divided into 
three classes: "those who do not want trouble", those who were 
pro-German, and "men who can be bought". 
2 However, Schunemann sent 
an ultimatum to the governor, saying he wöuld give the consuls three 
hours to leave; otherwise, he would attack, and he did so. The two 
sides fired many shots and Schunemann's force was able to occupy all 
the hills around the town and surrounded the Entente's forces and 
blocked the Hamadan road. The reports about casualties are slightly 
different -- two or four dead on the side of the Germans and one or 
two on the other side and several wounded on both. At least some of 
the Kangävar 'ulamä' met Schunemann, asked him to avoid bloodshed 
and arranged a meeting between the governor and Schunemann which 
1. F. O. 248-1112. No. 46. Hamadan, Aug. 28,1915. 
2. F. O. 248-1112, No. 49. Hamadan, Sept. 8,1915, 
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resulted in a cease-fire, the opening of the Hamadan road and allowing 
the consuls and their forces to leave. In the afternoon of the same 
day, they left the town escorted by the governor and his savars and 
reached Asadäbäd, a town on the road to Hamadan, nineteen miles from 
Kangävar and twenty-five miles from Hamadan. There was no incident 
on the way and the day after they proceeded to Hamadan. Schunemann 
also left Kangävar for Sahnah, as soon as he heard the consuls had 
reached Asaäabäd, and when he was informed that the Allied Consuls 
had arrived at Hamadan, he left Sahnah for Kermanshah. According to 
the German Embassy's article in a Tehran newspaper, which was published 
on 30th August, Schunemann reported the Kangävar incident as follows: 
Yesterday, 14th of Shavväl [26th of August], in the early 
morning we arrived in the suburbs of Kangavar; the Russian 
and British Consuls saw and recognised me on a hill under 
my country's flag through a telescope from the city, and 
immediately seventy Cossacks and thirty Iranian armed 
men fired at us and naturally my savars fired back at 
them. In three hours we surrounded the town and 
succeeded in occupying the necessary entrenchments, so 
that they could not flee. At this time the governor 
visited me and asked for three hours' respite to open 
the Hamadan road. Because I did not like bloodshed I 
assured them that the consuls could leave for Hamadan ... 1 
In Tehran the Kangävar incident caused a series of diplomatic 
problems, especially at a time when the Iranian Government intended to 
come to good terms with the Allies and apparently had tried hard to 
find a way to despatch some Iranian troops to protect the Russian and 
British Consuls at Kangävar. But the government protested against 
Schunemann's actions and requested the German Minister in Tehran to 
discharge Schunemann from his post. 
1. ""4r-i Jadid", No. 60. Aug. 30,1915/Shavväl 18,1333; I. F. O., 
C. 66, f. 6. No. 61.1333. 
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The Tehran newspapers interpreted the Kangävar conflict as a 
regrettable incident. "Irshäd" criticised the country's administration, 
for the Kermanshah Governor, Igbäl ud-Daulah, had been in Tehran for 
financial reasons for a few months. Then the writer continued: 
... and if Schunemann believed that had the Iranian 
Government been able to defend its rights, such an 
incident would not have happened and they would not 
have interfered at all ... he had to defend himself and, 
apparently as he claimed, the Kermanshah people from 
the Russian troops which have been seen in many cities 
and even the capital was threatened by their maneuver ... 
the consuls were escorted by some Russian troops ... the 
German Consul would have done it even if only for his 
own protection ... 1 
"Shürä" interpreted the conflict from another angle and, after 
professing its regret about the event, stated that the only reason 
for the incident was the ignoring of Iran's neutrality; if the Russians 
had withdrawn their forces from Iranian territory and the British 
Government had assisted the Iranian Government's request in Petrograd 
for the evacuation of the Russian force, events such as Azarbaijan, 
Bushire, Kermanshah and Kangävar would not have occurred. 
2 "Shihäb-i 
Sägib" discussed the disturbed condition of Iran and foreign intrigues 
in the country and wrote: 
They say the German Consul opposed the arrival of the 
Allied Consuls in Kermanshah. It would be good if they 
remembered at first which country's envoy committed 
such an action and arrested the consul of their hostile 
countries .. * which country disregarded the Iranian 
Government's request and plea for respecting its 
neutrality. 3 
1. "Irshäd", No. 96, Aug. 12,1915/Ramaýän 30,1333. 
2. "Shürä", No. 89, Aug. 31,1915 Shavväl 19,1333. 
3. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 78, Aug. 19,1915/Shavväl 7,1333. 
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The German Legation at Tehran, in replying to the Iranian Govern- 
ment's protest and demand for discharging Schunemann, sent a letter 
to the Majlis and to Tehran's newspapers, explaining the Kangävar 
conflict and blaming the British and Russians for the collision; it 
considered Schunemann's action self-defence and then added: 
... They say it is the neutral government's duty to escort 
them to their posts ... we agree with this point if Iran 
is neutral, but they have not respected its rights for a 
long time ... Certainly, those who are trying to keep 
their rights must not subvert others. On the contrary, 
anywhere they possessed power or opportunity prevented 
our consuls from remaining at their posts, such as at 
Tabriz, Bushire ... At Tabriz they plundered our houses, 
confiscated our factories ... killed our merchants .. e 
captured our passengers on the road to BahbahAn and sent 
them to India ... Have they committed those works with 
the Iranian Government's permission or with all those 
irregular and unacceptable tasks, how do they respect 
the neutrality of Iran? 1 
However, the Kangävar conflict was considered a German reaction 
to both powers' attitude towards the German representatives in Iran. 
On the other hand, the British and Russians understood that the region 
of Kermanshah was so vital to the Germans that they would stand against 
any hard measures in any case; and also at that moment the British 
and Russians were not able to do anything or take any action. 
The Situation of Iran and Allied Activities 
Azarbaijan was facing a catastrophe during the First World War 
and matters were more serious than in other parts of Iran; combat 
between the Turkish and Russian forces and their native allies resulted 
in the massacre of thousands of people, famines, destruction of hundreds 
of villages, and thousands of refugees and homeless. The other parts 
1. "'Asr-i Jadid", No. 59, Aug. 28,1915/Shavväl 16,1333. 
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of the country were under Russian or British forces or were in 
disorder. 
Public agitation against the great powers made such an impression 
on the country's atmosphere that those among the courtiers, politicians, 
authorities and even those who were well-known as friends of the 
British or Russians, kept silent and tried to avoid being accused of 
having communications with either country. The nationalists, as well 
as the pro-Germans and Pan-Islamists, controlled most of the cities 
which were not occupied by the British or Russian forces. The 
Russian Ambassador in Tehran reported to Petrograd: "Germans with 
their Mujahids and gendarmerie are virtually masters in some of the 
chief towns of Persia -- Shiraz, Ispahan, Kermanshah; they endeavouring 
to reproduce same conditions in Tehran itself. "1 
Under those circumstances, the Iranian Government attempted to 
come to terms with both powers and improve conditions, but it was 
faced with enormous difficulties -- an ampty treasury, disorder, and 
all the catastrophes of the war, as Mr. MacLean wrote to Mr. Greenway: 
The Persians are allowing their own affairs to drift most 
helplessly. The financial administration has been wilfully 
disorganized, the revenues are neglected and pilfered, 
the police, gendarmerie and other executive branches are 
months in arrears, and the Government debts are accumulated. 
Local disorders spready day by day ... 2 
As far as the Iranian Government and Majlis were concerned, there was 
no sign of any change or modification in the Allied policy towards 
Iran; nevertheless, the government intended to control and reduce the 
public agitation and disturbance in the country in order to obtain a 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 303. Tehran, Aug. 29,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 371-2426. Tehran, Aug. 26,1915. MacLean to Greenway. 
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better ground for negotiation with foreign countries and to maintain 
neutrality. Therefore, the Iranian Government ordered a ban on the 
anti Allied demonstrations which had been taking place in the Maydän-i 
Baharistän outside the Majlis gate, and even when it was shifted to 
the Masjid-i Shah in the Bazar, the preachers were not allowed to 
preach. The Prime Minister held a meeting with the editors of 
Tehran's newspapers, asking for their support and assistance in 
appeasing public excitement and to stop inflaming the political tension 
of the people. He also wished to summon some Bakhtiyäri savars to 
assist the police in controlling the capital. Other steps which 
Mustaufi ul-MamAlik's cabinet took included ordering the governors 
of the provinces to maintain neutrality. The Tehran newspaper 
"Parvardin" was shut down because of its bitter attack on Vusüq 
ud Daulah's appointment to the cabinet; he threatened that he would 
resign unless the newspaper was closed*1 However, the government 
showed its inclination toward the Allies; but this inclination, 
particularly the protest to the German Legation about the Kangavar 
incident and the request for the dismissal of Schunemann, was considered 
as a contradiction of government policy, which was one-sided, and 
raised commentaries and arguments in Tehran political societies and 
newspapers. 
"Shihäb-i Sägib", in an article referring to the background of 
the two powers' influence in Iran and their interference in the 
country's political, economic and administrative matters, stated: 
1. Sipihr, 198. 
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At the time of Näsir ud-Din Shah they started apparently 
in a friendly benevolent way; later on, they called it 
advice and then, in the name of protecting their interests, 
finally changed it to demands and orders. Again after a 
while, they said that Iran must consider our talks as a 
minor to its guardian; recently the matter increased 
seriously and their statements are as a lord orders his 
waiter ... Mercy and justice in the law of the new 
imperialistic culture are absurd and meaningless ... 
This government has to clear its policy and should not 
be. deceived by talk ... 1 
The pro-Democrat newspaper "Naubahär" believed that Iran's failure in 
fundamental reforms was due to the effect of the attraction and 
repelling of both powers' policy and continued: "At this time it is 
pressed by four powers instead of two ... each one in the name of 
preventing the opposition's activities landed their blows on our weak 
body. "2 The writer expressed his opinion on Iranian foreign policy 
and stated that in spite of the fact that Iran was-neutral and wished 
to have friendly relations with all countries, neither side in the war 
was satisfied; furthermore, they were deeply suspicious of Iran's 
policy. The writer complained: 
If anyone read "Novoye Vremya" and other Russian 
articles outside of the country, he would think that 
the Germans and Turks are of such influence that all 
the country is under their power. At the same time, 
if someone talks to the German or Turkish politicians 
about Iran, he will hear that all Iran is under the 
domination of the Russians and British, 3 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" criticised the British foreign policy towards Islamic 
countries and particularly attacked Sir Edward Grey's attitude in 
those matters and referred to British policy in Egypt and its treaty 
1. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 81, Aug. 30,1915/Shavväl 18,1333. 
2. "Naubahär", No. 65, Aug. 13,1915/ShavvAl 1,1333. 
3. Ibid. 
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with France about Morocco; it believed that British popularity had 
decreased and by the Convention of 1907 it had lost what little 
remained in Iran: "Britain, which is the Mother of Constitutions and 
Democracy, hand in hand with a despotic government's seeking an 
opportunity to swallow the weak countries ... "1 
However, the Iranian Government was well aware of the critical 
condition of the country and its responsibility for the future of 
Iran; therefore, in following the cabinet's program it used the utmost 
endeavours to achieve the policy of neutrality and to save the country 
from annihilation. In spite of the fact that the Iranian Government 
understood that the British and Russians were following a policy along 
the same lines in Iran, it nevertheless opened a series of negotiations 
with the British Legation in Tehran. This attitude of the Iranian 
Government towards the British even at that time was due mostly to its 
following the old policy which earlier governments had used to modify 
the obstinacy of Russian policy through British diplomatic relations 
with Russia. This Iranian tendency towards the British had been 
considered as total helplessness, as Mr. Marling reported: 
Knowing their helpless cabinet is appealing to the two 
legations for support, but they are conscious that by 
doing so they will alienate Democrats who have already 
attacked them in press for inclusion of Vusuq-ud-Dowlah 
and Sipahdar. 2 
Mr. Marling thought, however, that the cabinet would not last 
long; even if they did not try for its fall, the opposition would and 
he stated that "it is better for us that its fall should be composed 
by its late friend than by us. "3 The Iranian Government tried constantly 
1. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 78, Aug. 19,1915/Shavväl 7,1333. 





to find a solution to the deadlock of the relations between the country 
and both powers; but not only had they refused to honour that support 
and assistance which had been promised to the previous government, 
they also insisted on the fulfillment of their demands, such as the 
British demands concerning the conflicts between British forces and 
Iranian tribesmen in the south. Consequently, the Iranian Government 
was unable to improve the state of affairs without any assistance 
and was disappointed in its dealing with the two powers. 
Meanwhile, the situation in Iran grew favourable to the anti-Allies, 
owing to some German victories in Europe and especially to the war in 
the Dardanelles, news of which reached Iran by the German wireless 
every day. This superiority of receiving immediate news from the 
fronts had a tremendous effect on German propaganda. Moreover, the 
scheme of the German anti-Allied propaganda and the exaggeration of 
the news of the war in Iran had "greatly increased the Iranian belief 
in the ultimate German victory and guarantee of Iranian independence. "' 
It is certainly easy enough for the Germans to dangle 
before the eyes of the Persians the prospect of the 
end of Anglo-Russian control in Persia, and to promise 
them the help of Turco-German armies for the deliverance 
of the country. 2 
Although British forces had occupied the southern part of Iran, 
this had almost no effect on the capital; on the contrary, it roused 
the people against the British, The consul in Shiraz wrote that: 
"The method of our occupation of Bushire, i. e., removal of flag, has 
given German party a splendid war-cry against us. "3 The British 
1. F. O. 371-2426. Tehran, Sept. 2,1915. H. W. MacLean to Greenway. 
2. "The Near East", Aug. 13,1915. 
3. F. O. 416-63, Tele. No. 306. Tehran, Aug. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Ministers in London and Tehran were of the opinion that the rein- 
forcement of Russian troops in Iran would appease public irritation 
and handicap the Turko-German activities; therefore, Grey ordered 
Buchanan, the British Minister at Petrograd, to discuss the critical 
condition in Iran and to ask the Russian Government for the immediate 
despatch of Russian troops to Iran, but the Russians were engaged on 
the south-western frontiers and the viceroy of the Caucasus "had declared 
(he) had no troops to spare for Persia". 
1 Concerning Iranian affairs, 
Mr. Marling reached the conclusion that they had to choose between 
two alternatives: first, "to abandon frankly effect to induce or 
force Iran to adopt a policy of real neutrality"2; this involved a 
military operation which was improbable at the moment; secondly, 
To secure loyalty of principal tribes, and especially 
Bakhtiari, it is a question of money ... they are, as 
a tribe, under the influence of their traditional 
friendship with us and belief in our power, that they 
prefer our money to German and at this moment could 
induce them to collect a sufficient force at Ispahan 
to disarm the German. 3 
The amount of money that he suggested was about 200,000 t'_a. The 
suggestion was under consideration by the British Government; meanwhile, 
both powers agreed to join their efforts to defend and protect their 
interest and other matters should be considered as of secondary 
importance. 4 Therefore, their legations at Tehran were instructed to 
have closer coordination in their activities and were authorised to do 
what they could to their best abilities. The British Government also 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 1130. Tehran, Aug. 9,1915. Buchanan to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 276. Tehran, Aug. 10,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. Ibid. 





allowed the minister at Tehran to have sufficient credit for his 
expenditures and the amount of 200,000 tümäns for having an agreement 
with the khAns. The legations at Tehran and their consulates and 
agents in other cities began to take strong action to soothe the 
people's repulsion in any possible way. The main attempts were to 
influence the Shah, to make the government deal with their interests 
or to overthrow them and to put pressure on the Majlis. It happened 
that the British and Russian Ministers in Tehran, without having any 
appointment and at any time, could insist on meeting the Shah; they 
advised and threatened him and told him that he might lose his throne, 
but the Shah accepted no responsibility for the country's affairs and 
"negotiations with him were unsatisfactory. His Majesty appears to 
be very much under enemy influence. "' 
The Majlis presented the strongest opposition against Russian 
and British policy in Iran, and the government's proposals would be 
rejected if it contained further influence of both great powers in the 
country. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was of the opinion 
that the way to put an end to the PMajlis was "calling back the ex-shah 
who would make short work of Medjliss which were at bottom of trouble. "2 
The British Minister in Tehran sent a message to the Majlis in which 
he said, "We shall execute the opposition. "3 M3rzä Muhammad Sädiq 
Tabätabä'i on behalf of the Majlis replied, "We do our duties for the 
Iranian nation and you may execute us at any time you are able, "4 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 316. Tehran, Sept. 4,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63, Tele. No. 1130. Petrograd, Aug. 9,1915. Buchanan to 
Grey. 
3. Farukh Mu'tasim us-Saltanah, Khätirät-i Si äsi- Farukh (ed. 
Parviz LüshAni, Tehran, 1347 H. S. ), 9-10. 4. Ibid. 
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The British and Russians, in continuation of their rough policy, 
avoided coming to terms with the Iranian Government at that time, 
particularly when the Iranian gendarmerie had been defeated in two 
conflicts with rebel tribes, one in Luristan in which casualties reached 
about 200 men and arms and ammunition were lost. The other incident 
happened near Qazvin with the Shähsavän tribe and during the combat 
Captain Hierta, the commander of the gendarmerie, was killed. Colonel 
Edwall, the chief officer commanding at Tehran, stated that "pour le 
moment 800 gendarmes sont disaprus et je n'en sacs Tien de leur avenir, 
mais espere en retrouver la plus part. "1 In addition to these 
disappointing affairs, other problems in the country frustrated the 
state of relations between Iran and the Entente. Therefore, the Allies 
sought another alternative to stop anti-Allied activities and also 
stressed to the government the necessity of accepting their terms or 
they would be overthrown for a pro-Allied cabinet. 
In relating to public opinion, some famous Tehran newspapers, 
such as "'Aqr-i Jadid", which were pro-Allied, published some articles 
against German activities in Iran; but apparently they did not publish 
any article which could be considered as open support for the British 
and Russians. In other cities, the consulates endeavoured to negotiate 
with the khäns and to conclude agreements with them, especially the 
British in the south with the Bakhtiyäri khäns, through whose region 
oil pipes were laid, and other important tribes. They also published 
many pamphlets and leaflets, explaining that the Germans and Turks 
intended to use Iranians for their own purposes; for instance, there 
is an eight-page pamphlet, not dated or signed, entitled "A message 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 110. Tehran, Aug. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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to the religious and homeland brothers". 
1 It begins with the name 
of God and a verse from the Qur'an (Surat al-bacara, v. 195). The 
writer tried to prove there was no reason for the 'ulain' to declare 
a holy war. Consequently he rejected the 'ulamA''s proclamations for 
a 'iý h9d against the British and Russians. He criticised the Turkish 
Government, which had refused the Allies' proposals and joined the 
Germans for no reason but to destroy Turkey and involve other Muslim 
countries in the war. The writer regarded Irano-Turkish relations 
and attacked the Turks and asked why, if the Turks' reasons, as they 
claimed, for taking part in the war was zeal of Islam, they had not 
helped Iran in the wars with Russia or Britain in the past. Then he 
mentioned some cases of Turkish maltreatment of Iranian residents in 
that country, especially in Najaf, Karbalä' and other holy cities in 
Iraq. The writer also referred to Irano-German relations and mentioned 
Article 18 of the Irano-German Convention of Rabi' us-Säni 1290 H. Q. / 
June 1873, in which the Germans undertook to assist Iran in the case 
of any disagreement with other countries; he added that during these 
recent years when Iran needed assistance urgently the Germans did not 
pay attention to this matter. The writer apparently referred to the 
Germano-Russian convention of Potsdam, August 1911, when he wrote: 
"On the other hand (Germany's) Ambassador at Petrograd asked the Russians 
to let the Germans have a free hand in the north of Iran. "2 It seems 
that he had made a mistake; according to the Potsdam agreement, it 
was vice versa. However, the conclusion of the writer's message was 
that there were no founds for a -jihad and the Iranian people and 
government should remain neutral. 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 7, No. 96.1333 H. Q. 
2. Ibid. 
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Meanwhile the legations in Tehran and consulates in other cities 
had been following the traditional policy, probably the most effective 
measure, which was to use the influence of those Iranians in all 
classes of society, such as courtiers, politicians, tribal chiefs, 
clergy, merchants and others who had been serving the British and 
Russians as a family inheritance or were ready to do so at that moment. 
The important part of these group activities was to use their utmost 
effort to appease the people's irritation and neutralise anti-Allied 
propaganda. For instance, there was a long discussion between the 
Ministers of Britain and Russia in Tehran and their governments on the 
return to Iran of Zill us-Sullin, the son of Nuzaffar ud-Din Shäh, 
who was ill and quite old. Both powers wished to take advantage of 
his influence at the court or at least to have him installed as 
Governor-General of Isfahan, where he had a great deal of land and 
which was the centre of German activities. He would then be able to 
use his power to stop German propaganda and anti-Allied supporters. 
Your Excellency.. 
I write these few lines to thank Your Excellency 
for your letter of last October, for having been good 
enough to renew His British Majesty's protection for 
myself and all my family. 
I also take the occasion to assure you once more 
of all my sympathy and friendship for your Government 
which dates from many years, and to offer you also all 
my personal services,. in Persia in the present crisis. 
I have also telegraphed to my friends and sons at 
Ispahan and Teheran, to remain at the disposal of the 
British and Russian Ministers at Teheran, and to do 
their best in helping them if they are wanted. I 
have also written on the same subject to His Excellency 
the Russian Ambassador in Paris. 
signed Zil-us-Sultan. 1 
1. F. O. 371-2425. Villa Marie, Nice, Nov. 22,1915. 
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In Tehran, powerful men such as Farmän Farmas who was well-known 
as a friend of the Allies, received some money to assist the spread 
of propaganda in favour of the Allies. The British Foreign Affairs 
Minister wrote to P2arling: 
Russian Government agree to payment of subsidy of 
£1000 to Farman Farma ... merely expect him in 
accordance with his promise to check agitation and 
to win over public opinion ... the subsidy might be 
continued so long as he remains true ... 1 
The Foreign Office asked for Marling's opinion on whether or not the 
same amount should be paid on behalf of the British. 
Although Mr. Marling was quite optimistic about their activities 
against Germany and Turkey, especially the Iranian nationalists, as 
he reported: 
Meantime we have succeeded ... in creating a body of 
opinion among the more educated and substantial 
classes strongly opposed to the fatuous tolerance 
which the Persian Government has up till now exhibited 
to the Germans and their intrigues. 2 
it seemed that it had not affected public opinion so much, which was 
full of hatred for both powers' maltreatment, especially during recent 
years. 
The British Minister in Tehran, in a meeting with the Prime 
Minister, suggested that they wished "to secure the presence of 
sufficient number of [Bakhtiyäri] Sowars at Isfahan and Tehran to deter 
the Germans from attempting to create disorder, in fact to make Persian 
authorities masters in these towns ... "3 They also were willing to 
1. F. O. 371-2428. No. 166. P. O.., July 6,1915. to marling. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 111. Tehran, Sept. 1.1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 301. Tehran, Aug. 29,1915. ! sling to Grey. 
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assist with expenses*1 The Prime Minister replied that he had already 
instructed the khans to bring sufficient forces to Tehran but "he could 
not see his way to accept any monetary help except as a part of large 
scheme of financial assistance. "2 This desire of the Iranian Govern- 
ment was out of the question at that time for both powers. 
In relation to the Bakhtiyäri khäns, the British scheme did not 
turn out satisfactory either. In the negotiations between the khäns 
and the British representatives, the khäns "as a part of the agreement, 
... will want an assurance that Ispahan will not be left in the 
Russian sphere of influence. "3 According to the new Anglo-Russian 
agreement, Isfahan was already in the Russian zone. Grey warned the 
minister in Tehran: "but you should avoid, if possible, any discussion 
as to Ispahan and in no case should you give any undertaking in regard 
to it being removed from Russian sphere. "4 Therefore, the khans were 
not as friendly to the British as expected, The British Minister in 
Tehran believed that the khäns were "playing a double game"; he 
reported: "Bakhtiari are professing here and at Ispahan that they cannot 
bring sowars without orders from Government and Prime Minister will 
try to make these orders condition of leaving Bushire. "5 He added 
that "of course, Khans are making use of this opportunity to squeeze 
us for money, "6, but further negotiation between the khans and the 
British Legation concerning money failed. The khans stated that they 
could not accept direct payments from the British for their sanars. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 276. Tehran, Aug. 10,1915. Marling to Grey. 
4. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 223. F. O., Aug. 11,1915. Grey to Marling. 
5. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 298. Tehran, Aug. 28,1915. Marling to Grey. 
6. Ibid. 
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Mr. Marling believed that the khans were joining in the government 
tactics to squeeze the British in the interests of themselves and the 
cabinet, 
1 
Time was against both powers, especially the British. Conditions 
in the country became worse; the consul in Shiraz reported: "Unless 
we do something to soothe wide spread irritation ... It may be impossible 
for Khans to resist pressure which is being brought to bear upon them 
to join campaign against English. "2 
Problems in the South 
The Iranian Government tried to take advantage of the time and to 
reach a settlement with the powers. The negotiations between the 
Iranian Government and the legations had been continued but were not 
conclusive, so that, on 28th August 1915, the Iranian Government agreed 
in principle to the condition which has been mentioned before, with an 
exception as to the amount of the indemnity, and suggested that the 
Governor-General of Fars be recalled and Iranian authority restored at 
Bushire simultaneously. The British troops would be allowed to remain 
until any danger of further attacks was past. The Iranian Government 
would be obliged to put an end to German agitation and would punish 
the khAns who had been involved in the attack as soon as possible. 
3 
The British Minister at Tehran felt that the proposal should be 
considered and that the most important article was the removal of the 
Governor-General of Shiraz, who had been considered an "instrument of 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 302. Tehran, Aug. 29,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 306. Tehran, Aug. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 300. Tehran, Aug. 29,1914. Marling to Grey. 
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German agitation in the south and his removal would be a decisive 
blow to them in Persian eyes. ' He asked his government to agree 
with the proposal, with the modification that Iranian authority not 
be restored at Bushire until the Governor-General of Pars had definitely 
left and Qaväm ul-Mulk appointed acting Governor-General. The Legation 
was also to be consulted in the selection of two new Governors of 
Bushire and Shiraz. 
2 
Grey replied to Mr. Marling: 
I realise fully that inability of two powers to send 
strong forces to Persia renders it difficult to nego- 
tiate with success. I must therefore leave it to you 
to make the best use you can of the lever such as it 
is afforded by our occupation of Bushire, though you 
will doubtless bear following desiderate in mind; 
Persent Governor-General should be removed immediately. 
Substantive appointment of Kawam as his sucessor would 
be desirable ... Persian Government should also, as 
preliminary to evacuation of Bushire, remove all 
German emissaries, not only from Shiraz but also from 
the whole district extending to sea coast, and to 
intern them. 3 
Meanwhile the Iranian Minister in London, in a meeting with the 
British Foreign Minister, suggested that the situation might be 
improved if the Iranian Governor were allowed to return to Bushire and 
the Iranian flat again be flown there, even if the British forces 
remained in occupation. 
4 However, Mr. Marling modified this order 
because he believed that "it (would be) undesirable to demand substantive 
appointment of Kawam as it would arouse latent jealousy of Soulat, who 
is at the present on good terms with him'; and also to move German 
emissaries from Iran was beyond the powers of the Iranian Goverrment. 5 
Therefore, the proposal took this final form: 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 244. B. F. O. 2 Aug. 31,1915. Grey to Marling, 4. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 245. F. O., Aug. 31,1915. Grey to Marling. 
5. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 310. Tehran, Sept. 1,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Restoration of Persian flag and civil authorities in 
Bushire as soon as Mukhber has left Shiraz and Kawam 
has taken charge from him as Acting Governor-General; 
new Governors of Bushire and Shiraz to be appointed 
with our concurrence, 
Troops will remain at Bushire until all possibility 
of further attacks has passed. Persian Government 
to undertake effective measures against German agitation. 
Indemnity to be paid as laid down. 1 
In spite of the fact that the Iranian Government accepted the removal 
of the Governor-General of Pars as a prior condition, the arrangement 
was suspended because the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs disagreed 
with the conditions, as Buchanan reported: 
..., his Excellency expressed much concern at 
contemplated evacuation of Bushire. He. thought it 
would be a grave mistake on our part to withdraw, and 
that preliminary removal of German emissaries would 
afford us no guarantee against their eventual return. 2 
Concerning public opinion, the Iranian Government was obliged to 
consider the British occupation of the southern part of the country; 
therefore, on 2nd September 1915, following the protest of 15th August, 
it despatched a letter of protest to the British Legation at Tehran. 
... according to fresh reports received by the Imperial Persian Government letters arriving in Persia are opened 
by the British Officials at Bushire who put a green label 
on them on which is written "In the name of H. M. King 
George, opened by the censor. " The letters are also 
stamped in English "Bushire under English Occupation. " 
I am compelled to protest once more against the 
seizure of Bushire ... which has taken place in the time 
of peace and while perfect friendship existed between 
the two Governments. This measure which is contrary to 
the independence and the proprietary rights of Persia 
will add to the intensity of the public excitement and 
prolong the widespread movement against the British 
Government's unsatisfactory attitude. 
1. Ibid. 
2. P. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 1276. Petrograd, Sept. 1,1915. Buchanan 
to Grey. 
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I request Your Excellency to recommend to His 
Britannic Majesty's Government to abandon this attitude. 
It is obvious that each of the measures above 
mentioned increases the responsibility of the British 
Government for the Government who are doing their utmost 
to maintain the relations between the states, the right 
to request to put an end to this situation and not to 
throw difficulties in the way of the Persian Government 
in the execution of their duty of maintaining the 
relations existing between the two countries. 
Mothashem-es-Sultaneh. 1 
On the same day, the British Legation at Tehran received another 
letter from the Iranian Foreign Office which protested against the 
British force's actions at Bushire, especially their arrest of some 
gendarmes, and also against the bombardment of Dilvar. The Iranian 
Foreign Minister, in the conclusion of the letter, stated: 
In protesting against these harsh measures which in view 
of the friendship existing between the two states are 
matter for surprise and regret, I request Your Excellency 
to get orders issued by competent authorities for 
restoration of the arms, ammunition and for the release 
of the gendarme prisoners. 
Mothashem-es-Sultaneh. 2 
Mr. Marling, in replying to the Iranian Foreign Minister, stated 
that the British occupation of Bushire and the local administration 
of the city were matters between the British Government and the 
military Governor at Buchire. He believed that those officers were 
responsible only to the British Government and "it was superfluous 
for him to discuss with the Iranian Government any action taken in 
the execution of their duty. "3 He took the opportunity to explain 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 116. British Legation Gulhek, Oct. 2,1915. 
Marling to Grey; I. F. O., C. 66, f. 31, No. 117. Shavväl 18,1333. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371-2436. No. 116. British Legation Gulhek, Sept. 9,1915. 
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the reasons for the British military operation at Bushire. He referred 
to the incident of 12th July and the deaths of two British officers 
and some sepoys, then he added the Iranian Government's reaction to 
those matters: 
Neither at the time nor subsequently has the Imperial 
Persian Government shown any official sign of a desire 
to make amends for so gross an outrage, and after 
waiting for some four weeks H. M. Government ordered 
the occupation of Bushire for the double purpose of 
protecting the Residency and British interests generally 
from further attack -- a task which I may observe is an 
obligation laid on the Persian Government by treaty - 
and secondly to obtain the reparation which may justly 
be demanded. 1 
The reparation which Mr. Marling was instructed to require from 
the Iranian Government was as follows: 
1. The recall of the present Governor-General of Pars 
and the appointment of H. E. Kawam-ul-Mulk as temporary 
Governor pending the nomination of a new Governor-General 
to be selected in agreement with His Majesty's Legation. 
2. The adequate punishment of the Khans implicated in 
the attack of 12th July. 
3. The adoption of prompt and efficacious measures to 
put an end to the pernicious activities of the German 
and other agents directed against British interests in 
Persia and practised in flagrant violation of Persian 
neutrality. 
4. The payment of suitable indemnity, viz -- stg 5000 in respect of each officer killed: stg 500 for each 
sepoy killed and stg 100 for each man wounded. 2 
The Iranian Government's Struggle against Economic Crisis 
The Iranian Government was under extreme pressure from both 
parties in the war. Moreover, internal problems stopped the government 
1. Ibid. 
2. I bid. 
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from achieving any plans, Among their difficulties, the most serious 
one was the financial problem, for not even the treasry was able to 
pay its regular payment; the gendarmerie, one of the vital factors 
in the country's security, had not been paid for some months. Mr. 
Angetan, the commander of the gendarmerie force in Shiraz, reported 
to Tehran that: 
The condition is unbearable because there is no money, 
not even one shähi in the cash office. It is 8 months 
since cereal has been received, 5 months since salaries 
have been paid and 4 months since rations have arrived. 1 
The gendarmerie headquarters in Tehran had to close most gendarmerie 
posts because of the financial problem. They had to withdraw gendarmes 
from important roads, towns and cities, even from a city like Kerman. 
The financial problem in the Ministry for War was by no means 
better. "Irshäd", in an interview with the Assistant Minister for 
War, asked about the arrears of the Ministry. He replied: 
1. The officers' salaries have not been received for 
three months. 
2. The Artillery has been delayed for 11 months. 
3. The War Ministry's administration has been delayed 
for 9 months. 
4. The Arsenal has not received [anything] for 8 months, 2 
Employees in other government departments in the capital had received 
no salary for several months; most of the offices were practically at 
a standstill and some of them were closed. The condition of employees 
in the provinces was even worse. 
The country's political and social societies acknowledged the 
financial crisis of the country and tried to set up some activities to 
1. Sipihr, 210. 
2. "Irshäd", No. 65, May 18,1915/Rajab 3,1333. 
87 
prevent the country from total collapse. There were a few suggestions 
in Tehran's newspapers, recommending the government to carry out one 
of their proposals; such as a general contribution or a tax on the 
identity cards which had been planned for the general population. 
The 'u l had also been requested to take a part in this matter and 
to declare their decision about the financial involvement of the 
country. One of them, Ayät Allah Aqä Mirzä Ibrahim Agä'i, stated: 
Of course the government is involved in a financial 
deficiency in the country. This is due to the world 
conflict, decrease of trade and non-collection of 
revenue ... if ... it continues like this for a while, 
the total administration of the country will collapse ... 
under these circumstances, if the government is not 
supported by the nation urgently ... It is obvious what 
will be the result ... You are being requested to write 
in your handwriting the duties of a Muslim in this 
matter ... 1 
This request and the muitahid's answer were published and distributed 
throughout the country. The decision was that every Muslim should 
support the government to the best of their ability, to protect the 
peace of the Muslim people and to deter the foreigners' pretexts for 
interfering in the country. The people were even allowed to pay the 
sahm-i imam on their properties to the government in order to save 
the country from imminent destruction. 
The Iranian Government was so anxious about the increase in 
disturbances throughout the country, particularly in Tehran, that all 
its efforts were put into finding some money by any possible means. 
1. I. F. O. 3 C. 66, f. 7, No. 104. Appendix. 
2. The sahm-i imäm is that part of the khums which belongs to the 
religious leader who collects the khums and which he uses to 
further religious purposes, 
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The government asked some Iranian merchants to mortgage the royal 
jewels. If the money could be obtained it would be paid to the 
Bakhtiyari savars to come to Tehran in order to control the city; but 
none of the merchants ventured to help. 
The government desperately shifted. its attention to foreigners. 
The connection with the German Legation in Tehran for help ended up 
without achievement. Meanwhile the government negotiated with the 
United States Embassy in Tehran in order to receive a recommendation 
to an American bank to give a loan to the Iranian Government, 
guaranteed by the Iranian royal jewels. The conclusion was unsuccessful. 
l 
The Iranian Government had no hope of achieving any negotiations 
with the Russians or of reaching any reasonable conclusion. So once 
more they turned to the British. The gravity of the situation in the 
southern part of the country had increased to the point of explosion. 
The British force and subjects were the main targets in Iran. The 
Iranian Government realised that unless they took necessary measures 
immediately, there was a strong possibility that the country would be 
dragged into the war against the Allies, which from the government's 
point of view was most undesirable at that time. In spite of the fact 
that public opinion was strongly against the great powers, the 
Iranian Government nevertheless showed more inclination towards the 
British., hoping that they might agree to come to better terms. Mr. 
Marling's opinion about the Iranian Government's partiality was: 
I do not, however, believe that this partial change of 
attitude was due to any fear of future chastisement on 
the part of two powers. The impression created by the 
Russian retreat in Poland was too deep and it was rather 
from the consciousness that German intrigues had been 
allowed to go too far ... The same apprehension forced 
1. Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Di lomatic Relations 
1889-1921 (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1956), 139. 
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even the Democrats to recognise that a Government of 
some kind must be formed, and as they recognised that 
a purely Democrat Ministry, even if accepted by the 
Mejliss, could not stand for a week, they left Mustofi 
a free hand to get support where he could. 1 
The British and Russians were pessimistic about the Iranian Government's 
inclination towards them; and they feared that if the government fell, 
all their assistance would be used by their enemies. Therefore, not 
only did they not intend to help but they tried to get what they 
could out of-the government before its fall. 
2 
Incitement in the South against the British 
Isfahan 
Apparently, the Iranian Government's authority did not extend 
further than to most of the capital. Those cities which had not been 
occupied by the Russian or British forces were run by local leaders. 
In Isfahan a committee from the 'ulamä' had been organised during the 
first year of the war. They had strong influence over the people and 
actually governed the city. The committee and the Democrats had 
close connections and there had been some meetings between both groups 
in Isfahan to discuss the country's affairs. The committee had also 
opened correspondence with the government and Majlis, such as the 
following letter: 
... In the general conflicts of European countries, the Iranian people have obeyed the neutrality of the 
Government's policy. At this obvious juncture, (such) 
activities (as those) of the Shia sect's leaders in 
Iraq and the union of Islam (occurred). Up to now the 
peace and silence of the people is due to the utmost 
loyalty of the leaders to the Government and their 
efforts in every region. Regretfully, our belligerent 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 111. Tehran, Sept. 1,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Ibid. 
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neighbours have despatched armies from four sides to 
Iranian soil ... The neutrality of Iran has not been 
respected. It is not tolerable any more for the 
Muslims of Iran, particularly the tribes. The Govern- 
ment policy of neutrality and the advice of the nation's 
leaders could deter to some extent the general fear and 
excitement which is due to Islamic relations and 
nationalism. The events of Khuy, Salmas, Astarabad; 
the invasion and assembling of the Russian forces in 
most of the north and east; the British force in the 
south; the violation by Turkish troops in the same part 
of Azarbaijan and in the south and west; what neutrality 
has been left for Iran? ... We begged our popular 
Government to pay attention to the crying out of our 
brothers and sisters in the north, south, east and west, 
to take a decision immediately and to inform the people 
of their duties before their patience is exhausted. 
The Union of 'U1amä' 
Shaykh liar Allah and others. 1 
In Isfahan, public tension was being aggravated day by day. The 
British Consul in the city believed that there was no imminent peril 
to the Allies' subjects, but the possibility was very strong that it 
would happen shortly afterwards. Therefore, the British and Russian 
Consuls asked for permission to despatch the women and children to 
Ahvaz. 
2 The British Government disagreed with this suggestion because 
the evacuation of the whole Ispahan region by British and Russian 
subjects offered an opportunity to the Germans to take over completely. 
3 
The British and Russian Consuls in Isfahan had been warned that 
a plot was on foot to assassinate them and the other Allied authorities 
in the city. On 2nd September, a gunman attacked the British Consul 
and his companion, an Indian savar. It happened at 5.45 a. m., when 
they were returning from a ride through the countryside; the gunman 
shot and wounded the consul and killed the Indian. The British and 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 7. No. 90. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tole. No. 279. Tehran, Aug. 26,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tole. No. 315. Sept. 3,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Russian Consuls in Isfahan reported that "the situation (is) very 
disquieting'1 and suggested that women and children should be deported 
before it was too late. They explained that the general agitation 
against the Allies was due to the British occupation of Bushire. 
2 A 
broadsheet had been published, indicating that the "killing of consul 
is useless, and that all the British and Russians must be driven out. "3 
Concerning the conditions in Isfahan, the British and Russian Ministers 
in Tehran were of the opinion that the Iranian Government would not 
be able to guarantee the safety of the Allies' subjects in Isfahan. 
There was also a strong possibility that the opposition might repeat 
their attempts; therefore, in spite of the fact that the withdrawal of 
the women and children would have some disadvantages for the Allies, 
particularly a drastic effect on the excitement in Shiraz, nevertheless 
both ministers agreed with the consuls' proposals. 
The Isfahan incident suddenly overshadowed the other current 
problems in the country. "B9Lmd9Ld-i Raushan" commented on the event, 
blaming British policy in Iran and especially condemning the occupation 
of Bushire. The newspaper stated: 
Mr. Graham was well informed of conditions in the city 
and (the inability) of the government's forces and also 
knew that the nationalistic and Islamic feeling is 
intensive in Isfahan; so it would have been better for 
him to leave showing off his power and stout-heartedness 
until another time. 4 
The incident roused appeals fron both legations in Tehran. They 
strongly protested to the Iranian Government that it had no intention 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 319. Tehran, Sept. 6,1915. Marling to Grey. 
4. "Bändäd-i Raushan", No. 85, Sept. 6,1915/Shavväl 15,1333. 
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of maintaining the policy of neutrality, and warned the Iranian 
Government that if they did not receive some satisfactory measures, 
they would assume that the government showed without any doubt the 
possibility of relations being broken off between Iran and its neigh- 
bours. 1 On the day following the events in Isfahan, the Iranian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a meeting with the British Minister 
in Tehran, on behalf of the Iranian Government expressed regret for 
the attempt on the life of the consul-general at Isfahan. He also 
asked for financial assistance from both powers. The answer was that, 
unless the Iranian Government intended to take active measures to 
improve conditions, they should not expect to receive financial help. 
Mr. Marling interpreted the Iranian Government's policy as doing 
nothing to restrain the German proceedings or even to influence 
Iranian opinion against the Germans. On the contrary, the government's 
idea was to use the Germans as a lever to squeeze the two great 
powers for its own interests. 
2 Mr. Marling suggested a policy using 
pressure and considerable inducement to the Iranian Government in 
order to change its attitude. To achieve this purpose, he disagreed 
with the occupation of any other port in southern Iran, as had happened 
at Bushire, which would result in a pretext for stirring up Iranian 
sentiment against the British; but the pressure should be achieved by 
despatching a great number of Russian troops (15,000 men) to Iran, 
especially to Qazvin. 
3 Otherwise there would be no alternative but 
to give the Iranian Government an ultimatum, as Mr. Marling reported: 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 313. Tehran, Sept. 2,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 316, Tehran, Sept. 4,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. Ibid. 
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... only course open to us would 
be to give Persia 
choice of declaring herself for or against us. It 
would be akin to asking her to break off relations 
with enemy powers ... if Persia wishes to join us she 
must declare war on those powers, ... In the contrary 
case, two Legations would leave the country, ... 
Persians would have forty-eight hours in which to 
decide. 1 
He rather frankly expressed his anxiety and wrote: 
Unless some very drastic measure is taken or a 
decisive military success occurs to shake Persia's 
belief in German invincibleness, we shall not be 
able to remain at Tehran very much longer, and it 
would at least be less damaging to our prestige to 
depart by our own doing than to be driven out. 2 
The British Legation in Tehran foresaw that if the Iranian 
Government wished to join the Allies, it would certainly ask for 
military assistance, a sum of money and a guarantee of territorial 
integrity at the end of the war, also the gradual withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Iranian territory. But neither the Russian nor 
the British Governments intended to give the Iranian Government such 
privileges. As a matter of fact, much help to the Iranian Government 
was out of the question for both powers. The British Government also 
refused to give the Iranian Government an ultimatum which it believed 
would undoubtedly put Iran in the hands of the Germans. On the other 
hand, the Government of India recommended the policy of "holding up 
the situation. "3 Mr. Marling received a secret telegram which 
indicated the Allied, and especially the British, policy in Iran at 
that time. It was stated that: "we must emphatically deprecate 
ultimatum proposed by Minister, which would simply be playing German's 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. Ido. 321. Tehran, Sept. 7,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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game. "1 Then it explained that, in case the Iranian Government 
intended to join the Allies, they should be supported with substantial 
military force from both powers; otherwise they would not have the 
ability to prevent German activities; consequently, the consuls would 
be in greater danger than they were at the time. In addition to 
military aid, considerable financial assistance would be necessary 
too, not to mention the other privileges that they would desire. On 
the contrary, if the Iranian Government declared war against the 
Allies, of which they had shown no sign unless they were compelled, 
the British would have some difficulties: 
(1) our consuls and communities would be in more 
precarious position than now. 
(2) We should be compelled either to abandon Anglo- 
Persian oil company's pipe line or to defend it 
at expense of operations in Mesopotamia. 
(3) Enormous political capital would be made by 
Turkey and Germany out of entry into war of second 
Muslem state against us. This would react inevitably 
on Afghanistan, where there is preponderately Shiah 
community, and on Huslem opinion in India, particularly 
Shiah. Amir's position would be rendered difficult, 
if not untenable -- and M"Zuslem hostility now 
evidenced in sporadic attacks on North-West frontier 
would consolidate in possibly formidable dimensions. 
These are weighty considerations to which sufficient 
consideration does not appear to have been paid. 2 
In the conclusion the Viceroy stated: "For these reasons we infinitely 
prefer for the present policy of drifting. Persian Government is 
probably too invertebrate to take definite line against us. "3 The 
Viceroy pointed out that: 
It must not be forgotten that we have no troops to 
spare from either India or Mesopotamia and that presen- 
tation of an ultimatum to Persia may result in 




intensifying Mohammedan hostility towards Allies, 
rendering the situation in India very critical and 
increasing our difficulties both on and outside our 
frontiers. 1 
The Viceroy of India's Government hoped that the British forces 
in the Dardanelles would be successful and thus change their whole 
position in the war; therefore it would not be necessary "either (to) 
precipitate rupture with Persia or secure her partnership at a cost 
of money and embarrassing guarantees without compensating advantages 
of crushing German intrigues. "2 Consequently, all the legation's 
attempts failed to draw the British Government's attention to the 
importance of India and Afghanistan in relation to Iran's problems. 
Mr. Marling wrote: "I entirely fail to see how the policy of drift 
which Government of India advocate, can meet the difficulty. "3 He 
believed that the game was in the hands of the opposition. As he 
pointed out, "it is therefore not a question of drifting, but how 
long the Germans will hold their hands. "4 He tried to convince his 
government to change their policy towards Iran before it was too late. 
He recommended that it would be better for both powers to support the 
Iranian Government with financial and military aids, which they were 
constantly asking for. In return the Iranian Government would have to 
close the Majlis and suppress opposition newspapers. He urged his 
government that both powers should not miss the tendency of the Iranian 
Government towards the Allies, as he described: 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 321. Tehran, Sept. 7,1915. Ilrarling to Grey. 
4. Ibid. 
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As matter of fact, the only element of the present 
situation in our favour is that the Persian Govern- 
ment will go to considerable length to prevent the 
two legations from leaving. 1 
In fact the Germans were gaining power and influence day after 
day. All British and Russian efforts to improve conditions in their 
favour ended in disappointment; particularly the measures which both 
powers had taken up to that time in order to terrify the people and 
to squeeze the government resulted in resistance and agitation. "The 
Near East" commented on the failure of British policy in Iran: 
If every British diplomacy is called upon to divide 
its activities into successes and failures there can 
be no doubt as to the category to which its efforts in 
Persia belong. Eight years ago Great Britain and Russia 
reminded one another and the world at large that Persia 
was of such particular interest to both of them that 
they regarded it as a duty imposed upon them to make 
themselves responsible for her welfare, and to allow 
no other country to interfere with their Persian 
preserves ... An inquiry into the situation in Persia 
today reveals the uncomfortable fact that the Turco- 
German combination has only had to raise its little 
finger in order to have things almost entirely its 
own way in that country. 2 
The newspaper criticised the British Government in Iran during recent 
years. It was astonishing to the newspaper that the British had been 
disappointed in the result. It complained: 
If Anglo-Russian dealings with Persia had lived up to 
the spirit of the Convention of 1907, it would have been 
impossible for the Germans to have suborned the Persians 
from a friendship of eight years in less than that 
number of months ... The fact is that, in spite of a 
traditional understanding between Persia and Great 
Britain, the attitude of British diplomacy during 
the last few years has resulted in complete estrangement 
of both people and Government. 3 
1. Ibid. 
2. "The Near East", Sept. 10,1915. 
3. Ibid. 
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Mr. Marling anxiously reported that the situation would improve 
if they promised financial assistance and some other inducements; 
these would offer a chance "of pulling the chestnuts out of fire. "1 
In spite of the fact that Mr. r: arling doubted that Mustaufi ul-Mamälik 
would not dare to join the Allies against the Germans, and particularly 
against Turkey; nevertheless, they had to take the chance "wholly 
dependent on their good will. "2 Mr. MacLean in his report to Mr. 
Greenway wrote: "Until the war turns in our favour, the best we can 
hope for from Persia is to maintain some sort of sullen neutrality. "3 
Shiraz 
In Shiraz the condition was more serious than ever. There were 
several well-organised political groups acting for a national movement 
against the Allies. The 'ulama_ and the Democrat and Moderate Parties 
were also very active. The political groups and parties had close 
connections with the confederated khans. There was no disagreement 
between the parties and the Governor-General of Fars. The gendarmerie 
officers were also in touch with the parties and were willing to take 
part in any necessary actions. Some newspapers, such as "JAm-i Jan', 
"Tiziyänah", "Hayyit" and "'Adl", were published in Shiraz and circu- 
lated throughout the country, particularly in the south. These news- 
papers were extremely anti-Allied and inflamed the people's agitation; 
"Jäm-i Jam" commented on the British action in the south of Iran: 
So far as we can say with certainty, the English 
considered themselves not only the governor and 
ruler in the south, but the humble conduct and 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 321. Tehran, Sept. 7,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371-2426. Tehran, Sept. 2,1915. MacLean to Greenway. 
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slave-like action of the chiefs had given them such 
confidence that they considered themselves without 
trouble the owner of all the south. 1 
The union and coordination of these political factors produced 
a national movement in the province and put Shiraz at the apex of the 
internal crisis of Iran. Most of the British propaganda in the south 
resulted in total failure. Major Trevor, the British Military Governor 
at Bushire, in continuation of taking strict measures against the 
hostile khans, sent them letters of warning and threatened that they 
should avoid any hostile actions against the British forces in the 
south. One of the khans who had had no differences with the British 
before, but nevertheless joined the confederation, was Shaykh Husayn 
Chähkatä'i from Chähkütä, a region near Bushire. The British Military 
Governor had confiscated the property and money of the hostile khans 
in Bushire, among which were 10,000 tümäns belonging to Shaykh Husayn. 
In replying to the letter of the British Military Governor, Shaykh 
Husayn wrote: 
You have again threatened me with the confiscation 
of Tumans 10,000 .. 
As regards the attack by volunteers on your 
troops of aggression to which you have made a reference, 
in the first place, personally I have not been on hostile 
terms with the British Government. Your barbarous actions 
and the torture, detention and deportation of innocent 
people of Bushire and your insult to our sacred country, 
the home of our ancestors, have compelled me to oppose, 
and fight with you, and life has hereby been rendered 
unhappy for myself, my family and my friends. Up to 
now we have not made any attack which may be worth notice 
in support of the cause of Islam. The false British 
civilisation has become plain to all nations of the 
world and their cruel and oppressive aggression in our 
country and territories have been made by the authorities 
of the illustrious Government. Fie on the civilised 
1. F. O. 371-2434. Enclosure No. 2. Supplement to the "Jäm-i Jam", 
No. 18,4 Ramazä. n 1333/27 July 1915. 
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Government of Great Britain and on the founders of 
learning and justice in the world; Your lies and 
fraud have become known to the world and they have 
awakened. Your barbarous steps against a few helpless 
and workless traders of Bushire are of no importance 
... All the Muhammadans of the world, even all the 
nations of the world have become disgusted with you. 
If God wills, and by the grace and power of God, I 
will settle the affairs of Bushire in a space of two 
days .., 1 
A war against the British was imminent. Day by day pro-British 
elements, such as some of the khäns and those who were well-known as 
friends of the British or working for them, were living in a panic. 
The activities of the Moderate Party were more effective in Pars 
than in the other provinces. The highest committee of the party in 
Shiraz issued a broadsheet in order to neutralise the British propaganda 
and threatened those people who supported or worked for the Allies. 
It was published as an extra page in 'I 4Adl". The broadsheet contains 
short instructions about a human being's responsibilities for protecting 
his religion, homeland and society from foreign infringement; it then 
refers to the religious leaders: 
According to the 'u='s decision, nowadays it is 
obligatory and necessary for every Muslim who is able 
to prevent the British and Russians with their lives 
and properties. Any one who neglects these duties has 
rejected Muslim submission and it is lawful to shed 
his blood. 2 
The committee had asked the "u arms to declare their orders about 
people who help an enemy who has invaded an Islamic country. The 
'ulamä"'s reply was in the name of the six highest Shia muitahids at 
1. F. O. 371-2435. Aug. 21,1915. Dated Shavväl 9,1333. Subenclosure. 
From Shaikh Hussain Chahkutah to Major Trevor. 
2. I. P. O., C. 66, f. 7, No. 104.1333. 
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that time, such as Muhammad Tag! Shiräzi, Muhammad Qäzim TabAtabä'i, 
Sharif Isfahan. The orders were to banish or possibly to hang anyone 
who had helped the enemy in any way. 
1 In the cities the pro-British 
had no chance to take any action openly and tried not to be accused 
of doing so. Some khAns, such as Haydar Khan Hayyät Dä'üdi, remained 
pro-British in spite of Iranian sentiment. He received a lot of 
letters of advice, warning and threats from the khäns, 'u lamä', 
gendarmerie officers and even the Governor-General of Pars. The 
newspapers attacked him bitterly. Haydar Khan was Governor of the 
Bandar Rig region and he was able to prepare up to 3,000 savars, 
including his family savars. Therefore, he was encouraged, persuaded 
and threatened to join the confederated khäns. The letters which 
Haydar Khan received indicated the political excitement in the south 
and the pressure on pro-Allied people in Pars. Darya Baygi, the 
title for the Governor or ports of the Persian Gulf, D ashti and 
Dashtistän (the southern part of the province of Pars), wrote to 
Haydar Khan: 
I do not know by the deceit of what devil you have 
lost your senses and obtained a bad name for yourself 
in Persia, As I hold a high opinion of your sense, 
I write plainly to ask you whether you are ready, in 
return for your evil actions in the past, to give the 
hands of unity to your brethren in religion, and check 
the unbelievers who have invaded our country, or 
whether you prefer disgrace? 2 
Shaykh Ja'far, one of the Shiraz 'ulamAl, who arrive in Burazjän from 
Shiraz in order to assist the anti-British movement in the south, wrote 
to Haydar Khan: 
1. The broadsheet contains another proclamation of Nirza Äqä, a 
mu tahid in Pars. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. Enclosure No. 2. Dated Shawwal 20,1333/Sept. 2, 
1915. Prom the Darya Begi to Haidar Khan, Hayat Daud. 
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In accordance with my duty to the Shara'... I wrote to 
inform you that it is incumbent on all Muhamma. dians and 
especially the occupants of the frontiers to take steps 
without hesitation and to give their lives and properties 
in order to ward off the unbelievers and remove their 
cruel hands from Bushire and to stop their intrigues and 
deceit in Muhammadan lands, and their rule over Muhammdans. 
If anyone fails to follow this Divine order, it is 
obligatory on all who can to compel him to obedience to 
Divine orders ... 
It is obvious that after receipt of this letter you 
will have no excuse to make and in view of my good opinion 
of your devotion to Islam and devoutness, I trust that 
you will acclaim this Divine invitation ... 1 
The main reasons for the occupation of Bushire by British forces 
were guarding the oil wells and the pipe line and protecting the 
British Army in Mesopotamia from the east. From the Iranian Government's 
point of view the occupation of Bushire had had no effect but to increase 
the government problems drastically and to grant the pro-Germans' 
criticism of the government, that following the policy of neutrality 
was useless. 
However, there had frequently been collisions between the British 
forces and some of the followers of the hostile khäns whose regions 
were close to Bushire. Four British warships in the Persian Gulf 
had bombarded the hostile khäns' villages, destroyed houses and landed 
troops. Some conflicts were inevitable. There had occurred intensive 
fighting between the British force and the khäns' men. The fighting 
sometimes was so close that the British troops had to use bayonets. 
According to the British Jar Office, the British force lost 150 men in 
the two operations of Bushire and Dilvar. 
2 Ra'is 'Ali Dilvari was 
killed in one of these combats. The news of his death was followed 
1. F. O. 371-2436. Enclosure No. 4. Dated ZiQa'adeh 10,1333/Sept. 21, 
1915. Fron Shaikh Jaffar of Shiraz, Borazjun to Haidar Khan of 
Hayat Daud, Bandar Rig. 
2. Christopher Sykes, 'Jassmuss, the German Lawrence (London, 1936), 
109. 
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by a wave of anger in the south. In the cities mourning ceremonies 
were performed and Ra'is 'Al! was highly praised and called a martyr. 
In Shiraz the people's irritation was tremendously inflamed. The 
Iranian Government received a protest that it was doing nothing. A 
vä'iz in a Shiraz mosque said about the central government: 
Sometimes friends come to me asking if the Dowlat 
(Government) in Tehran hath declared neutrality how can 
we go about with arms? only from such speeches I learn 
that there is a Dowlat in Tehran. 0 Ye fools! the Dowlat 
of Persia is but a name or the Persians would not burn 
under the Russian and the Anglees. The Ministers pass 
their days in trembling and they nearly suffocate with 
fright. That is how they govern in Tehran: Can you 
imagine these few wretches as the leaders of our 
people. 1 
A military force was composed from volunteers of the people in 
Shiraz. All classes of society, even the 'ulaaä', took a part in the 
force; called the "National Arxy", they were training under the 
gendarmerie officers in Shiraz. The purpose of this action was to 
join the confederation for a great attack. On 7th September 1915, 
Ghuläm 'All Khan, an Iranian who worked as the British Consul's 
assistant in Shiraz, was attacked by a gunman and wounded twice; he 
died the next day. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, the Governor-General of Pars 
at that time, stated that Ghuläm 'All Kh. 1n used to pass a district 
where ruffians came to gather. On the day of the incident, Ghuläm 
'All Khän was passing by as usual and loudly said, "'All Dilvärl went 
to Hell"; he was followed by one of the ruffians, shot and later on 
died. 2 
Mukhbir us-Salianah, the Governor-General of Fars, had been blamed 
by the British Consul at Shiraz as a pro-German, The British Government 
1. Ibid., 112-13. 
2.1-Tukhbir us-Saltanah, 275. 
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rapidly requested his dismissal from the governorship. His recall 
from Shiraz was the first condition of the British demands to the 
Iranian Government for settling the Bushire problem. Mukhbir 
us-Saltanah claimed he had done his best to maintain neutrality, to 
decrease the people's agitation and to deter the people from maleng 
serious attempts against British subjects in Shiraz. He stated that 
he had deterred the Democrats from kidnapping the British Consul in 
Shiraz. He had told the Democrat representative that "the consul is 
under government protection and it is my duty to protect him"; when 
the Democrat insisted on the matter, he replied that "I am bound to 
stay at the gate of the consulate; (first) you must kill me and (then) 
enter. "1 
The British Legation in Tehran, in a letter to the-Iranian Govern- 
went, wrote that they were assured that the Governor-General of Fars 
had been a leader of the Democrats and a center of hostile activities 
against British interests in Fars. They asked for his recall from 
Shiraz. Mukhbir us-Sal4anah denied the charges and professed that he 
would have left Shiraz willingly even without the governor's permission 
if it were not for the peril of disturbances with which he would later 
be blamed. Mukhbir us-Saltanah referred to his relations with the 
Democrats and confessed that he had no alternative but to come to terms 
with them as they had public support. That was the only way he was 
able to prevent them from serious attempts. He added that "it is not 
my fault that the Democrats have paid no attention to the British pound 
and Indian star. "2 About his political opinion, .: ukhbir us-Saltanah 
said: "I am an Iranian and support my nation's interest. I do not 
1. Ibid., 271 
2. Ibid., 276. 
i 
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German, British or Russian. If I will be obliged to do anything 
against my nation, I will resign. "1 
When he was vehemently criticised by the British Legation in 
Tehran that he had no intention of maintaining neutrality and would 
not prevent the people demonstrating against the British, he wrote: 
"If the meaning of neutrality is to oblige the people not to talk for 
defending their rights, I am not able to do it; if such action is 
possible, why will the government in Tehran not do that? "2 However, 
14ukhbir us-Saltanah stated his sincere opinion not in his book but 
in a letter to Ismä'il Khän of Shabänkärah. 
... you should, by the grace of God, be engaged in 
safeguarding your own borders ... you should of course 
think well and not lose your reputation at the end of 
life with the nation and the Government, it is still 
the duty of the zealous chiefs of the tribes to check 
with all their might the aggressions of foreigners on 
the clean soil of Persia. 
At present by this unrighteous action on the part 
of British military authorities, neutrality had been 
violated. Whatever complaints they may have had, it was 
not expedient to pull down the Persian flag at Bushire 
and seize the Government Departments. 
As far as the matter of Bushire is concerned the 
Government will carry on negotiations with a view to 
maintaining as far as possible the former relations, 
but if they wish to overstep the borders of others, it 
will be your duty as a Muhammadan to check them and 
defend the national right. 3 
In another letter to Haydar Khan Hayyät DA'üdi, Nukhbir 
us-Saltanah tried to encourage him to join the confederation: 
1. Ibid.,, 278. 
2. Ibid., 279. 
3. F. O. 371-2436. Sub-enclosure No. 1. Aug. 17,1915. Tele. dated 
Shawwal 5. From Governor-General of Fars, Shiraz to Ismail Khan 
of Shabanlcareh (through Abu Tailb Khan, Gendarmerie officer, 
Borasjun). 
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It is a cause for regret. that such a an as you should 
become known among the people as a seller of your 
country and be cursed by them to the end of eternity ... 
It is the duty of men like you, who are a Muhammadan 
and Persian, in safeguarding neutrality not to allow 
foreigners to encroach on your country. 
Although the neutrality has already been 
violated by the measures of the British military and 
the Government has begun diplomatic negotiations with 
regard to the occurrence at Bushire with a view to 
maintaining the former relations yet if they want to 
make aggressions in other places, your duty is to check 
them and defend national and Islamic rights. 1 
The Iranian Government had gradually been losing its control over 
those cities which were apparently governed by government authorities. 
The Shiraz incident indicated that the people would not tolerate the 
government's policy of neutrality any longer. The government received 
a lot of telegrams and letters from the cities demanding immediate 
action; otherwise the people would act as they believed they should. 
A telegram from Kashan to the government, Majlis, and newspapers 
described the people's attitude towards the situation in the country: 
The violation of our northern and southern neighbours 
have been increased since the beginning of the war ... According to the orders of religious leaders ... it is 
necessary and obligatory to defend and check them from 
Islamic countries ... but thence the government was of 
the idea that the safety of Iran depended upon main- 
taining neutrality ... we obeyed the government's 
decision and kept silent. 
It seems that the foreigners considered our 
silence as evidence for our disobedience to the religious 
leaders, and (assumed) our assent to their violation ... Do we have still to be in idleness? Do we have to see 
the foreigners' domination in our home? ... For God's 
sake we are not able to stand any more ,., and we are 
not going to accept any more false promises. 2 
1. F. O. 371-2436. Sub-enclosure No. 2. Aug. 17,1915. Tele. dated 
Shawwal 5 (17th August 1915). From the I"lukbir-us-Saltanah, 
Governor-General of Fars to Haidar Khan of Hayat Daoud, Bandar 
Rig (through sultan Abu Talib Khan). 
2. "Bämdld-i Raushan", No. 86, Sept. 8,1915/Shavväl 27,1333. 
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The Iranian Foreign Office's envoy in Shiraz reported that the crisis 
in the city was getting worse. He believed it was better for the 
Iranian Government to reach an agreement for the evacuation of Bushire 
as soon as possible. He regarded that there were terrifying rumours 
around, and incidents such as Ghuläm 'All Khan's assassination. If 
things continued as they were, the authorities would be involved in 
big trouble. ' 
iqä Mirzä, the mu tahid of Shiraz, had received a message from 
the government in which the British Minister in Tehran had complained 
about his activities, such as the issue of his proclamation. He was 
asked to co-operate with the government. Äqa Mirzä was surprised 
that the government had not appreciated his efforts and stated: 
If I did not advise and prevent the people who are 
extremely excited by the ports' incidents, Shiraz 
would have been on fire by now. Now I have also 
convinced the people to wait for the result of the 
government's endeavours and I deter them from taking 
any actions. It is better for the government not to 
delay in obtaining the outcome of its actions, not to 
leave the people in a state of idleness. The British 
Minister's complaint about me is based on the informa- 
tion of the British Consul at Shiraz. The reason for 
the complaint in fact is my disagreement with their 
desires and expectations of me ... to receive money from 
the British for the gendarmerie and to be their propa- 
gandist, which I am not able to be ... 2 
Äqä Mirzä referred then to the proclamation and stated that it was 
his religious duty to answer the question. 
The Shiraz incident offered the Tehran newspapers another oppor- 
tunity to attack the Allies', and especially the British, policy in 
Iran. "Naubahir", in a comment on the assassination of Ghuläm 'Ali 




Khän, stated that it was annoying and called the incident a "political 
murder". The writer believed that British operations in the south 
was the main reason for the Shiraz occurrence. The newspaper did not 
blame the people of Shiraz but held the British responsible for the 
event and wrote: 
Nowadays affairs are dependent on the sword; if one 
day the affairs are settled by talk and proof, we 
will have proved that the British are sinful .. 
Whatever the Iranian politicians expected from the 
Russians in the north, the British committed it in 
the south and involved us in great danger. 1 
In another edition, "Naubahär" criticised Sir Edward Grey for his 
Middle East policy, referred to the British policy in Iran and stated 
that although the foundation of British Policy in Iran did not have 
any differences from that of Russia, the British Government's tactics 
and activities were at least unknown to public acknowledgement; there- 
fore it seeped a mild policy and was not as harsh as the Russian. 
Recently the tactic had changed and British representatives in Iran, 
particularly Sir Charles Marling, had approved this policy and was 
responsible for this change. The writer referred to "The Near East" 
article and believed the British Parliament and public opinion 
disagreed with this sort of policy. 
2 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" referred to the turmoil in the country and 
believed that the neighbours of Iran did not indeed want to let Iran 
develop. They used the ignorance of the people and traitors for 
their purposes. The writer then reverted to the past and pointed out 
some examples to prove his idea. He wrote: 
1. "Naubahär", No. 73, Sept. 10,1915/Shavväl 29,1333. 
2. Ibid., No. 72, Sept. 7,1915/Shavväl 26,1915. 
108 
If the Iranian Government enacted new taxation or 
collected revenue in order to overcome its financial 
problems, something happened and cost a great deal of 
money; consequently, the government became poorer and 
more indigent. If the government employed foreign 
financial experts or military advisers, these would 
cause irritation and suspicion. They protect those 
who avoided paying tax and supported the rebels. 1 
The writer intended to show his main point, that the European policy 
of colonisation had set up internal discords, civil wars and disagree- 
ment in Iran. He referred them to the condition in the southern 
part of Iran and attacked the British policy which was believed to be 
a great error: 
Threatening has recently been the policy of the British 
Government in order to subjugate us and if they could to 
drag us into a war against Turkey; in case this is not 
possible, at least they desire to be free in their 
activities in Iran and to arrest their hostile subjects 
in the country. 2 
"Shürä" believed that the occupation of Bushire by the British 
forces and their oppressive actions had produced armed agitation in 
the south; this reaction had gradually spread all over the country 
and created strong hatred in Iranian hearts against the British. The 
newspaper stated: 
We have always been firmly of the idea that the 
British harm to Iran is not less than the Russian, but 
the London Diplomatic court had constantly chosen a 
hypocritical policy to delude the simple-minded Iranian. 
On one hand they had taken part with the Russians 
in offending and violating (Iran). On the other hand ... (they) showed a friendly attitude towards Iran, while most 
of the Russian unrighteous actions were due to British 
instruction and inducement. 
1. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 83, Sept. 6,1915/Shavvil 25,1333. 
2. Ibid. 
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If we are not forgetful, we will remember that the 
first chant about the unfortunate convention of 1907, 
which must be considered as the foundation of our present 
misfortune, came out from the London Diplomat's mouth ... 
Now our unkind neighbours ... do not allow us to 
cure our wounds, which are the result of their brutality; 
they are cruelly cutting off our arteries of independence 
and integrity ... if they kill us eventually, why do we 
not the with honour? 1 
The British and Russians newspapers inveighed simultaneously 
against the Iranian Government, Majlis and iu__, which had been 
dominated by German and Turkish influence. The Iranian Ambassador 
in Petrograd complained about the Russian newspapers' attitude towards 
Iran, which had misinterpreted the country's affairs and published 
inaccurate news. He asked for permission to deny the report in 
"Novoye Vremya", which stated: 
The Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had gone to 
the British Legation to express his regret about the 
consul's incident (in Isfahan). The British Minister 
did not receive him and sent a message in which (he 
stated that) it was useless to receive an official 
statement of regret from a government which was not 
able to secure the safety of the British diplomatic 
representatives. 2 
On 6th September "Novoye Vremya" published an article about 
Iranian matters. The writer surveyed Iran's condition from the beginning 
of the war, stating that SultAn Ahmad Shäh, his government and the 
Majlis had agreed to announce the neutrality of Iran in the war; they 
had no alternative but to be neutral due to a lack of army and naval 
forces. In the second year of the war, the situation in Iran had 
1, "Shürä", No. 90, Sept. 2,1915/Shawäl 21,1333. 
2. I. F. O. , C. 62, f. 4. No. 12.1333 H. d. Dated Shawäl 30,1333. No. 2073. 
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changed and the Iranian Government was not able to maintain neutrality. 
He added his point of view about the neutrality of Iran: 
Neutrality is maintained only in those parts where the 
Russian and British forces have occupied and the forces 
have deterred the Turk and German's intrigues and pre- 
vented the court and government's administration to be 
dragged under the influence of the intriguers completely, 1 
The writer believed that there was no sign of official neutrality from 
the government in the central. and southern parts of Iran and referred 
to many incidents, such as the fights between the gendarmerie and 
Mrs and also with the Shähsavän, the Kangävar conflict, the Isfahan 
incident and so on. He alluded to the 'ul amä "s movement and leader- 
ship, that they had raised the flag of iihäd with German money and 
arms, organised some groups for war against Islam's enemy and had 
asked for help from the Prophet and "Haji Wilhelm". The writer 
expressed his pity for the situation of Iran and prophesied that the 
German and Turkish influence in Iran would cause the division of that 
unfortunate country, but he did not mention by whom it would be divided. 
He also attacked the Iranian Government, which had allowed its admini- 
stration to be dragged under German and Turkish influence and to follow 
a harmful policy for the country. He foresaw that in this case the 
country would be more and more involved in calamity. In his conclusion 
he anticipated that the threat and hostility which had been manifested 
to the Russians and British would come to act and warned his government 
to be aware of the Iranian situation. 
2 
"Horizont", published in Badkubah, stated that the political 
condition of Iran was gradually getting worse. The Iranian crisis had 
1. I. P. O. 2 C. 66, f. 10, No. 69. 2. . 
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been continuing for a long time, which was due to the cabinet crisis, 
the effect of the world war and, worst of all, the German propaganda 
and the Iranians who were pro-German, which misled public opinion to 
be against the British and Russians, The people's agitation was 
increasing every moment. The Germans were pouring money into the 
country and organising secret armed groups. 
1 
The British newspapers had their own point of view. "The Times" 
blamed the Germans for causing problems in Iran: 
... the untiring activity of German agents in Persia 
and their repeated attempts to cause embarrassment to 
Great Britain and Russia by stirring up trouble. Here,, 
as elsewhere, they have shown themselves utterly 
unscrupulous in their methods, one, a certain Dr. Pugin, 
having even gone as far as pretending to have embraced the 
Mahamdan religion in order to move easily to influence 
Persians. 2 
On 7th September, "The Times" not only attacked German activities in 
Iran but also blamed the Iranian Government for their inability to 
deter the German agents' actions in the country. The writer believed 
that the German agents had been spending money lavishly and their 
legation in Tehran and consulate in Isfahan were armed camps. He stated: 
A section of Majliss corrupted by German gold frustrates 
the efforts of any cabinet attempting to maintain 
neutrality ... The Persian masses fail to realise how 
the peace and neutrality they ardently desire is being 
jeopardised. 3 
"The Near East"'s commentary on Iranian affairs referred to the 
attempt on the consul-general's life in Isfahan, then to the crisis in 
1. "Horizont", quoted in "Bämdld-i Raushan", Tzo. 84, Sept. 4,1915/ 
Shavväl 23,1333. 
2. "The Times", Aug. 28,1915. 
3. Ibid., Sept. 7,1915. 
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the country. The writer criticised the British Government, which had 
done little for the safety of British subjects in Iran, and stated: 
British prestige has suffered too much already from our 
failure to exact respect for the lives of British subjects. 
It is impossible that latest outrages pass unnoticed. 
The time may not be opportune for dealing with the 
Persian question as a whole, but more will be expected 
of the British Government than landing of a small force 
at Bushire. 1 
The German newspapers looked at Iranian affairs from another angle, 
which caused a lot of embarrassment for the British and Russians. The 
"Berliner Tageblatt", about the conflicts between Iranian national 
forces and the British in the south, wrote: 
The determination about which the Persian statesmen 
seem to have agreed is a great one. The fight is a 
fight for the existence and independence of the country, 
rather for the recovery of the independence which has 
been lost during the Anglo-Russian efforts for the 
restoration of order in the country, The business for 
Persia is now to wipe out of existence the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of 1907 and all its consequences. The agree- 
ment was made without consulting the country, and the 
Persian Government has always protested against it. But 
beyond this platonic protest nothing was done. 2 
"Frankfurter Zeitung" referred to the situation in the south of 
Iran and the Iranian reaction against the occupation of the ports by 
3,000 men of the British force. The writer stated: 
The excitement in Southern Persia is great. Preparations 
are being made for resistance on a large scale in the 
event of the English advancing from the coast region. 
The principal tribes of Southern Persia have agreed to 
proclaim a Holy war. 3 
1. "The Near East", Sept. 17,1915. 
2. "Berliner Tageblatt", quoted in "The Tines", Aug. 26,1915. 
3. "Frankfurter Zeitung", quoted in "The Times", Aug. 26,1915. 
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In Iran, the editor of " Asr-i Jadid", in a letter to the German 
Ambassador, had asked some questions relating to current events in 
Iran, both questions and answers being published in the issue of 
7th September. The ambassador tried to show the German goodwill in 
Iran. He stated that the Germans had endeavoured to avoid any collisions 
with the British and Russians in Iran in order to prevent the country 
being engaged in the war. The ambassador referred then to the British 
and Russians, who had no intention of having the same attitude as the 
Germans. He referred to some incidents in which the Russians and 
British had been rude and maltreated German subjects in a neutral 
country. He mentioned the closing down of the German orphanage in 
Tabriz and other incidents in this city, the arrest of consuls and the 
death of a German woman in Urü. miyah and so on. The ambassador stated 
that their enemy without hesitation took any attempts, even mean ones, 
to make impossible the arrival or residence of German subjects in 
Iranian cities. The German Government had considered this savage 
behaviour and taken necessary measures. The ambassador expressed his 
opinion about Iranian policy and admitted that it would be better for 
the Iranian Government to follow neutrality, asking the Russians and 
British to withdraw their forces from Iranian territory and to let the 
German Consuls take their posts. Regarding the southern part of Iran, 
the German Ambassador stated that the Turkish Government had officially 
assured him that they had no intention of occupying Iranian territory. 
Had the British, who claimed that they had been a friend of Iran, 
offered the same assurance? The editor had asked what kind of assistance 
the Germans were able to give the Iranian Government in order to help 
to drive the enemy out of Iran, but the ambassador avoided commenting 
on that, 
l 
1. "'Aqr-i Jadid", No. 63, Sept. 7,1915/Shavval 26,1333. 
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A Solution to the Bushire Problem 
The gravity of the situation in the country and the serious 
threat to the Allies' interests and subjects forced the Iranian 
Government on one hand to appeal for financial assistance from the 
Allies and on the other hand to put them under pressure to stop their 
harshness and to come to terms with the Iranian Government; therefore, 
the government informed the British Minister in Tehran that the British 
demands for settling the Bushire problem had been rejected. 
On 7th September, the Russians landed 1,000 men at Anzall and the 
day after, 1,200 more. The landing of the Russian force was followed 
by two rumours, first, a large number of Russian forces were due to 
come soon; secondly, the Allies intended to bring back Muhammad $Ali 
Shäh, this time supported by a British force from the south of Iran. 
Mr. Iv: arling reported "Rumours that a considerable force is about to 
arrive have shaken German supporters considerably. "' He expressed 
also his anxiety that if the Russian force was not increased it would 
have a drastic result. 
"NaubahAr" wrote that "The Russians are coming to force the 
Iranian Government to come to their terms. "2 On one hand, the prospect 
of the war had changed in favour of the Allies in the Middle East. 
The British force in Mesopotamia had advanced towards the north and 
was preparing to approach Baghdad. The fear of the fall of Baghdad, 
the landing of the Russian force in the north of Iran and the intensity 
of disturbances in the country caused the Iranian Government to panic 
and turn once more to the Allies. On the other hand, the agitation 
in central and southern Iran had created intolerable conditions for 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 332. Tehran, Sept. 11,1915. 
2. "Naubahar", No. 73, Sept. 10,1915/Shavväl 29,1333. 
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the Allies' subjects. The British and Russian residences in Isfahan 
had left the city and there was a strong probability that the Russian 
and British Consuls personally would leave the city soon afterwards. 
There was a saying around in Tehran that the British and Russian 
Ministers also intended to leave the capital for Qazvin. The British 
and Russian Governments realised that they must take action and ease 
their policy in Iran. They were unable to despatch a considerable 
force to take control and the country was on the edge of war. Both 
governments were worried about the continuation of disturbances in 
Iran, especially the British Government; it sought a way for the safety 
of British subjects in the cities. Therefore, Mr. Marling was ordered 
to negotiate with the Iranian Government, asking if the government had 
any intention of protecting British Consuls, officers, and subjects in 
Iran. The legation had instructions to warn the Iranian Goverment: 
"If two Legations were once withdrawn, probable result might be that 
the two powers would never again be represented in Persia by two 
diplomatic missions accredited to an independent and neutral court. "' 
Mr. Marling was also authorised to explain the British Government's 
willingness to ease the financial problems of Iran by granting a 
moratorium from that time until six months after the end of the war. 
The British Government was ready to pay a subsidy at the rate of 
£50,000 per month during the war so long as the Iranian Government's 
attitude was satisfactory. Sir Edward Grey recommended to Marling 
that if it was absolutely imperative he might increase the offer up 
to a maximum of £100,000 per month. 
2 In a meeting with Mustaufi 
ul-Mamalik, 21r. Marling received the Iranian Government's proposals, 
as he reported: 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 262, P. O., Sept. 9,1915. 2. Ibid. 
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The Governor-General of Fars is to be removed at once 
and Kawara appointed as Acting Governor. Kawara is to 
select a suitable person to act as Governor of Bushire; 
Persian Government will inform me of name of person 
selected, and I am to transmit it to military authorities 
at Bushire, who will then hand over administration to 
him and allow Persian flag to be hoisted, 
Troops to remain as long as required in order to 
ensure safety of consulate and comity. 
Persian Government undertake to punish guilty 
Khans and to endeavour to put an end to German intrigues, 
but hope we shall not insist on excessive severity of 
former point. 1 
Regarding the last part of the proposal, Mir. Marling informed the 
Iranian Government that because it would take time to punish the khäns 
and to prevent German intrigues, the British Government agreed to give 
them the necessary time, 
2 
The news of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the 
British produced a strong protest from the anti-Allied societies. The 
newspapers inveighed against the government for its weakness. "ShihAb-i 
S qib" believed: 
Had the breaking off of relations between Iran and 
Britain had one harm for Iran, it would have had 
thousands of dangers for the British. Our capital 
will not be in danger from 2000 men but 30,000 troops 
and auxiliary forces in Baluchistan at India's gate 
will create a threat to end the British reign in India 
forever. 3 
The writer urged the government to decide and act without fear and 
hesitation and also to recognise whether the benefit to the country 
was in neutrality or partiality. In the case of the latter, which one 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 328. Tehran, Sept. 8,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 31, No. 146.1333 H. Q. Dated Sept. 10,1915. 
Marling to Iranian F. O. 
3. "Shihäb-i Sägib" , No. 85, Sept. 13,1915/2i Q, i. 1 dah 7,1333. 
117 
would assist Iran more and accept less? He encouraged the government 
to resist and avoid acting without a clear prospect. 
The recalling of Hukhbir us-Saltanah to the capital and the 
appointment of Qaväm ul-Mulk., caused the people of Shiraz to protest 
against the government decision. I'tiläfiyün Tauhidiyün (Coalition 
of Monotheists) sent a telegram to the Prime Minister and Majlis 
deputies: "The nation and political parties disagree with the change 
of governor. It is proved to them that this change is tantamount to 
handing the south over to foreign possession. "1 
"Bämdäd-i Raushan" believed that most difficulties in foreign 
relations of Iran at the time was the Pars problem and the unreasonableness 
of the British. The writer continued that the British demands were not 
acceptable to any Iranian. He expressed his regret for the discharging 
of rlukhbir us-Saltanah and appointment of Qaväm ul-Mulk, whose bad 
record, recommendation and support by the British, were proof that he 
was not suitable for the post. 
2 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" was against the agreement between the Iranian 
Government and the British; it believed it was a big mistake and that 
the Iranian Government had been defrauded. The writer stated that the 
British had done their utmost to put an end to their problems in the 
south. They realised that the DZujähidin were determined to attack the 
British force which had been under pressure constantly and had no 
alternative but to withdraw. The inclination of the Iranian Government 
granted the opportunity to negotiate with them and take advantage of 
the time. The writer criticised the government for the discharging of 
1. Sipihr, 209. 
2. "Bämdäd-i Raushan" , No. 90, Sept. 18,1915/il Qi I dah 7,1333. 
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Mukhbir us-Saltanah, who had done his best to handle the Fars 
administration. He warned the government not to trust in the British, 
who would not keep their promises@1 
On 14th September, Mustaufi ul-I, i -i 
1ik despatched a telegram to 
Nukhbir us-Saltanah to a vital position in Tehran and authorised him 
to hand over the governorship to anyone whom he wished. Mukhbir 
us-Sal'anah introduced Qaväm ul-Hulk as his successor. 
2 This was a 
great relief to the British in the south and very satisfactory for the 
British Legation in Tehran. Mr. Marling realised that it was time for 
the British to act and in a report to his government expressed his 
idea that "It would ... be politic now to allow Persian flag to be 
replaced at Bushire, as its removal has caused more irritation than the 
occupation, and to rehoist it would take some of the sting out of the 
German agitation, particularly at Shiraz. "3 But he pointed out that the 
flag should not be replaced until the appointment of the new Governor 
of Bushire was agreed on by the Iranian Government and the British 
Legation in Tehran. There were a series of negotiations about the 
selection of a governor for Bushire. In spite of the fact that aavam 
ul-Mulk appointed his nephew as Governor of Bushire, who was well-known 
as pro-British and "promises to work in harmony with Resident-General"4, 
the British requested that he should not be escorted with many savars. 
However, on 16th October, the Governor arrived in Bushire and the 
Persian flag was raised respectfully, but the British force remained 
in their positions. 
1. "Shihäb-i S5gib", No. 88, Sept. 23,1915/it ^, i4dah 12,1333. 
2. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, 282. 
3. F. O. 416-63. The. '1o. 372, Tehran, Sept. 30,1915. Marling to 
Grey. 
4. F. O. 371-2436. Tele, p. No. 2045. Sept. 18,1915. Cox to India. 
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The Moratorium 
The question of financial assistance from the British and Russian 
Governments to the Iranian Government had been discussed between the 
Iranian Government and the British and Russian ; Ministers in Tehran 
since the commencement of the war, particularly during 'Ayn ud Daulah's 
premiership. It was due to the general political condition of Iran, 
which was growing in favour of the Germans and Turks and against the 
British and Russians. The attitude of the Iranian people against the 
Allies attracted the attention of both powers, particularly the British, 
for "Turco-German intrigue and Moslem fanaticism are threatening to 
undermine the influence of His Majesty's Government and the Russian 
Government in the country, "" Therefore, both governments decided to 
assist 'Ayn ud Daulah in order to enable him to hinder German and 
Turkish influence in Iran. The negotiations between the Allied 
Ministers and 'Ayn ud Daulah's cabinet began with the object of 
concluding an agreement. Due to the bankruptcy and hopelessness of 
the Iranian Government, the British and Russian Governments were only 
willing to assist the Iranian Government financially and then only 
enough to keep the government in power, in order to follow a policy 
in favour of the Allies. Concerning the power of the Majlis, 'Ayn 
ud Daulah presented Mushir ud-Daulah's programme with some modifications 
to the benefit of the Allies. Mushir ud-Daulah's programme had earlier 
been totally refused by both powers. 'Ayn ud-Daulah's proposals at 
first consisted of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iranian 
territory and a moratorium; later on it was reduced to only financial 
assistance as a moratorium for three years. The word moratorium, from 
1. F. O. 371-2428. P. O., July 2,1915. Secretary to the Treasury. 
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the Iranian point of view, meant that, due to the war and Iran's 
crisis, the British and Russian Governments would allow the Iranian 
Government not to pay instalments and interest on British and Russian 
loans from the beginning of the war until a peace treaty was signed. 
In spite of the importance of Iran's situation in the war, both 
powers' ministers in Tehran finally concluded that financial assistance 
was the only aid which both powers were willing to give the Iranian 
Government in return for their demands. They believed the best method 
for offering financial assistance was "some modification of the scheme 
of a moratorium in connexion with the foreign loans and advances 
received by the Persian Government, "' They concluded that this plan 
would have two advantages, first from the Iranian Government's point 
of view, it would not be considered a new loan, and consequently 
would not need the Majlis's approval. Secondly, the British and Russians 
would be able to "afford assistance by means of monthly advance while 
retaining in their own hand the necessary term. "2 The British Govern- 
ment advocated the ministers' proposal, but the Russians haggled over 
the matter and simultaneously 'Ayn ud-Daulah's cabinet resigned. 
In the middle of September 1915, the Iranian Government had a 
better chance of dealing with both powers, but-the internal crisis of 
the country had bent the government to its knees and thus it was 
unable to take the opportunity. Therefore, the government imploringly 
requested financial assistance and stated that they would do their 
utmost to protect the consul and put an end to German propaganda. The 
negotiations between the Iranian Government and the legations, and 
communications between both powers and their legations in Tehran 
1. I, bid. 
2. F. O. 371-2428. F. O., June 29,1915. to Imperial Bank of Persia. 
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about the provisos of financial assistance had begun. I'Ir. Marling 
did not agree with offering the Iranian Government so large a sum of 
money all at once, and preferred to offer a moratorium with respect 
to southern customs receipts, about £10,000 monthly, and to "keep 
plenty in hand to meet their inevitable demands for more. "1 He also 
suggested that: 
I would also urge, as His Majesty's Government contemplate 
an expenditure ... 50,000 1, that I should be empowered 
to employ part of all the difference between this sum 
and subvention which should be at any moment granted to 
Persian Government for secret service purposes. I could 
use it more directly in our interests and with more 
effect than the present Cabinet. 2 
However, the Iranian Government suggested their proposals as 
follows: "1) A Moratorium or its equivalent to equal about 200,000 
toma. ns per month, as from 1st January last to the end of the war; 
2) 10,000 rifles with ammunition ... "3 In fact these suggestions 
were what the British Government desired without asking for, and the 
amount of money was much less than the British were prepared to pay. 
Mr. Marling pointed out: 
It must not be expected that Persian Government will 
be able to do much against the Germans, but moral 
effect produced by the fact the Cabinet, which owes 
its existence to pro-German influences, has had to 
appeal to the Powers to assist them to counteract 
German campaign might be considerable. It would 
discourage German supporters and encourage our 
friends, on which hitherto dubious attitude of the 
Government has had a very chilling effect. 
These are not very large results to look forward 
to, but the combination appears to me to hold out 
some chance of staving off the possibility of rupture 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 333. Tehran, Sept. 11,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele, No. 340. Tehran, Sept. 15,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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of relations for a time. Time is of great importance, 
and even if Russian Government were to decline to 
join in arrangement, I would urge that I may concede 
at least the monthly subvention in the form of a 
moratorium in the name of the two powers. 1 
However, the Russian Government also remarked that they agreed 
with financial assistance in principle and indicated that the sums 
which the Iranian Government received should bear interest. The 
British and Russian Governments refused to agree to military aid. 
Under those circumstances, the British Government in fact did not 
agree to help Iran with armaments; not only was it difficult to obtain 
and send such assistance to Iran, they were afraid of the possibility 
that their support would be used against them. Therefore, financial 
assistance was the only help which the Iranian Government could 
receive from both powers. After some verbal communication between 
the two sides of the convention and haggling about the date of the 
retroactive effect of suspension (the Iranian Government wished it 
to begin from 8th January 1915, the two legations from 8th March 1915), 
on 25th September 1915, the Iranian Government received a letter from 
both legations: 
With reference to interview which took place on 15th 
September between Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and British and Russian Ministers on the 
subject of suspension of service of British and Russian 
loans and advances, His Britannic Majesty's Legation 
has the honour to inform the Persian Government that 
its request for suspension of these services from 8th 
March until one month after conclusion of peace had 
been received with benevolence by British and Russian 
Governments, who agree that for period above indicated 
registered customs receipts affected to respective 
services be repaid to Persian Government, but with 
condition that total monthly sums accrusing to it do 
not exceed 30,0001. 
As regards sums resulting from retroactive effect 
of present arrangement, it is understood that as 
1. Ibid. 
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financial considerations prevent immediate payment 
thereof, they will be placed at the disposal of 
Persian Government when that is feasible. 
Imperial Bank of Persia is authorised by the 
two Governments to come to an understanding with 
Persian Government for execution of present agree- 
ment, as well as for eventual liquidation of sus- 
pended services. Contracting parties reserve right 
to terminate this agreement by a simple declaration 
to the effect. 1 
Another note was enclosed with the above letter in which both ministers 
indicated that the British and Russians' purpose in supporting the 
Iranian Government was to enable the government "to take measures to 
suppress foreign intrigues. "2 
As a matter of fact, Mr. Marling believed that the suspension 
which the Iranian Government wished to get under the name of a 
moratorium was indeed nothing but a monthly allowance from both 
governments; in this case the Iranian Government was allowed to agree 
to the convention without submitting it to the Majlis. However, this 
arrangement faced difficulties from both parties. The use of the word 
"moratorium" and suspension of "service" had produced the impression 
in Petrograd that the operation was a very complicated one. On 10th 
October 1915, the Russian Minister in Tehran received instructions 
to agree with the arrangement, but he was directed to omit the passage 
referring to the Imperial Bank of Persia and to insert the following 
at the end of the preceding paragraph: "Under the form of a new 
advance and on the same conditions as regards rate of interest as 
preceding advance. "3 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 364. Tehran, Sept. 25,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 363. Tehran, Sept. 25,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 392. Tehran, Oct. 12,1915. Marling to Grey. 
- 
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Both legations were astonished by the Russian instruction because 
the passage indicated by using the words "new advance" that it would 
be considered as a new loan, which inevitably should be approved by 
the Majlis, and there was no hope for the Majlis' sanction. In spite 
of the fact that the Russian Minister in Tehran described clearly the 
formula which both legations inserted in the notice, and which would 
enable them through the Imperial Bank of Persia to insist on any 
reasonable conditions that might be desired, the Russian Government 
took a lot of time to agree with the proposal. On the other hand, 
the Iranian Government raised objections to the last paragraph in the 
notice, which reserved for both parties the right to terminate the 
arrangement at any moment; the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
believed that it was "difficult for the Government to accept the 
accommodation as purport of paragraph was so palpably one-sided. "' 
The Iranian Government's objection was undesirable to both legations. 
They wanted to control the continuation of the subvention only so long 
as the Iranian Government made use of it in their interests. These 
various delays, however, had kept the Iranian Government without money 
for weeks; so they could not take any measures to counter German 
propaganda among the people; on the contrary it offered the best 
opportunities to the Germans to stir up the general sentiments incredibly. 
The Occupation of the Turkish Consulate at Rasht 
Meanwhile, the country was subject to crises, which occurred one 
after the other. In the north, at Rasht, on Wednesday, 22nd September, 
the Russian force attacked the Turkish Consulate and arrested Taufiq 
Bayg, the Turkish Consul, and his staff, occupied the consulate and 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 130. Tehran, Oct. 21,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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lowered the Turkish flag. This caused a panic in the city and the 
Iranian Governor was greatly embarrassed at the Russian Consul's 
interference in the city. The Turkish Embassy comaunicated its 
anxiety to the Iranian Government, requesting the release of their 
consul. It was a matter of astonishment, for the Iranian Government 
and the Allies were about to come to terms for a convention and 
friendly relations. The Iranian Government protested against the 
Russian force's action and immediately negotiated with the Russian 
Legation in Tehran. The Russians deported the consul to the Caucasus 
and claimed that they possessed some documents which showed secret 
activities against the Russians and that the Turkish Consular staff 
were spying on the Russian forces in the north of Iran and the Caucasus. 
The Russian Legation, in reply to the Iranian Government, stated that 
the release of the Turkish Consul was a matter for concern to Petro- 
grad. However, this incident was interpreted as a vengeful action 
for the Kangavar and Isfahan incidents. 
"Bämdäd-i Raushan" referred to the arrest of the Turkish consul 
at Rasht and considered it as another violation of the neutrality of 
Iran. The writer believed it was a matter of surprise; if the Russians 
and British were insisting on the neutrality of Iran, what would they 
call that action which threatened the independence and integrity of 
the country? On the other hand, it would affect the reputation of 
the Iranian Government among the Islamic countries, and especially 
relations between Iran and Turkey. The writer expressed his anxiety 
that there was the possibility that this kind of action would be taken 
as the Iranian people's attitude towards Islamic countries. He also 
was of the idea that such occurrences were due to the Iranian Govern- 
ment's weakness and to British policy. He blamed the British for 
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encouraging the Russians to commit such an action in order to over- 
shadow their violation in the south and attract the people's attention 
to the north. The British also used the Russians for their purpose, 
1 
The newspaper, on 16th October, published a quote from "Novoye Vreunya! "s 
commentary of 18th September: "The arrest of the Turkish Consul at 
Rasht has produced useful effects for us; because using force and power 
in Iran have always created a deliverer's role and prevented any hostile 
attitude and influence against us. "2 "Bimdäd-i Raushan" considered the 
comment a frank confession of the definite policy of the Russian 
Government in Iran and warned the government: 
It is not possible to protect Iran and Iranian rights 
with Foreign Office correspondence, indicating treaties, 
international laws and the neutrality of Iran. These 
words in the ears of foreigners are poems without rhyme. 3 
The writer recommended the government to follow a stable and serious 
policy. He also warned the two powers to ease their harsh action in 
Iran and leave the Iranian Government alone to maintain its neutrality; 
otherwise the people would tolerate it no longer. 
Anti-Allied Domination of Kermanshah 
The Germans believed that the Russians had the intention of 
invading Baghdad via Hamadan and Kermanshah, The landing of the 
Russian force in the north, under the command of a general, produced 
a strong belief in Germany that the Russians were determined to enact 
the plan. A German mission, under the command of Count Kanitz, had 
1. "Bämdäd-i Raushan", No. 94, Sept. 27,1915/ti Q, i'dah 16,1333. 




arrived in Kermanshah to prepare all the means to prevent the Russian 
advance towards Baghdad. They began a series of activities in every 
aspect, studying the strategical places in the Kermanshah, Kurdistan, 
Hamadan and Luristan regions, negotiating with tribal chiefs for their 
support, collecting savars, transferrring arms and ammunition and spending 
a great deal of money, The number of their agents in Iran increased: 
they arrived with tremendous quantities of arms and ammunition. 
According to British information, by that time there were at least 
60 Germans, 50 Turks and 250 Austrians, mostly prisoners of war who 
had escaped from Russian prisons, with 80,000 rifles, seven or eight 
machine guns and bombs. 
From the public point of view, the German propaganda was based 
on two important points; first, respecting the independence and 
integrity of Iran; second, supporting the Iranians to get rid of the 
Russian and British yoke and to obtain their freedom. Therefore, the 
political parties and a large number of people were ready to co-operate 
with them. On 26th September, Fauzi Bayg, the new Turkish Military 
Attache in Iran, accompanied by eleven Iranian students who had graduated 
from Turkish military schools, arrived in Kermanshah. According to the 
report of the Iranian Embassy in Istanbul, the embassy had been informed 
that three Iranian students had been killed in battles. The embassy 
asked the Turkish Government to permit those students who were willing 
to go to Iran. Fauzi Bayg asked them to join him on the journey to 
Iran. Their arrival produced a lot of rumours in the region and in 
Tehran; therefore, Fauzi Bayg decided to leave them in Kermanshah and 
to proceed to Tehran himself. However, the residence of these students 
in the city caused embarrassment to the Kermanshah authorities because 
at the time Schunemann was collecting his force and the abode of students 
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in the city seemed unwise, so the authorities asked the government 
for their departure. According to Mr. McDouall's report, "Fauzi Baig 
brought some manuscript Korans. One is at Kermanshah and the others 
were to be sent to other towns, the Turks ask the Persians in the name 
of this Book to join them. "' 
The first action of Fauzi Bayg was to find a solution to the dis- 
agreement and hostile attitude between the tribal chiefs and Husayn 
RA'üf Bayg's force. There was a gathering in the Kermanshah Kärguzäri 
between the Iranian authorities and Turkish representatives and tribal 
chiefs, which concluded that 
As on the coming of the Turkish army certain regrettable 
incidents took place between the tribes and the army 
which are contrary to the good understanding between 
Persia and Turkey therefore at this time Mirza Mehdi 
Khan secretary to the Persian Embassy at Constantinople 
and Fauzi Bey military attache to Turkish Embassy at 
Tehran have come to enquire into these events. At the 
Karguzarate the Tribal chiefs undertake that from and 
after this date they will safeguard the passage of 
Turkish passengers and merchandise from Kaleh Sabzi 
to Kermanshah and their followers will carry this out 
and not allow any loss or damage provided that Turks 
assure the safe passage of Persian travellers, pilgrims, 
and merchandise and that Husain Raouf's forces should 
leave Khaniq in that no such events should occur in future. 
Sealed by Karguzar; Samsam el-Mamalek Sinjabi; 
Suliman Sardar Nusret Kalhur; Ali Akbar Sinjabi Sardar 
Nasir; Salar Mansur son of Husan Khan Guran Sardar Muazzam. 2 
Meanwhile the union of the tribal chiefs had been encouraged by 
the Democrat party. Muhammad Bägir tlirzä, a Democrat leader in the 
1. F. O. 248-1112. No. 57. Camp Hamadan, Oct. 16,1915. British 
Consulate for Kermanshah. 
2. F. O. 248-1112. No. 56. Camp Hamadan, Oct. 9,1915. British Consulate 
for Kermanshah; I. F. O., C. 66, f. 29, No. 8.1334. The date of 
the agreement is 12 11 Qi1dah 1333. Qal'ah Sabzi is a village six kms north-west of Khusravi on the road to C)agr-i Shirin. In the 
meeting Rafiq Bayg, the Turkish Consul in Kermanshah, and Captain 
Sonessen, the gendarmerie commander-in-chief in this region, were 
present. The leaders of Sanjäbi also represented the Garin and Kaihur tribes. 
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city, endeavoured to hold an assembly of tribal chiefs. The scheme 
was advocated by the Turks and Germans. Schunemann put great effort 
into achieving these purposes. He employed 300 savars from various 
tribes and, according to Mr. McDouall, collected 2000 men in all. He 
believed: "By this means Schunemann had got all the tribes under his 
thumb, and his subject is to prevent the Governor general being able 
to raise tribal levis to bring the consuls to Kermanshah. "1 
However, the outcome of all these activities was that the tribal 
chiefs assembled at Mahidasht, a place between Shähäbäd and Kermanshah, 
and concluded an agreement in which they agreed to leave their differences 
aside and to be ready to defend the country against the Allies. They 
sent a message to the Shah and government that: 
The darkness of the political horizons of Iran and the 
gravity of its destiny in the future, warns today every 
Iranian of a disgraceful future, and informs every 
patriot of a regretful occurrence ... They assumed the 
neutrality of the government is a misnomer and have no 
respect for it ... We devotees of our government have 
observed such terrifying prospects and damages .. 
gathering in Mahidasht, God and His messenger are our 
arbitrators, to be united and undertake to do our utmost, 
whatsoever, spiritual and material to support our govern- 
ment up to the last foreign violator and willing to obey 
our popular Majesty ... 
0 King, endeavour; 0 Majesty, we can tolerate no 
longer. How long shall the Russians and British occupy 
our homeland? How long shall they humiliate our 
religious dignitires? Why are foreigners acting 
directly in the country? 
0 Majesty, we are still alive, we have the honour 
to support and sacrifice our lives and properties for 
our homeland. 
Ihtishäm ul ia. mälik, the Governor of Kerend; Sardar 
Nusrat, the Governor of Kalhur; Sardar Näsir, the chief 
of Sanjäbi; Sardar Muqtadir of Sanjäbi; Sardar Igbäl of 
Kalhur; Ghuläm 'All, the Governor of Gürin ... 2 
1. F. O. 248-1112. No. 56, Camp Hamadan, Oct. 9,1915. McDouall to 
Marling, 
2. "Bändäd-i Raushan", No. 99, Oct. 19,1915/il Hijjah 9,1333, 
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Consequently, British and Russian influence decreased drastically and 
no hope was left for their friends in this region; on the contrary, 
the Germans found a free hand to act. Mr. McDouall reported: 
The chief reason of the decay of British and Russian 
influence is that we were in Hamadan at first, though 
some of tribes and towns people were with Schunemann 
the majority both of tribes and town were our partisans 
and expected us to come with a sufficient force, .. * 
but since the Kangavar affair and our return to Hamadan 
and time has passed and they have no news of our coming 
people have become hopeless ... Schunemann's position has 
much improved and is increased by the large sums he has 
paid and is paying. 1 
The vast German activities produced the idea in the British that the 
German Consul wished to raise twenty thousand men to reinforce the 
Turkish troops in Baghdad*2 
Hamadan in Crisis 
German activities spread all over the Hamadan, Kurdistan and 
Luristan regions. They were determined to prevent the Russian force 
advancing from any direction through these regions towards Baghdad. 
After the Kangavar conflict, the return of the Allied Consuls to 
Hamadan produced a tense atmosphere in the city. The Allied Consuls 
considered the Kangavar conflict an insult to their prestige and were 
determined to go back to Kermanshah as soon as possible. They collected 
sav_ars and intended to use all possible means to return to Kermanshah. 
The British and Russian Legations also kept the Iranian Government 
under pressure to despatch forces to deter any German hostility and 
to escort the consuls to Kermanshah. 
1. F. O. 248-1112. No. 56. Ca=p Hanadan, Oct. 9,1915. McDouall to 
Marling. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. Tele. No. 1940. Sept. 14,1915. Cox to Secretary 
to the Government of India. 
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On the other hand, the Germans and their allies, in order to 
neutralise any Allied attempt to advance to Kermanshah, centralised 
anti-Allied activities in Hamadan and made preparations to confront 
them on the spot. The "situation at Hamadan is considered serious. "1 
Mr. Marling reported: "German consular agent at Hamadan is collecting 
men, with avowed intention of attacking British and Russian consuls 
and driving them from their posts. "2 
The Iranian Governor, Anir Afkham, was unable to control the 
affairs of the city. The region became subject to disorder and the 
people were very scared and extremely anxious. As a majority of the 
people were at any rate against the Allies, the position of the British 
and Russian Consuls and their subjects became crucial. From Hamadan 
there was a message to the government, Majlis and newspapers: 
Non-existence is better than "living" in disgrace 
This is the last petition which we will despatch to His 
Majesty and the authorities to implore that the Russian 
and British Consuls in Kermanshah have returned from 
Kangavar. They have the intention of collecting forces 
in order to go back to their posts. Their enemy also 
intends to take action against them. There is the 
possibility that they will come into conflict and 
consequently the hopeless people of this city will 
suffer. (Our) neutrality has not been respected, (our) 
prestige has been dissipated; we opposed our 'ulamä''s 
orders. (Therefore) we announced our lack of zeal and 
spirit. We will be destroyed in disgrace. He looses in 
this world as well as the hereafter. That is an evident 
loss. (3) A nation like us without spirit and zeal will 
naturally and logically disappear from the world ... Now 
either remove them from Hamadan as soon as possible or 
leave them with us ... 4 
1. F. O. 371-2435. Tele. No. 2067. Sept. 19,1915. Cox to Secretary 
to the Government of India. 
2, F. O. 416-63, Tele. No. 335. Tehran, Sept. 12,1915. Marling to 
Grey, 
3. ^ur'än XXII 12. 
4. "Naubahär', No. 73, Sept. 10,1915/Shav, väl 10,1333. 
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The Iranian Government did not agree to despatch the Cossack 
Brigade to Hamadan, because the gendarmes had already hinted of their 
attitude against the Allies. Consequently the arrival of the Cossack 
force in Hamadan would have made a collision between the two Iranian 
forces inevitable. In spite of the Iranian Government's protest 
against the despatching of Iranian Cossacks to Hamadan, the Russian 
Minister in Tehran ordered the Russian officers commanding the Cossacks 
to send 300 men to Hamadan. The Iranian Cossacks arrived in Hamadan 
and were stationed at Mugall Qal'ah, which was situated on a hill and 
possessed an important strategical point in the city. They fortified 
the castle and were ready to confront any aggression. Mr. Marling 
reported that: "Arrival of 300 persian cassacks of brigade sent by 
Russian Minister in spite of protests of Persian Government has quite 
restored the situation. "1 "Bämdäd-i Raushan" believed the opposite: 
that the situation was very complicated: 
The people are extremely terrified and anxious about 
recent happenings. Some are leaving Hamadan. On the 
one hand the fortification of Cossacks at Mugalä and 
increase of artillery forces, on the other hand the 
intrigues of internal and foreign envoys, have led the 
condition to the point that every hour they expect 
intensive conflict in the city. 2 
According to "Novoye Vremya", the Democrats had asked the British and 
Russian Consuls to leave the city. The situation was so critical 
that the British Government authorised Mr. Marling to withdraw the 
consuls from Hamadan but hoped that it would not be necessary "unless 
it appears to you imperative that they should do so. "3 
1. F. O. 371-2436. Tehran, Oct. 27,1915. Decypher Mr. Marling. 
2. "Bämdäd-i Raushan", No. 101, Oct. 13,1915/21 ? ijjah 3,1333. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tole. No. 323. P. O., Oct. 22,1915. Grey to Marling. 
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Disbanding of the Gendarmerie 
Prom the Iranian people's point of view, the gendarmerie was 
considered a national force, opposite to the Cossack brigade. All 
Iranian political societies and people respected them, Thus the 
news of its disbanding shocked the country, particularly Tehran. It 
caused the people, Majlis and newspapers to protest strongly against 
this intention. Due to the financial crisis in the country, the 
gendarmes had not been paid for several months. All the gendarme 
detachments had been recalled to the capital and the guards of the 
foreign legations had been removed. Colonel Edwall, the gendarmerie 
commander-in-chief, submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister, 
but it was not accepted. The Prime Minister convinced him that the 
government would do its utmost to supply the gendarmes' needs and 
asked him to continue his service. 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" raised the question, what would happen to the 
security of roads and safety of trade if the gendarmerie were 
disbanded, then referred to the background of the force with an intro- 
duction about the Cossack brigade, which was organised from Iranian 
youths at Iranian expense, but for serving Russian interests and 
influence. The writer then alluded to the British: 
The British, who have always considered their interests 
before everything, wanted a sufficient force to increase 
their influence. They endeavroued to achieve this purpose 
at our expense in order to make us weak and subjugate us. 
At first, they followed their purpose through some groups 
of nujEddin, but they did not obey. They relied then on 
Bakhtiari forces ... but they did not obey. Simultaneously, 
the Iranian Government decided to organise the gendarmerie. 
The British found what they were looking for ... The British Ministers' speeches in Parliament proved their 
attention to the gendarmerie. The Swedish officers were 
honest and knew they were employed by the Iranian Govern- 
ment and should be in the service of the Iranian Government 
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and nation ... After the commencement of the European 
war, the British expected that the gendarmes would 
arrest any German, Austrian or Turkish subject anywhere 
and deliver them to the British envoys.... The gendarmerie 
did not act so ... The British reaction was to delay 
their salaries and criticise them bitterly ,.. 1 
The writer asked that the gendarmerie be supported in any possible 
way, by contributions, taxation or loans, and believed that the 
existence of the gendarmerie was of vital importance to the existence 
of Iran. He stated that "the signs of death have appeared on the 
face of this unique beloved of the Iranian nation. "2 He recommended 
that the Iranian people ought to help the gendarmes by selling even 
their clothes. The commander-in-chief of the gendarmes, in an inter- 
view with a "Ra'd" correspondent, described the gendarmes' problems 
and complained about the Iranian Government, which had done nothing 
to assist them. He stated: 
I and the other Swedish officers have done our utmost to 
prevent the disbanding of the gendarmerie ... but now we 
feel that perhaps our presence in Iran is not necessary 
any longer. They tried indirectly to bring about the 
means of our definite resignation and our inevitable 
leave. I am surprised that the Iranian Government is 
not willing for our service to continue; why are they 
reserved and do not say it openly ... The arrears of 
salaries of gendarmes is about one million _ ns. How 
can I provide for seven thousand hungry gendarmes by 
meaningless talk? On what grounds shall I be assured 
that they desire the Swedish officers to remain in the 
service of Iran? Why should we not be content to resign 
before being forced to leave this country in an 
unsuitable way? 3 
The British and Russian Ministers in Tehran had another attitude 
towards the Swedish officers; particularly in 1915, the attitude of 
1. "Shihäb-i Sägib", No. 89, Sept. 27,1915/Zi Qi1dah 16,1333. 
2, Ibid. 
3. "R "s No. 14, Oct. 10; 1915/2i ; i'dah 29,1333. 
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the British changed drastically. They decided to stop their financial 
assistance to the gendarmerie. Mr. Marling believed: "There can be 
little doubt that one of the factors that have enabled the German 
propaganda in Persia to gain so strong a hold on popular sentiment 
has been the attitude of the Swedish gendarmerie officers. "' 
The British Legation had complained several times to the Iranian 
Government about the gendarmerie. Colonel Edwall, in replying to the 
Iranian Government, which had required explanations for the British 
Legation's complaints, rejected all the claims and answered each one: 
1) If the hostile countries blame each other for 
violating the neutrality of Iran, this problem is 
not the gendarmerie's concern, and it is not my duty 
to discuss this problem ... 
2) The gendarmerie has always endeavoured to oppose 
any violations in any part of the country if there is 
any gendarmerie office. 
3) The gendarmerie has done what foreigners could 
expect from its office. The gendarmerie office has 
protected foreign subjects and has given them letters 
of recommendation. In case they request to carry arms, 
this should be permitted without regard to personality. 
4) But concerning the transportation of arms and 
munitions into the country, I would like to ask ., 
whether the gendarmerie is an import supervisor or a 
customs controller ... 2 
Mr. Marling expressed the British attitude towards the gendarmerie: 
"Swedish gendarmerie may be now considered as practically an enemy 
force, and most Swedish officers hardly make even a pretence of being 
neutral, "3 Therefore, the British Legation in Tehran endeavoured to 
bring about all the means in order to put the Swedish officers under 
1. F. O. 416-63. NO.. 86, Tehran, June 10,1915. Marling to Grey. 2. I. F. 0., C. 66, f. 7, No. 109. Sunbulah 26,1333. No. 2875. 3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 296. Tehran, Aug. 26,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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pressure to resign and leave the country. The British Minister in 
Tehran tried to squeeze the Iranian Government to cancel their 
contracts. The British Government also requested the Swedish Govern- 
ment through diplomatic relations to recall the Swedish officers from 
Iran; but the Swedish officers were professionals and their govern- 
ment had no authority to call them back. So, Mr. Marling suggested: 
Swedish Government is unable to recall them, but it 
might be induced to send them serious warning to 
observe strict neutrality, If they would not consent 
to do so, I would suggest that Reuter's agent here 
might send suitably worded message to the press. 1 
From "The Near East'lls point of view the resignation of the 
gendarmerie commander-in-chief was a matter of regret, and it inter- 
preted the disbanding of the force as a dangerous occurrence and 
offered a suggestion: 
The situation may be a very critical one for Persia 
unless the matter is handled promptly and satisfactorily 
by the British and Russian Governments ... it would be 
thought that the two protecting Powers would not choose 
the present moment for allowing the Gendarmerie to be 
disbanded for arrears in their pay ... But there ought to be no delay in the reforming of a Gendarmerie force, 
commanded by British Officers from India, whose pay will 
not be dependent on the state of the Persian Exchequer, 2 
The assembling of the gendarmerie force in Tehran had caused 
anxiety in both ministers because they feared that it "would make 
Germans master in Tehran. "3 
The Iranian Government was not able to raise any money in order 
to help the gendarmerie; therefore Colonel Edwall submitted his 
1. Ibid. 
2. "The Near East", Sept. 24,1915. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 346, Tehran, Sept. 18,1915. Marling to 
Grey. 
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resignation again. "Ruski Slov" stated that "Edwall knows certainly 
that the Iranian Government tried to disband the gendarmerie. "1 
1. "Rusld. S1ov", quoted in "Bämdäd-i Rausha. n", No. 104, Oct. 27, 
1915/Zi Hijjah 17,1333. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MUH. IJIRAT 
Iran's Policy in Public Opinion 
The policy of neutrality in Iran had produced an undetermined 
state of affairs in the country since the commencement of the war. 
The Iranian Government believed the policy of neutrality was suitable 
for Iran and tried to convince the foreign countries and the Iranian 
people of this point, that the maintenance of neutrality was the 
government's intention and it would be to the benefit of all to support 
the government to achieve this purpose. But from the beginning, 
there was no sign of any respect from foreign countries for the Iranian 
Government's request and policy. The government also did not dare to 
take the risk, as was suggested by some newspapers, to call on the 
general public and to rise against any country which did not respect 
the government's appeal, The Iranian people hoped that not only would 
neutrality not involve the country in the war but would have some 
advantages too, 
"Parvardin" mentioned some of those advantages which the Iranians 
expected and which had been negotiated between the Iranian Government 
and both great powers since the beginning of the war: 
1) Cancellation of the convention of 1907 (Anglo- 
Russian convention of 1907); 
2) Cancellation of the concession of note belonging 
to the British Bank; 
3 Moratorium ...; 4 Reduction in interest (on loans); 
5 Obedience of the Cossack Brigade to the Iranian Jar 
Ministry, under command of Iranian officers; 
6) Abrogation of transactions of properties (from 
Iranian land to Russian subjects); 
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7) Preventing the Russian Consuls' interference in 
Iranian tasks, especially in the Iranian Govern- 
ment's affairs; 
8) Avoiding the protection of reactionaries ... and 
delivering them to the Iranian Government; 
9) Giving new loans to Iran. 1 
In fact, when the gravity of conditions increased against the 
Allies, they hinted that they were even ready to promise the Iranian 
Government the two holy cities of the Shi'a sect, Najaf and Karbala', 
in Iraq. Buchanan reported: 
Russian Government are therefore inclined to consider 
that the best means of counteracting intrigues of 
triple Alliance and secure sympathy of Persians is to 
hold up to the latter possibility of obtaining certain 
advantages by joining enemies of Turkey. Russian 
Government attach special importance to question of 
Kerbela and Nedjef and return to proposal made them 
at the beginning of the war to let Persians understand 
that these places will be removed from Turkish 
domination and in some way or other places will be in 
direct relations with Persia ... 2 
In spite of the fact that the Iranian people, Majlis and 
nationalists obeyed the government decision, there was no sign of any 
advantages to neutrality; on the contrary, some parts of the country 
were battlegrounds for the hostile countries and had been thoroughly 
devastated (e. g. Azarbaijan). Other parts were occupied by foreign 
forces or were disobedient. The rest were in a state of utter chaos. 
Consequently, the governments which took office were not able to 
stand long and had to resign. There was some hope that Mustaufl 
ul-Mamälik's cabinet would achieve something, but it resulted in 
disappointment; day after day the criticism of his government grew 
louder and louder. 
1. "Parvardin", No. 36, Oct. 18,1915/Zi i ijjah 8,1333. 
2. F. O. 371-2434. No. 1340. Petrograd, Sept. 12,1915. Decypher. 
Sir G. Buchanan. 
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"Ra'd" strongly criticised government policy and wrote: 
Those persons who dared to take the reins of Iranian 
destiny ... have 
(already) lost everything; why, their 
whole bodies shudder when they hear the words 
"specification of a definite policy", and they are 
afraid to take a decision in favour of Iran's interest. 
It is fifteen months since the war started and any useful 
opportunity for Iran has gone, while we do not know 
(what our position is) and who our real supporters are. 1 
"Naubahär" pointed out that "the souls of the nation have reached up 
to their lips" (i. e. the nation can no longer tolerate this ). 
2 
"Bämdäd-i Raushan" quoted from an article about the undetermined 
state of affairs in the country, indicating that: 
Is there anything left for Iran to be afraid of losing? 
... to release 
(a country) like Iran from partition 
and annihilation, politics and prudence are not 
effective. There is no alternative but to sacrifice 
everything by a firm decision. 3 
"Irshäd" looked at the general situation and stated that: 
Fourteen months have passed of the European war and 
Iran has not put forward fourteen steps to improve its 
affairs ... 
Before the war, the excuse of the authorities was 
the interference of foreigners and neighbours' intrigues. 
But from fourteen months ago, the neighbours have been 
engaged in conflicts and considering the geographical 
situation and religion of Iran, these intriguers have 
been ready to hear a lot from us. Unfortunately, we 
have not been prepared to take advantage for fourteen 
minutes. 4 
The writer then complained about the corruption of society and stated 
his belief that everybody would work for their own personal benefit. 
1. "Ra'd", No. 22, Oct. 19,1915 Z! Hijjah 9,1333. 
2. "Naubahär", No. 77, Oct. 9,1915/ii Qi'dah 28,1333. 
3. "Bändäd-i Raushan", No, 96, Oct. 2,1915/2i Q, i'dah 21,1333. 
4. "Irshäd", No. 119, Oct. 9,1915/2i Qi'dah 28,1333. 
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He inveighed against the political parties, particularly the Majlis 
deputies, which in other countries, in spite of the difference in 
their opinions, would unite and support their country's interst in the 
face of danger from abroad. He thought that this kind of attitude was 
the opposite of that in Iran and everyone was just concerned about 
"his packet". He added that "we have been partial to Germany, 
Russia, England and Turkey only for personal interest, but we did 
not want to be patriotic and work for our nation. "1 
The Iranian Government was also attacked by foreign newspapers, 
particularly Russian ones: 
The Persian Government is neutral only in word; it even 
asserts that it is friendly to Russia. But in fact ... the Germans seem to be the masters, leading open 
agitation against Russia ... 
Some of the members of the Persian Cabinet, 
includin the representative of the Council of Ministers, 
... 
(are) using every convenient opportunity in order to 
underline the neutrality of Persia and the sympathy 
of the government with Russia. 2 
Colonel Yate, a member of the British Parliament, stated: 
Persia, as we all know, is supposed to be a neutral 
country, yet we find that the whole of Persia is 
occupied and terrorised by armed bands under German 
officers, who apparently are doing their best to raise 
the whole country against us. The Persian Government 
is powerless. The Shah himself is helpless. The Majliss 
do nothing but talk and try to make as much money as 
they can for themselves ... 
... Nothing can be expected of the Persian 
Government. Nothing can be done by them. They are 
hopeless and helpless. 3 
1. Ibid. 
2. "Novoye Vregya", Oct. 15(28), 1915. 
3. "The Near East", Oct. 8,1915. 
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Apparently, there was no political friction among the parties 
in the Majlis on foreign policy, but they had been strongly criticised 
by other political groups and newspapers, The Democrats were blamed 
for creating problems in the country's affairs, especially in over- 
throwing the various governments. "The Near East" wrote: 
The Democratic party constitutes, in fact the Radical 
party in the Mejliss, it holds in check all the Cabinets 
that assume office. Rather than give way to the Demo- 
cratic deputies, three of these Cabinets have preferred 
to resign, ... 
The Democrats protest because Great Britain and 
Russia do not withdraw their troops from Persian 
territory; but they find nothing to say against the 
massacres and organised pillaging in Azerbaijan carried 
out by the Turkish troops ... They are silent regarding 
the violation of frontier in the neighbourhood of 
Kermanshah by the troops of Reouf Bey .., 1 
The intensity of the Democrats' activities against the Allies 
made them well-known throughout the country and, in spite of being in the 
overall minority, it had powerful influence in the Majlis and in the 
government's affairs. They claimed that most people had sympathy with 
them and the party was the leader of the nation; therefore, on any 
necessary occasions, publishing a proclamation expressed the party 
policy. The Democrats' proclamation No. 272 on 25th September 1915, 
indicated the critical situation of the country which was increasing 
rapidly, and accused foreign enemies and traitors' activities for 
causing the problems. The proclamation explained that the country's 
enemies had a plan consisting of two purposes: firstly, to nullify the 
economic power and defensive force of the country; secondly, to weaken 
the national sentiments. Then it addressed itself to the nation: 
1. Ibid. See also The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), 
Fifth Series, Volume LXXIV, House of Commons, Seventh Volume of 
Session 1914-15 (London, 1915), 759-64. 
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Today, as you see, the foreign politic has achieved 
the first part and our economic power and defensive force 
have been paralysed ... and recently they have been 
acting extraordinarily to fulfil the second part by 
various inducements ... to attack our national feeling ... 
Fortunately they have not yet been successful. The 
fight is continuing between patriots and the enemy ... 
The Democrats are at the front of the battle ... 1 
The party advised the nation that if the people were able to defeat 
their enemies in the second aim, the nation would be able to rebuild 
the economic and defensive powers of the country very soon. The 
Democrats' motto was "withstand, unite and fight". The party also 
warned its members that their enemies intended to bring discord to 
the party's organisation and members. 
"Ra'd" published a commentary on the Democrats' proclamation. 
The writer believed that it was unjust that the Democrats claimed that 
they were the party who confronted foreign violations. He referred 
to some people who had fought and were not members of the Democrat 
Party. He believed the proclamation should have been addressed to 
the entire nation without discriminating between political views. 
2 
The Irano-German Convention 
The Iranian Government had tried its utmost to come to terms 
with the Allies, to conclude an agreement, The Allies followed their 
policy of procrastination, which produced great disappointment to 
the Iranian Government. The turmoil of the country's affairs, the 
lack of money, pressure of public opinion, the activities of anti- 
Allied groups and the German-Turkish propaganda dragged the Iranian 
1. "Bämdäd-i Raushan", No. 94, Sept. 27,1915/21 Qi'dah 16,1333. 
2a "Raid", No. 6, Sept. 30,1915/Zi Qi'dah 19,1333. 
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Government towards the Germans, seeking better conditions. The 
negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Germans had been 
under way since the beginning of September 1915. It was so confidential 
that most of the ministers in the cabinet had no knowledge of it. 
Grey informed Mr. Marling that "German Government have informed United 
States Embassy at Berlin that Persia is going to join German alliance. "1 
Marling was also instructed to find out what progress the Germans had 
made in their negotiations, what were the principal terms and with 
whom the negotiations had been conducted. 
2 The news of the Irano-German 
convention was a matter of great surprise to both Allied Legations in 
Tehran. In spite of the fact that the legations had received reports 
on all secret matters at the court of the Shah, cabinet meetings, 
Majlis sessions and all government offices, they had little information 
about the convention. Mr. Marling set up special inquiries and also 
met the Prime Minister, asking frankly if such a convention had been 
signed. The Prime Minister "absolutely denies the truth of it"3, 
but Mr. Marling believed that "negotiations of some sort are on foot. "4 
As a matter of fact, after two months of secret negotiations between 
Germany and Iran, at the beginning of November 1915, both parties 
agreed to conclude a defensive alliance, A draft of the convention 
had been prepared and accepted by both parties. 
Vu Particle XVIII du traits d'aaitie de commerce 
et de navigation entre 1'Allemagne et la Perse, signs 
ä St. Petersbourg le 11 Juin 1873, article congu dann 
les termes suivants: 
En cas de guerre de l'une des Puissances 
Contractantes avec une autre Puissance, il ne 
I. F. O. 371-2436. ; "lashing, Oct. 20,1915. Decypher, Sir C. Spring Rice. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. No. 333. F. O., Oct. 21,1915. Decypher. To Marling. 
3. F. O. 371-2436. No. 411. Tehran, Oct. 26,1915. Decypher Marling. 
4. F. O. 371-2436. No. 415. Tehran, Oct. 27,1915. Decypher Marling. 
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sera porte pour cette seule cause atteinte, 
prejudice ou alteration ä la bonne intelligence 
et a l'amitie sincere qui doivent ouster ä 
jamais entre les Hauten Puissances Contractantes. 
- Pour le case oü la Perse serait impliquee dann 
un differend avec une autre Puissance, le 
Gouvernement d'Allemagne se declare pret ä 
employer sur la demande du Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste le Schah sen bons offices pour contribuer 
ä applanir le differend, " 
le Gouvernement Imerial Persan, desireux de montrer d'es 
ä present sa sympathie sincere et sa confiance ä 
l'Allemagne qui de tout temps a suivi en Perse une 
politique sincere en respectant les droits du 
Gouvernement Persan, 
et le Gouvernement Imperial Allemard, desireux 
de montrer sa sympathie sincere et sa confiance ä la 
grande Puissance Islamique Persane, et voulant prouver 
qu'il tient ä coeur, m&me pendant la guerre aussi bien 
qu'avant et apres la guerre, le developpement, le progrbs, 
1'integrite territoriale et l'independance politique et 
economique de la Perse, 
et l'un et lautre egalement et sicerement desireua 
de resserrer les rapports d'amitie entre 1'Empire 
d'Allemagne et 1'Empire Persan, 
sont convenu de conclure le suivant traits 
d'Alliance: 
A cet effet 
entre S. A. Mostovfi-ul-memalek, President du Conseil 
des Ministres, et S. E. Mohtechem-es-saltaneh, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres, agissant au nom du Gouvernement 
Imperial Persan 
dune part 
et S. A. S. le Prince Henri XXXI Reuss, Ministre d'A1lemagne, 
agissant au nom du Gouvernement Imperial Allemand, 
d'autre part 
ii a ete convenu ce qui suit: 
Article I. 
a) Un traits d'A1liance definsive est conclu entre 
A1lemagne et la Perse pour une duree de vingt annees solaires. 
Apres ce de1ai le traits resters en vigueur jusqu'-ä 
l'expiration de 12 mois apres que 1'une des deux Hautes 
Parties Contractantes aura annonce a lautre 1'intention 
146 
d'en faire cesser les effets. Par consequent si la 
Russie et 1'Angleterre ou l'une de ces deux Puissances 
venaient ä attaquer une des deux Parties Contractantes, 
l'autre devra imnediatement prendre les armes pour 
defendre son a1]ie et lui prdter un secours prompt et 
efficace et l'appui materiel necessaire contre toute 
agression et pour repousser l'ennemi. A cet effet, les 
deux Parties Contractantes se consulteront, le cas 
echeant, et se mettront prealablement d'accord sur les 
mesures militaires, ou toute autre mesure defensive ä 
prendre pour secourir 11allie menace. I1 est entendu 
que le casus foederis surgira tant dans la cas dune 
attaque directe de la Russie et de l'Angleterre ou 
d'une de ces deux Puissances que Bans le cas oü la 
Perse ou l'Allemagne serait forcee a prendre les armes 
la premiere pour la defense de son independance et de 
son integrite menacees ou violees par les Puissances 
voisines. 
b) le Gouvernement Imperial d'Allemagne s'engage 
e. aider la Parse avec taus les moyens dans la guerre, 
surtout de lui fournir la quantite necessaire d'armes at 
de munitions - le nombre du fusils n6cessaires a la 
Parse etant prevu titre au moires 100.000 at une quantite 
proportinnelle de canons, de mitrailleuses at de munitions - 
at do mettre ä sa disposition un nombre suffisant 
d'officiers-instructeurs allemands. Il est entendu quo 
dans le cas oü la guerre se prolongerait at pour remplacer 
les pertes, des quantites supplementaires d'armes, de 
munitions etc* seront wises ä la disposition do la Parse 
pour lui permettre de poursuivre les operations at la 
garantir du danger d'&tre annihilee, par la Russie at 
1'Angleterre. L'Allemagne declare, an outre, ne pas 
avoir l'intention d'annexer ou d'occuper ou de laisser 
annexer ou occuper par un de ses Allies apres la guerre 
une pantie quelconque du Territoire Persan, at eile 
s'engage ä faire lors des negociations de paix tout le 
n6cessaire pour defendre at assurer l'independance 
politique at economique at l'integrite territoriale de 
la Parse aux conferences de paix; il ne se servira pas 
lui-meme at ne laissera ses allies se servir de la Parse 
comme object de compensation, at il interviendra, le cas echeant, pour defendre la Parse conformement ä Particle 
I§a; 
c) le Gouvernement Persan s'engage, de son c8te, 
ä ne pas se joindre ä une Alliance de Puissances etrangbres 
qui serait dirigee contre l'Allemagne ou un de ses Allies 
et de commencer ä faire toutes les demarches necessaires 
pour mettre la Perse aussi vite que possible en etat 
d'attaquer les ennemis, Dans ce but, le Gouvernement 
Persan procedera ä la creation et ä 1'organisation dune 
armee reguliere qui sera au fur et ä nesure des ressources 
aussi rapidement que possible portee au chiffre d'environ 
cent mille hommes. L'organisation de cette are sera 
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confiee, aussitöt apres le commencement des hostilitees 
par la Perse, ä une mission d'officiers allemands dont 
le chef devra etre un officier superieur d'etat Major. 
Sa Majeste Imperiale le Schah nommera le Generalissimo 
et les Commandants des troupes. Mais il est Bien entendu 
que la mobilisation n'aura lieu qu'au fur et ä mesure que 
les armes, les munitions et l'argent seront disponibles, 
et de fagon ä ne pas compromettre trop tot la neutralite 
persane. 
Article II. 
a) le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand s'engage ä 
aider financierement le Gouvernement Imperial Persan 
par les moyens suivants: 
1. ) il fournira au Gouvernement Imperial Persan 
ä compter ä partir de la signature du present traite 
jusqu'ä la fin des operations et la conclusion de la 
paix mensuellement une somme necessaire et suffisante 
pour les d6penses de guerre, 
2. ) en outre une somme d'un kouror (500.000) de 
tomans mensuellement sera mise ä la disposition exclusive 
du Gouvernement Imperial Persan pour les depenses de 
1'administration civile, 
b) les sommes susmentionnees seront considerees 
comme avances d'un gros emprunt pour lequel un accord 
special sera des ä present conclu ä Berlin et qui aura 
pour but de fournir ä la Perse, aussi apres la fin des 
cier, la creation et le maintien d'un administration 
reguliere ainsi que pour une reforms productive. I1 
est convene d'or et deja que les conditions de cet emprunt 
ne seront en tout cas pas plus onereuses que celles des 
emprunts contractes par la Turquie en Allemagne. 
c) le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand s'engage ä 
faire lore des negociations de pair, d'accord avec le 
Gouvernement Imperial Persan, tout le necessaire pour 
liberer entierement la Perse de ses obligations envers 
ses creanciers anglais et russes (emprunts et avances); 
d) le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand appuyera la Per 
Perse, dans la meme mesure quo ses autres allies, lors 
des negociations de paix, apres une guerre victorieuse 
Bans be but d'obtenir 1'indemnisation des pertes subies 
par les pays et les populations pendant la guerre ainsi 
qu'une augmentation territoriale qui ne serait pas 
contraire aux traites entre l'Allemagne et la Turquie 
tout en respectant les dispositions de Particle I§ b3 
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Article III. 
Serviront comme garanties du service d'interets 
et d'amortissement des avances et du gros emprunt les 
revenus des douanes de 1'Ampire Persan. Au besoin une 
garantie supplementaire sera donnee par l'augmentation 
du tarif douanier actuellement en vigueur, ä la revision 
duquel le Gouvernement Imperial Persan procedera. I1 
est entendu que ]. 'Article 3 du traits de commerce conclu 
ä Turkementchal entre la Perse et la Russie le 10/22 
fevrier 1828, (modifie par ]. 'article 3 de la declaration 
douaniere du 27 Octobre 1901), aussi bien que i'article 
2 de la Convention douaniere entre la Perse et la Grande 
Bretagne signee ä Teheran le 9 fevrier 1903, seront 
consideres, aussi bien que tous les traites, conventions, 
accords signs aver les Puissances ennemies et les 
ultimata imposes par celles-ci, comme nuls et non avenus, 
et le Gouvernement persan, vu ]. 'article I§b de ce traits, 
aura pleine liberte de negocier et de conclure des traites 
de commerce avec les Puissances Etrangeres pour un nombre 
d'annees determine, et conformement aux interets commerciaux 
et industriels de la Perse et ä ceux du trafic international. 
En tout cas la Perse garantit ä 1'Allemagne le status quo 
au sujet des droits des sujets allemands en Perse e. 
l'eaception des changements expressement prevus par le 
present traits d'Alliance jusqu'ä la conclusion d'un 
nouveau traits reglant ces matieres. 
Article IV. 
Pour faciliter le service de 1'emprunt, le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial Persan autorise une banque allemande qui 
lui sera indiquee par le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand 
ä ouvrir des succursales ä Teheran et Bans toutes les 
villes de la Perse et de s'occuper de toute sorte d'affaires 
financieres et commerciales. Le Gouvernement Persan 
accordera ä cette banque toute protection necessaire. 
Les privileges et les devoirs de cette banque ainsi que 
les modalites et conditions de 11execution de cet article 
et de Particle V feront ulterieurement 1'objet d'un 
accord special ä intervenir entre le Gouvernement Imperial 
Persan et la banque. 
Article V. 
a) la banque aura le droit d'emettre des billets de 
banque au porteur remboursables ä presentation. Le 
Gouvernement allemand garantira le paiement de ces billets, 
Neanmoins, pour parer ä toute eventualite la banque sera 
tenue de maintenir une reserve constante d'or equivalente 
a 1/3 des billets emis. 
b) la banque sera obligee pendant un delai de 6 mois ä partir de l'ouverture de ses succursales en Perse 
d'accepter ou d'echanger contre ses propres billets les 
billets de la "Imperial Bank of Persia"; ä cet effet 
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eile en informera le public par la voie de la presse et 
par tout autre moyen. Le Gouvernement Persan s'engage, 
de son c8te, ä confisquer les biens immeubles de la 
"Imperial Bank of Persia" et ses reserves metalliques 
en Perse. La valeur totale des billets de la "Imperial 
Bank of Persia" ainsi receuillis apres deduction de la 
valeur des immeubles et reserves susmentionnes sera 
consideree comme une avance donne ä la Perse par 
l'Allemagne sur le gros emprunt, mais l'Allemagne s'engage 
ä faire, lors des negociations de la paix, toutes les 
demarches necessaires pour obtenir de 1'Angleterre le 
remboursement de cette Somme ä la Perse. 
Article VI. 
Le Gouvernement Persan accorde ä la banque le droit 
exciusif de la construction et de l'exploitation d'un 
chemin de for a largeur normale de 1m 55 partant de 
Khaneguine et aboutissant ä Teheran. Les conditions de 
la concession de construction et d'exploitation seront 
determines d'un commun accord entre le Gouvernement 
Persan et la banque apres 1'achevement des etudes; 
Article VII. 
Au cas oü une entente ne serait pas obtenue entre 
les parties contractantes au sujet des conditions de la 
concession de construction et d'exploitation dans un 
delai d'une anziee ä partir de la presentation des projets 
et Bevis de la part de la banque, le Gouvernement Imperial 
Persan remboursera ä la banque les frais d'etudes. Par 
le remboursement des frais d'etudes le Gouvernement 
Persan gagnera toute liberte d'accorder la concession ä 
une autre societe, mais la banque aura un droit de 
preference valable pour cinq annees ä condition egales 
vis ä-vis dune autre societe. En tout cas il est entendu 
que si la banque obtient la concession, les frais d'etudes 
seront & sa charge; 
Article VIII. 
Le Gouvernement Persan s'engage ä etablir en Perse 
un service de telegraphie sans fil, et d'entrer pour ce 
but d'urgence on pourparlers avec unc societe allemande 
pour la construction des stations et l'engagement de 
techniciens et telegraphistes allemands qui serviront au 
Gouvernement Persan comme instructeurs du personnel persan. 
I1 est entendu que les frail de 1'installation et de 
l'entretien de ce service de radiotelegraphie, qui supleera 
autant que possible au systeme aerien actuel, seront 
imputes sur le produit du gros emprunt a conclure ä Berlin (voir 1'Article II § b). 
Article IX. 
I1 est entendu que les sujets allemands auront le droit 
d'etablir en Perse des bureaux d'expedition de marchandises 
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et de les faire transporter par les moyens de transport 
dejä existants; 
Article X. 
Le Gouvernement Imperial Persan considere comme 
nul et non avenu Bans les limites prescrites par le 
droit international (ainsi que tous les traites et 
conventions conclus avec des ennemis avant la guerre, 
y compris, pour autant qu'elle a trait ä la Perse, la 
Convention de 1907 entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie 
reconnue par le Gouvernement Persan ä la suite de 
l'Ultimatum de 7 Zihidje 1329 et de la note collective 
russo-anglaise du 29 Zafar 1330) le traits conclu avec 
la France au sujet du droit permanent et exclusif de 
faire des fouilles scientifiques en Perse. 
Article XI. 
La Perse ne sera pas tenue de commencer les hostilites 
avant l'arrivee de 50.000 fusils ä la frontiere persane. - 
Au cas oü la pain entre l'Allemagne et ses ennemis ou 
l'un ou plusieurs Ventre eux, intervenait avant que la 
Perse eat commence les hostilites conformement aux 
dispositions de l'Article I§ co l'Allemagne fera - m8me 
en ce cas - lors des negociations de paix, toutes les 
demarches necessaires pour defendre et assurer l'indepen- 
dance politique et economique et l'integrite territoriale 
de la Perse, mais les autres obligations de 1'Allemagne 
mentionnees dans ce traits feront alors 1'objet d'un 
accord special. 
Article XII. 
Le present traits resters secret jusqu'& la fin de 
la guerre europeenne. 
En foi de quoi le present traits a ete signs par 
S. A. Mostovfi-ul-memalek, Pres. du C. des Ministres, et 
S. E. Mohtechem-es-saltaneh, M. d. A. E., ainsi que par 
S. A. S. be Prince Henri XXXI Reuss, Min. d'Allemagne, et 
ratifie par S. M. le Schah Sultan Ahmed. 
Fait ä Teheran en double expedition le 10. November 1915.1 
The convention was for twenty years and both countries undertook 
to support each other in the case of any attack by the British and 
Russians. The convention consisted of twelve articles, some of which 
contained two or three parts. After referring to the Irano-German 
1. Gehrke, II, 327-31. 
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treaty of friendship of 1873, each party's undertakings were described. 
The most important points of the convention were that the Germans would 
undertake to assist Iran in the war by delivering arms (at least 
100,000 rifles and other war equipment), ammunition, information and 
officers; Germany and its allies recognised the independence and 
territorial integrity of Iran and would do their utmost to protect 
the political, economic and territorial independence of Iran; the 
Germans would support Iran's taking part in the peace conference; 
Germany would pay Iran the necessary sums for the expenditure of war 
and also a subsidy of 500,000 tümäns for civil administration 
(these 
sums would be considered as an advance payment of a loan which would 
be signed in Berlin later on); Germany would help Iran to get rid of 
English and Russian debts at the peace conference; customs tariffs 
would be in favour of Iran; and mobilisation of the country would 
take place step by step. On Iran's side, the Iranian Government would 
prepare one hundred thousand men to be trained under German officers; 
the commander-in-chief of the army would be appointed by the Shah; 
the Germans would be allowed to establish a German bank and branches 
in Iran and also have a concession of bank notes; the Germans would 
have the telegraph concession and would be permitted to establish 
trade offices in Iranian cities. Article XI would give Iran the right 
not to enter the war unless it had received 50,000 rifles at its border, 
1 
Grey warned Marling that if the convention had been signed the 
Allies should expect a coup d'etat or declaration of war at any moment. 
On 28th October, Mr. Marling reported that "I hear convention has been 
signed. "2 He was instructed to contact the Iranian Government immediately 
and warn them that: 
1. Gehrke, II, 325-27. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. No. 418. Tehran, Oct. 28,1915. Decypher Marling. 
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... if Persia has entered 
into a hostile agreement 
with Germanys she will be responsible for any con- 
sequences that follow from it, and we shall be free 
to take what action is necessary on our own behalf 
to protect lives and property of British representative 
and subjects. 1 
Mr. Marling, in a meeting the Iranian Foreign Minister, expressed 
the British Government's attitude towards Iran in the case of a con- 
vention with Germany. The Iranian Minister denied the idea and asked 
"what grounds there were for belief that there was any convention 
between Persia and Germany. "2 He assured Mr. Marling that "there was 
not a word of truth in the report. "3 Mr. Marling pointed out that a 
coup d'etat might be set up by the Germans and a cabinet organised 
which would be ready to sign a convention which had already been 
negotiated secretly. However, the Iranian Minister admitted that the 
government was helpless. 
Although the Russian Minister in Tehran had doubts about the 
signing of the convention4, his government's reaction to the convention 
was very serious, The Minister for Foreign Affairs held a meeting 
with the Iranian Ambassador in Petrograd and told him to inform his 
government that: 
The Anglo-Russian agreement was conservative in 
character and aimed at maintenance of Persian integrity 
and independence ... if they sided with our enemies that 
instrument would be used in an entirely contrary sense 
that would be fatal to Persia. 5 
Although the draft of the convention in French implied that the 
convention had been signed ("le present traits a ete signs ... "),, the 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 341. F. 0., Oct. 29,1915. Grey to Marling. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 426. Tehran, Oct. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 422. Tehran, Oct. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
5. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 1596. Petrograd, Oct. 28,1915. Buchanan 
to Grey. 
153 
German draft does not mention the matter. In fact, the Iranian 
Government avoided signing the convention until German aid would be 
received at the border, and up to the 5th November, when Prince Reuss 
reported the draft of the convention to Berlin, there was no sign of 
German assistance; even a month later, Litten, a German representative 
in Tehran, complained in his report about the situation in Iran and 
indicated that the convention had not yet been signed. 
' Mr. Marling, 
also on 5th December 1915, stated in his report to London about the 
convention: "... subsequent facts show that whatever hopes Germany 
may have had of concluding a convention, its realisation was still 
distant. "2 Sipihr was present at a meeting between Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabättabä'i, the leader of the Moderate Party, and Prince Reuss in 
Aräk and acted as interpreter between them. In their conversation 
Tabätabä'i referred to the Irano-German treaty of alliance and Prince 
Reuss replied that nothing had yet been signed and complained about 
Mustaufi ul-Manälik's hesitation. He believed that Mustaufi had 
strongly insisted on immediate military assistance and a great deal 
of financial help. 
3 Yahyä Daulatäbädi believed that Mustaufi ul-Mamälik 
feared the Russians and British and did not dare to sign the agreement. 
He was expecting the arrival of German assistance into Iran and 
preparations for activities against Russia and Britain were ready,, but 
the Russians blocked his intention. 4 1 
1. Gehrke, II, 191. 
2. P. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey, 
3. Sipihr, 264. For further details on this matter, see Chapter IV, 
324. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in 'Jorld Affairs (2nd ed., 
New York, 1956), 40, indicates that the treaty had been signed, 
as does Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Russian Relations 190_5-191 (London, 
1975), 297. Ibrähim Safä'f, Rahbarän-i Mashrüti Tehran, 
1334 H. S. ), II, 171, refers to Gehrke, presumably the French 
draft quoted above, 
4. Daulatäbädi, III, 312. 
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Revier of Negotiations concerning the Moratorium 
The British and Russian Ministers in Tehran realised that it was 
a matter of days or even hours before Iran would be on the side of the 
Turko-German alliance, which would be most undesirable to their govern- 
ments. They tried every way which would possibly prevent Iran from 
falling into the hands of the Germans. The most effective way was to 
raise once more the question of financial assistance., which the Iranian 
Government needed desperately. The moratorium negotiations had been 
going on and off during those days; therefore, both ministers endeavoured 
to urge the Russian Government to agree to financial assistance at any 
rate. The British Minister in Tehran asked his government to encourage 
the Russian Government through the London-Petrograd diplomatic channel 
for the same purpose. Sir Edward Grey wrote to Buchanan: 
... Situation in Persia is still critical, and it is 
essential that Medjliss shall not be given an oppor- 
tunity in connection with this financial assistance. 
Your Excellency should therefore do your utmost 
to induce Russian Government to send such instructions 
to Russian Minister at Tehran as will enable him to 
act in complete accor4 with Mr. Marling. 1 
Grey also authorised Mr. Marling to make the date of the payment 8th 
January 1915, instead of 8th March, if necessary. 
2 The British and 
Russian Ministers in Tehran used any occasion to squeeze the Iranian 
Government to accept the British and Russian Governments' terms of 
the moratorium and warned the government against taking any hostile 
attitude towards the Allies. The Iranian Government had objected to 
the last paragraph of the moratorium memorandum and believed it was 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tole. No. 2384. P. O., Oct. 13,1915. Grey to Buchanan. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tole. No. 316. P. O., Oct. 13,1915. Grey to Marling. 
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unnecessary. Mr. Marling admitted that the Iranian Government's 
objection was right and believed that it should be modified as the 
moratorium would be continued "until a month after conclusion of peace"; 
l 
but the Iranian Government did, not insist on the objection2 and the 
Russian Minister in Tehran absolutely disagreed with the objection 
because he already had a problem in obtaining the Russian Government's 
approval for the present note. 
3 
Mr. Marling hoped that the Russian 
Government would allow its minister in Tehran to act according to 
their suggestion, so there would be no excuse for the Iranian Govern- 
ment to reject the Allies' terms and would reveal their policy. He 
reported: "Attitude of Persian Government is very equivocal ... There 
is a strong pro-German in it, ... Prime Minister is also openly 
influenced ... by Democratic party and press., 
4 
Indeed, the Iranian Government was under pressure. The news of 
receiving financial assistance from the Allies was unwelcome in public 
opinion. The government was blamed for being inclined towards the 
Allies. The opposition criticised the government bitterly. It seemed 
the circumstances resulted in the Iranian Government's hesitating to 
accept financial help. They needed some land of assistance to affect 
and appease public opinion. The Allied assistance would be hardly 
enough to run the government administration. The Iranian Prime Minister, 
in a meeting with the Russian Minister in Tehran, informed him that at 
£30,000 per month not even the payment of two installments was enough, 
for the government needed 1,800,000 tümäns to be paid at once in respect 
of arrears on the moratorium. When the British Minister in Tehran asked 
1. P. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 394, Tehran, Oct. 16,1915. Marling to Grey. 2. P. O. 416-63. No. 130. Tehran, Oct. 21,1915. Marling to Grey. 3. Ibid. 
4. P. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 402. Tehran, Oct. 21,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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the Iranian Prime Minister for an explanation, he pointed out that 
the Prime Minister knew that the payment of such an amount was 
impossible and it appeared that he would not wish to proceed with 
the terms, but hoped to obtain better elsewhere. The Prime Minister 
replied that the sum was not enough to pay seven or eight months' 
arrears of payment in government departments and it was absolutely 
vital for the government to receive it all at once. After discussing 
the difficulties, the Prime Minister agreed on six weeks for the pay- 
ment. 
1 Mr. Marling reported that he had pointed out to the Prime 
Minister that: 
The two Governments were ready to give Persia finan- 
cial assistance on the understanding that the Persian 
Government would take steps to stop the German campaign 
here, but that nothing whatever had been done to that 
end .., in the case we might at any moment see his friendly cabinet replaced by a hostile one, and any 
money we might have advanced would be used against us ... 
We must have some kind of a guarantee that the 
Persian Government would keep its part of the bargain 
before we paid over the big sum he required. We wished 
to assist a strictly neutral Persia, but not hostile 
Persia. 2 
The Prime Minister answered that the government had to act very slowly, 
as public opinion was extremely hostile to the Allies. From Mr. 
Zlarling's point of view the Prime Minister's explanation was 
unsatisfactory; he did not believe "This weak and timorous Prime 
Minister would sign any agreement"3 unless inducements were enough to 
create a "colourable excuse". Mr. snarling reported that: "It looks 
as if the cabinet were trying to get all the money out of us. They 
can go line their pocket and resign on the familiar grounds that they 




have not received the support of two Legations. "1 Therefore, he 
instructed the Imperial Bank of Persia not to let the Iranian Govern- 
ment draw money. After a few days, the government struggled with the 
difficulties in order to receive better terms while not intending to 
take any risk; finally the government accepted the Allied conditions, 
and informed the legations: 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
Excellency's note of the 18th instant, enclosing a 
memorandum containing the conditions on which a delay 
in the payment of the debts of the Persian Government 
would be allowed and accepting the moratorium. 
My Government hereby express their utmost thanks 
for the assistance received from Your Government through 
your efforts to bring about a satisfactory arrangement 
in this matter, which has been under discussion for some 
time past, and especially request your Excellency to 
convey the thanks of my Government to that of His 
Britannic Majesty. 
In view of the contents of the memorandum above 
mentioned, the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia 
has been approached, and has expressed his readiness to 
facilitate the repayment of the past instalments, but 
he only awaits your written authority to open at once 
a credit to meet the bills drawn by the Persian Govern- 
ment. I therefore hope that your Excellency will at 
once send him the necessary authority in writing, and 
urge him to show his goodwill in the matter. Considering 
the assistance already rendered by His Britannic Majesty's 
Government, the measures taken by your Excellency, and the assurances given for the fulfilment of your promises in connection with the legal question of the moratorium 
from January last, perhaps there may be no need for 
referring to the question again. 
I avail, etc. 
Hassan, Mohtashem-us-Sultaneh 2 
In a meeting the Iranian Foreign Minister asked the British Minister 
in Tehran whether the Allies would let the Iranian Government draw the 
installments for September, October and November. The meeting was held 
1, Ibid. 
2, F. O, 416-63. Enclosure No. 153. Note communicated to Has. Marling 
by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated Oct. 31,1915. 
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in a friendly atmosphere and both ministers thought that it would be 
wise to let the Iranian Government draw money; but it seemed the 
Iranian Government was reluctant to do soy as ITr. Marling explained: 
The attitude of the Persian Government was more than 
dubious. They had just accepted our financial support 
in the shape of a moratorium, but in spite of their 
constant lamentations of imperative want of money they 
did not draw on the credit account opened at the 
Imperial Bank of Persia in their favour. The obvious 
inference was that the Cabinet did not dare to commit 
themselves to us by accepting our money. 1 
However, on 7th November, the Iranian Government implied its inclination 
towards the Allies by drawing some money from the bank, 
2but "Persian 
Government have so far drawn only September and October instalments 
and part of November instalment. They have not touched arrears. "3 
British Activities for a Treaty with the Khans 
The Allies had no confidence in the Iranian Government and had been 
working on another possibility to prevent the pro-Germans from taking 
control over more cities and, if it was possible, to gain some supporters. 
Naturally in this aspect, the khäns were of great value. They had 
both power and influence which all the hostile countries in the war 
competed to possess, espcially the Allies, who considered their friend- 
ship a most desirable factor in that situation. Up to this time the 
pro-Germans had obtained the support of the majority of the khäns. The 
Russians had very little sympathy among the tribes. Not only had the 
British lost a lot of their influence among the tribes, they had in 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 438. Tehran, Nov. 7,1915. rIarling to Grey. 
3. F. O. 371-2435. No. 493. Nov. 27,1915. Decypher of telegram from 
Mr. Marling Tehran. 
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in fact gained many enemies as well. Apparently there were no khäns 
left friendly to the British in the west and the south, except a few 
who supported the British openly; the rest of them kept silent or were 
totally against the Allies. 
One of the most important tribes in the south was the Bakhtiyäri 
and their khäns were considered as essential keys to southern Iran's 
problems. Their friendship was vital to the British interest in the 
south because, firstly, they commanded a powerful tribe with consider- 
able force in their region, and secondly, the oil pipe was laid through 
their region and had been guarded by them for years. Therefore, having 
an agreement with them was desirable for the British Government at 
the time. Most of the Bakhtiyäri khäns followed the Iranian Government 
policy as it was interpreted by Mr. Marling: the khäns "like the rest 
of Persia ... want to be on the winning side. "1 One of the most important 
khans was ýaulat ud-Daulah. Due to the lack of a definite policy by the 
Iranian Government, Saulat, like some other khäns, was puzzled. He 
urged the government to make a serious decision. However, on one hand 
he had been in communication with the confederated khäns and encouraged 
the others to join the confederation; on the other hand, concerning 
the rivalry between him and Qaväm ul t"2ulk and the future of the 
governorship of Isfahan, he kept in touch with the British and did not 
personally take any steps against the Allies. In connection with the 
British Legation, a secret agent of Saulat2 asked the British Minister 
in Tehran for personal protection for ýaulat and in return he would 
guarantee the British interest and would keep order in his region and 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 358. Tehran, Sept. 23,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
§aulat's secret agent, as Mr. Marling stated, was 11I1intaz(j) 
Khanoum -- a somewhat remarkable personality if only for being 
the only woman who takes a public part in politics. " 
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check German agents in the region. This attitude of Saulat's was 
considered, as he had been under pressure to join the hostile khans. 
The Russian Minister in Tehran declared that his government would 
agree to the proposal and Mr. Marling asked the British Government for 
instructions. The British Consul in Shiraz also urged his government 
to agree to the protection and stated: "There is no alternative if 
we are to remain in southern Persia and if we do not make arrangements 
with Soulat, Germans will do so and could render our position untenable. 
"' 
Although the Indian Government and Mr. Marling personally disagreed 
with any connections with the khans which involved the British in the 
local problems of Iran, the Bakhtiyäri matter was completely different. 
Mr. Marling explained that "These chiefs exercise influence over 
thousands of armed men and scores of smaller kahans and over large 
tracts of country, and they may in fact be said practically to rule 
South Persia. "2 Mr. Marling advocated the idea of having a definite 
policy towards the khans in order to obtain a satisfactory agreement 
with them. The friendship of khans such as §aulat and Qaväm was too 
important to the British to be ignored. Mr. Marling warned his government: 
If we allow this opportunity to stop, we must naturally 
expect Germans to take advantage of our failure ... if 
we wish to remain here at all, it is absolutely essential, 
as I venture to think, that we should seize the oppor- 
tunity to cement friendly relation with so powerful 
chief as Soulet. 3 
On the other hand, the Germans also endeavoured to attract Saulat's 
sympathy as much as possible. The German Legation despathced a letter 
to Saulat and praised him for his patriotic attitude towards his 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 350. Tehran, Sept, 20,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. : 1o. 357. Tehran, Sept. 21,1915. Marling to Grey. 
3. Ibid. 
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country and his friendly relations with the Germans. It was added that 
the Germans were true friends of Iran and Islam, and reminded him 
the British occupation of Bushire. Saulat was encouraged to act 
against the British. Finally, a present from the German Emperor, a 
rifle, was offered to him. 
l 
However, the British Minister in Tehran was authorised to give a 
letter of protection to ýaulat and also credit of 200,000 tümäns for 
the expenses of concluding an agreement with the khäns. 
2 Saulat 
ud-Daulah received a letter from the British Legation in Tehran: 
His Majesty's Government have authorised me to assure 
your Excellency that so long as you maintain attitude 
of friendly co-operation with British government whose 
policy in southern Persia directed solely to the main- 
tenance of order and tranquillity, to the development 
of commerce, to the security of the high roads, and in 
particular at this moment to the suppression of the 
present disturbances due to the intrigues and instigation 
of foreign agitators, His Majesty's Legation will afford 
your Excellency such protection and support as are 
compatible with friendly relations which happily exist 
between the British and Persian nations, and will use 
its influence with Persian Government at Tehran to 
assure your personal protection and well being. 3 
The British representatives in southern Iran and Tehran co-ordinated 
their best efforts to bring about the means for obtaining an agreement 
with the khans, especially Saulat. 
4 A credit of £50,000 was set aside 
for achieving this purpose. 
5 However, the British were able to keep 
ýaulat out of trouble in the south of the country. Mr. Marling pointed 
out: "I believe that this measure, coupled with the financial inducements 
1. Sipihr, 208. 
2. F. O. 371-2434. No. 3045. Aug. 26,1915. From Secretary of State 
to Viceroy Foreign Dept., India Office. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 359. Tehran, Sept. 23,1915. Marling to Grey. 
4. F. O. 371-2437. Oct. 29,1915. India Office. 
5. F. O. 371-2434. No. 3045. Aug. 26,1915. From Secretary of State 
to Viceroy Foreign Dept. ) India Office. 
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... was of the greatest value in keeping Soulat clear of German 
influence. "1 Sir Percy Cox supported the idea of concluding an agree- 
ment with the khäns, but "I would point out that events have shown 
clearly that cash payment do not serve purpose and the Bakhtiyari 
require as I think is natural, something more substantial and enduring. "2 
He believed the best inducement for the khäns would be to encourage 
them to come to terms with the British, who were offering the governor- 
ships of southern cities, especially Isfahan, which was in their region. 
He stated that the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement with the 
khäns should bring about friendly relations between the Shaykh of 
Muhammarah and the Bakhtiyiri khäns. Cox hoped the British Government 
would do its best to achieve this purpose, which he believed "would be 
of such immense political and strategical value to us". 
3 
He simul- 
taneously expressed his opinion in case the khäns did not come to 
terms with the British: 
I incline to belief that while Khans will not do much 
for us, possibly nothing at all, they will certainly 
not side in an active way with the enemy and they believe 
that our having to depend on them to protect oil fields 
will force us in future to overlook any present 
infidelities on their part ... 
Our policy would seem to be to prevent any 
alliance between them ... 4 
However, the Isfahan matter was out of the question and the British 
had hoped that the advance of British forces to Baghdad would affect 
the khäns and that some more inducement would make them willing to 
accept the British terms; but there was no change in the khäns' 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 371-2434. No. 2068. Basra, Sept. 19,1915. Cox to India. 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O. 371-2434. No. 2049. Basra, Sept. 19,1915. Cox to India. 
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attitude. Mr. ; darling described the khans as "nervously anxious not 
to be looked on as actively pro-British. "1 He believed neither the 
khans in Tehran nor those in Isfahan would accept any proposals which 
would not be approved by the Iranian Government. He also thought that 
it was unlikely that the khans would take any serious action against 
the Allies. Although he suggested that the only way to gain the khans' 
support was to give"promises and gifts and more gifts; he could not 
resist stating that even the khans closer to the British Legation had 
confessed 
... quite openly that they would place their loyalty 
to the Shah before their friendship with us. We 
might prevent them from attaching themselves to the 
Germans, but we could not bind them definitely and 
in all circumstances to ourselves, 2 
A Coup d'Etat in Shiraz 
As long as Mukhbir us-Saltanah was Governor-General of Fars, he 
had tried to soothe the people's irritation and deter them from taking 
strong action against Allied subjects in Shiraz. He had friendly 
relations with most of the parties and tribal chiefs in the province. 
Although he was blamed by British diplomats for most of the anti-British 
activities in Fars and his dismissal was the first demand of the British 
Government for the settlement of the Bushire problem, after he left 
Shiraz conditions nevertheless went from bad to worse. The British 
Consul's attitude was strongly against Mukhbir us-Saltanah, which even 
Mr. Marling considered too pessimistic. O'Connor, the British Consul 
in Shiraz, believed Mukhbir us-Saltanah had taken part in disturbances 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 358. Tehran, Sept. 23,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. F. O. 416-63. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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in Shiraz even after his dismissal. He reported that "ex-Governor- 
General and democrats are hatching a plot to be carried out by help 
of Gendarmerie, "1 As a matter of fact, a compact of all anti-Allied 
organisations in Shiraz, acting under the title "The National Committee 
for the Protection of Iran's Independence", actually ruled in Fars. 
The National Army became quite well-known and powerful. The Iranian 
gendarmerie officers had joined the Committee and taken charge of 
training the army. In other cities in the province, such as Käzirün 
and Buräzjän, the Committee had organised branches and established 
training centres for volunteers. The campaign of the National Army 
had been concentrated in Buräzjän. The volunteers were despatched to 
the camp after receiving a short training period. As was mentioned, 
the Government of India had refused to use force against Iranian 
tribesmen; in other words, the Government of India could not afford, 
under those circumstances, to despatch sufficient troops to overcome 
the problems of southern Iran. They were well aware that a weak 
force in a vast region of south-western Iran might produce disastrous 
consequences. 
Therefore, a hasty agreement over Bushire was concluded between 
Iran and the British, and the Iranian flag was rejoisted and an 
Iranian Governor entered the city and apparently took office. Con- 
sequently, the agreement prevented the National Army from attacking 
Bushire. It was indeed effective and appeased the high feelings in 
the south and left no strong reason for the National Army to invade 
Bushire. Moreover, such an attack would have been directly against 
the Iranian Government, which had already taken responsibility for 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No, 350, Tehran, Sept. 20,1915. Marling to 
Grey. 
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any outrages on Bushire. The National Committee for the Protection 
of Iran's Independence avoided friction with the Iranian Government. 
On the other hand, the British troops in Bushire, with the assistance 
of British naval forces in the Persian Gulf, were strong enough to 
hold their position. However, in spite of the fact that some conflicts 
occurred between tribesmen and British forces around Bushire, a 
general invasion never happened; but the problem of the south remained 
unsettled. The people expected the withdrawal of British forces from 
Bushire shortly after the agreement, but this did not take place. 
From the National Committee's point of view, the Iranian Government 
was too powerless to take any steps against British forces and policy 
in the south. The National Committee of Fars many times requested 
the government for the withdrawal of the British forces from the south 
and for the prevention of British interference in Iranian affairs. 
The results were disappointing, as was to be expected; but the National 
Committee had been preparing the means for a coup in Shiraz for weeks. 
The British Consul in Shiraz warned the legation in Tehran that there 
was a possibility of a coup and asked for immediate action. The 
British Ilinister in Tehran kept the Iranian Government under pressure 
to recall the gendarmerie division of Fars to the capital. The govern- 
ment instructed the headquarters of the gendarmerie of Fars that, due 
to financial problems, the Fars division should proceed to Tehran. 
Shiraz protested strongly against the governiient's decision, A crowd 
gathered at the telegraph office and directly contacted the government 
and urged then to reconsider their instructions. The people of Shiraz 
guaranteed to assist the gendarmerie financially. Ultimately the 
government cancelled the order. 
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The National Committee for the Protection of Iran's Independence 
informed the government of their demands and pointed out that if 
their demands were not fulfilled they would take action independently. 
The demands consisted of: 
1) The return of all prisoners [German and Iranian]; 
2> Compensation for damages to the Mujähidin [the 
British had confiscated the money and property of 
some of the confederated khäns]; 
3) The maintenance of the gendarmerie; 
4) The evacuation of Bushire by British forces 
immediately, 1 
The Committee, with the assistance and encouragement of German 
agents in Fars, particularly Jassmuss, decided to design a plan for 
a coup d'etat in Shiraz. The Iranian gendarmerie officers had great 
parts in the plan. The gendarmerie detachments of Käzirün, Buräzj. n 
and other towns in the province joined the National Army. The 
situation became very crucial. 
On 23rd October an Iranian employed as munshi (secretary) in the 
British Consulate in Shiraz and his companion, a huläm, were attacked 
and shot at by a gunman; the munshi was wounded and the hý uläm died 
instantly. The British colony were living in fear in Shiraz. The 
consul, in his report, expressed his opinion that "unless the Persian 
Government are prepared to take immediately vigorous steps to set 
matters right in Fars, it is impossible for us to remain here any 
longer. "2 He complained that most of the British Consular staff had 
been killed or wounded and he personally was practically a prisoner. 
He also added that all Iranian friends of the British, such as gavän, 
had been threatened with death. He pointed out that the situation 
1. "Bämdäd-i Raushan", No. 100, Oct. 4,1915/ft Oi'dah 4,1333. 
2. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 408. Tehran, Oct. 25,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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was intolerable and suggested that they evacuate the city. He stated 
that the continuation of his residence was useless in Shiraz and 
moreover he did not wish to leave friends and employees of the British 
to further dangers. Public opinion had left no chance whatsoever for 
any influential khäns who were friends of the British at the time to 
take any measures for their protection. O'Connor was so disappointed 
and wrote, "I fear we cannot rely either on Kawam or Soulet to deal 
adequately with the situation. "1 He believed the evacuation of Fars 
would give the British a free hand to take any desiarble measures 
against Iran, for instance stopping imports and exports from the 
south or militarily occupying more Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. 
In spite of all the imminent dangers which threatened the lives of 
British subjects in Shiraz, the British Minister in Tehran disagreed 
with evacuating the city. He believed the withdrawal of the British 
colony from Shiraz was tantamount to having "both Kawam and Soulet 
fall into the enemy camp. "2 Mr. Marling believed that the colony 
should remain in Shiraz as long as possible and suggested that if 
Qaväm received an adequate sum of money to collect a troop of savars, 
the consulate could be protected. However, he could not see any use- 
fulness in withdrawing the colony from Shiraz, unless the Government 
of India was able to despatch adequate forces capable of operating 
inland in the south of Iran, with a simultaneous increase in the 
Russian forces at Qazvin. Otherwise, the occupation of more ports in 
the Persian Gulf would not have much effect in Iran but would probably 
add "fuel to the hostility which the Germans have roused against us 
[British]. "3 The British Government considered the evacuation of Fars 
1. Ibs d0 
2. Ibid. 
3. I bid. 
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undesirable and left the decision to Marling in Tehran. Therefore 
the consul and colony remained in Shiraz. O'Connor intended to 
collect savars but due to the hatred of the people for the British, 
it was not an easy task and in spite of Qaväm ul-Mulk, the acting 
Governor of Shiraz, the consul was not at all successful. Qaväm 
ul-Mulk had no power to control the province, particularly in Shiraz. 
Everything was ready for the coup. The Iranian officers of the 
gendarmerie undertook to carry out the plan, When the time arrived, 
Captain Agmann, the Swedish officer in command of the gendarmerie 
division in Fars, went on an inspection outside Shiraz and the Iranian 
officers took control of the headquarters. On 2nd Muharram 1333/ 
10th November 1915, in the early morning, the telegraphic connection 
between Shiraz and Tehran was cut off, All strategic and important 
places in the city were taken by gendarmes. The government offices, 
the Indo-European telegraph office, the Imperial Bank and other foreign 
offices were occupied by gendarmes. All British subjects were arrested 
and taken to gendarmerie headquarters. The British Consulate was 
surrounded by gendarmes with cannon and machine guns. O'Connor 
received the following ultimatum: 
Monsieur le Consul, 
Le Comite soussigne a 1'honneur de porter ä votre 
connaissance: 
L'arrestation provisoire de vous et de la colonie 
Anglaise a ete decidee par les patriotes persans, une 
demi heure, ä compter de la remise de cette lettre, vous 
est accordee pour prendre votre decision. Si vous vous 
rendez prisonnier avec la Colonies vous serez envoys ä 
Borasjan et y serez retenu pour etre echange contre les 
persans et allemands qui ont ete fait prisonniers par 
vos compatriotes sur territoire neutre persan; quant 
aux femmes, elles peuvent, selon lour volonte rester 
en toute securite ä Chiraz, ou vous accompagner ä Borasjan 
d'ou alles seront imnediatement envoyees sous escorte ä 
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Bouchire. La propriete personelle et privee ici sera 
scellee et gardee, de meine que le Consulat. 
Si apres trente minutes (vous aurez l'obligeance 
de signer 1'herue et la minute de l'arrivee de cette 
lettre sur son enveloppe) vous ne vous rendez pas, le 
Consulat Anglais et les maisons Anglaises seront 
bombardees et le Comite decline expressement la responsa- 
bilite de toutes les consequences qui pourraient resulter 
de votre refus pour vos ressortissants et specialement 
pour les femmes. Aussit8t que vous vous aurez constitute 
prisonniers vos maisons seront occupees et on vous accordera 
trois heures pour preparer votre depart. Trois mulets 
pour chaque Europeen ou Europeenne sont tenu ä votre 
disposition, chacun de vous peut se faire accompagner 
par un domestique. 
Nous ajoutons que l'installation telegraphique 
doit nous titre remise intacte faute de quoi noes tiendrons 
le directeur Mr. Smith personellement responsable. 
Le Conite National Pour La Protection de 
1'Independance Persane. 1 
O'Connor had no alternative but to surrender and after three 
hours, the entire British colony was assembled in gendarmerie head- 
quarters and immediately deported to Buräzjän under the escort of 40 
gendarmes. Qp. väm ul-Mulk, the acting governor, asked the gendarmerie 
for an explanation of their action and he received the reply that "They 
were acting under order of the Government and Iran was at war. 12 Due 
to the disconnection of the telegraph lines he could not contact Tehran. 
However, the city and region were under the Committee's orders. British 
authorities and one member of the colony, Mrs. Ferguson, confessed 
that the gendarmes fulfilled their promises and treated them kindly. 
The women of the colony reached Bushire safely and the men were kept 
in Abram, about 45 km east of Bushire, for negotiations and an exchange 
of prisoners and demands of the National Committee and some confederated 
khäns. 3 
1" F. O. 371-2727. Sub. Enclo. to Serial No. 151. No, Cf. 398. Nov, 21, 
1915, Bushire. Major A. P, Trevor to Marling. 
2. P. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 471. Tehran, Nov. 21,1915. Marling to Grey; I. F. O. C. 66, f. 95, No. 10.1333 H. Q. 
3. F. O. 371-2727. Enclo, to Serial No. 151. No. Cf. 398. Nov. 21, 1915. Trevor to Marling. 
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The Uncertainty of Allied Policy in Iran 
The British diplomatic authorities had anxiously exchanged a 
series of opinions to find a policy to secure their interests in Iran. 
This policy must be agreeable to the Russian Government and practical 
to Iran's condition at the time. The purpose of this policy was to 
deter the Iranian Government from joining the German side; otherwise 
they would have to confront a general uprising in Iran which would 
definitely have drastic effects on Afghanistan and India. Furthermore, 
the eastern part of the Mesopotamian front would be in danger. Above 
all the oil fields and 150 miles of pipe-line had recently become of 
extraordinary value to the British Government. New discoveries of 
oil fields around Ahvaz indicated prospects of huge development. Due 
to the war, the price of oil had increased and companies received 
considerable profit. ' From the British War Office's point of view., 
"The Admiralty attach great importance to the continued supply of oil 
from Persian field for naval purpose. "1 The cutting off of the oil 
pipe-line would have disastrous consequences for the British Government. 
Neither the British nor Indian Governments were able to despatch 
troops to Iran in order to bring the southern part of Iran under their 
control. Although the Russians had already landed troops in the 
northern part of the country, it was not enough even for securing their 
sphere of influence. Moreover, the British Government was absolutely 
reluctant to see Russian forces in their zone and at the Persian Gulf. 
The only remedy which British politicians could conceive for a better 
position in Iran was to have a great victory, such as the occupation 
of Baghdad, which would produce a shock to pro-Germans; and in addition 
1. F. O. 371-2435. Enclosure. No. 5. Oct. 16,1915. 
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to that, by spending a great deal of money in order to bring tribal 
chiefs to their side. 
Up to November 1915 the former part had not taken place; con- 
sequently the latter part would not have the desired effect. This 
lack of a positive and energetic policy by the Allies in Iran brought 
strong criticism from Russian and British politicians and press. 
"Ruski Slov" stated that the Allies were unable to maintain the 
neutrality of Iran. The writer referred to German activities in Iran, 
the transportation of arms and ammunition and their attacks on Russian 
and British Consuls in some of the cities in Iran. He wondered why 
both governments would do nothing about it. He stated: 
If the London and Petrograd courts do not want to 
overcome the enemy because of the neutrality of Iran, 
we say the time has arrived and the Russian and British 
Governments must put an end to this shameful policy. 
The Allies ought to put the Iranian Government under 
pressure to deport all German, Turkish, Austrian and 
Hungarian diplomats from Iran and if the Iranian Govern- 
ment do not want to do so, the Russian and British 
Governments can take action and arrest all ambassadors 
and consuls in Iran and deport them to Turkey. 1 
"Novoye Vremya", in a long article about the position of Russian 
and British diplomacy in Iran, described the situation as unfavourable 
to both powers as well as to the Iranian people. The writer believed 
that the activities of the Russian and British diplomats in maintaining 
a stable government in Iran had resulted in complete failure. He pointed 
out that the Allied diplomats 
... without going into the sources of Persia's 
heartening embarrassment ... did not improve the 
situation of wide circles or nations and therefore 
were not able to call to their side either their 
faith or gratitude ... Not able to acquire supporters, 
we have actually gained enemies. 2 
1. "Ruski Slov", quoted in "Shihlb-i Sägib", No. 90, Sept. 30,1915/ 
ft Qi'dah 19,1333. 
2. "Novoye Vremya", No. 14230, Oct. 21,1915; also translation of this 
issue in I. F. O. 2 C. 66, f. 7, No. 114.1333 H. Q. 
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The writer referred to the Potsdam treaty and believed it was the 
Russian Government's fault by concluding the treaty, which opened 
Iran's gates to German agents. He stated that the problem of the 
Russian Government was not about building up the Iranian Government 
but about defending their situation in Iran from German intrigues. He 
emphatically pointed out that "the growth of the German influence in 
Persia happened before our very eyes. "1 He then referred to German 
activities against the Allied representatives and warned his govern- 
ment of further German actions in Iran. He recommended that the 
Allied Governments should prevent the German and pro-German groups' 
propaganda, otherwise Iran would end up in the war against the Allies, 
as had happened in Turkey and Bulgaria. As a matter of fact, the 
Iranian Government was the main target of his criticism. The writer 
accused the government of being under German influence and would do 
nothing to deter the hostile actions by German agents against Allied 
subjects. On the contrary: 
... in the very height of German war activities in 
Persia, it demanded from us the removal of war detach- 
ments from various occupied points, silently allowing 
the organisation by German agents of war detachments 
of Persian nomads set free to murder, spilling the 
blood of Russian and English diplomatic generals and 
at the same time looking for the removal from Persia 
of various Russian detachments. 
The Persian Government, it seemed, with sufficient 
conviction, showed its real face. 2 
The writer attacked their diplomats in Tehran for showing a mild attitude 
towards the Iranian Government and stated that there had been enough 





"The Habul Matin" referred to the value of neutrality for Iran 
and considered it "the most important bearing, at the present moment 
to the peace of the Asiatic continent, to the safety of India and to 
the future of the Islamic world. " The writer believed that the Iranian 
Government had intended to maintain neutrality and would do its best 
to enact this intention, but the government had been involved in 
numerous difficulties. From the writer's point of view a minority 
part was the greatest cause of the difficulties. He avoided mentioning 
the name of the party, but it was obvious that he meant the Democrat 
Party. He stated: "It proves that there is a party in Iran, which 
is anxious to join Germany in fighting Britain and Russia. It is true 
that this party is in a minority, but still is in a position to do 
mischief. " The writer then explained the difficulties which the Allies 
would have to confront, whether the Iranian Government joined the 
Germans or the Allies. In both cases the British would have tremendous 
problems to face. In the first place, the British would have war at 
the gates of India, also in the eastern part of Mesopotamia and so on. 
In the second place, they had to give huge military and financial 
assistance which seemed inopportune for the British military and 
financial difficulties at the time. The writer alluded to the Reuter 
report from London that stated: "The Persian Legation states that 
Persia is doing her utmost to preserve neutrality and deal with unrest 
in Southern Persia in the face of immense military, political and 
financial obstacles. " He then addressed the British Government by 
discussing the matters in detail and concluded that it was to the bene- 
fit of the Allies to support the Iranian Government in achieving the 
policy of neutrality and allowing the government to proceed on its way 
without intereference in its internal affairs. He believed that this 
would have a great effect on the Iranian people, because: 
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The prestige of the Iranic Government in the eyes of 
its subjects depends upon its power and independence .,. 
The Persians love their freedom, they are sensitive 
people and proud of their past glories. They will 
never submit to any Government which will surrender 
national freedom and honour. 
Although the writer believed that "there is no legitimate excuse for 
the British and Russian Governments to meddle in Persian matters", 
nevertheless he recommended that it would be better for British 
interests if they followed the policy of "non-intervention" in Iran 
as they had in Afghanistan. He also tried to draw the British Govern- 
ment's attention to the point that "It is also certain conviction 
that the neutrality of Persia is of greater advantage to England and 
her allies than her active support. "1 
The British Government was not saved from criticism by British 
politicians and press. Colonel Yates in Parliament, criticised the 
British policy in Iran and believed British subjects and interests 
had suffered considerably due to the mispolicy of the British Govern- 
ment in Iran. He referred to the confrontation between the British 
force and the confederated khAns in the south of Iran and urged his 
government that "Unless these tribesmen are punished severely, their 
villages razed and their chiefs taken as hostages, things will go from 
bad to worse. " He urged his government to do something before it was 
too late. He suggested that 
... a combined India and Persian levy corps under 
command of British officers of Indian army, with 
good knowledge of Persian, to hunt down these various 
bands ... to put down these German raiders and place 
the whole of Southern Persia under the charge of the 
Government of India. 2 
1. "The Hab1u1 Matin", No. 14, Oct. 6,1915. 
2. "The Near East", Oct. 81 1915. 
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In replying to the Colonel's suggestions, the Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, stated that owing to 
the military and financial difficulties in which the British Govern- 
ment had already been involved at the time, Colonel Yate's recommendation 
was not practical; although a couple of months later, in 1916, the 
British decided to carry out the Colonel's proposal. Therefore, Sir 
Percy Sykes' mission set out from India for Iran to organise a local 
force which was called the South Persian Rifles. 
l 
Public opinion was extremely anti-Allied in Iran; the Iranian 
press was at its most critical against the Allies. This sort of 
attitude had not been revealed before; particularly, the recbnt debate 
in the House of Commons about Iran agitated some of the Iranian newspapers. 
"Shari! ' wrote that the reasons for the weakness and inability of 
the Iranian Government to take any measures to improve the country's 
affairs were due to the conspiracies and interference of the British 
and Russians in Iran. It stated that whenever the Iranian Government 
tried to take a decision to achieve a plan for better conditions in 
the country, it was faced with interference and disagreement from 
both powers. Consequently all the government's efforts were nullified. 
The writer alluded to the revolt of Samad Khän against the Iranian 
Government under Russian protection and some more revolts and rebels' 
names as examples. He added that the Iranian Government sincerely 
desired to maintain neutrality; therefore he asked the British and 
Russian Governments to withdraw their forces from Iranian territory. 
The government had warned the Allies that there would be disastrous 
consequences for Iran if they refused to do so. The writer then 
1. For details on this subject, see the unpublished Ph. D. thesis of 
Floreeda Safiri under the same title, Edinburgh University, 1976. 
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mentioned some incidents, such as the arrest of the German Consuls in 
Tabriz and Bushire. He continued and stated that not only had the 
British and Russians avoided withdrawing their forces from Iran, they 
had increased them, and moreover their policy became even more harsh. 
Ultimately, the Bushire, Isfahan and Shiraz occurrences were the 
direct results of their policy. The writer alluded to the debate 
about Iran in the House of Commons in which it was said that the 
neutrality of Iran had been disturbed by German intrigues, and asked: 
"which government's military force has occupied the neutral country 
of Iran? Are the Russian and British forces not occupying the north 
and south of Iran? "1 The writer also referred to Colonel Yate's 
speech about the death of two British officers in Bushire and asked, 
"was there not any body to ask the speaker, what these two officers 
were doing in Bushire and why they went there? " The writer concluded 
that "the Colonel assumed the occupation of our commercial port is 
the British Government's right. "2 
""Ahd-i Ingiläb", in an editorial entitled "the darkest days of 
Iran", criticised the Allied policy in Iran and believed that it had 
been proved in the past few years that both the Russian and British 
Governments had by no means any tendency to give the Iranian Government 
a chance of having a stable and determined policy. On the contrary 
they were endeavouring to hold Iran in a disturbed and shaken state 
of affairs. They were looking foriard to seeing the end of the war, 
for then they would have an opportunity to enact their attention; as 
"Rush Slov" and "Novoye Vre=ya" wrote, they "would settle all old 
and new affairs with Iran. " The writer was astonished that in spite 
1. "Shürä", No. 111, Nov. 8,1915/ii Hijjah 29,1333. 
2. I_. 
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of all unjust dealings with Iran, the Allies still claimed that they 
were the protectors of Iran's independence, and the nation's hatred 
against them was just the result of the other countries' propaganda. 
They expected to attract the people's attention in their favour; but 
he believed that the people were well-aware of the intention and 
maltreatment of both powers, 'which had created disaster and adversity 
for the country) 
"Parvardin", after inveighing against both powers' policy in 
Iran, blamed them for causing all crises in the country and expressed 
its surprise that both powers had committed all these mistreatments 
and humiliations in the name of friendship and humanity and of course 
maintaining their interests. The consequences of this policy was that 
the nation was disturbed, the treasury was empty and the country was 
involved in disorder. The writer continued and alluded to British 
and Russian interference in the country's affairs and stated that it 
was just enough that a consul could indicate that a governor should 
be dismissed; the Iranian Government would be kept under pressure by 
the legations until their demands were fulfilled. Any notorious man 
whom they desired would be installed as governor-general for the 
provinces. The writer went on and stated that it seemed "The Russian 
and British banks are two pockets of Iran, both legations are two local 
governments, 'Novoye Vremya' and 'The Times' are two holy books, " 
2 
He 
also attacked the European newspapers: "The European newspapers ... 
have no intentions and purpose except concealing injustice and truth, 
deluding the nations, getting some money and writing something. "3 
1. "' Ahd-i Ingiläb" , ; lo. 24, Oct. 5,1915/2i li' dah 5,1333. 2. "Parvardin", Oct. 17,1915/ft Hijjah 7,1333. 
3. Ibid. 
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However, the connections between British authorities for 
planning an immediate policy in Iran was complicated. One of the 
British political advisers for Iranian matters was Aqä Khan, the 
leader of the Ismä'ili sect. The parliamentary Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs had a meeting with Aqä Khan in London and discussed 
Iran's political condition. Äqä Khan anticipated that the Germans 
would reach Istanbul; they then would certainly do their utmost to 
inflame anti-Allied sentiment in Iran. The Germans' purpose would be 
to pass Turkish troops through Iran and Afghanistan towards India. 
He believed that the British should gain the Middle Eastern countries' 
support. One of his suggestions was the partition of Iran. In this 
case they should install a man such as Zill us-Sultan to govern in 
the south under British protection and someone else in the north under 
Russian protection. Äqä Khan believed this scheme was a "perfectly 
feasible but very immoral policy. " The Secretary commented in his 
report on this idea that "It would be in the teeth of all our under- 
taking to Persia. "' 
The other course was that the British and Russians would guarantee 
to the Iranian Government the integrity and independence of Iran. They 
would assist the Iranian Government financially and allow them to 
reorganise their country with the help of American officials. Äqä KhAn 
thought that the second course would be successful and it was "more 
in accordance with our (British) principles than the other course. " 
But he pointed out that if the second one was not practical, then 
"the former alternative should be at once adopted. " The Secretary 
reported that Aqä Khän believed: 
1. F. O. 371-2437. Oct. 25,1915. Sect. to Grey. 
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The one fatal thing was to do nothing. It was no use 
bribing people here and there or taking any half 
measure. The Persians would merely take bribes from 
us [British] and from the Germans and then do whatever 
they thought right or expedient. 1 
In fact, the British authorities did not wish to commit themselves 
to either of Äqä Khän's suggestions. Meanwhile they continued their 
current policy, which was to cope with the situation and wait for a 
better opportunity. Mr. Marling was at the centre of this political 
puzzle in Iran; some Iranian politicians blamed him for the discrediting 
of British prestige in Iran. 
"Naubahär" stated that the current British policy in Iran was 
contradictory to the foundations of their policy. He explained that 
the principle of British policy was based on attracting the Iranian 
Government's friendship and public sympathy to their side, The 
reason for this change, from the writer's point of view, was the 
attitude of the British Minister in Tehran, who misled British policy 
in Iran. He stated that this policy had caused the complaint of the 
Iranian Government and the hatred of the people against the British. 
He believed that the Iranian Government had done its best to satisfy 
the British Government's desires and showed their willingness for 
compromising with them. The writer stated that the discharge of 
IMlukhbir us-Saltanah; the prevention of tribal attacks on the British 
force in Bushire; the appointment of Sardar Zaffar, a notorious man, 
as Governor of Kerman at the British request, were due to the friendly 
attitude of the Iranian Government towards the British; but they 
received nothing in return, the British did not even withdraw their 
troops from Bushire. He complained:. 
1. ibid. 
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Has the British Minister sworn to prove to the Iranian 
Government and nation that their assistance with British 
purposes and their submission to the British Government's 
demands has no value and they still are a government under 
their mercy or a sacrificial cow? 
No, never; neither the Iranian Government will 
sell (the country) cheaply nor the Iranian nation is 
so ignorant. 1 
Mukhbir us-Saltanah believed that Mi. Marling was not well aware 
of Iranian culture, attitude and policy. 
2 
"ShihAb-i Sägib" stated that Mr. Marling, with his harsh methods., 
had complicated the state of affairs between the two countries. 
3 
On the other hand, Mr. Marling had to confront a great number of 
difficulties without many possibilities, Although he had a large credit 
for his expenditure, compared to the Germans' lavish spending it was 
not considerable; moreover, the nation's hatred for the British and 
Russians had paralysed all British and Russian propaganda. Mr. Marling 
confessed that he did not have the ability to stand against German 
activities and propaganda; for instance, in the matter of public 
opinion he stated: 
... it is true, our newspaper organs, and one of them, the Asir-i-Jadid most ably and loyally conducted by 
Matin-us-Sultanah, has done a great deal to open the 
eyes of public, not in Tehran only but all over the 
provinces, to the periolous position to which 
"neutrality" was leading the country. But this sort 
of influence, valuable as it was, could not alone 
prevail against German methods. 4 
Mr. Marling was on the stage of political crisis in Iran and 
received all information about political and economic aspects in the 
1. "Naubahär", No. 81, Oct. 22,1915/Zi Hijjah 12,1333. 
2.1"Iukhbir us-Saltanah, 271. 
3. "Shihäb-i Sägib"", No. 39, Nov. 4,1915/21 Hijjah 25,1333. 
4. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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country; therefore, he was the one who could suggest some ideas and 
plans for the survival of British policy and interests in Iran. One 
of his suggestions was to offer a defensive alliance to the Iranian 
Government. In his reports he pointed out the possibility of an 
Iran-German alliance. He requested that he be authorised to open 
negotiations with the Iranian Government for a defensive alliance 
between the Allies and Iran. From a military point of view, Mr. 
Marling believed that the British advance towards Baghdad and seizure 
of that city within a few days would not make it necessary to send 
any British forces to Iran; he estimated that the Russian forces in 
Iran were sufficient to hunt down German agents in the country. From 
a financial point of view, he was of the opinion that they must assist 
the Iranian Government with a considerable sum of money and also give 
a guarantee for the integrity and independence of Iran. He pointed 
-out that "A hostile Persia on the other hand would be most embarrassing 
to us. To say nothing of commercial loss it means a free road to 
Afghanistan and a threat, though not very formidable perhaps, to our 
military operation in Mesopotamia. "1 He added that if Iran joined the 
Germans, "No financial inducement would keep Kawam and Saulat or even 
Bakhtiyari faithful to us. "2 He asked to be allowed to negotiate with 
the Iranian Government on these grounds. He believed this scheme at 
least would delay the conclusion of an Irano-German agreement. Further- 
more, it would give time for Russian forces to arrive in Iran. He 
warned his government that due to the arrival of some Russian troops 
in Iran, it would make the Germans anxious and they would do their 
utmost to persuade the Iranian Government to join them before the 




Russian troops became numerous enough to have any effect on pro-German 
feeling. Mr. Marling reported that the Russian Minister in Tehran in 
general agreed with him. He stated: "Essential thing is to gain time 
and I propose to take an early opportunity to discuss the proposition 
academically with Minister for Foreign Affairs. "' 
Meanwhile, the Allied Legations used their utmost ability to 
neutralise the German influence in Iran. Some pro-Allied newspapers, 
such as "'Asr-i Jadid", published some articles against German intrigues 
in Iran, particularly in the south, and of course against the most 
well-known British enemy, Massmuss, in Fars. "'Asr-i Jadid" published 
a commentary on Wassmuss' activities in Fars. The writer complained 
bitterly about Wass=ass' mischief and believed that he had created 
disorder and disaster in the province of Fars. The writer criticised 
the government for taking no measures against him. He also attacked 
the former Governor-General of Fars, Nukhbir us-Saltan. ah, for taking 
part in the problems of Fars and accused him of corruption and neglect 
of his duties in connection with the assassination of Ghuläm "All 
thAn Navväb, the British Legation's munshi (secretary). 
2 
The British Legation in Tehran also received help from foreigners 
who were employed by the Iranian Government to work in the government 
administration. Many Belgian officials had been working in Customs 
offices all over the country. The British Government requested the 
Belgian Government to instruct its minister in Tehran and other 
Belgians who were employed by the Iranian Government to assist the 
British and Russian Legations and Consulates in Iran with any informa- 
tion which might help the Allies. Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister 
1. Ibid. 
2. "Asr-i Jadid" Nov. 2,1915/Zi Hijjah 23,1333. 
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for Foreign Affairs, accepted the British Government's request and 
immediately instructed his minister in Tehran. Mr. Marling admitted 
that the Belgians had done their best; he reported that "Belgian 
Minister gives us all the information he can gather from these sources 
and is most helpful in every way. "1 
On 28th October 1915, Mr. Marling realised that the situation 
was very crucial; particularly, the news of an Irano-German treaty 
worried him intensely. In his report to the British Government he 
expressed his anxiety about the safety of British subjects and suggested: 
"In order to avoid useless danger to colony I should be authorised to 
send in an ultimatum giving Persian Government 24 hours in which to 
cancel convention, failing which we break off relations. "2 He also 
added that he and the colony would withdraw to Qazvin. The Russian 
Government was opposed to the suggestion and preferred a mild tactic, 
such as a warning to the Iranian Government. Sir Edward Grey, in 
replying to Marling's proposal, wrote: "It would be mistake in any 
circumstances to give Persians the ultimatum which Germany wishes to 
provoke from us, "3 
There was no way left for the British but to turn to the Russians. 
The most important factor which saved Allied policy at every crucial 
time was the Russian force in Iran. At that time a considerable increase 
in the force was vital for them, and particularly for the British. 
Therefore, Grey communicated with Buchanan and instructed him to inform 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British would do 
their utmost to influence the neighbourhood of Baghdad. He also added 
1. F. O. 371-2436. No. 450. Nov. 12,1915. Decypher. Marling. Tehran. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. No. 418. Tehran, Oct. 28,1915. Decypher. Marling. 
3. F. O. 416-63. No. 341. P. O... Oct. 29,1915. Grey to Marling. 
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that the British Government was well aware of Russian military 
difficulties but if it would be possible, to send troops to Iran as 
its "effect might be of the greatest importance. "1 Meanwhile, the 
British Legation in Tehran warned the British Government that the 
Iranian Government might be forced to join the German side. They 
believed there was no alternative but "an immediate large reinforce- 
ment of the Russian garrison at Kazvin ... but a weak addition would 
be useless. "2 London Petrograd diplomatic authorities were very 
concerned about the importance of Iran's affairs. Grey tried to convince 
the Russian Government that "The urgency of the situation in Persia 
is apparent and it is clear that Russians and we must act with prompti- 
tude if we desire avert most serious consequents. "3 He asked that 
the British Minister in Petrograd ask for the immediate despatch of a 
Russian force to Iran. Buchanan was instructed to encourage the 
Russian Government and informed them that the British army would 
approach Baghdad and explained that "the capture of the important place 
will doubtless create a great impression in Persia favourable to our 
common course. "4 Grey recommended Buchanan to point out that the 
Russian and British action should be simultaneous. Buchanan, in his 
report about the Russian attitude towards the British proposal, wrote: 
"Russian Government is only too anxious to do all it can with limited 
means at its disposal to take some simultaneous action in North Persia. "5 
Buchanan was told that the Russians had already sent reinforcements to 
Iran but the number of troops was unknown and they would find out if 
there was any possibility of sending more. 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. 
2, F. O. 416-63. Tele. 
3. F. O. 416-63. Tele. 
4. Ibid. 
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Iran at the Apex of Crisis 
The Iranian Government had practically lost the reins of rule 
over the country. Chaos and panic saturated the capital's atmosphere. 
The Iranian Government was desperately struggling with internal prob- 
lems as well as the difficulties created by foreign countries, In 
addition to all this, there were other incidents, such as a rumour 
about the organisation of a committee consisting of some politicians 
and influential persons who were plotting against the government. 
This group was called The Committee of Corruption by the press. They 
stated that the aim of the committee was to bring discord betmeen the 
Democrats, cabinet, gendarmerie, Bakhtiyäri savars and the IMIajlis 
parties. The press requested that the government take action against 
them at once. Meanwhile, Mr. 'destdahl, the Swedish officer commanding 
the Tehran police force, declared that he would not renew his contract 
with the Iranian Government, which was due to expire on lst November. 
2MIu'tamin ul-Mulk, the Majlis chairman, announced that he was about to 
resign. 
The capital seemed to be the last point for the belligerent 
countries' conflicts in Iran. The situation was generally in favour 
of the Germans. The arrival of the German force in Istanbul and the 
Bulgarians' entry into the war against the Allies overshadowed the 
importance of the British forces in the neighbourhood of Baghdad. The 
prospect of a German victory was considerably, high in the eyes of the 
Iranian people at the time. Meanwhile, due to the possibility of the 
capture of Baghdad by the British forces, which would have created 
difficulties in communication between Iran and Germany, the Germans 
sent a stream of military aides to Iranian cities, in company with 




the Germans concentrated arms and ammunition and savars. From these 
two cities the Germans distributed military equipment to other cities 
in Iran. In late October heavy transportation of arms and munitions 
to Tehran terrified the Allied Legations and their friends. Well-known 
pro-Allied persons did not appear in public. FarmAn Farmä found the 
capital unsafe and asked the British Minister in Tehran "whether he 
should not accept the Governorship of Khorassan". Akbar Mirzä announced 
that his father, Zill us-Suliän, had despatched a telegram asking him 
to go to Europe. 
1 The Allied Ministers expected a coup in Tehran at 
any moment and that the Germans would take over the capital as they 
did in Kermanshah, Isfahan and other cities. Mr. Marling believed 
that from the middle of October "the Germans were virtually masters 
of Tehran. "2 According to the reports which the British Legation in 
Tehran received, it was estimated that the Germans possessed 2,000 
rifles and 3,000 bombs and grenades. Two hundred escaped Austrian 
prisoners from Russia assembled in a barracks not far from the capital. 
It was believed that six to seven hundred gendarmes would support them. 
Opposing this pro-German force were five hundred Cossacks and one 
thousand police, who were not considered very reliable. 
The Allied Legations in Tehran, through the London-Petrograd and 
Tehran-Petrograd diplomatic channels, endeavoured to convince the 
Russian Government of the importance of the situation in Iran and 
urged the government that the only alternative to save the Russian 
and British interests and the lives of their subjects in Iran was to 
despatch a considerable number of troops immediately into the country. 
Mr. Marling pointed out that the gravity of the situation might force 
1. P. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. I_. 
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the legation to evacuate Tehran. The legation had already destroyed 
secret documents but the idea of evacuating the capital was rejected 
by the British Government. The British Minister in Tehran was 
informed that "We do not desire to precipitate a breach with Persia, 
and it should be made clear that if a rupture takes place it will be 
due entirely to Persian submission to German agents. ' Mr. Marling 
was instructed to communicate a list of all attacks on Allied subjects 
and employees to the Iranian Government. On 29th October the British 
Legation in Tehran despatched a letter to the Iranian Government, stating: 
Your Excellency, 
His Majesty's Government to whom I have of course 
communicated the lamentable intelligence of the attack 
on the munshi of the British Consulate at Shiraz and 
the murder of the Gholam who accompanied him, have 
naturally been most painfully impressed with this fresh 
proof of the inability of the Imperial Government to 
protect the British consuls, and I have consequently 
been instructed to inform Your Excellency that unless 
the Persian Government gives redress for this and other 
similar outrages and shows proof of its capacity to 
protect British Consular officers in future, His 
Majesty's Government will hold Persia responsible for 
any rupture of the friendly relations existing between 
the two countries. 2 
Mr. Marling then recounted all the attempts on British subjects in 
Iran, such as those at Buchire, Kangavar and Shiraz. He concluded 
that "This list of outrages will not fail to bring home to Your 
Excellency the reasons why His Majesty's Government take so grave view 
of the situation,, ,3 On 30th October another note sent to the Iranian 
Government expressed the British Government's uneasiness: 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 336. P. O., Oct. 27,1915. Grey to Marling. 
2. F. O. 371-2437. No. 134. Tehran, Nov. 4,1915. Marling to Grey. 




... I drew Your Excellency's attention to the dangerous 
position in which His Majesty's consular officers in 
various towns in Persia have been placed by the neglect 
of the Imperial Persian Government to afford them pro- 
tection to which they are entitled as the representatives 
of a friendly power. 
The presence in the capital of a considerable 
number of Germans, Austrians, and Turks, many of whom 
are soldiers, the introduction by the enemy Legations 
of large quantities of arms and ammunition, the 
enlistment by those legations of numerous retainers, 
and other proceedings with which the Persian Government 
are perfectly well acquainted and which I need not 
therefore recount, has produced in the mind of my 
Government the apprehension that even His Majesty's 
Legation and those of the Allies are not safe from 
the possibility of attacks organised by Germans, with 
the Persian connivance, ... 1. 
In the continuation of the note the British Minister referred to the 
Irano-German convention and held the Iranian Government responsible 
for the consequences which followed from this attitude. 
Due to the emergency request from London and Tehran to send 
Russian troops to Iran, the Russian Government instructed the Russian 
commander of the Caucasus Army to despatch troops to Iran. During 
the last few days of October the Russian troops landed gradually at 
Anzali. On the 26th two squadrons and two days later 4,000 men 
landed at the same port. The arrival of the Russians in Iran produced 
a great relief at both legations in Tehran and they anticipated that 
more troops would come soon. The Russian press reported that the 
arrival of their forces in Qazvin had a great effect on the capital 
and the situation was improving; the Germans had reduced their 
activities and the press had lessened their attacks on the Allies. 
"Novoye Vremya" wrote: 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 133. Tehran, Nov. 4,1915. Marling to Grey. Note 
communicated to Persian Government dated Oct. 30,1915. 
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The British and Russian actions have recently had 
important effects in the country. The situation has 
changed this week .., the pro-Germans and Turks tried 
to escape from any dangers. The German Ambassador and 
some consuls have asked the American Embassy in case 
of danger if they could take refuge in the American 
Embassy. 1 
The mourning month of Muharram was about to begin. Everyone 
expected some sort of incident. The British and Russian Legations 
received reports that their lives were in danger and they anticipated 
that there was a possibility of both ministers in Tehran being kid- 
napped. They also received reports that the legations would be stormed 
by mobs during 'Ashürä. The political condition in Tehran was extremely 
complicated. Would the Germans bring off a coup d'etat at the last 
moment? Would they be able to drag the Iranian Government to their 
side? What were the Allies' intentions? Were they going to occupy 
the capital and put an end to the neutrality of Iran? The final 
question was, which one was going to move first. Mr. Marling, however, 
could not understand why the Germans did not bring off a coup despite 
being perfectly able to do so. As soon as General Baratof, the 
commander of the Russian army in Qazvin, arrived in Anzali, he issued 
the following proclamation: 
Due to false rumours which have been spread by the 
Germans, Austrians and Turks that the Russian force 
has hostile intentions towards the Iranian Government 
and inhabitants, I am therefore obliged to declare to 
the people of Gilän and neighbourhood: 
1) The force which has already arrived and the force 
which will arrive later definitely have no enmity towards 
the Iranian Government and inhabitants, and the people 
can continue their business. 
2) I came to Iran just to help the Iranian Government 
in case our enemy creates disorder. 2 
1. "Novoye Vrenya", quoted in "Bämdäd-i Raushan", No. 104, Oct. 23, 
1915/21 xijjah 13,1333. 
2. I. F. O. 1334 H. Q. dated Nov. 3,1915. 
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The proclamation also contained other points that the condition of 
Iran had been disturbed by German intrigues, and the Iranian Govern- 
ment was unable to deter them; due to the friendship between Russia 
and Iran, the Germans were indeed the Russians' enemy and it was the 
general's duty to stop them. He asked the people to be kind to the 
Russian troops. The general's arrival in Qazvin heated up the tension 
in the capital. The Allied Ministers requested to be authorised to 
give the troops in Qazvin orders without consulting their headquarters 
in the Caucasus. They also asked for the immediate despatch of the 
troops to Tehran. The Russian Government refused the first request, 
but accepted the second one. 
The normal activities of the capital were disturbed. The people 
were in a very tense mood, panic, anger and disappointment revealed 
on their faces. The Iranian Government gathered all its efforts to 
do whatever was possible to save the capital. The government was 
well aware that the belligerent countries had gone too far in Iran, 
but was absolutely unable to take any measures against them without 
putting the country at great risk. The German promises had not gone 
beyond the stage of talks. If the Iranian Government had joined the 
Central Powers and the Germans could not fulfill their undertakings, 
the country would have been in great jeopardy. Therefore the Iranian 
Government avoided taking any action contradictory with its neutrality. 
On the other hand, the Iranian Government had no hope of receiving 
any decent suggestions from the Allies. The British and Russian 
attitudes were as harsh as ever; the British particularly seemed 
uncompromising. 
The concentration of the Russian troops in Qazvin, with the anti- 
cipation of more to come, caused the prospect of the capital being in 
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definite danger. There was no time, the opportunity was moving out 
of reach, the Iranian Government tried hard to bring the Allied Govern- 
ments to terms before it was too late. Both powers' policy in Iran 
during this time could be interpreted as a policy of "the carrot and 
stick". They tried to ease the Iranian Government by allowing them 
to draw money from the moratorium credit and put them under pressure 
by threat of the Russian force in Qazvin. The Allies desired to deter 
the government from falling into the hands of the Germans for the time 
being, until the Russian troops had arrived in sufficient numbers to 
deal with any events. Therefore, when the Iranian Government appealed 
for better relations, the Allied Ministers showed that they were 
interested in the Iranian Government's proposals. Concerning the 
changes and progress in the war and the political situation in the 
Middle East, the British and Russian Governments understood that it 
might be possible for them to come to terms with the Iranian Government 
and to consider its proposal seriously, They also found out that the 
Iranian Government had planned to organise an army under Turkish and 
Swedish officers, which was a great matter to be considered. 
As soon as the Russian troops arrived in the north of Iran and 
later on moved to Qazvin, the Allied Governments gained confidence, 
they became reluctant-to the Iranian Government's proposals and enacted 
tougher attitudes towards them than before. The Shah was many times 
frankly threatened that he would lose his throne if he had any intentions 
of following German desires. They also kept the government under 
pressure and gave them frequent warnings about their policy. Mr. 
Marling received information that the British Government had informed 
the Iranian Ambassador in London that: 
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His Majesty's Government were convinced from recent 
events in Persia and other symptoms that our enemies 
were determined by various means to obtain full control 
of Persia and force her into a breach with Great 
Britain and Russia. 
Such a situation should not continue. It was a 
matter of common sense for a country like Persia to 
keep on good terms with her two powerful neighbours 
and if she allowed herself to be forced into a quarrel 
she would one day bitterly repent having been duped by 
the machinations of the Central Powers. 1 
The Iranian Ambassador was asked to urge his government to accept the 
advice of the British and Russian Ministers about the situation in 
Tehran, "which might have very serious consequences for Persia. "2 
Iran and Benevolent Neutrality 
There was no indication how the idea was brought up that the 
Iranian Government intended to follow benevolent neutrality as its 
policy. However, it was what the Allies desired, though they did 
not show enthusiasm about it, The policy was suggested by the Iranian 
Government but the negotiations did not proceed progressively. On the 
other hand the Germans possessed a strong position in the capital and 
in other important cities in the country. In spite of the fact that 
Mr. Marling thought that the Iranian Government was sincere in its 
intention of achieving benevolent neutrality and was trying to avoid 
being pulled into the war, he nevertheless had doubts that the govern- 
ment was strong enough to stand against the Germans. Mr. Marling also 
expressed his opinion about the ministers in the Iranian cabinet: 
"I fear that Ministers conscious of their own impotence will put forward 
impossible demands so as to be able to lay on us responsibility of 





refusing them and so save their own face. "1 As Ir. Marling had 
realised that the Allied Governments still desired to gain more time, 
he therefore suggested that "We must respond to their overtures and 
show ourselves friendly* 112 The Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
in a meeting with both Allied Ministers in Tehran, submitted the 
conditions under which his government was ready to follow the policy 
of benevolent neutrality in favour of the Allies. The Iranian Minister 
pointed out that the terms were necessary for appeasing public opinion. 
They were as follows: 
1) Settlement of purely Russian question, that is, 
collection of revenue by the Russian Consuls, and 
strict observance of Treaty of Turkamanshai. 
2) Revision of tariff, 
3) Request for arms etc. from Persian Army. 
4) Persia to be represented at the peace Conference 
if other neutral countries are allowed to send Delegates. 
5) Undertaking to withdraw Russian troops from all 
parts of Persia will be discussed in a friendly spirit 
at a later date. 
6) Recognition by Persia of 1907 convention to be 
cancelled as well as other undertakings obtained by 
1911 Ultimatum. 3 
Both ministers immediately reacted to the proposal and criticised the 
stipulations. Mr. Marling, referring to points 2 and 4, felt that the 
public had no knowledge of them, for they had not been mentioned in 
the press or by the ministers at all. He thought that point 4 looked 
as if it had been prepared in Germany, and finally concluded that he 
assumed the proposals would not make a "favourable impression in London. "4 
1. P. O. 371-2435. No. 432. Tehran, Nov. 2,1915. Decypher marling. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371-2435.442. Nov. 9,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
4. Ibid, 
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The Russian Minister admitted his colleague's idea and blamed the 
Iranian Government for carelessness in negotiating points 1 and 5 with 
the Russian Legation in Tehran before. However, he indicated that he 
was willing to negotiate the matters. He agreed about financial 
assistance for the Iranian Government. Both ministers stated they 
would inform their governments about the proposals, with their 
recommendations. 
The Russian Government's reaction to the proposals, especially 
to point 6, was total disagreement. The Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs expressed his government's attitude: "Strongly against any 
abrogation of convention of 1907 upon which all Anglo-Russian relations 
in Persia were based ... such step would be a lamentable confession 
of weakness ... "1 Buchanan, in a report from Petrograd, stated that 
the Russian Government's attitude about point 6 indicated that "Imperial 
Government are of opinion that such a demand should in no case be 
granted. "2 From a financial point of view, the Russian Minister 
indicated that his government would assist the Iranian Government, 
but "It is necessary to make Persian Government understand that no 
pecuniary transaction can be effected until the two Legations have 
obtained positive assurances on this subject. "3 
The British Government had no objections to points 1 and 2. 
Regarding point 3, they wanted to know what kind of guarantee the 
Iranian Government would give the Allies that the arms would not be 
used against them. As to point 5, they thought it was premature to 
talk about the international situation. The British Government did not 
wish to commit itself on point 6. Financial assistance was the only 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1640. Nov. 5,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1646. Nov. 5,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
3. Ibid. 
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point which the British Government agreed to. Grey recommended to 
Marling that, if it was necessary, they would increase the moratorium 
or cancel some of the Iranian Government's debts. He warned Mr. 
Marling that he should be cautious of offering the Iranian Government 
large sums of money at one time, which might be used against the 
Allies. However, Grey also did not wish to discourage the Iranian 
Government, which had expressed its friendly attitude. 
The Advance of Russian Troops towards Tehran 
Meanwhile, the Russian Minister in Tehran and the British Govern- 
ment through their legation in Petrograd urged the Russian Government 
to send more troops to Iran. Mr. Marling warned his government that 
the Germans were perfectly capable of bringing off a coup d'etat 
easily. He stated that "we may see a cabinet with Mukhbir us-Saltanah 
at the head of it, "2 The Russian Minister reported that the Germans 
would attempt to create disorders in the city within the first days 
of Muharram, which had already started. 
3 He asked that the Grand Duke 
be requested to permit at least two regiments of the Russian troops 
at Qazvin to advance to Tehran at once. The Russian tiinister for 
Foreign Affairs stated that he would try to encourage the Grand Duke 
to send troops as soon as possible, but he was afraid that the Germans 
would withdraw from Tehran to Isfahan or another city and would take 
the Shah with themselves; in that case they would have no alternative 
but to recall the ex-Shah to Tehran. 
1. F. O. 371-2335. No. 350. P. O., Nov. 2,1915. to Marling; F. O. 
371-2335. No. 2655. Nov. 12,1915. to Buchanan. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. No. 437. Nov. 6,1915. Decypher I'larling. Tehran. 
3. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1665. Nov. 9,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
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As soon as General Baratof arrived in Qazvin, he ordered some 
Russian troops to be ready to approach Tehran. He had been instructed 
"to raise prestige of the Russians, before Persia declares scar upon 
Russia and to occupy Tehran if war is declared. "1 Late on the night 
of 7th November, the Governor of Qazvin reported that the Russian 
forces had left the city, and so did Mr. Marling in his report to 
London; but the kärguzär in Qazvin, after investigating the news, 
contacted the Russian Consul in the city on the following day and 
found out that the Russian troops had not been sent out of the city; 
according to the consul, they would leave the city an hour before the 
noon prayer. 
2 The next report, in the late afternoon, confirmed that 
the troops had proceeded towards Tehran and were estimated as consisting 
of 1,200 men under the command of General Zolotaryov, with fourteen 
cannon and other military equipment. They had reached Kavandaj, a 
village between Qazvin and Karaj. In the morning of the same day in 
Tehran, Mr. Von de Etter, the Russian Minister in Tehran, had an 
audience at the court to present his letters of credence on his appoint- 
ment. During the ceremony nothing was mentioned about the purpose of 
the Russian troops' advance. But in the afternoon, the situation 
became crucial. From the Iranian Government's point of view the 
outcome of the situation was extremely vital to the country. The news 
also created intensive diplomatic communications, on the one hand 
between the Iranian Government and the belligerent countries' legations 
in Tehran and also between the Iranian Embassies in London, Petrograd, 
Berlin and Istanbul with the belligerent government, and on the other 
hand, the foreign legation in Tehran with its government. The Russian 
1. Miroshnikov , op. cit., 49. 
2. Prayer time on 8th November would have been about 12.50 p. m. 
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troops' advance to the capital panicked the inhabitants. The Shah 
stated that he would leave the capital. In the afternoon of 8th 
Novemeber, the Iranian 14inister for Foreign Affairs called on both 
Allied Ißinisters in Tehran and strongly protested against the advance 
of the Russian force towards the capital. The ministers realised 
that it was the time to squeeze the Iranian Government even more. 
They replied: 
The attacks and murders committed on our consuls in all 
parts of Persia and of the total failure on the part of 
the Persian Government to take any measures whatever 
to protect them or to punish the aggressors, our Govern- 
ments, seeing that there was a grave risk lest similar 
events should occur in the capital where the Germans 
were making quite unconcealed preparation for a coup 
of some kind, had decided that it was necessary to bring 
a small force closer to the capital for our protection. 1 
The ministers pointed out that the troops had no hostile intentions 
against Iran nor would they enter the capital except if disorders 
broke out. The Iranian Minister assured the ministers that the Iranian 
Government would do its best to protect the Allied Legations and 
subjects, and promised that the German savars and Austrian soldiers 
would be removed. He also added that the armed groups would be disarmed, 
The Allied Ministers indicated that the Iranian Government had no power 
to take any measures against them and if the government were planning 
to rely on the gendarmes, they were already in the pay of the Germans. 
The ministers believed that not even the government had a friendly 
attitude. They referred, as before, to the Irano-German treaty, 
particularly when the government intended to form an army under 
Turkish officers which probably would be used against the Allies. 
There had always been an intention to organise a national army in 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Iran, but this idea had been discouraged by the British and Russian 
Ministers in Tehran. In 1915 once more the Iranian politicians began 
to think of forming a national arny. 
1 The first step was the recall 
of Iranian officers from Turkey, where they were being educated. Their 
presentation to the Shah was a matter of great anxiety, for the Allied 
T-Zinisters thought they were Turkish officers. 
2 
Therefore, both ministers stated that they would avoid asking 
their governments to recall the Russian troops back to aazvin. The 
Iranian Minister pointed out that in that case the government would 
have no alternative but to transfer the capital to another city. Later 
on the same day, Shihäb ud Daulah, the Minister for Education, in a 
meeting with both ministers, stated that he had been sent to receive 
a reply to two questions. First, on what terms would the Allies 
withdraw their troops to Qazvin? Secondly, were the ministers ready 
to negotiate on Iran's benevolent neutrality? Regarding the first 
point, the ministers stated that it was not up to them. Mr. Marling 
then referred to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs' indication 
that the government would withdraw to Isfahan. He believed that it was 
"nothing but a threat that Persia would throw in her lot with Germany 
if we did not agree to Persia's requirements in return for her benevolent 
neutrality. "3 Mr. Marling reported that he had told the Iranian Minister 
for Education: 
I was not auch impressed by the threat as I was convinced 
that the Shah would not care to take a left seat in Prince 
Reuss' carriage and I knew the Cabinet did not wish to 
see Persia involved in a war which could only have disastrous 
results for her. If the Government was sincere in its 
professions towards us, it should have the courage to 
declare its policy openly and let the world know that it 
1. F. O. 416-63. Tele. No. 402. Tehran, Oct. 21,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. "Bämdäd-i Raushan" , No. 108, Nov. 2,1915/Zi Fii 
j jah 22,1333. 
3. F. O. 271-2435. No. 443. Nov. 9,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran, 
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frankly accepted our assurances that the troops had been 
moved merely to ensure the safety of the Legations ., 
and had not an unfriendly purpose. . Je had already given 
proof of our friendship by according Moratorium and we 
must have some corresponding sign from Persia. 1 
The Iranian Minister replied that the advance of the Russian troops 
might create a disastrous effect in the provinces. The British Minister 
believed that it would not make the situation worse than it was for 
the Allied Consuls in the cities. He alluded to the second point of 
the Iranian Government's request, and stated that 
... the whole thing looked like blackmail, but we were 
not in a position to defend ourselves and it was ridicu- 
lous to ask us to abandon that advantage. If the troops 
now withdrew to Kazvin. I should, probably, be in the sane 
plight as the Consul at Shiraz who had not been able to 
leave his garden for 2 months. I declined to accept the 
position, and the nearer troops came the better I should 
be pleased. 
As to the substance of the Persian proposals, the 
more I thought of them the less I understood the spirit 
in which they had been framed. To accept them in 
principle as he suggested, sounded well, but, as regards 
two of them any acceptance at all was a full acceptance. 2 
However, both ministers stated that they would inform their 
governments about the matters. Mr. Marling reported that "so long as 
we stand fast, and allowed troops to move nearer, the situation may 
be saved. It will be certainly lost if we show weakness. "3 Sazanov, 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, advocated the ministers' 
idea and stated that "troops could not be ordered to return to Kazvin 
till an end had been put to German intrigues at Tehran by removal of 
Austrians, Germans and Turks, and by seizure of their arms. "4 He even 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371-2435. iTo. 
4. P. O. 371-2435. No. 
443, Nov. 9,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
1673. Nov. 10,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
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suggested that the Iranian Minister should be instructed to advise 
"the young Shah that if he left Tehran he might not find it easy to 
return. "' 
The prospects for the independence and integrity of the country 
were as black as ever. The press were outraged. Some of them openly 
encouraged the government to join the Central Powers. "Parvardin", 
in an article entitled "The 'Äshürä of the country", after referring 
to the history of '1shürä, expressed regret for the condition of the 
country at the time. The writer was astonished that despite many 
shaking events the people were still sleeping. He criticised the 
people who claimed to be Muslim but did nothing against unbelievers 
who occupied their country or were fighting with their Muslim brothers. 
He stated: 
We allowed the enemy to be so insolent as to occupy our 
homeland part by part. Now, they intend to invade the 
capital ... to confirm our slavery and surrounding 
officially .. * it is enough self-indulgence ... 
Rise for the protection of the homeland and 
religion ... today is the 'äshürä of the country; gone (self-sacrificing) is the basis of religion. 2 
The writer encouraged the people to form an alliance and not to be 
afraid of the Russian troops and encouraged them to fight for their 
country's independence. He ended the article with some slogans and 
asked the people to "sweep away the foreigners from your homeland ,, 
3 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" stated that the Iranian people were still drunk 
and unaware; they were forgetful and absurd. The writer addressed 
the people thus: 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1673. Nov. 10,1915. Decyoher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
2. "Parvardin" , No, 40, Nov. 10,1915/1'Iuharram 2$ 1334. 3. Ibid. 
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Arise, awake ... This is Tehran and that is the Russian 
force ... we have received two ways of death and life 
... 
(but) death with such humiliation and unmanliness. 
Partition with fear and submission ... Our neighbours 
want to cut off our heads. 1 
"NaubahAr" blamed the Iranian Government for its inability to 
maintain neutrality and for revealing its tendency towards the Russian 
and British Governments. He believed the government would enact what 
both powers desired and would do what they ordered. On the contrary, 
not only had both powers by no means intended to respect the neutrality 
of the country, they treated the Iranians in a way in which no one 
would behave towards his enemy. The writer believed it was a vain 
aspiration to expect humanity from both powers. He added that despite 
all their claims of being civilised and humanitarian countries, they 
showed constantly their cruelty to powerless countries which were not 
of their own race or religion and wanted to put an end to their 
existence. The writer recommended the government to follow public 
opinion because both powers would do what they wanted; he addressed 
them: "It is enough, undo this tie of adversity ... say farewell to 
these cruel and bloodthirsty friends ... "2 
"'Ahd-i Ingiläb" bitterly complained about the state of affairs 
and wrote: 
What kind of life is this, that its option must be in 
the hands of others? 'What country is this which has 
no power at all? Our neighbours want us to die; yes, 
we will the but the way of dying is in our hands. They 
want us to die from fear but we will the bravely. 3 
1. "Shihäb-i S. Igib", No. 101, Nov. 11,1915/Muharram 3,1334. 
2. "Naubahär", No. 84, Nov. 5,1915/21 Hij ah 26,1333. 
3. "4Ahd-i Ingiläb", No. 39, Nov. 14,1915/M arram 6,1334. 
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The writer addressed the Allied countries that it was better for them 
not to put more pressure on the Iranian people, otherwise they would 
"wash their hands of life", would sacrifice their lives. 
"Shihäb-i Sägib" wrote that Iran's neighbours' pressure over the 
country had been so continuous that it now seemed natural. The 
authorities had almost been strangled by their harsh policy in Iran, 
In spite of being involved in the war with their enemy on their 
territory, they did not lessen their pressure on Iran, On the other 
hand, the Iranian Government had done its utmost to express its 
friendly attitude towards them. The writer then referred to the 
discharge of ;: izkhbir us-Saltanah, the prevention of the declaration 
of jihad against both powers, and the deterrence of the Mujlhidin from 
invading Bushire and also the appointment to the governorship of those 
persons who were recommended by the Allied Ministers in Tehran. The 
writer alluded to the Imperial Bank, which without having any official 
orders, had confiscated the money of Shaykh Husayn Chähkutä'i and 
added that the Iranian Government, for the sake of friendship, did not 
take any measures against them. In conclusion, the writer asked both 
powers to modify their policy towards Iran. 
1 
Some of the newspapers had turned the sharp point of their 
criticism toward the Iranian Government and members of the Majlis. The 
strongest criticism against them was published in the daily newspaper 
"Raid". In the editorial commentaries, the writer attacked the govern- 
ment's policy and administration. He believed the decline of Iran, 
the crisis in the country and unfortunate occurrences arose from bad 
policy and the carelessness of the government. The writer held the 





government responsible for the disgraceful condition of the country 
and accused it of failing in its duties. The writer stated: "Any 
calamity and disaster which strikes the weak body of Iran is due to 
the lack of a straight policy which our government is unable to 
pursue. "' He added that if the belligerent governments were asked 
about the Iranian Government's policy, their reply would hold nothing 
but repulsion for such an ambiguous policy. In the issue of 10th 
November the writer wrote: "It is three months since our ministers 
have held political negotiations and assured us that the government 
would declare its definite policy after exchanging views with foreign 
authorities. "2 The writer complained that the danger had arrived 
but there was still no sign of any definite policy by the government. 
He asked the government to take an immediate decision. 
"Bamdäd-i Raushan", in an article entitled "The present situation's 
stated that although the advance of the Russian troops had been anti- 
cipated for at least three months, nothing had actually been done 
about it. The writer then attacked the government for being careless 
and held them responsible for the situation. He blamed the cabinet 
and members of the Majlis for being unconcerned with the country's 
affairs and complained that the government would not follow a definite 
policy. He believed that under those circumstances the government 
had three choices: "defending, surrounding, and transferring the 
capital". He added that, regretfully, the government was still 
following the old policy, which was negotiating with the Allied Ministers 
and their governments and expecting to receive a satisfactory reply 
from London and Petrograd, which was vain. Consequently, the people 
1. "Ra' d" , No. 37, Nov. 10,1915/IMIuharram 2,1334. 2. Ibid. 
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did not know their duties, the Shah was in danger and there was an 
imminent invasion of the capital. The writer advocated the idea of 
transferring the capital to another city. He was also astonished that 
the Russian Government had committed such an action and asked: "Do 
they want to attract the Iranian people to their friendship .. kind- 
ness with force is impossible ... threatening the capital would 
increase the people's hatred and irritation. "' The writer stated 
that the Iranian Government had no intention of joining the Central 
Powers. He believed that the Russian action was the result of British 
pressure and then attacked British policy in Iran. In his conclusion 
the writer asked the people to rise to protect the independence and 
integrity of the country, 
"Shürä" also criticised the state of affairs and complained, 
"How far (can) negligence (go) and how much carelessness (can be 
tolerated)? How long is it possible to be patient and how long to be 
silent? "2 
"Naubahär", in an editorial entitled "The enemy attacked", 
referred to the Russian troops' advance towards Tehran. He believed 
there was no difference between that 'Äshürä and those previous ones 
which the Allied Ministers took as an excuse to call the Russian troops 
to the capital. He asked for a general rising to defend the country. 
3 
Both legations in Tehran sent letters of protest to the government 
against the article in "Naubahär". The Russian Legation protested on 
2nd Mluharraa 1334/10th November 1915: 
... I draw your attention to the impolite article 
published in "NaubahAr", No. 85, dated yesterday 
1. "BImdäd-i Raushan", No. 113, Nov. 13,1915/Muharran 5,1334. 
2. "Shiirä", No. 112, Nov. 6,1915/Z! Hijjah 27,1333. 




[9th of November] under the title "The enemy attacked", 
which Your Excellency will appreciate is a matter of 
strong and serious protest and will be requested ... 
either to punish the editor and suspend the newspaper 
or to banish him from Tehran; thus he will not publish 
such an insolent and exciteable article again. 1 
""Aqr-i Jadid", in a long editorial on the situation in the 
country, expressed its anxiety at the advance of the Russian troops 
and referred to the rumour that "'Air-i Jadid" had been blamed for 
having a tendency towards one of the belligerent countries. The 
writer rejected the rumour and stated that the newspaper had remained 
neutral but was against publishing slogans and exciting articles at 
the time. He alluded to the article published in "Naubahär", which 
called the Russian troops enemies, and criticised the writer. He 
expressed his opinion, opposite to that in "NaubahAr", that this 
'1shürä was completely different from the previous ones. He explained 
that before there had not been armed men from Russia, Germany and 
Turkey marching in the streets of the capital. Now, arms and bombs 
had come to Tehran in such amounts that "one can say we are walking 
over bombs. " He added that the regretful events of Bushire, Shiraz, 
Isfahan and Kermanshah had not happened before. The writer believed 
that one of the reasons which caused the Russian troops to approach 
Tehran was the publication of articles just like that in "PTaubahär". 
The writer believed the situation would not be improved by agitating 
the people. He asked the people to keep calm, to be patient and to 
follow the government's decisions. He also recommended the government 
be concerned with nothing but the independence and integrity of the 
country. 
2 
1. I. F. O., C. 62, f. 5, No. Ss 1333 H. . dated I4uharram 2,1334 H. R., 
No. 235. 
2. "tAir-i Jadid", No. 23, Nov. 9,1915/Muharram 1,1334. 
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"Naubahär", in the next issue, published another article, entitled 
"Friend also attacked", which was a reply to ""Aqr-i Jadid". On the 
same day the "Naubahär" office was closed down by government order 
and on the recommendation of the British and Russian Legations in 
Tehran. The editor, Malik ush-Shu'arä' Bahär, was told to leave the 
city. A few days later the government, in reply to British and 
Russian letters, announced: 
... As Your Excellency has been informed, the govern- 
ment has suspended the newspaper but the arrest of 
its editor (cannot be carried out) due to his immunity 
as a member of the Majlis ... I hope Your Excellency 
would disregard this request. 1 
The Iranian Government despatched letters to both legations in 
Tehran, to be reported to their governments, They contained the 
Iranian Government's protest against the approach of troops to the 
capital and also suggested that if the troops returned to Qazvin, 
the Iranian Government would take certain measures, including: 
1) 50 soldiers (sarbaz) and a number of Cossacks [to 
be stationed] at the British and Russian Le ations (and lesser numbers at the other Legations. 
); 
2) The Escaped Austrians to be removed to a distant 
point and there to be interned; 
3) All mujheds (armed men) to be disarmed. By 
preference the Persian Government would take this in 
hand after the 10th of Moharrem (i. e. in a week's 
time). 
4) No Moharrem processions to pass through any 
quarter inhabited by Europeans; and even in the native 
quarters the processions to be under police supervision. 
5) No arms nor ammunition to be imported into Tehran. 2 
1. I. F. O., C. 62, f. 5, DNo. 11.1333 H. Q. dated Muharram 20,1334. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. No. -. Tehran, Nov. 13,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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But the Allied Governments and their legations in Tehran had no 
intention of considering these proposals. 
The capital was not quiet; people gathered around government 
offices and the Majlis, asking and shouting for a definite decision 
by the government. Rumours circulated in the capital that there would 
be a food shortage, and prices increased drastically. Meanwhile, a 
sudden devaluation of notes created a great embarrassment in markets. 
Transactions in bäzärs required silver and gold coins. Government 
administration was nearly at a standstill and a general closing of 
b. Izärs seemed imminent. The government was in contact with all 
important politicians, members of the Majlis and parties. There were 
constant meetings about the process of political affairs. Many 
representatives from the 'u=, merchants, students and other groups 
visited the members of the cabinet and discussed the situation in the 
country. Anxiety at the court was extremely high. The members of the 
cabinet, politicians such as Mushir ud-Daulah and Mukhbir us-Saltanah, 
some members of the royal family, 1Ayn ud D aulah and Farman Farmä, 
assembled at the court and held meetings to find a way to deal with 
the crisis. Foreign ambassadors received appointments every day. 
The ministers of the Central Powers and the Allies met the Shah and 
the government and, by threats or inducements, tried to incline them 
to their side. The Shah was encouraged to leave the capital. Sipihr 
had discussed with the Shah which city should be chosen as a temporary 
capital. The Shah preferred to go to Isfahan, but Sipihr tried to 
convince him that Kermanshah, from a strategical point of view, had 
more advantages, because the city was situated close to the Turkish 
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border, 1 The Allied Ministers threatened him that "he ran a risk of 
losing his throne. "2 
The Iranian Government took some measures to prevent any disturbances 
in the capital and prepared the ground for negotiations with the Allied 
Legations. Therefore, the Minister of War ordered one hundred soldiers 
to guard the British and Russian Legations, and other foreign legations 
were allotted a lesser number of gendarmes. The city was under police 
control. The mullahs were asked not to preach against neutrality and 
to avoid inflaming public sentiments. The leaders of local religious 
processions received the government's request that they should avoid 
political overtones in their ceremonies. "Naubahär" was suspended 
and its office was closed down. The most important action was that 
the government started to draw money under the moratorium from the 
bank, which Mr. Marling considered "would mean a declaration that 
Persia sides with us and Russia. "3 
On 11th November, the British and Russian Ministers in Tehran 
visited the Iranian Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The Iranian Ministers tried to convince the Allied Ministers 
that under the circumstances it was necessary to appease public 
opinion and that would be achieved by recalling the Russian troops 
back to Qazvin. If that was done, and the Allied Governments concurred 
to the conditions on which Iran would follow the policy of benevolent 
neutrality, then the Iranian Government would announce publicly its 
intention to prevent German intrigues in Iran. But there was no change 
in the Allies' attitude. They replied along the same lines as before 
and added that 
1. Sipihr, 237. 
2. Sykes, Persia, op. cit., 157. 
3. P. O. 371-2435. No. 437. Nov. 6,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
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Persian Government had promised to remove Austrian 
prisoners and take other measures but had done 
absolutely nothing but provided a few guards for 
legations armed with unserviceable rifles. In the 
circumstances orders to troops could not be modified. 1 
The ministers also did not wish to disappoint the Iranian Government 
totally; therefore, they stated that it might be possible to receive 
instructions from their governments to negotiate the Iranian Government's 
proposals for benevolent neutrality. It was pointed out that 
Persian Government by accepting moratorium had practically 
pledged themselves to benevolent neutrality and had no 
cause whatever to regard presence of troops as unfriendly; 
if Government were sincere in their professions they would 
at once make this clear to the public and our governments. 2 
Concerning public opinion, the Iranian Ministers stated that it was 
impossible to fulfill the Allied wishes at the time. The result of 
the meeting was unsatisfactory for both sides. On the other hand, 
diplomatic activities of Iranian Ambassadors produced no better results. 
In London, the Iranian Ambassador, in a meeting with the British 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that he had been informed by 
his government to appeal to the British Government to agree to the 
return of the Russian troops to Qazvin or at least to stop them some- 
where near Tehran, but not to allow them to enter the city. He also 
added that the Russian Minister in Tehran had realised that the troops 
should not approach further; but Mr. Marling had an opposite version. 
The Iranian Ambassador received a reply, to inform his government that 
... there was complete identity of views between the two Representatives and between the two Governments 
that the two Representatives were the best judges of 
the needs of the situation and that His Majesty's 




Government had complete confidence in Mr. Marling and 
fully approved his action and language. Moreover, as 
the two Representatives discussing matter with Persian 
Government it would be futile to discuss it here ... 
His Majesty's Government could not expose His Majesty's 
Legation and British colony to same dangers and murders 
of which British subjects elsewhere in Persia had been 
victims, 1 
The Russian Minister in Tehran had been instructed to inform the 
Iranian Government that "there can be no talk of conditions until they 
have put an end to Germaa, Austrian and Turkish intrigues. "2 
On 11th November, the Russian troops arrived at Yangi Imäm, a 
village between Qazvin and Karaj. The number of troops was estimated 
as between 1,800 and 2,400 men. A few hours later, there was a 
rumour that the advance guard of the troops had arrived at Karaj and 
taken over the Karaj-Tehran bridge. The sequence of the deadlock of 
the Irano-Allied negotiations and the imminent arrival of the Russian 
troops in Karaj left no alternative for the Iranian Government but to 
evacuate the capital. The Iranian Government had anticipated the 
possibility of an evacuation; therefore it took some precautions. 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik had asked a few members of the Majlis to go to 
Qom and Isfahan to make preparations for the arrival of the Shah and 
the government. 
iiusayn Sami'1, a member of the Majlis with sympathy for the 
Democrat Party, stated in his memoirs that on 3rd Muharram, the leader 
of the Democrat Party arrived in the Bahäristän gardens and informed 
the members who were gathered there: "Friends, a definite decision 
has been taken; the Prime Minister has finally said that the Shah will 
proceed to Isfahan on the seventh of Muharram [November 15th]. " As 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 2645. P. O., Nov. 11,1915. to Buchanan. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1686. Nov. 12,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
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soon as his statement was finished the members of the party left in 
order to make their preparations for leaving the capital. Mr. Sami'i 
left Tehran on the same day with some of his colleagues. 
1 
The Central Powers' Legations in Tehran were busy making prepara- 
tions to leave Tehran. Secret documents and files were destroyed. 
The Germans had already asked the United States Embassy for protection 
and this proposal had been accepted. Some members of the German 
Legation took refuge in the American Embassy. The two legations were 
situated in a semi-detached building, so the wall between them was 
pulled down and on the following day a sign was pasted on the German 
Legation, reading "United States of America Legation". The U. S. 
Legation informed the Iranian Government and the Allied Legations in 
Tehran that the U. S. Ambassador had accepted a proposal to protect 
German interests in northern Iran, which was occupied by Russian forces. 
This decision by the U. S. caused great embarrassment to the British 
Government and a series of diplomatic communications followed. The 
Turkish Minister also received U. S. protection, while the Spanish 
Legation took the Austrian Legation under its protection. Meanwhile, 
Prince Reuss, the German Minister; fisii Bey, the Turkish Minister; 
and M. Logothetis the Austrian Minister, had frequent meetings with 
the Shah and government, encouraging them to leave the capital. They 
"warned the Shah that Tehran would be stormed by the Russian troops 
and that he would be arrested, if not executed. "2 
In spite of the fact that the Iranian Government was absolutely 
hopeless, it nevertheless endeavoured to take any measures to save the 
1. IJusayn Sani'i and Amän Alläh Ardalän, Avvalln A' Aa-i Muaaddas-i 
Milli dar Jang-i barn ul-Milal-i Avval (Tehran, 1332 H. S. ), 15. 2. Sykes, Persia, o` cit., 157. 
ýý 
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capital. Therefore, when Mr. Marling met the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, he was most cordially received and the Iranian Minister 
expressed his government's desire for better relations. Mr. Marling 
reported that the Iranian Minister had 
... most friendly way and asked whether Russian Minister 
and I mistrusted cabinet as if so a cabinet could easily 
be formed that would enjoy our confidence. He declared 
that the Shah had no intention of leaving the Capital ... 
Government seems to be coming over to us. 1 
On the other hand, the Shah sent a message to the Russian Minister in 
Tehran that he had no desire to leave the capital and expressed his 
wish "of going to meet Russian troop. "2 But the city was as a sea 
before a storm. The people had tolerated enough, anything was possible, 
The Belgian Minister in Tehran reported: 
... populace calm but agitation commencing. It is indispensable to prevent a situation which is certain 
to arise and will probably produce tragic results, 
that troops should not stop half way but should proceed 
to Kerej. 3 
Mr. Marling constantly requested the arrival of Russian troops in 
Tehran. He stated, "sole possible chance of saving situation is 
immediate (? Occupation) of Tehran. "4 Sir Edward Grey also ordered the 
British Minister in Petrograd to ask the Russian Government and to 
insist on sending the troops to Tehran; "the entry of Russian troops 
into Tehran appears most urgent and desiarble. "5 Grey, in the next 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 
2. P. O. 371-2435. No. 
3. F. O. 371-2434. No. 
Havre. 
4. F. O. 371-2435. No. 
5. F. O. 371-2435. No. 
452. Nov. 12,1915. Decypher Marling. 
1694. Nov. 14,1915. Decypher Buchanan. Petrograd. 
57. Nov. 10,1915. Decypher Sir F. Villiers. 
448. Nov. 11,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
2663. F. O. to Buchanan. Nov. 13,1915. 
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despatch to Buchanan, emphatically stated that "In these circumstances 
I hope earnestly that troops may be instructed to push on and decision 
be left to our two representatives on the stop. "1 Grey suggested an 
explanation which could be given the Iranian Government: 
Assurances should be given to Persian Government that 
sole object is to afford protection to our subjects 
against operation of German officers and officials and 
that Persian Government have no reason to be apprehensive. 2 
On the other hand, he indicated that the British Government agreed 
with the idea that the German and Austrian representatives in Tehran 
should be arrested as soon as the Russian troops arrived in the city, 
and if they had run, should be chased and captured by the troops. 
The Russian Government had no disagreement with Grey's proposal. But 
Buchanan reported to London that the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs believed that "Division that had been sent from Caucasus had 
not disembarked and there were not in His Excellency's opinion sufficient 
troops at Kaszin to occupy Tehran. "3 
In fact, the numbers of the Russian force were a mystery at that 
time. Some Iranian newrspapers, such as "Ra'd", seemed to exaggerate 
the number of troops and figured it at about 28,000 men. "'Asr-i Jadid" 
also overrated the number and anticipated that there would be more to 
come. The British and Russian Ministers, even a month later, had no 
idea whether the Russian troops consisted of 10,000 or 20,000 men. 
However, the average estimated was reported as between 10,000 and 
12,000 men. It appeared that the occupation of Tehran was not advisable. 
Although the situation was very crucial, the Allied Ministers confidently 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 2683. P. O., Nov. 15,1915. F. O. to Buchanan. 
2. F. O. 371-2435. No. 2663. Nov. 13,1915. F. O. to Buchanan. 
3. F. O. 371-2435. No. 1694. Petrograd, Nov. 14,1915. Decypher 
Buchanan. 
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relied on the Russian troops and did not wish to change or modify 
their tough attitude. 
By 14th November, there was no change in the Allied policy and 
the Russian troops still threatened the capital; as their advance 
continued, so did the pressure of both ministers in Tehran. The 
British and Russian Ministers had an audience at the court on this 
same day. They informed the Shah that the troops had no hostile 
intentions against Iran and stated that they had some demands to be 
fulfilled. Mr. Marling reported that: 
We urged on Shah that modification of Cabinet should 
be made such as would satisfy our Governments that 
Persia meant to carry out engagement implied by 
acceptance of financial support from us, to put an 
end to enemy intrigue and that a declaration of 
Government's new policy of benevolent neutrality 
towards us should be published. 1 
The Shah concurred with the appointment of a Minister for the Interior 
agreeable to both governments, but on condition that the troops should 
return to Qazvin. This was rejected completely by both ministers. 
They tried to convince the Shah that if 
... Persian Government did not act against Germans, Russian troops would undertake that task and that if 
Persia allowed herself to be driven into war against 
us results to Persia and himself would be disastrous, 
we were unable to move him from that position. 2 
The meeting ended with a most unsatisfactory result. The language of 
both ministers was approved by their governments. The Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs advocated that 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 456. Nov. 14,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
2. Ibid. 
215 
We ought to speak strongly at Tehran and tell Persian 
Government we are quite aware of what they are scheming 
with Germans and Turks, and we should be guided solely 
by our own interests and put every other consideration 
aside. 1 
On the afternoon of 14th November, the capital was extremely 
depressed. The bäärs were closed. Those people who had made their 
minds up had left the city or were leaving. A crowd had gathered 
around Gulistän Palace where the government was holding meetings. 
The people were loud and angry. They demanded a definite decision 
immediately. The crowd stayed till midnight; finally the Prime 
Minister came out in order to explain the situation and to conciliate 
the people. HallAj, who was at the back of the crowd, stated: 
I saw Mustaufi ul-Mamilik ... with special intonation ., 
and a shaken voice ... say, "The affairs are bad and you 
are still here. " As soon as he said these words he turned 
and went away. 2 
Halläj wrote that his sentences were interpreted by some other officials 
around him to mean that they should leave Tehran for Qom. Malik 
ush-Shu"arä' Bahär, the editor of "Naubahär", had gone to Qajr-i 
Abyaý, a building in the GulistAn Palace complex, where the cabinet 
held meetings. In a private session, Bahr, with the Prime Minister 
and SulaymAn Mirzä, a leading Democrat, discussed the political 
situation of the country. Finally Bahär asked what had to be done. 
The Prime Minister said, "The Shah must be taken and leave. " Bahär 
was also advised to leave the capital. 
3 
1. F. O. 371-2436. No. 1695. Nov. 15 1915. Decypher Buchanan. 
2. Mudir Ha11aj, Tärikh-i Nihzat-i 
Trän (Tehran, 1312 H. S. ), 97. 
3. Malik ush-Shu'arä' Bahär, Td. ikh-i Mukhta3a r Ahzäb-i Siyäsi-y 
Trän Inaaräý Cäiärivah (Tehran, 1323 H. S. ), I, 19. 
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The Day of Muhäiirat 
The following day, Monday, 7th Iii arra 15th November 1915, was 
an historical and unique day in Iranian history. It was considered 
as a defensive reaction against the military occupation of the capital 
and the political demands of the Allies. "Izz ul-Mamälik Ardalän, 
a member of the Majlis at the time, expressed his opinion about the 
political conditions of the country and the reasons for the Russian 
troops' advance towards Tehran: 
The Czarist Government, with the assistance of the 
British Government, insisted that Iran should incline 
towards them and allow the Russian and British force 
to cross Iranian territory and attack Turkey. This 
proposal was against the neutrality of Iran and the 
Iranian Government could not agree with the Russian 
and British plan. The troops moved towards Tehran to 
breach the neutrality of Iran. 1 
A general movement started from early morning in Tehran. It was 
a day of saying farewell to families. The streets of Tehran were 
crowded. Prom Gulistän Palace to the Gate of Shah 'Abd ul-'Azim, on 
the road to Qom, police flanked the streets. There were crowds on 
both sides of the streets, they were intensively anxious and impressed. 
The Shah was going to leave the capital. The people wanted to see 
the procession of his departure. There was a fear in the city that 
the capital would share at least the same fate as Tabriz had during 
'Ashürä in 1330, when the Russian troops occupied the city and hanged 
some well-known nationalists. The most famous one was Sagat ul-Isläm, 
a respected and high ranking member of the 'ulamä'. Groups of people 
fron all classes were leaving the city. Gendarmes had been removed 
from guarding the foreign legations to the Bägh-i Shah, a barracks in 
1. Sami'i and Ardalän, o_,,. cit., 42. 
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Tehran. A group of them were in charge of securing the Tehran-Qom 
road, and the rest were ready to escort the Shah. All foreign legations 
in Tehran, except the Russian and British, received a letter from 
the Iranian Government: 
I have to inform Your Excellency with great regret that 
owing to the advance of Russian troops from Kazvin on 
the capital of H. I. M. the Shah my Master, for which 
there can be no conceivable cause, the position of the 
Government has become difficult and impossible. 
In view of the fact that my Government would with 
the greatest reluctance see that owing to the advance 
of Russian force any incident should occur contrary to 
the friendly relations existing between Persia, Russia 
and England, therefore His Imperial Majesty the Shah 
and the Government have decided temporarily to remove 
the capital from Tehran and they hope that the neigh- 
bouring Governments will, in accordance with the wishes 
of the Persian Government immediately order the return 
of all the Russian troops, and facilitate the return of 
the Capital of His Imperial Majesty the Shah and my 
Government. 
Signed Mothashem es Sultaneh. 1 
Therefore, the official withdrawal of the Shah and his government 
was announced. Ardalän wrote in his memoirs that although the members 
of the Majlis had been informed unofficially that the government would 
transfer the capital to Isfahan, nevertheless, on 7th Nuharram, in 
an urgent session in the Majlis, the members received the royal message 
that "the Shah and government will leave Tehran and Isfahan will be 
the temporary capital. "2 From the Majlis, Mr. Ardalan went to the 
palace to gain more information about the situation. He observed 
that the carriage of the Shah was ready at the palace. Colonel Edwall 
was waiting for the departure of the Shah. He reported rapidly about 
1. F. O. 371-2438. Enclosure. No. 147. Nov. 18,1915. dated Nov. 15, 
1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Sami'i and Ardalän, on. cit., 47. 
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the advance of the Russian troops into the capital. He warned the 
Shah that he should leave Tehran as soon as possible; otherwise, it 
would be impossible for him to leave later on. The government 
installed Sa'd ul-Mulk as Governor of Tehran with responsibility for 
the royal treasury and palace. As he understood that the Shah and 
government would definitely leave Tehran,. Ardalln went home to be 
ready for the departure. The government archives had been packed and 
all the ministers and the royal family were assembled at the court 
to leave the city in company with the Shah. There was a rumour that 
the Iranian Government would declare war on Russia and Britain. The 
German Minister and Sipihr left the capital in the early morning. The 
Turkish and Austrian Ministers proceeded towards Shäh 'Abd ul-'Azim. 
The members of the Majlis, who were at an urgent session of the Majlis, 
approved the Shahts and his government's decision and shortly after- 
ward most of the members left the city. Sulaymän Mirzä, the leader 
of the Democrats, had already left the capital. Sayyid Sadiq Tabltaba'i, 
the leader of Iltidäliyün, and liudarris, the leader of the third party 
in the Majlis, 'Ilmiyyah, and some independent members also set out on 
the Qom road. Even two ministers, Hakim ul-Mulk and Mustashär ud-Daulah, 
went to Shah 'Abd ul-'Azim. Mr. Marling described the procession: 
"a great exodus of Germans, Austrians, Turks, gendarmerie and Democrat 
deputies was in full progress. "1 The Muhäjirin consisted of all 
classes of society, 'ulamä', politicians, members of the Majlis, 
merchants, soldiers and gendarmes, government employees, students and 
other groups of people. As Litten, a German diplomat in Tehran, said, 
"Without exception anyone who was not a friend of the Russians went 
on the Muhäjirat [emigration]. "2 All newspaper editors, except those 
1. F. O. 416-64.157. Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Sipihr, 240. 
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of ""Asr-i Jadid" and "Raid", left the city. Dihkhudä, the famous 
writer, 'Arif and 'Ashgi, two well-known poets, had left the city; 
in other words, anyone who had anti-Allied attitudes was leaving 
for Qom. 
On the other hand, on the morning of the same day, the Russian 
Legation in Tehran issued a proclamation: 
... The Imperial Government of 
Russia have despatched 
numerous troops into Iran, just for the purpose of 
preventing the conspiracies of German, Austrian and 
Turkish intriguers, which have recently increased to 
such an extent that they threatened security and 
residence in Iran. 
Our enemy's purpose in Iran ... is to destroy 
the friendly relations which have existed between the 
two countries ... 
Due to the futility of any efforts to obtain the 
complete union of the Imperial Government [of Iran] and 
prevent the effect of German activities and gold ... the 
Imperial Government [of Russia] was obliged to bear the 
expenditure of [an expedition] to put an end to the 
German, Austrian and Turkish intriguers ... and to 
maintain security in Tehran and to make the friendly 
relations between the two countries stable ... 
All our Iranian friends know the Russian forces' 
arms will not be used against them, their families 
and properties. The Russian forces will be terrible 
and horrible against German, Austrian and Turkish 
intriguers and those who have united with our enemy ... 1 
Meanwhile, the Russian and British Legations in Tehran received the 
Iranian Government's letters: 
Military operations and measures taken by the 
Russian Government in Persia for some time past and 
increased in severity since the beginning of the War 
have obliged my Government to protest in order to 
prevent evil results and to maintain friendly relations. 
I have in different Notes ... pointed out to the British 
Legation the evil consequences of the above mentioned 
1. Ahmad Ahrär, Tüfän dar Trän (Tehran, 1352 H. S. ), I, 434-35; 
Daulatäbädi, I, 296. 
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measures. But up to the present these friendly 
representations, based on amity and our mutual 
interests, have had no satisfactory result. At 
least want of regard on the part of Your Government 
for the representations of the Persian Government and 
disregard for the friendly relations existing between 
the two states led to the fact that without any reason 
the Russian troops in Kazvin advanced on the capital 
of His Imperial Majesty, which ought to have been 
respected by the two neighbouring powers. This 
measure is as much a matter of regret to the Govern- 
ment as of annoyance to the public. Worse than all 
I have just received information that, contrary to 
friendship, the Russian troops have left Yengi Imam, 
where they were encamped, for the capital and that 
even their advance guards have already reached Karej. 
I have received the news of these unexpected 
measures, which are contrary to the friendship between 
the two states, with great surprise and concern, and in 
drawing your attention to the points previously mentioned 
and also to the former strong protests, I beg to state 
and once more that contrary to the expectation of Persia 
the two Governments of Great Britain and Russia have 
not respected the Persian Government and have taken 
such measures as are inconsistent with our mutual 
interests and that the grave responsibility therefore 
rests entirely with the Governments of Great Britain 
and Russia. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Persian Government, 
not having the slightest desire to show any spirit of 
discord or to break off friendly relations with the two 
neighbouring Powers, have decided, in order to prevent 
any untoward incident which might be caused by the approach 
of the Russian troops, to remove its capital temporarily 
from Tehran, and it hopes that the neighbouring powers 
will not admit this and will at once send orders for the 
withdrawal of the troops, so that His Majesty and my 
Government may be able to return to the capital with 
the intention of maintaing and increasing their friend- 
ship with the two Governments, in which they are most firm. 
I ... avail, etc, 
Sd/ Hassan, Mohtashem-us Sultaneh. 1 
Simultaneously, the Shah also despatched a telegram to the 
Russian Emperor: 
Fron the commencement of the conflict among the 
European countries, I and my government, after consideration, 
1. P. O. 371-2438. Enclosure. No. 145. Nov. 17,1915, dated Nov. 15,1915. 
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especially in the interests of Iran, decided to preserve 
neutrality completely during this conflict. 
Regretfully., this decision, which was entirely in 
conformity with Iran's and Russia's interests, did not 
receive the consent of the Imperial Government's bene- 
volence and in spite of my government activities, more 
soil of Iran had been occupied by Russian forces than 
before. Due to the actions which had no relevance to 
the friendly relations existing between the two countries, 
the attempts of the Iranian Government's authorities for 
protecting neutrality were paralysed and without effect. 
At this time, I avoid mentioning the arrest of the hostile 
consuls and the invasion of the Russian force through 
Azerbaijan on the Turkish border, and so on. 
Of course this kind of past incident has produced 
great harm to the principle of neutrality and engaged 
my country in a very complicated position towards [other] 
countries. 
Regarding the friendly attitude which has existed 
between the two royal families from years past and the 
trust that I have in Your Imperial Majesty's justice 
and benevolence, I have always hoped that no damage to 
the dignity of my reign and country has been connived at 
and-the Russian Government will follow a policy closer to 
the friendly relations between the two countries; never- 
theless, on the pretext that, during the month of Muharram, 
the Russian and British Ministers and their subjects would 
have no safety, [their subsequent actions] produced great 
harm to the principle of the neutrality of Iran. The 
Russian force at Qazvin has moved towards Tehran. 
In spite of the fact that there had recently been 
expressed [our] concordance to the Russian and British 
Legations and the ministers promised [nevertheless] the 
Russian force's advance continues; therefore, in the 
presence of the Russian force, it is impossible for me 
to rule and it is impractical to protect the neutrality 
[of Iran). So, I will leave Tehran and proceed to the 
central region] of the country. I want to prove that 
at any rate, despite the damages to the rights of my reign, 
I am diligent in protecting the friendly relations between 
the Governments of Iran and Russia. I will ask all 
ambassadors represented at my court to accompany me on 
the journey. 
But, due to my sincere feeling for Your Great 
Majesty and my desire to protect the neutrality which is 
useful to both Iran and Russia, I will resort to Your 
Imperial Majesty and ask for instructions that the Russian 
force be turned back; so I will be able to return to my 
capital and to enact order and general peace which contains 
both Iran's and Russia's interests and benefits. I hope 
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Your Imperial Majesty will approve how much I have 
sincerely and honestly tried to preserve the friendly 
relations between the two governments. 
Regarding that, I have complete trust in the bene- 
volent intelligence of Your Imperial Majesty; I hope 
you will not refuse to grant your advocacy and assistance 
to mar endeavour, which is just for protecting peace. 1 
A similar telegram, with some changes, was despatched to the King of 
Great Britain, but, due to the request of the Russian and British 
Ministers in Tehran, on the same day, the Iranian Government stopped 
both telegrams from reaching their destinations. The first telegram 
was stopped in Russia and the second one at Karachi. 
The Allied Ministers were confident of the effect of the Russian 
force, which could easily reach Tehran in a very short time. There- 
fore, in spite of rumours that on Sunday night, 14th November, the 
British Legations would be attacked by a mob, the British Minister 
spent the night as usual. The day after, the Allied Legations found 
out that the situation was indeed crucial. The arrival of Sipahdär 
and amsäm us-Saltanah indicated the importance of the situation. 
They stated that "The Shah found it impossible to remain in his 
capital while Russian troops were at the gates ... "2 Neither the 
British nor Russian Ministers in Tehran expected that the Shah would 
make a serious decision. They realised that if the Shah left Tehran, 
Iran would be on the German side. Consequently, it would be considered 
a great failure of their efforts and most undesirable to their govern- 
ments. The ministers determined to do their best to deter the Shah 
from leaving the capital. Mr. Marling, in replying to Sipahdär and 
Samýäm us-Sal'anah, repeated his explanation that the presence of the 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 9, No. 41.1333 H. Q., Muharram 7,1334. 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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Russian troops was purely for the protection of the legations, and 
the troops had been instructed not to move into the city as long as 
there were no disturbances. The diplomatic communication between the 
two legations and the court of the Shah continued all morning. In 
fact, some pro-Allied members of the royal family, such as Farman 
Farmä, made great efforts to deter the Shah from leaving the capital,. 
1 
But it seemed that the Shah was determined to leave. At 1.30 P. M. 
both Russian and British Ministers arrived hastily at the court and 
held a meeting with the cabinet and discussed the situation. The 
Allied Ministers were told: "The Shah could not tolerate the presence 
of foreign troops so close to the Capital and that unless we ordered 
them to withdraw, His Majesty would leave Tehran at once. "2 
After three hours of debate and discussion, both sides complained 
about the state of relations between Iran and the Allies; the Allied 
Ministers especially indicated that the Iranian Government had failed 
in fulfilling its undertaking against the Germans. They also explained 
that the Russian troops had no hostile intentions. Meanwhile, both 
ministers were under pressure by receiving the news that the Shah was 
about to leave the court or was getting into his carriage. Finally 
they reached an agreement which was reported by Mr. Marling as follows: 
Troops will not advance beyond Kerej and meanwhile the 
cabinet will be strengthened by the inclusion of Ain- 
ed-Dowleh and Farman Parma whose presence in it will be 
a guarantee to us of a policy of benevolent neutrality. 
As soon as our conversation with the new cabinet for 
the purpose of agreeing as to the measures required for 
giving practical effect to this policy has begun, troops 
are to withdraw from Kerej to Yengi Imam. 3 
1. "One precaution we took to prevent a hasty departure by His Majesty 
was to remove an essential part of the engine of his rotor-car. " 
F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371-2436. No. 457. Nov. 15,1915. Decypher Marling. 
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Later on both ministers had an audience with the Shah. Mr. Marling 
described the Shah's appearance, as he "was painfully agitated. His 
usual colour had vanished, and his face and hands constantly twitching, 
and he had all the appearance of not having slept, as he told us, for 
four nights, "' The result of the meeting was satisfactory., but Mr. 
Marling in his report pointed out that the Shah would definitely leave 
the capital if the troops did not draw back. He urged his government 
to approve the arrangement. 
The Committee of National Defence at Com 
On 3rd MuharraWllth November, Mustaufi ul-Mamälik recommended 
some of the Democrat members of the Majlis and other high ranking 
government authorities to go to Qom. They had been instructed to 
organise a committee to arrange a welcome ceremony for the arrival 
there of the Shah. On 15th November, everything was ready and the 
Shah was expected to arrive at any time, but he did not appear, and 
they were left in absolute frustration. On the evening of the same 
day, the German Minister arrived in Qom and was welcomed by the 
committee. The Turkish and Austrian Ministers took up residence in 
Shih 'Abi ul-'Azim, a town a few kilmetres to the south of Tehran on 
the Tehran-Qom road, and they were in touch with the capital. However, 
the Muhäjirin realised that the Shah had cancelled his journey. It 
was a great disappointment for them and they wondered how they should 
deal with the situation. After some meetings between various groups 
of Muhäjirin on one hand, and their leaders with the German Minister 
on the other, they decided not to return to the capital. In broadsheets 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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they declared that the Shah had lost all freedom of decision under 
the Russian bayonets. 
1 Therefore, it was their duty to unify all the 
forces in the country to protect the independence and integrity of 
Iran. The committee immediately set to work and despatched many 
members of the Majlis and other politicians to provinces and cities 
to appeal for general support. As it was Muharram, the envoys of the 
Committee had the best opportunity to preach and to stir up the people 
against the Russians and British. They asked for the people to support 
the Committee inýQom. The main task of some of the envoys was to 
encourage the tribal chiefs to accept their appeal and to join the 
Muhäjirin. Had the envoys been successful in their mission, the 
Committee would have received the manpower, arms and considerable 
assistance from the tribes, which was very vital to the MuhAjirin. 
Meanwhile, the Germans undertook to pay the expenses. They paid out 
so much gold that the value of Turkish, British and Egyptian gold 
coins then in use drastically decreased. 
The Committee consisted of members of the Democrat Party and had 
control over all activities of the Muhäjirin. The members of other 
parties complained and the German Minister was asked to mediate and 
deter discord among the parties. Prince Reuss held some meetings. 
In a session with the leaders of I'tidäliyün (the Moderates), Sayyid 
Muhammad §ädiq Kh&n Tabijabä'i, M1rzä Qäsim KhAn Tabrizi and NRSir 
u1-Isl5Lm Giläni (the editor of "Shüra% the matters were discussed 
and Tabätabä'i said that due to the neutrality of Iran, I'tidäliyün 
had not had any connection with the Germans, but now there was no 
reason to continue that attitude; they could openly have friendly 
relations. He alluded to the Committee and suggested, as they had 
1. Blücher, 26. 
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indicated before, that they would like to take part in the organisation. 
Prince Reuss replied that he had been interested in having friendly 
relations with the party and from a German point of view there was no 
difference between the Iranian parties. At any rate, in a common 
meeting they decided the Committee should consist of four representa- 
tives from the parties in the Majlis to take power over the entire 
organisation. Therefore, Shähzädah SulaymAn Mirzä, the leader of 
the Democrats; Mirza Muhammad ýädiq Khän Tabäjabä'i, the leader of 
the Moderates; Mudarris, the leader of 'Ilmiyah; and Nizäm us-Sullän, 
from the independent members of the Majlis, were appointed. The 
Committee telegraphed to all provinces and declared its authority 
and aims to the people and asked for their support. They received a 
considerable number of replies, espeically from those cities where 
anti-Allied influence was very high. However, due to friction between 
Tehran and Qom, the Committee did not receive enthusiastic support 
from all over the country. Kermanshah, Isfahan, Arak, Shiraz and 
some other cities declared their support for the Committee of Qom. 
The chiefs of the Sanjäbi tribe in the west of Iran announced their 
men were willing to fight to the last man to defend the country. The 
'ulamä' and leaders of Isfahan offered their assistance to the Committee: 
Shiraz supported the Committee and informed them of anti-British 
activities in the south. 
There was not much time to gather s avars from far regions of the 
country, The Committee endeavoured to receive support from any valuable 
forces in the central regions, even from rebels. One of the most 
notorious rebels was Na'ib Husayn Kash! and his son MAshä'lläh Khan. 
This father and son held a vast area of the regions of Kashan under 
their domination. They fought against the government for a few years. 
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Saulat ud Daulah Bakhtiyäri had been instructed by the government to 
put an end to the band of Nä'ib Husayn, and had been chasing him for 
some time. Simultaneously, the Committee of Qom charged Mirzä 
Sulaym. n Khan Kulüb (known as Maykadah), the assistant to the Prime 
Minister in the Ministry of the Interior, with contacting Nä'ib 
Husayn and Mäshi'lläh Khän. and offering them both a pardon if they 
joined the national army at Qom and defended the country. It was the 
best opportunity for them to get rid of ýaulat's pressure; therefore, 
they accepted the Committee's offer and proceeded to Qom. Mäshä'lläh 
Khän, in his memoirs, mentioned that "In spite of being engaged in 
war his father decided to join the Nationalists' front and they had 
to cross a vast area of the central desert" in order to reach Qom as 
soon as possible. They had a few hundred well-armed and -trained 
1 
savars. 
The Roles of the Shah and Mustaufi in the Muhäiirat 
Al; mad Shah changed his mind and agreed to stay in the capital 
so long as the Russian troops did not advance further and if they 
would return to Qazvin shortly afterwards. The decision of the Shah 
produced various opinions. Sykes believed that "The Shah realised the 
true position of affairs and decided to remain at Capital. "2 due to 
1. P. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey; 
Sipihr, 237-47; Kasravi, 734-45; Ha1laj, op. cit., 96-97; Sami'i 
and Ardalän, op. it., 20,62-66; RiiA 'Ali D1v5nbaygi, Safar-i 
Muhäiirat dar Nukhustin Janp--i Jahäni (Tehran, 1351 H. S., 5-7; 
interview with Mr. Muhammad 'All MAfI, the son of Nizäm us-Saltanah, 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the National Government 
of Kermanshah, see Appendix II; Mäshä'lläh Khan, "Khätirat-i 
Mäsha' llah Khän" , "Vahid" , No. 233 
(May 1978), 81--82; Husayn 
Sa' adatnüri, "N .' ib Husayn va Mäshä' 11äh Khän I shl (5)" , "Haftagi Vahid", Fifth Year (new series), no. 5,18-19; Daulatäbädi, III, 
291-99. 
2. Sykes, Persia, ova., 157. 
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the threat and advice of the British and Russian Ministers in Tehran. 
Sipihr thought that the Shah had always had doubts and was not able 
to make a decision; even on 7th Muharram, he preferred to surrender 
to the enemy than to leave the capital. 
1 Bahär considered many 
reasons for the Shah's decision and believed the reasons were accurate 
and logical. 
2 
Some of the Muhäjirin believed the whole incident was 
a plan to send the radicals out of the capital. 
Mustaufi's part in the Muhäjirat was very important. It was said 
that the whole Muhäjirat was Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's idea and that 
whatever he did was good for the country. 
3 Kasravi believed Mustauf! 
was not honest in his plan; he sent out the nationalists, involved 
them in a war against the Russian forces and himself stayed away from 
them, 4 Yahyä Daulatäbidi believed the intention of Mustaufi ul-Mamälik 
was to prevent the massacre of the nationalists, which would probably 
have happened if the Russian troops had entered Tehran, as had occurred 
in Tabriz in 1330/1911.5 Mr. Marling reported in December that: 
We have since learnt that practically only four of his 
many councillors really exerted themselves to dissuade 
the Shah from quitting his capital, namely, Kamran Mirza, 
Farman Parma,, Mustaufi-el-Mamelek, and Sahib Bakhtiar [? Ikhtiyarl, and that among the most active to urge 
him to go were Mohtashem-us-Sultaneh, Serdar Bahadur, 
Bakhtiarai (-, ), Moin-el-Vizareh, and Mustasha-ed-Dowleh [Mustashär ud Daulah]. 6 
Reorganisation of the Cabinet 
The Iranian Government became absolutely powerless and left every- 
thing to the Allied Ministers' decision, On 16th November, both the 
1. Sipihr, 237. 
2. Baha. r, op. cit., 20. 
3. Kasravi, 641. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Daulatäbgdi, III9 292. 
6. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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British and Russian Ministers were invited to the court for a reorgani- 
sation of the cabinet. They were asked to take part directly in the 
session for appointment of ministers. Mr. Marling reported that "The 
president said that Ministers, including himself, unreservedly placed 
their portfolios at our disposal. "1 "Ayn ud-Daulah was suggested as 
2 
Prime Minister and Farmän Farmä as Minister of the Interior. In spite 
of the fact that the Allied Ministers insisted that 'Ayn ud Daulah 
accept the position, he nevertheless refused, but finally agreed to 
enter the cabinet without portfolio. The Allied Ministers realised 
that there would be a problem if they suggested Farmän Farm! for the 
post of Prime Minister. He had been well-known as a strong pro-Allied 
supporter, particularly of the Russians, and had gained the hatred of 
the nationalists and pro-Germans during the past six months. There 
was also the possibility that some of the ministers would resign as 
soon as he took the position. 
3 Farmän FarmA was not the Shah's 
favourite choice at the time. The Allied Ministers' conclusion was 
that the best and most suitable choice at that time would be to retain 
Rastaufi ul-Mamilik in his position. They were also able to get the 
post of Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior for Akbar M1rzä, 
the son of Zill us-Sulttän. Consequently, the Allies' influence grew 
considerably in the cabinet. 
The Capital after the Muhäiirat 
The procession of Muhäjirin who left Tehran continued for two days 
more. The streets of the capital were deserted. There was no trans- 
1. Ibid. , 2. Daulatäbidl, 295, reported that Farman Parma was appointed Minister 
for the Interior, but without authority over the west and south of 
Iran. 
3. Even after his appointement as Minister of the Interior, Mr. Marling 
reported: "Swedish officer commanding Gendarmerie had flatly 
refused to obey orders of the Minister of Interior ... we are trying to obtain his dismissal. " F. O. 371-2437. No. 462. Nov. 17, 
1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
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portation left in the city; the Muhäjirin used every available one in 
order to leave Tehran. " ... a very perceptible percentage of the 
inhabitants of Tehran had disappeared. "1 The bäzär and shops were 
still closed. In spite of the agreement between the Iranian Govern- 
ment and the Allies that the troops would not appear in the capital, 
the city remained in an intensive atmosphere for a few days and even 
the government and court were ready to move out of the capital at 
any moment. 
No newspapers were published for a week. On 21st November, 
"Ra'd" published an issue and the editorial was full of compliments 
to the Shah and the Prime Minister for being so patient and praised 
them for their endeavouring to seek a solution for the crisis in the 
country. The newspapers reported the events of the past seven days 
and commented on the day of Muhäjirat, 15th November. The writer 
believed "it was an unforgettable day ... such an event in the past 
and present history of Iran was unique. "2 
"'4r-i Jadid", in their editorial, approved the decision of the 
Shah and government and considered that it would have been a great 
mistake if the Shah and government had left the capital. Another 
important point which the writer alluded to was the gendarmerie; he 
criticised its administration, which had caused the gendarmerie's 
interference in the political affairs of the country. Finally he 
concluded that the existence of the force was harmful for the country. 
3 
The Russian newspapers showed two completely different attitudes 
towards the Iranian Government before and after 15th November, Before 
the day of the Muhäjirat, they were talking about a military expedition 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
2. "Ra'd", No. 41, Nov. 21,1915/Mu4arram 13,1334. 
3. "Air-i Jadid", No. 25, Nov. 23,1915/I. Iuharram 15,1334. 
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in Iran and recommended that the Allies should give the Iranian 
Government a severe lesson. 
"Rus]a. Slov", in an article titled "Eastern Peril", wrote: 
A severe lesson inflicted on the Persians would operate 
beneficially in the entire Near East, where only force 
is respected. Hesitation or indulgence with the Persian 
authorities who have betrayed the trust reposed in them, 
would simply be calculated to create a new danger for 
England and Russia in the Middle East. 1 
The writer had urged his government to give the commander-in-chief of 
the "Anglo-Russian expedition in Persia" and the Allied Ministers 
freedom of action in Iran. 
After 15th November the attitude of Russian newspapers towards 
the Shah and his government changed completely. Their reports 
indicated the improvement of the state of relations between Iran and 
the Allies. They also stated that there was the possibility of an 
agreement to be concluded between Iran and the Allies very soon. 
The inclusion in the cabinet of 'Ayn ud-Daulah, who was one of the 
"sincere partisans of Russia", and Farmän Farmä, "the second partisan 
of Russia and England"2, was interpreted by the Russian press as an 
increase in Allied influence in Iran. The capital, from the Russian 
press' point of view, was quiet and had come to life again. They 
reported that Farman Farmä had already taken some strong measures 
against pro-Germans in the capital. They believed the gendarmerie 
forces were taking orders from the Germans and they were the only 
cause of the disturbances in Iran. 
3 
1. "Rusk. Slov", quoted in "The Times", Nov. 16,1915. 
2. I. F. O., C. 63, f. 7, No. it "Ruski Slov", Nov. 8/21,1915, No. 857. 
3. "Novoye Vremya", Nov. 9/22,1915, I. F. O., C. 63, f. 2., No. 4; 
"Rusl: i. Slov" , Nov. 8/21,1915, I. F. O. , C. 63, f. 7, No. 1. 
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The British newspapers suddenly became very interested in 
Iranian affairs. News and commentaries on Iran filled some pages of 
the press. Members of Parliament also kept questioning the Secretary 
and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs about Iran. All the incidents 
in the past few months were rapidly revealed in the press. In fact, 
as "The Near East" commentator wrote, "the British Government appeared 
to have adopted the attitude that the less said about Persia the 
better. " Now it was time for a change in the British Government's 
attitude towards Iran; therefore, the British Government, in an 
official statement about the current events in Iran, hinted that 
there was no need for the silence about Iran to continue any longer. 
"The Near East" had a comment on Iran and referred to the Russian 
newspapers' reports about an "Anglo-Russian expedition in Persia" and 
rejected the whole idea. The writer claimed that the British forces 
had withdrawn from the south of Iran after the Iranian Government had 
managed to take control of the region. The force in Bushire was 
there only to support the Mesopotamian front. He believed that the 
British military forces in the south of Iran could hardly be considered 
in harmony with the Russian military operation in the north. The 
writer then alluded to all incidents which had happened to Allied 
subjects in the past few months and added that due to the lack of any 
measures being taken for the safety of the Allied Legations in Tehran 
by the Iranian Government, the Russian forces at Qazvin approached 
Tehran "as the only means of giving protection" to the legations in 
case of disturbances. The writer tried to prove that the Russians 
had no ill intentions against the Iranian people and referred to the 
Russian proclamation in Tehran, but there was somehow a change in the 
proclamation. "Russia has decided, in agreement with the government 
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of the Shah, to put an end to these activities in the interests of 
the good relations between two countries. " There was no evidence 
that there was a secret agreement between the Iranian Government and 
the Russians, for the proclamation which was issued in Tehran did not 
contain anything which indicated that the Iranian Government had agreed 
to the Russian advance on Tehran. The writer was well aware of the 
Iranian attitude towards the Allies and from his point of view "the 
real Persian problem turns largely on Persia's grievances against our 
Ally [Russia]. " The writer left no doubt that there might have been 
a change in British policy towards Iran; on the contrary, he believed 
the Russians had modified their attitude towards Iran, otherwise "If 
we did not believe that Russia of to-day was very differently minded 
from the Russia that Persians know, we should not choose this moment 
for referring to the subject. " Although the writer admitted that 
there had been many maltreatments by the Russians in Iran, he believed 
that the Russian Government had no knowledge of these actions in Iran 
and blamed the stubbornness of the Russian diplomats and agents, who 
acted independently. Consequently, they created a feeling of enmity 
in the Iranian people against the Russians, which was used by the Turks 
and Germans to increase their influence in the country. The writer 
warned the Allies that the situation would grow worse if they did not 
consider the Iranian opinion and suggested that it would be better to 
suspend the idea of "spheres of influence" in Iran and the British 
Government should use its influence to improve the relations between 
Russia do Iran. l 
"The Times" also commented on the situation in Iran and the advance 
of Russian forces to Tehran. The writer stated that "It is satisfactory 
1. "The Near East", Nov. 19,1915. 
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to see that the Allies do not intend to allow German intrigues to 
have the easy success in Persia which they have achieved in the 
Balkans. " The writer referred to the German and Turkish activities 
against the British and Russians in Iran and the inability or unwilling- 
ness of the Iranian Government to prevent them, The writer believed 
that "England and Russia have shown great patience in their dealings 
with this feeble and untrustworthy administration. " He alluded to 
the attempts on the lives of British and Russian subjects in Iran 
and stated that it was time to prevent more incidents and stop 
"murderous attacks upon our [British] consuls and their staff. " He 
concluded that: 
The warning addressed to Persia by Russia and England 
and supported by the movement of the Russian troops 
from Kazvin will suffice to open the eyes of responsible 
Persians to the danger of playing with German incite- 
ments to hostility, 1 
Tehran-Qom Relations 
The Iranian Government apparently did not expect that there 
would be friction between Qom and Tehran. It was assumed that if 
the Central Powers' Ministers, particularly Germany's, returned to 
the capital, the members of the Majlis and other nationalists would 
also return to Tehran. Therefore, the Iranian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs despatched a telegram and asked Prince Reuss to return to 
Tehran. The German Minister replied that he preferred to stay at 
Qom. 2 At the first step, the Iranian Government faced great 
difficulties in persuading the German Minister to come back to Tehran. 
1. "The Times", Nov. 16,1915. 
2. Sipihr, 240. 
I 
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On 22nd November the Iranian Government informed the governors of 
provinces and the foreign legations in Tehran and the Central Powers' 
Ministers in Shäh 'Abd ul-'Azim and Qom that the Russian troops had 
withdrawn from Karaj and the Shah no longer had any intention of 
leaving the capital. 
' Simultaneously the German Minister received a 
telegram from the Iranian Foreign Minister: 
Due to Your Excellency's mission at the court of 
His Imperial Majesty, it is necessary to return to 
the capital immediately. It is believed that Your 
Excellency's assistance will have extraordinary value 
to Germany and Iran in Tehran and will have more benefit 
in Tehran than in Qom ... Concerning the present 
difficulties and obstacles, you will disregard some 
personal concerns and will agree with our view. 2 
The German Minister, in replying to the Iranian Minister, stated that: 
The reason for my departure from Tehran was the 
imminent occupation of the capital by the enemy force 
and official announcement of Your Excellency that His 
Imperial Majesty would leave Tehran. 
The perils of the occupation of the capital by 
the Russian forces have not been reduced and it is 
obvious that the enemy of the German Government can 
occupy Tehran in a few hours at any time which they want. 3 
The German Minister believed his return to the capital would 
cause the Allies to occupy Tehran. He expressed his regret that he 
was obliged to postpone his return to the capital until he was sure 
of his safety there. He informed the Iranian Government that the 
Russian forces intended to breach all communications between Tehran 
and the western part of Iran. In a continuation of the telegraphic 
1. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 90, No. 26. dated Muharram 14,1334, No. 4414; 
Sipihr, 246. 
2. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 90, No. 42, dated Nov. 15,1915; Sipihr, 252. 
3. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 90, No. 40, dated Dec. 1,1915; Sipihr, 252. 
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communication between Tehran and Qom, the Iranian Government insisted 
on its demand and informed the German Minister that the government 
had made some inquiries in Berlin. Prince Reuss, in rather strong 
language to the Iranian Government, stated that the Iranian Government 
had confessed to the Austrian Minister that the government was unable 
to guarantee their safety and it was better for them to keep their 
confidential documents and archives somewhere safe. 
' 
Simultaneously, the Iranian Government asked the 'u and 
members of the Majlis to return to the capital. Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabalibä'i, the most famous leader of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution, received a telegram from Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, asking him 
to return with his companions to Tehran. The Prime Minister notified 
him that due to winter, the Muhäjirin would create difficulties for 
the inhabitants of Qom. 
2 TabAlabä'i replied that they would return 
as soon as he was informed by the Prime Minister that the government's 
diplomatic activities had had some results in favour of the country. 
3 
Two days later, Mustaufi ul-Mamälik informed Tabätabä'i and the members 
of the Majlis that diplomatic negotiations were in progress and he 
was hoping to achieve a satisfactory conclusion. The Prime Minister 
also complained about current activities in Qom, which he believed 
were contrary to the government's intentions and had produced many 
difficulties for the government in receiving favourable results in 
its negotiations with the Allies. The Prime Minister repeated his 
appeal to Tabätabä'i to return to the capital. 
4 
Meanwhile, the Speaker of the Majlis also despatched a telegram 
to the members of the Majlis, that it was necessary that all the 
1. Sipihr, 252. 
2. Ibid., 246,247. 
3. Ibid., 249. 
4. Ibid., 250. 
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members be present in the capital to discuss the country's affairs. 
1 
The Committee replied that they would not return to the capital unless 
the government's diplomatic activities produced, satisfactory results, 
They indicated that as long as the Russian troops had not withdrawn, 
they would not be able to fulfill their duties, 
2 
The Irano-Allied Alliance 
In spite of the fact that the Shah changed his mind and remained 
in the capital, there was still a possibility that he would leave 
Tehran at any time. He was very nervous because there was no sign of 
the Russian troops withdrawing from Karaj. The Russian Minister in 
Tehran had frequent meetings with the Shah and assured him that the 
troops would definitely withdraw from Karaj shortly. The rapid 
assurances by the Russian Minister soothed the Shah's excitement. 
The Iranian Government also expected the withdrawal of the Russian 
troops, which would reduce panic in the capital, and the government 
would have a chance to settle its problems. 
On the other hand, the Russian Minister in Tehran faced a great 
difficulty because the Grand Duke refused to instruct the troops to 
withdraw and believed they should remain at Karaj until the Iranian 
Government was able to control the situation and the Allied Ministers 
were able to fulfill their duties without disturbances. The Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs advocated the decision by the Grand Duke 
and stated that the Russian Government "had decided not to withdraw 
Russian troops from Keredj in any case until a Persian Government 
1. Sipihr, 251. 
2. Ibid. 
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affording satisfactory guarantee for future is actually formed., "' 
This attitude of the Russian Government put their minister at Tehran 
in a very embarrassing position. He confessed that if the Grand Duke 
did not modify his decision, he would have no alternative but to 
resign. Mr. Marling urged his government to ask the Russian Govern- 
ment to reconsider their decision. At last the Russian Government 
agreed to a gradual withdrawal of the troops from Karaj to Yang! 
Imäm. The minister in Tehran believed that the attitude of the Iranian 
Government was satisfactory, for they had agreed to allow 100 Russian 
soldiers to come to the capital to protect the legations. The Shah 
also expressed his most friendly attitude towards both powers and 
stated that he wished to visit Russia after the war. The Shah and 
his government indicated that they believed Iran should have a 
definite policy and ought to join one side or the other in the war; 
but they preferred to join the Allies and declare war against Turkey. 
2 
The Iranian Government assumed that there was an opportunity to 
receive a better deal with the Allies. In spite of all the crises, 
the situation for an agreement in favour of Iran seemed probable. 
The Germans had lavishly promised arms, money and forces. The situation 
in Mesopotamia from a military point of view, particularly around 
Baghdad, was not very successful. Except for the advance of the 
Russian troops towards Tehran, the Allies had not made a great 
impression on Iranian public opinion. The Allied Ministers realised 
the importance of the situation and warned their governments that if 
the inducement of the Central Powers attracted the Iranian Government 
1. F. O. 371-2437. No. 1705. Nov. 17,1915. Decypher Buchanan. 
Petrograd; F. O. 371-2437. No, 1717. Nov. 18,1915. Decypher 
Buchanan. Petrograd, 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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to join them, Mesopotamia would be in danger and they would be able 
to create problems in the Caucasus too. It was probable that the 
Central Powers could afford to despatch armies to Iran but at least 
by sending officers and arms, they would be capable of organising 
armies from Iranian levies. These armies would definitely be used 
against the British in Mesopotamia and Afghanistan. Mr. Marling also 
alluded to the importance of India and expressed his opinion that it 
was advisable to keep Iran on the Allies' side. He anticipated that 
the demands of the Iranian Government for an alliance with the Allies 
would possibly be the six points in the proposal for benevolent 
neutrality and 100,000 rifles and 200 guns, plus British and Russian 
officers to command the artillery, The Iranian Government also would 
ask for support against Turkey in case of an invasion of Iran. Mr. 
Marling reckoned the advantages of an Irano-Allied alliance would not 
only outweigh the disadvantages which were mentioned, it would also 
jeopardise German propaganda in Iran. Mr. Marling believed the main 
demands of the Iranian Government would be economic and political. 
Later on, he did not find it necessary to assist Iran with arms and 
officers. He hoped that the British Government would authorise him 
to open negotiations with the Iranian Government. He added that if 
the Iranian Government's demands were undesirable they could stop 
negotiations at any time and at least the Allies would "gain time". 
' 
The Indian Viceroy in the Persian Gulf considered the Irano-Allied 
alliance as most desirable, if it would not provide "unduly extravagant 
political conditions, " They believed that it 
1. F. O. 371-2435. No. 472. Nov. 22,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
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... would produce a good moral effect upon Mohammadian 
public opinion in India and tend to remove bad effect 
created by our war with Turkey. It would greatly 
reduce risk of any breach with Afghanistan and Persia. 
It should make pipeline secure and render it possible 
to reduce our forces on Karun. 1 
The Russian Government confessed that it was impossible for 
the Russians to supply arms and officers for Iran at that time; 
otherwise, they completely agreed to an alliance with the Iranian 
Government. The Russians believed the Iranian proposals should by 
no means be rejected. They indicated that the Iranian Government must 
be offered substantial privileges to attract them to the Allied side. 
The Russians recommended that the past promises of Iranian possession 
of the holy cities of Najaf and Karbalä' be kept., which would make a 
great change in public opinion in Iran. 
2 
The British Government was also unable to afford sufficient 
military assistance to submit to Iran. On the other hand, the question 
of the two holy cities was undesirable. The viceroy indicated that 
it would irritate the sharif of Mecca and the Arabs in Mesopotamia. 
They believed the British should "keep Mesopotamia out of bargain. "3 
The Indian Government had a pessimistic opinion of the Iranian 
Government's proposal. They considered that the change in the Iranian 
Government's attitude was only due to the Russian troops' advance on 
Tehran and it might continue so long as the government believed that 
"the strength of Allies exceeds that of their enemies in Persia. "4 
1. F. O. 371-2437. (P 4328). Prom viceroy, Nov. 24,1915. F. O. and 
repeated to Tehran. 
2. F. O. 371-2436. No. 2703. Nov. 17,1915. Decypher Buchanan. 
Petrograd. 
3. F. O. 371-2437. No. 431. Nov. 28,1915. From viceroy. 
4. F. O. 371-2437. Indian Government. P. 4303. Immediate. India 
Office, Whitehall, London. 23 Nov. 1915. 
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The Government of India believed the declaration of war against 
Turkey by the Iranian Government was of little value to the Allies. 
The Government of India stated that if the Iranian Government showed 
determination to take strong measures against Germany and its allies 
and enacted some steps, such as the deportation of the Central Powers' 
Ministers, disarming the gendarmerie and dismissing Swedish officers, 
the Government of India would have no disagreement to an Irano-Allied 
alliance. 
1 
However, the British Government instructed Mr. Marling to open 
negotiations with the Iranian Government and recommended to him that 
"if it is impossible to keep Mesopotamia out of the discussion you 
should be careful to limit your language. "2 Sir Edward Grey desired 
the Ministers in Tehran to induce the Iranian Government to ask the 
Russians to suppress the gendarmerie. It seemed the Iranian Government 
had done whatever they could to satisfy the Allies. Marling stated: 
"I am very unwilling to embarrass the Government at the present with 
any demands that would humiliate them and see unfriendly ... "3 
Anti-Allied Domination of Hamadan 
The situation in Hamadan had remained critical. The Cossacks 
had fortified MujallA and the gendarmes and pro-Germans controlled 
the city. There was an intensive atmosphere over the city. It was 
expected that at any moment a clash would occur between the two forces. 
The Iranian Cossack forces had been reinforced by the arrival of 240 
Iranian Cossacks from Tabriz. It was estimated that the total numbers 
1. i. 
2. F. O. 371-2437. No. 432. Dec. 2,1915. F. O. Decypher to Marling. 
3. F. O. 371-2437. No. 476. Nov. 22,1915. Decypher Marling. Tehran. 
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of Iranian Cossacks were over 500, plus 40 Russian soldiers in Hamadan; 
the latter group were for the protection of the Russian Consulate. 
The pro-Germans also received support from Kermanshah and the gendarmes 
were reinforced from the regions of Burüjird and Qazvin. By this time, 
2,000 gendarmes were at Hamadan. The inhabitants of the city were in 
an absolute panic. They anticipated that there would be a "brother- 
killing" fight between the Cossacks and gendarmes. From the beginning 
of Muharram, the anti-Allied groups had the best opportunity to stir 
up the people's sentiments against the Allies, particularly the Russians. 
In the mosques, all over the city, mullahs in their speeches described 
the Russian forces' brutalities in the occupied cities of the country. 
They reminded the people of the 'Äshürä of 1330 in Tabriz and the 
bombardment of Imäm Rijä's shrine in Mashhad and so on. In a report 
from Hamadan to the British Legation in Tehran, the occasion of an 
assembly in a mosque was reported. In the report, the occasion had 
been considered as purely propaganda in which a preacher who claimed 
that he had come from Mashhad made a speech, telling the crowd about 
the Russian brutalities in Khurasan. He took out a woman's chädur 
which had been torn and bloodied and showed it to the people, saying: 
This is a yä d-i-ýär [reminder] of the way the Russians 
have treated and are still treating our women in every 
province where Russians exist. This is how you may 
expect your women of Hamadan to be treated when the 
Russians ..., arrive here. How long, brothers, are we 
to remain under the heel of such a monster? 1 
There was speculation that Allied subjects would be massacred 
on the day of 'Ashürä. The Allied Consuls were advised by the 
governor to leave the city. The consuls did not wish to repeat the 
1. F. O. 371-2438. Copy. 194587. Hamadan, Nov. 17,1915. to F. O. 
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Kermanshah incident, when they had left the city and were not allowed 
to return. Therefore they tried to stay as long as possible. They 
took precautions by destroying their archives and confidential 
documents. The Imperial Bank had sent away as much of its treasury 
as they could. Due to the interference of some of the "ul! of 
Hamadan, who deterred any disturbances in the city., the day of 
'Äshüri passed rather quietly without serious incident, 
The news from Tehran created an uncompromisable state between 
the two forces in Hamadan: the Russian forces' advance to Tehran, 
the exodus of members of the Majlis and nationalists, the organisation 
of the Committee of National Defence in Qom, the proclamation of the 
Committee which informed the cities that the Shah and government in 
Tehran were powerless and unable to take any decision, the subsequent 
claims by the Committee that it was responsible for the country's 
affairs and had declared war on the Russians. On the other hand the 
Russians despatched 200 men to Hamadan. The Russian Minister in 
Tehran was asked by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs to stop 
the advance of the Russian troops towards Hamadan,, which would increase 
the gravity of the situation in the city and the government's difficulties 
in finding a solution for the problem of Hamadan. The Russian Minister 
stated that the advance was a military action without his knowledge; 
besides, he had received information that the Russian subjects were 
in danger. The anti-Allied groups in Hamadan understood that they 
should not delay any longer and were set to bring about the final 
operation. 
The Russian Consul realised that the situation was indeed critical 
and despatched the Russian families to Qazvin. The Iranian Commander 
of the Cossacks in the city indicated that the Allies could not rely 
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on the Cossacks because public opinion was against them and mullahs 
were preaching against the Russians all over the city. The Iranian 
commander of gendarmes, Major Muhammad Tagi Khan Pasiyän, had been 
many times in contact with the Cossack commanders for a union or 
peaceful surrender; in the latter case, they would be allowed to 
leave the city. The Cossack commanders refused to accept the 
gendarmes' demands and left no alternative but a conflict. From 
early morning on 22nd November 1915, Mulallä, where the Cossacks 
were located, was surrounded by gendarmes and pro-German savars. 
Around two o'clock in the morning both sides kept each other under 
fire. The fight did not last long and finally the Cossacks were 
surrounded and disarmed. Some of them joined the gendarmes and the 
rest were allowed to leave the city for Qazvin. The total casualties 
of the conflict were not more than ten men. It was said that the 
gendarmes used a tactic to approach the Cossack fortifications in 
Musalla. They were wearing Muharram ceremonial clothes and proceeded 
towards Mujallä in a procession. It was considered by the Cossack 
guards as a normal procession for 1M4arram by the inhabitants of 
the city; they assumed that the procession was coming to hold a 
ceremony there. When the Cossacks realised the truth, it was too 
late. After a brief fight the Cossacks were surrounded and disarmed. 
Some Allied reports indicated the Cossacks had been bribed by the 
Germans. 
It seemed the Russian soldiers did not take part in the fighting 
and through the governor's mediation, it was arranged that if the 
Russians surrendered their arms and ammunition, they would be allowed 
to leave the city immediately. The Allied Consuls understood that 
the governor was powerless and could do nothing for their protection. 
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They tried to contact the Swedish officer Major Kaellstrom, but 
failed. The Swedish officers informed the Allied Consuls that if 
they did not leave the city by the following day, he could not 
guarantee their safety. The gendarmes controlled the city, occupied 
the Imperial Bank and took possession of 138,000 t= left in the 
treasury. The Allied Consuls were promised that there would be no 
maltreatment but they had to leave the city by the day after. The 
Russian and British colonies had no alternative but to leave the 
city and a few days later safely arrived at Qazvia. The incident was 
a great privilege for the pro-Germans and an advantage to the 
Committee of National Defence in Qom. 
The Iranian Government was absolutely powerless. Its authority 
did not extend beyond the capital. The news of a coup in Shiraz 
and the domination of the gendarmerie over Hamadan, was followed by 
another similar incident in Aräk (Sullinäbäd). The anti-Allied 
groups took over the city. On 24th November, the situation became 
critical. The British Consul and colony had to leave the city and 
the Imperial Bank was occupied by the groups. Subsequent incidents 
in other cities such as Kerman and Yazd indicated the fall of the 
Iranian Government's authority in the country. The government was 
horrified; it informed all the cities that Iran was not at war with 
the Allies, but in fact the government had very friendly relations 
with Russia and Britain, 
1 
1. For events in Hamadan, see: Rizäquli Q 'immagämi, Vagä'i' Gharb-i Irän dar Jan -i Jahänf- Avval (Arak, n. d. ) 65-67; Parviz Afsar, 
Tärikh-i Zhändärmi. ri-71 ran Qom, 1332 H. S. 
5,129-31; 
I. F. O., 
C. 37, f. 27, No. 23.1334 H. Q. dated Muharram 12,1334; F. O. 
371-2724. Comp. No. 1. Nov. 30,1914. Patrick Cowan to Marling; 
F. O. 371-2724. Kazvin, Nov. 30,1915. McDouall to Marling. 
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American and German-Turkish Interests in Tehran 
The American Legation in Tehran, after accepting requests to 
protect German and Turkish interests in Iran, informed the Iranian 
Government and the Allied Legations in Tehran that "The United States 
has taken charge of German and Turkish interests in those parts of 
North Persia in occupation of Russian troops. "1 This statement was 
a matter of great embarrassment to the Allied Governments. Mr. 
Caldwell, the American Minister in Tehran, received replies from the 
Allied Legations, stating that they refused to recognise the protection 
by any neutral country of German and Turkish interests in Iran while 
the Iranian Government was at peace with its goverlment. 
2 The Spanish 
Legation., which had taken charge of Austrian interests in Iran, 
received a similar reply. Grey instructed Marling to send a strong 
reply to the United States, stating: 
... There has been no rupture of relations between the 
Persian Government and the Government of Germany and 
Turkey, I am at a loss to understand why German and 
Turkish interests in certain localities in Northern 
Persia should be entrusted to the care of a Representa- 
tive other than those accredited by the two above-named 
countries to the Persian Government. The presence of 
Russian troops in certain localities of Northern Persia 
is not of recent date, as you are well aware, and their 
presence at the present time and their necessary rein- 
forcement are all the more essential in view of the 
agitation which has been actively propagated and 
stimulated by German agents and their Allies and which 
have resulted in several most serious outrages in 
various parts of Persia. The presence of Russian 
troops is solely with the object of protecting foreign 
lives and properties against the dangers which were and 
are menacing them; and the Persian Government are under 
1. F. O. 371-2438. No. 460. Nov. 16,1915. Tehran. Decypher Marling. 
Tehran. 
2. Pile no. 7 04.6291/10. Nov. 24,1915. Tehran. Caldwell to Secretary 
of State, quoted in Forei Relations of the United States. 1915, 
Sumlement. The World War Washington, 1928)s 995-996. 
247 
no misapprehension in regard to the justifiable purpose 
for which these troops have been strengthened and placed 
in a position to render immediate aid and protection 
when required. I am consequently instructed to inform 
you that I regret being unable to accept the announce- 
ment which you have made to me. 1 
London and Petrograd, through diplomatic channels in Jashington, 
complained about the attitude of the American Legation in Tehran. 
The British authorities considered the United States responsible 
only for the buildings and archives of the German and Turkish Legations 
in Tehran. 
However, after the official announcement by the Iranian Govern- 
meat that the Shah and government would not leave the capital, the 
United States Legation in Tehran informed the Iranian Government: 
I have the honour to notify you today at 12 noon 
the German Legation and interests at Tehran were taken 
from my charge. The American flag has been taken down 
... The German interests are in German hands in Tehran. 3 
1. F. O. 371-2438. No. 298. P. O., Nov. 18,1915. to Marling. 
2. F. O. 371-2438. Nov. 23,1915. to Grey. 
3. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 90, No. 46. dated Nov, 27,1915. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IMRM. A. NSHAH 
The Germans' Plan in Iran 
Prom the end of October to the middle of November 1915, the 
Central Powers' influence was at its apex in Iran; even the Allied 
Ministers expected to see a pro-German Government replace the present 
one and to declare war against the Allies. After 15th November, the 
situation became very complicated. Neither the Iranian Government 
and Nuhäjirin nor the Allies and Central Powers had any concept of 
what the next step would be. From the Germans' point of view, although 
the situation changed and they lost their influence in the capital 
and the Shah and government inclined towards the Allies, the basic 
plans of the Germans were, nevertheless, still feasible. 
From the military point of view, the appointment of Field 
Marshal von der Goltz Pasha as the commander of the Sixth Turkish 
Army was of great importance to military and political conditions in 
Mesopotamia and Iran. He was in charge of all military operations 
concerning the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra as well as Iran 
and Afghanistan. All assistance from Germany or Turkey, whether 
troops, officers, money, arms or ammunition, were under his super- 
vision. Von der Goltz Pasha would also be informed of diplomatic 
activities in these regions. 
1 Field Marshal von der Goltz Pasha 
believed that the name "Sixth Army" sounded well as it was under the 




command of a German field marshal, but in fact there were not many 
troops. Moreover, it was a heterogeneous army of Arabs, Turks, and 
local tribes and, of course, not well trained. Concerning the 
situation of the war in Europe, General von der Goltz was well aware 
that the Germans could not afford an expedition into Iran and the 
Turks had no better capability at the time. Although the Germans 
had planned to organise three armies in Khurasan, Azarbaijan and at 
the Karun River, in the south-west, from native forces and volunteers 
under the command of German officers', due to the changes in the 
situation in Iran, there was no ground for the Germans to achieve 
their plan. Von der Goltz Pasha modified the Germans' plan according 
to the situation. His main target in Iran was the west and south of 
the country; due to the Germans' activities, the situation in those 
parts was absolutely in favour of the German; therefore, it was 
desirable to form two armies in the south-west and west of Iran. 
Wassmuss had been preparing the means to co-ordinate the interests 
of Iran and Germany in the south-west. He had been in contact with 
most of the tribal chiefs and built up friendly relations. He also 
had the full support of the nationalists in the south. Wassmuss, at 
any rate, was incredibly successful; if the Germans were able to send 
officers and furnish the tribes with arms, the tribes would be capable 
of a serious threat to Mesopotamia and the British forces in the south. 
In the west, German influence had great advantages in every 
political, military and strategical aspect, It had been predicted 
that the Russian forces would attack Baghdad, Von der Goltz' plan 
was to organise another army from the western Iranian tribes and 
1. F. O. 371-2436. No. 324. P. O., Oct. 22,1915. Decypher to Marling. 
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native volunteers to prevent the invasion of Baghdad by Russian troops. 
Count Kanitz, the German military attache in Iran, had been charged 
with preparing the means of organising the army in the west. He had 
been in contact with the chiefs of tribes and influential leaders in 
the western provinces. The German Consulates in the cities were very 
active for this purpose and they employed armed men and were in touch 
with the tribal chiefs regularly. 
From a political point of view, by 15th November, the Germans' 
hope to bring the Shah and his government to their side, had vanished. 
The incident was a serious defeat to German policy in Iran, which 
caused the German Minister, Prince Reuss, to be recalled to Berlin. 
The German envoys used their utmost abilities to prevent the total 
collapse of German policy in Iran. In fact they still had the support 
of the majority of the people, particularly the members of the Majlis, 
nationalists, 'ulamä', gendarmerie forces and tribal chiefs. The 
Germans were well aware that the only chance for keeping up the German 
influence in Iran was through the Committee of Qom; therefore, they 
determined to assist the Committee by all means to enable it to take 
form as a provisional government. This government would have to call 
for a general uprising against the Allies. They would attack Tehran 
in order to release the Shah and government, which were not free to 
take any decision. The provisional government should have a regular 
administration to attract the Iranian people's sympathy and to main- 
tain security and justice. A well-organised system would deter the 
opposition from calling the provisional government anarchist. The pro- 
visional government should take charge of all the country's affairs, 
1 
1. Gehrke, III 323-24. 
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When the news of an alliance between the British and Russian 
Governments and Iranian Government was released, the Germans despatched 
a note of warning to the Iranian Government, that in case of an 
alliance between Iran and the Allies, Iran would have the same fate 
as Serbia and Belgium when the German troops invaded India. 
l 
Simultaneously, a proclamation was issued by the Germans on 
20th December 1915: 
I, the minister and extraordinary envoy of Germany, 
am authorised by my Government to declare to Persian 
people at large the following facts: 
As Russia and England, the traditional enemies of 
the Mohammedan nations and the whole East, are being 
beaten by the gallant German armies and her allies, 
now the occasion is most favourable for the oppressed 
nation of Persia to rise against her enemies and do 
their duty for the salvation of their country. 
Germany is struggling not only for the safety of 
her own country, which was menaced by her jealous foes, 
but also for the liberation of the Eastern countries. 
Now her armies are fighting the enemies of Islam 
shoulder to shoulder with the armies of Turkey who are 
the defendents of the Holy places of the Mohammedans. 
As Russia and England openly have intended to 
struggle all the Mohammedan Kingsdoms, occupied a large 
part of Persian soil, and reduced the rights of indepen- 
dence of this country to what are known to all; therefore 
it is now the best chance and last opportunity for the 
oppressed Persian people to move and regain her complete 
independence and integrity. 
I declare to the Persian people that Germany will 
help them in every way in their struggle for the salvation 
of their Fatherland and will guaranty the future indepen- 
dence and integrity of Persia, if the Persians join hands 
with Germany and her allies. I have the arms, ammunitions, 
officers and money enough ready to offer to Persia, when 
she decides to do only her national and religious duties 
against her enemies. 
The above declaration is made in perfect harmony and 
with the full support of our allies, Austria and Turkey. 2 
1. Miroshnikov, op. cit. , 50, 2. Gehrke, II, 325. 
252 
Deadlock of Tehran-Qom-Negotiations 
The National Committee of Qom widely publicised its attitude of 
opposition, that not only did the Muhäjirin not revolt against the 
Shah and government, but in fact they were determined to relase them 
from the Allied yoke. They repeatedly announced their submission and 
obedience to the Shah. The basic point of the Committee's propaganda 
for a general uprising against Russian troops was the freedom of the 
Shah and the independence of the country. 
Meanwhile, the government desperately tried to find a solution 
to the disagreement between Tehran and Qom. Arbab Kaykhusrau, the 
Zoroastrian deputy in the Majlis, went to Qom as the government's 
representative to negotiate the problems and, if possible, to persuade 
them to return to Tehran. The negotiations resulted in total disappoint- 
ment. Arbib Kaykhusrau returned to Tehran in the company of one 
member of the Majlis. He was Bahär, the editor of the newspaper 
"Naubahär", who had had one of his hands broken in an accident and 
had come back to Tehran for treatment. 
On 2nd December, the Committee despatched a mission to the 
capital for further negotiations with the government. In a meeting 
with the Prime Minister, they expressed the Committee's view about 
the situation of the country. The Prime Minister replied that the 
reasons for the Muhäjirat had now disappeared and he could hardly 
believe it would happen again. He added that if the members of the 
Majlis desired that the Russian troops completely withdraw from 
Iranian territory under those circumstances, it was impossible. The 
Prime Minister complained about the difficulties which the Muhäjirin 
had created for the government. He stated that the government could 
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not take any decision without consulting the Majlis and receiving the 
members' approval. He apointed out that there was the matter of the 
independence and the future of the country and if the members of the 
Majlis in Qom insisted on maintaining their present attitude, he would 
have no choice but to resign. In that case, concerning the state of 
affairs, it might have disastrous consequences for the country. 
1 
On the other hand, Mustashär ud-Daulah, the Minister for Post 
and Telegraph, held a completely opposite opinion to the Prime 
Minister; in a letter to Tab ab', the leader of the Moderate Party, 
he bitterly complained about the state of affairs and the government's 
policy. Without mentioning any names, he criticised the Prime Minister 
for his hesitation to take any decision and blamed him for leading 
the country and people to a state of annihilation. He stated that 
the recent inclination of the government towards the Allies, contrary 
to general desire, had gone beyond expectation and if some persons had 
not taken action against the government's intentions, a treaty of 
alliance between Iran and the Allies would have been signed on 6th 
December. MustashAr ud-Daulah expressed his pity that the Democrats 
were still supporting the Prime Minister. He recommended Tabätabä'i 
to take a risk and follow the policy already implemented at Qom and 
if they died at least it would be for the country. 
2 
The Ävai Front 
The crisis in Hamadan caused General Bartof to despatch a force 
consisting of 300 men towards Hamadan in order to protect the Russian 
1. Sipihr, 259-60. 
2. Ibid., 266. 
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and British Consuls and colonies in the city; but the Russian troops 
met the consuls and colonies on their way to Qazvino The Qazvin- 
Hamadan road crossed through a chain of mountains which, from a 
military point of view, possessed a very important strategical loca- 
tion; particularly, Sult. n Bulägh. pass (8,000 ft. ) was a vital point. 
The road through the mountains was called Ävaj (Ävah), which is a 
village on the same road, 111 km from Qazvin and 118 km from Hamadan. 
The pass was situated on the road a few kilmetres from Avaj towards 
Hamadan. 
The Russian troops had approached as far as Razan, a village 84 
1m north-east of Hamadan on the Hamadan-Qazvin road. It was said that 
at that time a considerable number of gendarmes and savars were con- 
centrated at Hamadan. About 30th November, a confrontation occurred 
between the Russian troops and a detachment of gendarmes; the Russians 
withdrew 34 km2 as far as Ävaj, and left the pass in the hands of 
the opposition. 
It was considered a national victory and the Committee at Qom. 
celebrated the occasion. It was also an encouraging incident which 
created a sensation and brought enthusiasm from the people. Mr. 
Marling criticised the Russians for having 10,000 men at Qazvin and 
"tamely [allowing] her consul to be driven out from Hamadan. "' On 
3rd December a force of 4,000 Russian troops approach Hamadan from 
Qazvin. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that 10,000 
men would take part in that operation. There were 500 gendarmes and 
in addition to them 1200 savars. The pass was the main battlefield 
between the two forces. In spite of superiority in both numbers and 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 157. Tehran, Dec. 5,1915. Marling to Grey. 
I 
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arms, the Russian troops faced a strong stand by the National Army. 
After several occasions of heavy fighting the National Army had to 
withdraw towards Hamadan. Although they faced the Russians near 
Hamadan once more, they did not last long and had to retreat to 
Hamadan and immediately evacuated the city in two divisions, one to 
the Asadäbäd pass and the other towards Maläyir. The news of the 
National Army's defeat at Suljän Bulägh caused a horrible panic in 
Hamadan. The anti-Allied adherents left the city as fast as possible. 
Some leaders of the community with a white flag went out of the city 
to meet the Russian commander. Some of the inhabitants who had signed 
a telegram, asking the government to declare war against the Allies, 
on the same day rushed to the Post and Telegraph Office to cancel 
their signatures. The Russians took control of the city and on 16th 
December the Russian flag was hoisted over the consulate in Hamadan. 
The British Consul arrived at Hamadan on 28th December and surprisingly 
found the British belongings untouched, 
1 
Major Iiuhammad Tagi Khän, the gendarme commander, commented on 
the defeat, and stated that due to a lack of union, strength of will 
and sincerity of the leaders of the parties and tribesmen on one hand, 
and the superiority of Russian arms and numbers on the other, made it 
impossible to withstand the Russian troops. 
2 
Formation of the Provisional Government 
The Muhäjirin had been accused of being in rebellion against 
the government and causing disturbances in the country. On the 
1. F. O. 371-2724. No. 90. Jan. 5,1916. British Consulate, Kermanshah, 
Hamadan; "The Times", Dec. 11,1915. 
2. Kasravi, 648. 
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contrary, the National Committee at Qom endeavoured to deter any 
disorders in its regions and did its utmost to establish a well-organised 
administration in the cities which had accepted the Committee's 
authority. They tried to maintain security in the cities and on the 
roads, to obtain provisions for the cities; but the most important 
action was the establishment of Shir-i Khurshid-i Surkh. It was 
the first foundation similar to the Red Cross in Iran. 
From the political point of view, the plans for a provisional 
government were about to take form. In that case the Committee would 
be officially recognised as the Provisional Government of Iran and 
the Central Powers would recognise its authority; therefore, there 
would not be any difficulty. for the Provisional Government in 
concluding a teaty with the Central Powers. 
The great difficulty in forming the Provisional Government was 
leadership. It was obvious that due to intensive rivalry among the 
parties' leaders, none of them would have received the others' 
support if he nominated himself for the leadership. Therefore, 
there was a suggestion to ask Mukhbir us-Saltanah to accept the 
leadership. The Committee despatched a letter to Mukhbir us-Saltanah 
in Tehran. After referring to the country's situation, they indicated 
that the only alternative to save the country from a disastrous 
future would be the help of patriotic and experienced persons. At 
that moment, he was the only one who could lead the country. The 
Committee hoped that under his leadership the country would have a 
better future. Mukhbir us-Saltanah was asked to accept the proposal 
and to join the Muhäjirin at Qom and they were expecting. to receive 
orders from him. But Mukhbir us-Saltanah refused the request. 
1 In 
1. Mukhbir us-Saltanah, 289. 
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fact, he was not in favour of the Muhäjirat at all and did not agree 
with their views; even on 15th November, in spite of 'Ägim Bey, the 
Turkish Ambassador, who asked him to join the Muhäjirin, he rejected 
the idea and went to ShAh 'Abd ul-'Azim. As soon as he received the 
government's message to come to Tehran, he returned to the capital. 
The political prospects in Qom were a matter of anxiety for the 
parties, particularly the Moderates, who had recently established a 
close relationship with the Germans. The Moderate leaders, intending 
to deter any accusation of blindly following the Germans, concluded 
a convention of co-operation with the Imperial Government of Germany 
on 2nd December 1915; the convention was signed by the Committee of 
the Moderate Party and Schunemann, the German Consul of Kermanshah, 
who was present at Qom on behalf of the Government of Germany. The 
Moderates undertook to assist and co-operate with the Germans for 
Irano-German interests*in all cities of Iran; the Germans undertook 
the following articles: 
1) As long as the war continues against the Russian 
and British Governments in Iran, the Imperial Govern- 
ment of Germany will assist, as much as possible, the 
Moderate Committee with arms, ammunition and officers 
for the provinces. 
2) It will be recommended to all German agents to offer 
their assistance by all means to the members of the 
Moderate Party in the provinces, and consider them as 
their allies and friends. 
3) Mr. Schunemann at Qom and the Secretary of the 
German Legation in Tehran will pay the Moderate Committee 
leaders the expenditure for preparation of arms and 
equipment for pro-Moderate tribes, The Committee of Moderates will submit the lists and documents of expenses to the German Legation. 
4) The German Minister will give official protection to six members of the High Committee of the Moderate 
Party for their lives, properties and dignities. 1 
1. Sipihr, 258. 
2 58 
The main purpose of political activities in Qom was to bring 
about the means of a general unification against the Allies in the 
country. Apart from direct contacts with the tribal chiefs and 
influential people in the provinces, the National Committee of Qom had 
started vast propaganda in the provinces by despatching envoys for 
public speeches, distributing broadsheets and official proclamations 
as representatives of national authority. In a proclamation, the 
National Committee acknowledged to all the people in the country, 
especially the members of the parties, that due to the foreigners' 
activities the eternity of the Islamic religion, national dignity 
and sovereignty were in great danger. For the survival of the country, 
there was no hope but the union of all sincere Iranian people against 
the foreigners. The Committee believed it was necessary for the 
members of the Democrat and Moderate Parties and other political groups, 
without concern for their political views, to unite to defend the 
integrity and independence of the country against their enemy. 
' 
Prom a military point of view, the military organisation of the 
National Committee at Qom was quite complicated. In addition to 
receiving forces from tribes such as the Bakhtiyäri and Shähsavän 
and hundreds of volunteers from the cities, even some notorious groups 
under the command of their leaders, such as Nä'ib Husayn Khän Käshi 
and his son Mäshä'lläh Khan, had joined the National Army. Such a 
heterogeneous force would naturally create some problems. Apart 
from lack of training, arms, ammunition and discipline, they were 
various groups with different interests and some of them were not 
on friendly terms with each other; for instance, Sardär ýaulat 
1. Ibid., 249. 
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Bakhtiyäri and M9sh5. 'l15h Khan had been fighting against each other 
for a long time. However, the Committee kept all the forces under 
the title of National Army and the tribesmen and other groups were 
called Mujähidin. Each one called himself a muiähid or fadä'i. The 
only regular force was the gendarmerie, which created the backbone of 
the National Army. The army was under the instruction of German 
and Swedish officers, Iranian gendarmerie officers, tribal chiefs 
and leaders of nationalist groups, which sometimes produced some 
problems. The National Army acted under the supervision of the 
Committee, in the name of a jihad for the country's independence and 
religion. At any rate, the forces produced no mischief and most of 
them did their utmost. 
The German military assistance up to that time consisted only 
of some officers, arms and ammunition which could be used only in 
small operations and did not enable the National Army to stand against 
Russian forces, especially as some of the volunteers were not even 
armed or had unsuitable rifles. The only remedy was the arrival of 
German or Turkish assistance and in spite of all promises there was 
no sign of any adequate armaments for them. 
The Sänah Conflict 
The National Committee of Qom and the German military advisers 
realised that there would be an imminent invasion of Qom by the 
Russian troops; therefore, a force consisting of gendarmes and some 
other groups of tribesmen, Shähsavän and I sha'lläh Khän, had forti- 
fied themselves near Sävah, 140 km south-west of Tehran and 90 km 
north-west of Qom, where the roads to Tehran, Hamadan and Qom met. 
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The National Army used its utmost to strengthen their position near 
Sävah and despatched those groups who arrived from the provinces to 
the Sävah front, 
The second division of the Russian forces marched on Qom in 
order to put an end to the problems there as soon as possible and to 
deter the Committee from being powerful and dangerous. On 9th Decem- 
ber, an intensive battle between the National Army and Russian troops 
occurred. In spite of the Russians' superiority in all aspects of 
military operations, the National Army stood against the Russian 
troops for some days. At first the National Army even had some small 
victories. Both sides received reinforcements; the Russians received 
1,000 men and the National Army 500 men. On 19th December the Russian 
artillery opened fire on the National Army and the Russian-cavalry 
attacked them. The irregular forces of the National Army fled but 
the gendarmes fought as long as was possible and pulled back 
tactically. The Russian troops occupied Sävah shortly afterwards, 
and their legation, in a proclamation issued in Tehran about the 
Sävah fight, stated that: 
On Sunday, the sixth of Decaber, 11th of §afar, 19th of 
December, the Imperial forces occupied Sävah. The rebels 
and corrupters who had revolted against the lawful Shah 
and government fled and left their casualities and 
wounded on the battlefield. Pursuit of the rebels is 
continuing. Yesterday, all of Qom's dependencies were 
occupied by the Imperial forces. The Imperial Legation 
of Russia indicates that any news about the progress of 
the rebellion is absolutely false and groundless; it 
should not be believed. 1 
The last defence for Qom was I"Ianzariyah, a good strategical 
location 27 km from Qom on the Tehran-Qom road. A division of the 
1. I_.., 275. 
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Russian forces, simultaneously with the occupation of Sävah, approached 
Qom. At Manzariyah, gendarmerie forces and some tribes, such as the 
Bakhtiyäri, took part. Heavy fighting occurred but did not last 
long. Russian forces, especially the artillery, forced the National 
Army to withdraw to Qom. 
The Fight at Rubä Karim 
The National Committee formed a plan to send a force to attack 
the capital and to take the Shah to Isfahan. In that case, the 
formation of a government would be no problem and Iran could declare 
war against the Allies. Therefore, a force consisting of 700 to 800 
men (the Reuter agency reported 1000 men') were gathered, The 
gendarmes consisted of a squadron of cavalry and a regiment of infantry 
and the rest were some groups of Mujähidin under the command of Amir 
Ijishmat and $All Khän Siyähkühi and other leaders of the Mujähidin. 
These forces arrived at Rubit Karim, 27 km from Tehran on the Tehran- 
Qom road. It was a matter of great anxiety to the government. There 
was a possibility that the capital would be a battlefield. In a tele- 
phone communication, Mustashär ud Daulah, the Minister for Post and 
Telegraph, tried to convince Amir Hishmat to reconsider his intentions 
but Amir Hishmat refused; therefore, the government took precautionary 
measures by sending gendarmes and Cossacks, who were at Tehran, to 
guard the capital from possible attacks by the National Army, and 
deferred a public panic. Meanwhile, the Russians had been informed 
of the national forces' intention. Therefore, the Russian troops at 
1. "The Times", Dec. 27,1915. 
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Yang! Imäm and reinforcements from Qazvin under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Belomestoff, "with instructions to destroy by a 
sweep and unexpected blow the band in question"1; advanced towards 
Rubäj Karim via the capital. On Wednesday 22nd December about 1.30 
p. m. heavy fighting occurred. The Russians used all their possibilities 
to put an intensive pressure on the opposition. The artillery opened 
fire on the gendarmes and Mujähidin fortifications and then armoured 
vehicles kept them under strong machine gone fire. Withstanding 
this was not possible, mostly due to inadequate arms against Russian 
troops. The national force had to leave their position in order to 
withdraw. The Russian cavalry finished the battle on the same day. 
They attacked the opposition with sabres and swords. It was nearly 
a massacre. They hated the gendarmes and killed them without mercy. 
It was said 140 to 200 were killed and-72 captured and a large number 
wounded. The Russian Legation in Tehran, on 25th December, issued a 
proclamation: 
Yesterday evening, the rebels and a division of 
gendarmes, which have forgotten their duties towards 
the Imperial Majesty and government and had joined 
the rebellion, were defeated completely at Rubil Karim. 2 
The proclamation stated that over 240 were killed and 70 men captured. 
The Russians blamed Amir Hishmat and 'Ali Qiän Siyähkflhi, the leaders 
of the National Army, for causing the bloodshed and then they took 
flight. However, the rest of the gendarmes and Mujähidin withdrew 
and due to the occupation of Qom some of them, by changing their 
clothes, went to Tehran; Amir &ishmat and the others proceeded towards 
Isfahan via Kavir. 
3 
1. Ibid. 
2. Sipihr, 276. 
3. "Ra'd", No. 68, Dec. 23,1915, and No. 74, Dec. 25,1915; "'Air-i 
Jadid", No. 38, Dec. 23,1915 and No. 39, Dec. 25,1915; "The 
Times/ 
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The Fall of Mustaufi ul-t? amä. lik 
After being disappointed with German assistance,, NNIustaufi 
ul-Mamälik was very anxious for the future of the country. He 
believed that it was better for the country to build a positive and 
friendly relationship with the Allies by concluding a treaty in 
favour of Iran. He had been trying many times but received no 
positive answer from the Allies; now the time seemed ripe and he 
tried hard to achieve his intention. Some of the politicians agreed 
and encouraged him to do so. For instance, both Iranian Ambassadors 
in Petrograd and London advocated the idea of an alliance with the 
Allies and believed that Iran should not miss that opportunity. They 
advised the government to conclude the treaty as soon as possible., 
for due to rapid changes in the war's situation,, Iran might have no 
better chance. They recommended, with few differences, that the treaty 
should contain a guarantee of independence and integrity to Iran by 
both powers and their Allies, France and Italy; abrogation of spheres 
of influence in Iran; cancellation of capitulations; military and 
financial assistance; and a guarantee of Iran's presence at the 
peace conference. 
1 
Apparently Mustaufi ul-Mamälik used the Muhäjirin as a winning 
card to ease the Allies' pressure and bring them to friendly relations 
in favour of Iran. He was successful but his plan went beyond his 
control, and the situation became crucial. The Committee of Qom 
received support, organised administration, gained power and claimed 
Times", Dec. 27,1915; see also Sipihr, 275; Kasravi, 652-56; 
QQ'immagämi, op. cit., 87-90; IrMiroshnikov, op. cit., 51; Afsar, 
oD. cit., 137-38. 
I. I. F. O., C. 66, f. 24, No. 7, dated 22 Muharram 1334. Petrograd; 
I. F. O., C. 66, f. 36, No. 96. dated 21st MMuharram 1334, No. 143. 
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that they had legal authority over the country's affairs, while the 
Iranian Government lost its popularity as it inclined more and more 
towards the Allies. 
From the Allied point of view, the prospects of political 
conditions in Iran and the military situation of the war., especially 
in Mesopotamia, was not in their favour; nevertheless, the Allies 
tried to keep the Iranian Government under their influence by 
threatening the future of the country's independence and controlling 
through the moratorium the government's only income, They also used 
the Russian forces to eliminate any opposition. On the other hand, 
they wanted to bring Iran on their side with a treaty of alliance to 
deter any possibility of a general uprising against themselves and to 
weaken their political opposition in the country. The ebb and flow 
of diplomatic language of the Allies' representatives in Tehran was 
dependent on the progress of the Russian troops against the National 
Army. The Allies had no doubt about the tendency of the Iranian 
Government towards themselves, as it was reported that "at this 
moment the Shah and Prime Minister, both very timid are sincerely in 
favour of alliance. "1 The Iranian Government was well aware that 
the largest opposition to any inclination towards the Allies was 
public opinion; therefore, they endeavoured to prepare the ground in 
public for an Irano-Allied alliance. The Tehran newspapers, in support 
of the idea of having an alliance with the Allies, issued several 
articles. They encouraged the government in its intentions and 
strongly attacked the opposition, especially those ministers who 
were opposed to the policy. 
1. F. O. 371-2438. No. 505. Dec. 2s 1915. Dec., MSarling, Tehran. 
265 
"Ra"d" commented on the situation of the country and believed 
that the time was very crucial and only the government could take a 
definite decision in order to put an end to the crisis. The writer 
added that the effort to maintain neutrality had been in vain and 
encouraged Mustaufi to act immediately. In conclusion the writer 
quoted the Prime Minister's speech, that "the government without 
support of the nation and the nation without leadership of the govern- 
ment will not reach any prosperous points, "' 
"'Agr-i Jadid" rejected the continuation of neutrality and 
stated that there were two ways and the government had to choose one 
or the other. The writer added that the Prime Minister had rejected 
the rumours of any arrangement with one side (Germany) and the other 
side would accept the Iranian conditions. 
2 The newspaper in a later 
issue referred to the Prime Minister's speech, that "we have neither 
drunk milk with the Germans [as brothers] nor undertaken to be the 
Russians' enemy till the day of judgement. Our friendship and enmity 
is only from Iran's interests, 13 
However, the Iranian people had suffered and were still suffering 
from the policy of both powers and their military operations in Iran, 
particularly the Russians' threat to the capital; their hatred was 
too deep to be uprooted by a change in government policy. The Shah, 
government and the speaker of the Majlis had received telegrams from 
some cities, stating that there had been news that the government 
intended to join an alliance with the British and Russians in order 
to declare war against Turkey. They protested and expressed their 
1. "Ra'd", 'No. 56, Dec. 8,1915fMul; arram 30,1334. 
2. ""Asr-i Jadid", No. 29, Dec. 2,1915A. Iuharram 24,1334. 
3. Ibid., No. 40, Dec. 30,1915/Safar 12,1334. 
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rejection of the government's attitude and warned the government that 
if they took such a decision the people would rise in rebellion. 
§aulat ud-Daulah despatched a telegram to the Shah, stating: 
Ever since the outbreak of the European war, when Your 
Royal Order was issued to maintain neutrality, I have 
been checking public excitement with great trouble and 
I have been using my endeavours in the hills of Behbehan 
for the first 2 or 3 months for the preservation of order. 
News has been received stating that the Government 
have passed a resolution to embark on hostile operations 
against the Turkish Government. Although this regrettable 
news cannot be believed, I humbly beg to represent to 
Your Imperial Majesty that whoever has moved such a 
resolution is a traitor. I pray Y. I. M. in the name of 
all the Qashgais, and the majority of the people of 
Fars not to cause the Nation, God forbid, to lose its 
love for Your Imperial Majesty, should such a decision 
have been taken, I beg by means of this telegram to 
resign my service and responsibility, and it is impossible 
for me to oppose a Muhammadan Government. 
If the fact is contrary to this rumour, I and my 
family and all Qashqais will be always ready to sacrifice 
our unworthy lives in compliance with Your Imperial 
Majesty's orders, 1 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik believed that the only alternative which 
might appease public opinion and settle the political crisis in the 
country was to receive inducible advantages from the Allies through 
the alliance in order to recover past and present maltreatment by the 
Allies and attract the Muhgjirin and nationalists' attention. The 
Allied Legations in Tehran had been informed of the approximate terms 
which the Iranian Government most likely would submit to the Allies 
for concluding an Irano-Allied alliance. The Russians received the 
terms in eight points and the British in more detail, eleven points 
in all: 
1. F. O. 371-2725. Dated 1st Jadi (21st December 1915). 
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First. Cession of Persian territory embracing holy 
places including (Khadimain) ? Haramain, viz., Baghdad. 
Second. Cancellation of all Persia's debts to Great 
Britain and Russia. Third. Two Powers to supply arms 
and ammunition for 50,000 men. Fourth. Large monthly 
subvention during war. Fifth. Abrogation of 1907 
convention. Sixth. Stipulations of 1911 ultimatum 
to be cancelled. Seventh. Large modifications of 
treaty (of) Turkomanchai. Eighth. Loan of 8 million 
pounds to be arranged after war by international 
syndicate. Ninth. Revision of tariff. Tenth. In Persia 
foreigners to possess real estate on same conditions 
as exist in Turkey. Eleventh. Two Powers to guarantee 
independence and integrity of Persia, 1 
Meanwhile, the alliance between Iran and the Allies had been 
considered by both powers' governments, The Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs had indicated that the Russians did not have arms 
to spare to submit to Iran, but "Persia is free to buy and import 
them via Russia"; concerning financial assistance, he stated that he 
agreed with financial support "provided that foreign debt of Persia 
is not affected. " Mr. Marling expressed his opinion about the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' attitude and stated that "His 
Excellency does not at all realise delicacy of the situation. " He 
added that this kind of attitude would "obviously ... inspire mistrust 
of sincerity of our friendship. " He added that the Iranian Government 
was not able to obtain any arms and if they could, they might be 
suspended in Russia at any time. Mr. Marling then referred to 
financial assistance, from the Russian Minister's point of view, 
that "indicated intention of maintaining our financial grip, " He 
believed "an attitude of this kind would be in my opinion unfortunate 
at present. "2 Mr. Marling referred to present conditions in Iran and 
1. F. O. 371-2727. Tele. No. 508-F. Dec. 4,1915. Tehran to India. 
2. F. O. 371-2428. No. 505. Dec. 2,1915. Decypher. Marling, Tehran. 
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the situation in Mesopotamia; he anticipated the possible consequences 
in future and stated that: 
Baghdad being relieved and Nixon being in no position 
for the present presumably to resume advance I submit 
it may be assumed enemy will devote all his attention 
to his main objective that is forcing Persia into war 
against us, This will be best achieved by sending 
into Persia all troops that can be spared from watching 
Nixon with practical certainty of raising at least 
western provinces against Entente. Appearance of Turkish 
Army reinforced by gendarmerie and by local levies 
already being collected will fire Persia with hope of 
driving out Russians. This combined with promises 
held out by Germans ..., will make it extremely hard 
for any Cabinet to join us except on terms of a most 
attractive nature. 1 
Although the Shah and Prime Minister were willing to conclude 
the treaty of alliance, it was reported by Mr. Marling about the 
Prime Minister: "I do not doubt his good faith for he is making great 
efforts to bring round public opinion to accept (? ) alliance with the 
two powers, "2 But the government did not have the support of all 
members of the cabinet. Mr. Marling described the attitude of the 
ministers towards the Allies, as they could "only count on Farman 
Parma, Sipadar and Ala ul-Saltanah, two latter are valuable only as 
passive vote in the Cabinet., 
3 He was also able to buy one more 
vote. The rest of the ministers, mostly due to public opinion, did 
not agree and even showed a hostile attitude towards the Allies. 
From the Allies' point of view the Iranian Government's terms 
for a treaty of alliance were interpreted as "the Persian Government 
has an exaggerated opinion of the importance which an Alliance with 
Persia would have for Russia and England ... "4 Regarding territory, 
1. P. O. 271-2727. No. 508-P. Dec. 4,1915. Tehran to India. 
2. F. O. 371-2438. No. 513. Dec. 6,1915. Decypher Marling Tehran. 
3. F. O. 371-2438, No. 1801. Dec. 2,1915. Decypher Buchanan, Petrograd. 
4. F. O. 371-2438. No. 1829. Dec. 7,1915. Decypher. Buchanan, Petrograd. 
tý 
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finance and arms, the Russians might agree with certain modifications. 
They could not afford to help Iran with military assistance; but Iran 
would be free to obtain arms elsewhere. As to financial assistance, 
the Russian Government believed it could only be given as a new sub- 
vention and cancellation of principal of the loans, which would be 
approximately 70,000,000 roubles, and this was unacceptable. The 
revision of the treaty of Turkmanchai and the tariff were negotiable; 
but as to the ultimatum of 1911 and the convention of 1907, the Russian 
Government believed any revision of these were out of the question. 
Mr. Sazonof stated that he did not see "what services Persia could 
render us in return for such sacrifices as such an army could not be 
raised and trained for long time. "' 
The British Government took the matters under careful consideration. 
The advantages of having an alliance with Iran from the British point 
of view were: 
1) The great moral effect upon Moslem opinion and 
the loss to Pan-Islamic propaganda of one of its 
chief weapons. 
2) The closing of the road from Constantinople to 
India. 
3) The protection of our flank in Mesopotamia and 
safety of the oil fields. 2 
But, even if the Iranian Government concluded an alliance, 
public opinion would refuse it, and consequently most of the country 
would be against the government. Therefore, Pan-Islamic propaganda 
would not fail, Mesopotamia would be in greater danger and the oil 
fields could not be saved. 
3 
1. F. O. 371-2438. No. 1829. Dec. 7,1915. Decypher Buchanan, Petrograd. 
2. F. O. 2438. No. 508-F. Dec. 4,1915. to darling, Tehran. 
3. Ibid. 
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The British War Office looked at the situation from another angle 
and believed: 
It is of the utmost importance to prevent the Persian 
Government from throwing in its lot against the forces 
of the Entente. From a military point of view it is 
worth paying a very high price to ensure having Persia 
or part of it on our side under existing conditions. 1 
The Government of India disagreed with any rupture of relations 
with Iran, particularly if it would put an end to an alliance between 
Iran and Germany, which "could have a very unfavourable effect on 
Moslem opinion in India and Afghanistan"2, but the Government of 
India disregarded the Iranian proposals and hinted that at any rate 
"the Russian Government would reject them as impossible .,, 
3 However, 
it seemed the Government of India did not disagree with some sort of 
moderate terms for the alliance. 
The British Government indicated its view, that "it is clear 
that many of the conditions which have been suggested would not be 
acceptable, to both British and Russian Governments"; nevertheless, 
the ministers in Tehran were instructed that due to the vital 
importance of the situation they should avoid a breach of relations 
between Iran and the Allies and their reaction to the Iranian proposals 
"should [be to] return a conciliatory and temporising reply. " It was 
recommended that in any case the ministers try to postpone a decision 
about the negotiations until the Russian troops' operation obtained 
some results and the British Army stabilised its position in Mesopo- 
tamia. Finally, the British Government expressed their'idea that: 
1. F. O. 371-2438. Dec. 8,1915.310 to F0. 
2. F. O. 371-2438. No. 4495. Dec. *9,1915. India Office. 
3. Ibid. 
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Government to extend to Great Britain and Russia an 
effective and friendly neutrality which in the circum- 
stances of the case will in my opinion be in some 
respects preferable to an open alliance. 1 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik once more despatched a mission of three men, 
'Adl ul-Mulk, deputy Majlis speaker, Arbäb Kaykhusrau and Mirzä Qäsim 
Khän Tabrizi (Sur-Isräfil), to Qom to inform the Committee and the 
members of the Mjalis of the Prime Minister's message, which indicated 
that he intended to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Allies. 
It was pointed out that the Prime Minister believed it was in the 
interests of Iran to join the Allies and the Muhäjirin should return 
to Tehran in order to consult with the government. It was added that 
if the treaty was not signed in three days he would have to resign. 
The members of the Majlis who had made the Muhijirat, who were at 
Käshän at the time, in a meeting, discussed the matters and decided 
to refuse the Prime Minister's suggestion and protested against any 
alliance with the Allies. Mirzä Qäsim Khan Tabrizi joined the Muhäjirin 
and the others returned to the capital without hope. 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, in a meeting with the British and Russian 
Ministers, informed them that due to public opinion, he was not able 
to join an alliance against Turkey, which probably would end in civil 
war, and Iran would prefer to remain neutral. It was the time for both 
ministers to hammer the Prime Minister. Mr. Marling reported that 
they replied to the Prime Minister that: 
It was idle to talk of a policy of neutrality which 
would inevitably result in Persia being forced to join 
our enemies. 11o middle course was possible, Persia must be with us or against us, and the Government had better 
reflect seriously on the consequences to Persia both 
immediate and future if she allowed herself to be led by 
1. P. O. 371-2438. No. 188274/15. P. O., Dec. 16,1915. To Count 
Benckendorff, Russia. 
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pressure of ignorant and venal public opinion to join 
our enemies, negotiations should commence at once, 1 
The Russian Minister referred to the Russian force at Qazvin and 
stated that it "might take matters into its own hands. "2 
The Shah 
The Shah had been under considerable pressure since he had 
assumed the throne, for it was beyond his power and ability. He was 
at the stage of a nervous breakdown. He was much more concerned about 
his future than the country's; therefore, in a secret message to the 
Russian Minister through Kämarän Mirzä, his uncle, he informed the 
minister that: 
His Majesty feels difficulties of his position for one 
so young and inexperienced as himself to be intolerable. 
It was he who had come to the conclusion that an alliance 
with. the two powers was the only way out of Persia's 
difficulties but obstacles in his way were too formidable 
for him to ... deal with and he has therefore decided to 
abdicate in favour of his father; he himself would again 
become Valiad [Vall 'Ahd] and live at the Court. 3 
It was a kind of secret crisis in Iran for the Allied Governments, 
and was immediately taken under consideration. The Russian Minister 
at Tehran was instructed "to use all his influence to induce the Shah 
to abandon this intention which he attributed to German intrigues. "4 
But if he insisted on his decision, it might be advisable that the 
Shah should become Val! 'Ahd and be installed as Governor of Tabriz, 
1. Ibid. 
2. F, O. 371-2438. No. 521. Dec. il, 1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
3. F. O. 371-2438. Dec. 10,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
4. F. O. 371-2438. No. 1871. Dec. 15,1915. Decypher Buchanan, Petrograd, 
273 
where he would be safe from German influence; and the ex-Shah would 
take his position. 
The Government of India was in total disagreement with the Russian 
proposal, in which Muhammad 'Ali Shah would be a tool in Russian hands 
and there would be an uprising against him in Iran. The British 
Government was not in favour of the return of the ex-Shah but suggested 
a Council of Regency, consisting of three persons, and that the Shah 
might go to Tabriz or to Russia as he desired, with a suitable pension 
for himself and the three regents "whose names would be submitted to 
him by two Legations, "' The Russian Government was opposed to a 
Regency Council, as were the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran, 
as Mr. Marling believed that "Regency council of three would be quite 
unworkable in Persia where personal jealousies and intrigues outweigh 
all considerations of public interests. "2 
However, it was suggested that the Shah be kept on his throne 
at any rate. The Shah informed the Allied Ministers that due to the 
ambiguity of the situation and his future, he would like to have 
assurances from both governments regarding his future and he required 
, the following points: 
Firstly. Inviolableness of his Person and household, 
Secondly. Freedom of movement in and out of Persia, 
Thirdly. No interference (? with his) Correspondence 
by post or telegraph. 
Fourthly. Civil list of 30,000 tomans a month to be 
guaranteed in case Persian treasury cannot 
pay it. 
Fifthly. Suitable allowance in the event of his 
departure from Persia. 
Sixthly. Crown Jewels to be considered his personal 
property. 3 
1. F. O. 371-2438. No. 448. P. O., Dec. 15,1915. 
2. F. O. 371-2438. No. 544. Dec. 19,1915. Decypher marling, Tehran. 
3. F. O. 371-2438. No. 552. Dec. 21,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
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In return, "the Shah would unreservedly throw in his lot and at once 
appoint any Prime Minister we (the Allies] may wish. "1 
The British Government agreed to the Shah's proposals with some 
modifications and the elimination of point 6. The Russian Government 
received the Shah's proposals, the most important difference from the 
British modifications being that "He asks for pension not only if he. 
leaves Persia but also if he abdicates, 'and he demands that the 
Crown jewels should be regarded as his personal property if he 
abdicates. "2 The attitude of the Russian Government towards the 
Shah's demands was almost the same as the British. However, it 
seemed there had been some sort of agreement with the Shah in which 
the problems were apparently sorted out. 
ParmAn Farmä's Cabinet 
At the same time as the Russian troops had pushed back the 
Muhäjirin, the language of the Allied Ministers changed. In an 
audience with the Shah, the ministers stated that the present cabinet 
consisted of anti Allied elements and they believed "a change of Prime 
Minister was inevitable in near future. "3 The British Minister 
suggested that Farman Farmä be appointed Prime Minister, The Shah 
agreed and believed it should take place at once. On 24th December 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik presented his resignation and Farman Farmä was 
appointed to form his cabinet. Three days later Farman Farmd intro- 
duced his cabinet to the Shah, as follows: Farman Farmä, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Interior; MushAvir ul-Mamälik, Minister 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 371-2438. No. 1967. Dec. 26,1915. Decypher Buchanan, Petrograd. 
3. F. O. 371-2438. No. 564. Dec. 25,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran, 
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for Foreign Affairs; Sipahdär A4zam, Minister for War; Shihäb ud Daulah, 
Minister for Sciences; Sardär Mangnr, Minister for Post and Telegraph; 
'A19 us-Saltanah, Minister for Justice; Sarim ud Daulah, Minister for 
Public Works. 
The announcement of Farmän Farmä's cabinet indicated a radical 
change in favour of the British and Russians in their Iranian policy. 
As I1r. Marling stated, "Farman Farma at least got rid of the enemy 
elements that had figured in late Administration. "1 The appointment 
of Sardir Manqür and §arim ud Daulah, son of Zi11 us-Sul n, was a 
great advantage for the Allies. Reuter reported, "Prince Firman Firma 
has been nominated Premier by the Shah. This is considered a great 
deplomatic victory for the Allies. "2 The cabinet list did not include 
the Minister for Finance, but Yamin ul-Mulk was in charge of this 
ministry. It was not surprising that even Mr. Marling believed that 
the appointment of Yamin ul-Mulk "was most unfortunate, and certainly 
made to facilitate the Prime Minister's scheme of personal profit. It 
is universally accepted that his Highness took 12,000 tomans to make 
the appointment. "3 
Farman Farmä was well known as a pro-Allied supporter and after 
15th November, when Mustaufi ul-Mamälik was under pressure to include 
him in his cabinet, Farmän Farmä's popularity decreased intensively. 
Mr. Marling reported,, "Farman Farina has thrown in his lot with us and 
is risking life and property in our cause.. 
4 In fact Farmän Paring 
had frequently been threatened with death and was asked either to 
L, F. O. 416-64. No. 36. Tehran, March 24,1916. Marling to Grey. 
2. "The Times", Dec. 27,1915. 
3. F. O. 416-64. No. 36, Tehran, March 24,1916. Marling to Grey. 
4. F. O. 371-2438. No. 473. Nov. 22,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
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join the nationalists or to leave the country. There was an attempt 
on his life. Since FarmAn Farmä had been a member of Mustaufi's 
cabinet, he had expressed anxiety about his safety and damage to his 
property to the Allied Ministers at Tehran and askem them in case of 
necessity, that if he should leave the country he needed to be assured 
of both powers' support, which included financial assistance. The 
British Minister at Tehran suggested to his government a grant of 
£400 monthly to Farman Farmä and also he received £15,000 for damages 
to the harvest of his villages, which according to his claim had been 
plundered by the anti-Allied groups. Farman FarmA also expected to 
receive compensation for his property and wanted a guarantee from both 
governments that after the war he would be helped to regain his fortune. 
l 
The British and Russian Governments believed, however, that they should 
firmly support Farmära FarmA. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
instructed the minister at Tehran to inform Farmän FarmA of full 
support by the Russian Government and a "certain amount of pecuniary 
assistance from Russian Government. "2 
Farmän Farmä's first step was to take some measures against 
anti-Allied elements in the cities, especially Tehran. Some people 
had to leave the capital or hide somewhere. Farman Farmä's main 
intention was to discharge the Swedish officers, which was one of the 
greatest Allied desires. Mustaufi ul-Mamälik had already discharged 
some of the Swedish officers commanding the gendarmerie forces in 
Qazvin, Fars, Burijird and Arak. They were accused of being disobedient 
to the government. Farman Farmä dismissed almost all the rest of the 
1. P. O. 2437. No. 507. Dec. 3,1915. Decypher Marling, Tehran. 
2. P. O. 371-2437. No. 1940. Dec. 23,1915. Decypher Buchanan, 
Petrograd. 
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officers. Colonel Eilwall, the commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie 
forces, resigned and Major Nystrom was appointed. Simultaneously the 
Swedish officers commanding the gendarmerie in Isfahan, Käshän and 
Kermanshah were also dismissed. In fact there were very few Swedish 
officers left in the gendarmerie forces in Iran, 
The Allied Legations in fact had complete control over the 
government and asked for whatever was possible. The Russian Legation 
issued proclamations at any occasion. Their language against the 
Democrats was insulting in spite of the party's popularity in the 
country. In one of the statements, the Russians referred to the 
friendly relations between the two countries and stated that due to 
the disturbances in the country, which had been created by "corrupters 
and rebels in the name of the Democrat committee", the subjects of 
both powers did not have security and their trade was paralysed. The 
Iranian Government was not taking, or did not want to take, any 
measures against them but both governments could not be silent and 
inevitably took action by sending Russian forces into Iran. The 
statement pointed out that the Russian troops had no intention of 
occupying the country, but only of preventing intrigues by their 
enemies. 
1 
Later on, Farmin Farm& tried to convince the Muhäjirin that the 
prolongation of their attitude was in vain and they could neither 
achieve anything nor benefit the country. He despatched a telegram 
to Sardär Ashja', the Governor of Isfahan, instructing him to convey 
the telegram to Häj Aqä Mir Allah, Mudarris and Tabätaball. He asked 
the leaders of the 'u lama' whether they agreed with him and would allow 
I. Sipihr, 319. 
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the government to take some steps to improve the situation in the 
country, or if they would follow the attitude of those German-gold 
paid persons who were concerned with their own interests only. In 
the second case Farmin FarmA had to keep silent and let them have 
another experience at Isfahan as they had had at Aräkp Sävah and 
Rubät Karim. 
Farmin FarmA tried to encourage the Shah to agree to an alliance 
with the Allies. The presence of Russian troops and the defeat of 
the Muhijirin overshadowed public opinion. He received the support 
of both "Ra'd" and ""Asr-i Jadid" for the alliance with both powers. 
On 16th January 1916, Farm, -In Farmä submitted a draft of the government 
proposals for an alliance with the Allies to both legations. It was 
more or less Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's proposal, as follows: 
1. There shall be an alliance for fifteen years from 
date of signature on following terms. 
2. Great Britain and Russia will within three months 
of signature furnish gratuitously to Persia modern 
rifles, ammunition, and guns sufficient in the judgement 
of Persian Government for 50,000 men, and will make good 
losses incurred in circumstances contemplated in article 4. 
3. Should she request it, Great Britain nad Russia will 
give Persia military assistance. Operations will be 
directed by a staff composed of Persian officers and 
officers of the Power sending troops. Commander-in-chief 
will be appointed by the Shah. 
4. During continuance of the European war Persia will 
employ all her influence and all her forces, regular and 
irregular, to safeguard her interests and those of her 
allies in Persian territory. The two Powers will endeavour 
by all means to prevent an attack on Persia. 
In case of danger they will take every step to ensure 
the safety of throne to Shah and his descendants. 
5. All troops of the two Powers will evacuate Persian 
territory as soon as needed for their presence as 
provided in articles 3 and 4 has ceased. Persia will 
not be called upon to contribute to their expenses while in Persia, and will have the right to determine date of their departure. 
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6, From date of signature Great Britain and Russia will 
abstain from all measures contrary to independence and 
territorial integiry of Persia, such as interference in 
her internal affairs, conclusion of public or private 
pacts with tribal chiefs, etc. j and any such existing 
conventions are herely annulled. 
7. Engagements of 24th December, 1911, and 20th March, 
1912, taken by Persia in consequence of Russian ultimatum 
of 29th November, 1911, and of Anglo-Russian demands of 
18th February, 1912, are cancelled, 
Nor will the two Powers in future conclude any agree- 
ment with each other or with other Powers such as infringe 
Persian independence, and will oppose such an attempt on 
the part of any other Power. 
8. Anglo-Russian monthly subvention until one month 
after conclusion of the great war of 500,000 tomans, as 
well as 750,000 tomans for upkeep of troops mentioned 
in article 2. 
9. Persian debts of every kind whatever to be taken over 
by the two Powers. 
10. Revision of Treaty of Turkmanchai and annexe 
concerning ceremonial. 
11. Revision of customs tariff. 
12. Persia will recognise rights of foreigners to hold 
landed estates on condition that such persons are sub- 
jected in all respects to Persian laws and customs. 
Immigration en masse to be prohibited unless immigrants 
are treated while in Persia as natives. 
13. Persian sovereignty to be recognised over islands of 
Bahrein Tomb, Sire, Abu Musa, Farur, and Ashouradi. 
14. Persia to have the right to navigate the Caspian 
Sea and have men-of-war there. 
15. Persia to be represented at Peace Conference. 
Annexe. 
Execution of treaty to be secured by signature thereof 
oy France, Italy and Belgium. 1 
The significance of the proposal showed the grip of the Russian 
and British Governments over the country. The Allies did not desire 
1. F. O. 416-64. Tele. No. 51. Tehran, Jan. 19,1916. 
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to commit themselves to such considerable unertakings, especially at 
that time as they were in a much better position in Iran than before. 
It was expected that the proposals would be submitted to drastic changes 
and omissions. However, the British and Russian Governments took 
the proposals under their consideration, during which time Farmin 
Farmi had to resign , and the government received no reply. 
Withdrawal of Muhäiirin to Isfahan 
The defeat at Sävah and the Manzariyah conflict horrified the 
Muhäjirin in Qom. The evacuation of the city took place hastily. 
Most of the Muhäjirin proceeded to Käshän and some of them via Aräk 
and Burajird, to Kermanshah. 'Qom was occupied on 21st December. 
The government authorities and some leaders of the community met the 
Russian commanders and explained the situation in order to ease the 
Russian troops' harshness. The occupation of Qom took place without 
many serious incidents. Martial law was declared immediately and some 
of the opposition were arrested. 
At Käshän, the Muhäjirin were welcomed by the people. The last 
contact of Mustaufi ul-Mamälik's envoys took place in the city. The 
Committee called up a succession of members of the Majlis and other 
leaders of nationalists to discuss Mustaufl's plan for an alliance 
with the Allies, and also the return of the Muhäjirin to Tehran. 
The Prime Minister's proposals were refused with strong warnings to 
the government. Consequently Mustaufi's cabinet was changed. The 
Russian troops advanced towards KAshän, causing the Muhäjirin to 
leave the city for Isfahan. The gendarmerie forces of Kashah also 
left the city and Russian forces occupied it on 1st January 1916. 
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Isfahan was the second main city of Iran which was in the hands 
of anti-Allied groups. The 'ulamä', Democrats and other parties indeed 
ruled in the city and the governor, Sardär Ashja', was absolutely 
powerless. The Muhäjirin received an enthusiastic welcome by the 
people. Highly anti-Allied propaganda covered the city. But after 
a while the residence of the Muhäjirin, due to the occupation of 
Käshän and the Russian troops threatening Isfahan, produced tension 
and anxiety in the city. 
After the change of cabinet not only did relations between the 
Muhäjirin and the government not improve, but in fact they grew worse. 
Meanwhile, the governor of Isfahan had been instructed to inform the 
inhabitants that the MuhAjirin were acting against the Shah and govern- 
ment and warned them that the Russian forces would occupy the city if 
the Muhäjirin remained there. It was a matter of great anxiety for 
the people; finally a telegram on behalf of the people was despatched 
to the Shah that the inhabitants of the south of Iran, especially 
Isfahan, would willingly sacrifice their lives and properties to 
defend his sovereignty and the country's independence. They had no 
intention whatsoever but to serve their popular Shah and were ready 
to obey what he ordered. 
' In replying to the telegram, the Shah 
pointed out that he had no intention of breaching his friendly 
relations with the Russian and British Governments, which existed 
at the time. 
2 Later on, Farmän Farm!, in a telegram, instructed the 
governor of Isfahan to inform the 'ulainä_ that after the telegram of 
the people to the Shah, he had been trying through diplomatic channels 
to detain the Russian forces from further advance. He indicated 
1. "Ra'd", No. 91, Jan. 23,1916/Rabi4 ul-Avval 17,1334. 
2. Ibid. 
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that he had assured the Allies that he would settle the problems in 
Isfahan. Farman Farmä then criticised the Muhäjirin not only because 
their action had not saved the country, but also because they might 
attract the Russian troops into the central part of Iran. He blamed 
the Democrats for causing the crisis and attacked them because they 
were dragging the country into a state of annihilation for their own 
benefit. Farman Farmä believed that it was the third time that the 
Democrats had involved the country in disastrous incidents. He 
referred to the incident of the bombardment of the Majlis by Muhammad 
'Ali ShAh, the ex-Shah, during the Constitutional Revolution, and 
the Russian ultimatum of 1911 about the Shuster event; at the time, 
they had closed down the Majlis. Farman FarmA believed the Russians 
and British did not desire to take action against Iran; nevertheless, 
they were willing to give assurances and undertakings for the inde- 
pendence of Iran, but all had been in vain because of the ambition of 
those persons. He pointed out that open hostility against the Russians 
and British would jeopardise the independence of the country. There- 
fore, the anxiety of Iran's powerful neighbours should be soothed, 
1 
However, Farman Farm! was able to postpone the Russian troops' 
advance towards Isfahan. 
Although the German agents tried hard to hold Isfahan in hand 
and to stir up people against the Russians, it was obvious that they 
were not able to do so. The Muhäjirin realised that the people were 
worried about the arrival of Russian troops; therefore, they decided 
to leave the city. Some of them, such as Dihkhudä and Vahid-i 
Dastgirdi, preferred to go to Bakhtiyäri tribes, but the other leaders 
1. I'zäm Qudsi, 316-17. 
n 
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and members of the Majlis, nationalists, and gendarmerie forces 
determined to go to Kermanshah. They gradually set out in groups 
at different times, via Qulpayigän, Khumayn, Burüjird and Nihavand 
to Kermanshah. Some of them had to take a longer way and joined the 
Muhäjirin in Qajr-i Shirin. The diaries of most of the Nuhäjirin 
indicate a journey full of fear, danger and suffering. Considering 
the age and ability of most of the leaders, this kind of journey was 
a considerable risk. It was during winter and the ground was covered 
with heavy snow. They had to pass through a chain of mountains in one 
of the coldest regions of Iran. Their transportation was very poor 
and unsuitable and due to the Russian troops' threat on the main roads 
they had to proceed on by-ways. The inhabitants of some cities and 
villages did not show much sympathy towards them. The people were 
afraid of chastisement by the Russian troops and were reluctant to 
help the MuhAjirin. Above all, most of the Muhajirin were not used 
to this kind of life. 
After the Muhäjirin left Isfahan., the German Consul once more 
tried to keep the city under German control. He encouraged ýaulat 
ud Daulah and some other groups to take over the city and they did so. 
Their savars took all the government offices and occupied the bank, 
It was a good pretext for the Russians to march on Isfahan and after 
brief fighting the opposition withdrew and on 19th March 1916, the 
Russian troops occupied the city. 
The Occupation of Ark 
The Russian scheme was to approach the west of Iran from two 
directions, first via Hamadan to Kermanshah and second via Arak, 
Burüjird and Nihavand to Kermanshah. Ark was the main battlefield 
284 
for the second way. The National Army had a great stronghold and 
received some reinforcements from Luristan and Kermanshah. They 
could stand against the Russians for some weeks. However, some heavy 
fighting occurred between both sides and the National Army retreated; 
the Russian forces were able to occupy Ark by 21st January 1916 and 
proceed towards Burajird. 
Nizäm us-Saltanah's Leadership 
After the MuhAjirin had been refused by Nukhbir us-Saltanah for 
their leadership, it was suggested that Nizäm us-Saltanah was suitable 
for the position. A mission under the supervision of one of the 
Democrat leaders, Musävat, and some German officers went to Burüjird 
to meet Nizäm us-Saltanah. He was Governor-General of Luristan and 
Khuzistan (Arabistan), and well known in the country. He had governed 
some of the most important provinces of Iran, such as Azarbaijan and 
Kermanshah. 
Mr. Muhammad 'All Mä61, son of Nizäm us-Saltanahs who had been 
elected as a member of the Majlis from Burüjird and at the time was 
at Tehran, has stated that he had received a telegram from his father, 
asking him to join his father in Burüjird as soon as possible. Nizäm 
us-Saltanah and Farmän FarmA were related by marriage, for Sälär 
Lashgar, the Governor of Hamadan, who joined the Muhäjirin, was the 
son of Farmän FarmA and son-in-law of Nizäm us-Saltanah. However, 
Mr. NAfi was told by Farmän Farmä. to inform his father not to join 
the MuhAjirin. Mr. MAfi went to Qom and met the Committee and members 
1. Personal interview with Mr. Muhammad 'Ali MAfi, Nizäm us-Saltanah (he received his father's title), Friday, Oct. 14,1977; see Appendix II. 
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of the Majlis. He was asked to encourage his father to accept the 
leadership of the Muhäjirin. When he arrived at Burajird his father 
had already joined and agreed to the Huhäjirin's proposal. Nizam 
us-Saltanah had also received telegrams from FarmAn Farmä and Shaykh 
Khazal, a powerful leader of Arab tribes in the south of Iran, who 
was a great friend of the British. He also was related to Nizä. m 
us-Saltanah. They asked Nizäm us-Saltanah to avoid any connection 
with the Muhäjirin; otherwise he would lose all his fortune. Mr, 
Mäfi said his father, in replying to them, despatched a verse of 
Sa'di, the famous Iranian poet: "Bestowing life and properties, 
renouncing honour and disgrace, [for the skae] of love is the first 
step. " Therefore, Nizäm us-Saltanah indicated that he had chosen 
his way. 
The German mission under the command of Count Kanitz had some 
meetings with NizAm. us-Saltanah in the summer of 1915 and on 29th 
December 1915, a treaty between Count Kanitz and Nizäm us-Sallanah 
was signed: 
Monsieur le Comte Kanitz represantant autorise de 
1'Empire Allemand conclue et arrdte au nom de son 
Gouvernement avec Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh la 
convention suivant: 
Article 1. Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh 
s'engage de prendre la direction du mouvement national, 
pour la liberation de la Perse, avec tout son influence 
et tous ses moyens et faire la guerre contra la Russie 
et l'Angleterre jusqu'ä la conclusion de la paix generale 
ou jusqu'au moment quand le Gouvernement Persan obtiendra 
la neutralite et 1'independance absolue. 
Article 2. Le Gouvernment Allemand garantie, 
jusqu'ä la fin de la guerre, ä Son Excellence Nizam-es- 
Saltaneh, le commandement de toute l'armee nationale 
persane, aussi bien que le commandement des forces 
allemandes et torques qui agiront en Perse contre les 
Russes et les Anglais, excepts les forces qui operent 
dann 1'Azerbaidjan. 
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Article 3. Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh 
s'engage de se conformer aux hautes directions de Son 
Excellence le Marechal v, d. Goltz Pacha ou de ses 
successeurs. 
Article 4. Le Gouvernement Allemand s'engage de 
mettre ä la disposition de Son Excellence Nizam-es- 
Saltaneh un corps d'officiers formant 1'Etat Majeur 
de la dite Excellence. 
Les plan des operations seront dresses par le dit 
Etat-Majeur et executes apres avoir ete approuves par 
Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh. 
D ans le cas de desaccords entre Son Excellence et 
son Etat-Majeur la question sera tranchee dans une 
commission compose de Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh, 
Monsieur l'Attache Militaire de 1'Allemagne, le chef de 
1'Etat-MTajeur et une personne designee par Son Excellence 
Nizam-es-Saltaneh. 
Article 5. Le Gouvernement Allemand s'engage, do 
mettre ä la disposition de Son Excellence Nizam-es- 
Saltaneh les armes et les munitions necessaires pour 
la guerre et de faire parvenir en Perse des troupes 
auxiliaires turques ou allemandes. 
Le Gouvernement Allemand commencera les envois 
des dits armes, munitions et troupes au plust8t possible. 
Article 6. Le Gouvernement Alleetand payera, autant 
qu'il sera necessaire, les frais de la guerre, des fonds 
qui ont ete accordes ä la Legation d'Allemagne ä Teheran 
et des sommes qui seront envoyees dans la suite pour ce but. 
Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh employera autant 
que possible les ressources du pays pour le memo but. 
Article 7. Le Gouvernement Allemand mettera ä la 
disposition de Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh, pour les 
depenses personnelles et politiques de sa fonction la 
somme de vingt mille tomans par mois. 
Article 8. Son Excellence Nizam-es--Saltaneh fers 
son possible pour que les sommes depensees par 1'Allemagne 
pour la guerre en Perse soient converties en une dette 
gouvernementale de la Perse remboursable ä termes. 
Article 9. Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh 
s'engage d'avoir prdt en tout cas pour le 14 Janvier 
1916 quatre mille homiues armes. 
Dans le cas oi. les provinces de Kermanchah de 
Kurdistan et la position de Kengaver seront pendant 
deux mois sous sa dependance, Son Excellence fournira 
en plus une force de six (6) mille hommes armes. 
Article 10. Le Gouvernement Alleetand protegera 
dune maniere legale et diplomatique Son Excellence 
Nizam-es-Saltaneh, ses biens et sa famille pendant 
quinze ans apres la guerre. 
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Article 11. Vu, que Son Excellence Nizam-es-Saltaneh 
entre dans la guerre sans l'autorisation de son Gouverne- 
ment, le Gouvernement Alleetand lui garantie en tout cas, 
que la guerre finisse aux avantages de l'Allemagne ou 
non, lors des negociations de la pair, la propriete de 
tous ses biens meubles et immeubles et ses creances. 
Article 12. En cas de la wort de Son Excellence 
Nizam-es-Saltaneh, les articles 10 et 11 de cette 
convention seront executes par le Gouvernement Allemand 
envers'les heritiers de la dite Excellence. 
Fait en double et signs ä Bouroudjerde le vingt-six 
Decembre 1915 at le dix-sept Safar 1334. 
(gez. ) R. Nezamessaltaneh (gez. ) Gf. Kanitz 
(u. persische Unterschrift) 
Article additionnel. Son Excellence accomplira 
ses obligations concernant la raise en campagne des 
troupes (Art. 9) dann le case oü Nazar Ali Khan sera 
empdche par le Gouvernement Allemand d'entrer ä Loristan 
jusqu'ä la find de la guerre. I1 es convenu que cet 
article additionnel ne concerne que les troupes de 
Loristan. 
(gez. ) Gf. Kanitz (gez. ) Nezamessaltaneh 
(u. persische Unterschrift) 1 
There were many speculations about the treaty between Nizim 
us-Saltanah and the Germans. "Rusks Slov" wrote that Nizäm us-Saltanah 
had received 8,000,000 manats (Russian roubles) from the Germans. 
2 
Mr. Marling reported that "Nizam us-Sultaneh ... is credibly reported 
to have received 80,000 1 from the Germans. "3 
The Formation of the National Government in Kermanshah 
After the conflict at Kangavar and the withdrawal of the British 
and Russian Consuls to Hamadan, Kermanshah became the main centre for 
1. Gehrke, II, 334-35. The number of troops mentioned in Article 9 
is in dispute. According to Lenczowski, oti_cit., 41, the 
number is 40,000. Ishtiaq Ahmad, on. cit., 298, gives the same 
number; although he seems to have taken his information from 
Sykes, the latter reports that the number agreed upon was only 4,000. Sykes, A History of Persia, op. cit., II, 544. 
2. "Ra'd", No. 105, Feb. 9,1916 Rabic us-Sani 5,1334. 3. F. O. 416-64. No. 36. Tehran, March 24,1916. Marling to Grey. 
-1- -S 
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anti-Allied groups; even the Germans openly confessed the importance 
and vitality of the city from a German point of view, when Igb. U 
ud-Daulah, the Governor-General of Kermanshah, who was at Tehran and 
intended to go to Kermanshah, received a message from the German 
Legation that they hoped there was no intention of bringing the 
Allied Consuls back to Kermanshah, otherwise the "Governor's own 
arrival would be forcibly prevented as German interests could not 
permit the possibility of closing their only means of communicating 
with outer world. "1 
The country's administration was in total chaos, particularly 
in Kermanshah. It had been months since the government's employees, 
including the police forces, had received salaries and rations. As 
soon as IqbAl ud-Daulah arrived in Kermanshah, he tried to take some 
measures and to improve conditions, but he was not very successful. 
The advance of Russian troops towards Tehran produced a hostile 
reaction against the Allies in Kermanshah. The people of Kermanshah 
declared their full support of the Committee of Qom; most of the 
trbies in the region announced that they would send armed forces to 
their assistance. The gendarmerie force at Kermanshah, under the 
command of Captain Sonsesson, a Swedish officer, after a brief fight 
with Iranian Cossacks, disarmed them. By that time, from a military 
and political point of view, the region was completely under anti-Allied 
influence. Igbäl ud-Daulah and other government officials were 
absolutely handicapped. On 10th December 1915, government offices 
and the Post and Telegraph Office were occupied by the gendarmes. 
Meanwhile, a heavy concentration of tribesmen at Kermanshah occupied 
1. F. O. 416-63. No. 373. Sept. 30,1915. Marling to Grey. 
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the Customs offices in the region. They arrested the head of 
Customs, who was of Belgian nationality. In fact the city was cut 
off from the central government. Prince Reuss, the German Minister, 
who had been recalled to Berlin, arrived in Kermanshah on his way 
to Baghdad. He had already visited Isfahan, Ark and Burüjird. 
The German Minister, in several meetings with the nationalist leaders 
in these cities, assured them of German support. In spite of all 
German propaganda, the news of Prince Reuss' dismissal was considered 
a defeat for German policy in Iran. Prince Reuss also had some meetings 
with local leaders and after some days left Kermanshah for Baghdad. 
Simultaneously, Dr. Vassel, Special Minister of Germany in Iran, 
arrived in Kermanshah and took over German political affairs in Iran. 
On 2nd January 1916, Marshal von der Goltz Pasha, in company with 
Colonel Popp and his military mission, arrived in Kermanshah. 
Colonel Popp had been in charge of military operations in Iran. 
Marshal von der Goltz stayed in the Kermanshah region for three days 
and discussed matters with the leaders of the nationalists and the 
German and Turkish representatives, and left the city for Baghdad. 
Fauzi Bey, the Turkish military attache, and the Turkish Consul in 
Kermanshah were in the city and were co-ordinating highly political 
activities for the pan-Islamic movement. 
The arrival of the Muhäjirin in Kermanshah created an intensively 
political atmosphere in the city. The outcome of a war between the 
National Army and Russian forces was not hopeful. They wanted to 
form a government as soon as possible in order to conclude an agree- 
ment of alliance with the Central Powers. There were some meetings 
between the 'ulmä', members of the Majlis, nationalists and some 
tribal chiefs. They decided to ask Nizäm us-Saltanah to take over 
executive power and informed him officially that: 
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Due to the importance of the present situation of the 
country and the necessity for maintaining the means of 
forces and effective policy for securing of the internal 
administration of the country, releasing His Majesty Ahmad 
Shih from danger and siege of foreign forces, and concluding 
political and military conventions and agreements, the 
committee of representatives believe that it is necessary 
to organise a council of executives which will be under 
your leadership to enact the duties according to 
opinions and programs which will be obtained by the 
committee of representatives. 1 
The Committee's program had the same aims as that of the Muhäjirin. 
Nizäm us-Saltanah was determined to organise his cabinet. The 
National Committee of Qom, some of whose members were in Kermanshah, 
in a telegram congratulated Nizäm us-Saltanah on his appointment, 
which indicated that the Committee recognised his leadership and 
submitted its authority to him. Nizäm us-Sallanah immediately 
informed Berlin and Istanbul of his appointment. In his telegram 
to the German Emperor he stated: 
Counting upon the sincerely friendly feelings of 
Your Majesty towards the Musulman world Is occupying 
the post of commander-in-chief of the Persian National 
Army, have the honour to express to your Majesty heartfelt 
gratitude for the evidences of your sympathy with our 
national affairs. Persia hopes, with the assistance of 
the brilliant officers of Your Majesty, to receive the 
help promised by you in the shape of Military stores, 
to overcome its enemies for all time. May God bless the 
sacred cause for which our country is fighting. 
-- Nizam-Sultana. 2 
The German Minister for Foreign Affairs was instructed to reply 
to Nizäm us-Saltanah as follows: 
I thank your Excellency for the news of your 
appointment as Commander-in-chief of Persian National 
Army. I am sure that with the help of the patriots 
1. Sipihr, 309; I'zäm Qudsi, 337. 
2. "The Times", April 17,1916; Persian text, Sipihr, 309. 
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and the brave Persian troops you will succeed in 
restoring the glorious past of Persia, so that she may 
occupy her proper position among the other nations of 
the world. The sending to Persia of von der Goltz 
Pasha and other German officers proves that the German 
Government is willing to show every sympathy with your 
efforts. Let all Persian patriots be assured that the 
Imperial Government will render the Persian nation the 
. most active assistance, with the object of procuring its national independence which has been threatened for 
centuries by the enemies of Persia. Germany wishes - 
and prays - for the Triumph of the Persian troops. - 
Wilhelm 1 
Nizäm us-Saltanah, in another telegram to Enver Pasha, the 
Turkish ! Minister for War, informed him of his appointment and 
expressed his intention of fighting against the enemies of Islam 
and asked for military assistance. Enver Pasha, in his reply., 
congratulated him on his appointment and stated that the union of 
both nations against their common enemy would result in their victory 
and added they would assist him as far as possible. 
2 
It was the time for Niz5m us-Saltanah to take some action to 
control affairs. He found the presence of Igbäl ud-Daulah, the 
central government's representative, unnecessary; therefore, he was 
asked either to co-operate with the provisional government or to 
leave the city. The governor preferred the second alternative; he 
moved out of the city in preparation for his journey, but he was kept 
under restriction. 
Nizäm us-Saltanah arrived in Kermanshah with an escort of 200 
men and was warmly received by the Muhäjirin and inhabitants of the 
region. The only hope of the provisional government and the ! Iuhäjirin 
was military assistance from the Germans and Turks. Everyone expected 
1. "The Times", April 17,1916; Persian text, Sipihr, 309-10. 
2. Sipihr, 309. 
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an imminent arrival of Central Power troops; but except for 1500 
Turkish troops, they received no more help. Dr. Passel, in an 
official letter, encouraged him in his intention and informed 
Nizäm us-Saltanah: 
Sanneh, le 31 janvier 1916 
Excellences 
Le Gouvernement Imperial d'Allemagne vient de me 
charger telegraphiquement de vous exprimer tous ses 
voeux pour la formation d'un gouvernement national 
et de vous communiquer que nous sommes pr§ts ä vous 
secourir le plus energiquement. 
Le Gouvernement Imperial avait donne ä Son 
Excellence Mustaufi al Nemalek dernierement la declaration 
formelle suivant que je suis autorise a vous repeter et 
ä confirmer officiellement: 
Le Gouvernement Imperial garantit qu'aprbs une 
guerre victorieuse il defendra et sauvegardera 
lors des n4gotiations de pair, 1'integrite 
territoriale ainsi que l'independance politique 
et econoinique de la Perse 1 condition que la Perse 
ait participe ä la guerre contre l'Angleterre et 
la Russie. 
Les Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Turquie 
avaient charge leurs representants ä Teheran de remettre 
des declarations identique ä la natre. L'oeuvre nationale 
et patriotique de votre Excellence se trouve ainsi entouree 
de toutes les garanties d'ordre international que les 
patriotes persans semblaienent desirer. 
Je profite de cette occasion pour repeter ä Votre 
Excellence les assurances de ma haute consideration. 
(gez. ) Vassel 
etc. etc. 
Son Excellence 
le Chef des Forces 
Nisam es Saltaneh 
Nationales de Perse 
1 
1e Gehrke, II, 339. 
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The Fight at Asadäbäd 
The fall of Hamadan and hasty withdrawal of the gendarmes, 
nationalists, tribal savars and about 200-300 Turkish troops was a 
great embarrassment to the anti-Allied groups, They retreated in 
two directions, some groups to Pul-i Shikastah, 19 km south-west on 
the Hamadan-Maläyir road; the rest of the forces withdrew to the 
Asadäbäd pass, at the town of the same name, 54 km south-west of 
Hamadan on the Kermanshah-Hamadan road. 
At Pul-i Shikastah, the anti-Allied forces were able to resist 
the pressure of Russian troops for three days and then had to retreat 
to TMa]. äyir, 85 1m from Hamadan. They were followed by the Russian 
troops and at any suitable location fights occurred between the two 
groups. 
At the Asadäbäd pass, the National Army and Turkish troops 
possessed a stronghold and from a military aspect this was the only 
advantage they had over the Russian troops. As a matter of fact, 
they were short of all military and living facilites. The region of 
Asadäbäd is one of the coldest parts of Iran and especially in 
winter everything comes to a standstill for months. The pass was 
covered with heavy snow that year. But the gendarmes had not even 
received proper winter uniforms and many of them were still wearing 
their summer clothes. 
The British War Office was pressuring the British Government to 
encourage the Russian Government to instruct General Baratof to push 
his army to the Turkish frontiers, 
1 The Russian Government also 
desired their troops to join the British forces at Baghdad, 
1. F. O. 371-2437. No. 2907. F. O., Dec. 5,1915. Cypher. To Buchanan. 
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Simultaneously, General Baratof received reinforcements and instructions 
from Russia; therefore, the Russian troops, in spite of unsuitable 
conditions, used all their ability to push from Asadäbäd to Kerman- 
shah and then Baghdad. Some heavy fighting occurred and on 17th 
January the Russian troops were able to push the National Army back 
and to occupy the town of Asadäbäd. 
The Conflict at Bid-i Surkh 
The next National Army strategical point was at Bid-i Surkh. 
The city of Kangavar became the advance battlefield for both sides. 
There was a heavy concentration of various forces at Bid-i Surkh. 
The gendarmerie forces were about 3000 men and there were about 
5000 or 6000 from tribal and other armed groups. They had come from 
Azarbaijan, Luristan, Isfahan, Tehran and Kermanshah. Some special 
forces had also been organised by the parties and paid by the Germans, 
such as §ähib Zamani and N54iri1; they took part in the fight at 
Bid-i Surkh. Nizäm us-Saltanah also arrived at Bid-i Surkh with 
three or four thousand men. Sahnah became his headquarters. The 
Turkish assistance at Bid-i Surkh was over 1500 men. The general 
idea was that it might be possible to protect Kermanshah for some 
time until assistance was received from Germany. Nizäm us-Sallanah, 
in a telegram to Iusayn Quli KhAn Navväb, the Iranian Minister in 
Germany, who had sympathy with the nationalists and was co-operating 
10 Mr, Xhusravi, was one of the Nädiri savars. He took part in the 
fight of Bid-i Surkh. In a reconnoitre operation with a group 
of his fellows, they were ambushed by Russian troops, and had 
to retreat quickly. The group had some casualties and Mr. 
Khusravi was shot in the leg and taken to headquarters before 
being sent to Kermanshah. Personal interview with Mr. Khusravi, 
17/11/2536; see Appendix II. 
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with Tagizädah in Berlin, described the situation and asked him to 
negotiate the nationalists' proposals: 
La condition proposee ä savoir: l'entree de la 
Perse en guerre a ete realisee depuis deux mois. Moi 
et tous les citoyens independants de la Perse nous 
combattons avec toutes les forces idisponibles. 
Je vous pris d'obtenir sans aucun delai la garantie 
sans condition de 1'independance politique et economique 
de la Perse. En stipulant 1'independeance economique 
de la Perse, ii est indispensable d'obtenir l'annulation 
de tous les traites, conventions, concessions contractes 
avec les gouvernements et les ressortissants russes, 
anglais, francaise et belges aussi bien que l'annulation 
des dettes anterieures de la Perse. I1 faut obtenir 
aussi la garantie pour l'abolition des capitulations 
et la modification du tarif douaniere avec toutes les 
puissances, aussi bien que la garantie pour l'envoi 
des troupes, armes, munitions et les depenses de guerre 
en fixant le montant et le date des payements. 
Jusqu'ici il n'est arrive comme secours que deux 
mille soldats ottomans et cinq cents fusils vieux systemes. 
Les Russes ont envoys do nouveau de grand nombre de 
troupes et exercent de forces pressions. 
Si 11assistance de troupes et d'armes ne nous 
arrivent pas bient8t, la situation deviendrait grave 
et critique. 
Je vous (fehlt, pris? ) de faire de serieux efforts 
pour expedition immediate de Berlin, de Constantinople 
et de Baghdad des troupes allemandes et turques, armes 
et munitions. 
Je suis en train de former gouvernement provisoire 
des "Leaders" des partis et des fractions. 1 
The Germans used all their efforts to build up fortifications 
at Bid-i Surkh, including a system of trenches about 20 km in length. 
The Germans kept their government under pressure to send military aid 
to Iran as soon as possible. Although the German Government despatched 
military aid two or three times to Iran, the Turkish Government 
1. Gehrke, II, 340. 
rI 
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believed their army in Mesopotamia were more in need of aid and did 
not allow the assistance to reach Iran. It was a matter of extreme 
annoyance to the German officers and political representatives, 
particularly Count Kanitz, who had made a great number of promises. 
The German officers were well aware that if they did not receive 
adequate assistance, it would not be possible to hold Bid-i Surkh 
for very long. 
Since the arrival of Colonel Popp and his mission, the colonel 
had taken over command of Germanymilitary advisers in Iran and directed 
the military operations. He stopped the lavish spending which Count 
Kanitz had done. Count Kanitz, the military attache who was in charge 
of all German military operations in Iran, realised that in spite of 
his utmost efforts he had been totally unsuccessful. One night, in 
company with a savar and a gendarmerie officer, he arrived at a 
village. He wrote some letters and sent his companions away on the 
pretext of submitting those reports to Colonel Popp. As soon as 
Colonel Popp received the letters he realised that Count Kanitz 
intended to commit suicide. The colonel and some other German officers 
immediately went to the village but Count Kanitz had left his room, 
taking only his gun, and he never came back again, 
' 
Kangavar became the next stage of fighting. The town was 
captured and recaptured by both sides several times. The confrontation 
lasted for some weeks. It was unexpected for the Russians; however, 
they planned to go around Bid-i Surkh from Maläyir via Nihavand, 64 
km south-west of Maläyir. The city was occupied by the Russians on 
1. Riýäqull Q 'immagämi, a lieutenant, was the gendarmerie officer 
with Count Kanitz that night. He has explained the incident in 
detail in his book, on, cit., 170-86. 
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13th February 1916, The National Army at Nihavand was not strong 
enough to resist; a heavy invasion of Russians and some carelessness 
by the Swedish officers commanding the National Army caused the 
collapse of the Nihavand front. The Russians attacked on both 
fronts. Some groups of tribes from Luristan left the front. The 
gendarmes and Turkish troops had to bear the most pressure from the 
Russian bombardment. Kangavar was occupied by Russian troops and the 
main battlefield became Bid-i Surkh. Both sides received heavy 
casualties. The Turks had great losses. It was estimated that the 
Russians had 30,000 men who had taken part in the fight, The National 
Army could not resist any longer and had to retreat to §ahnah and then 
to Bisitün, 30 km away on the Hamadan-Kermanshah road, which was 
occupied by the Russians by 25th February, The fall of Kermanshah 
was imminent. The Russians took precautions in approaching the city. 
The gendarmes confronted them once more around Bisitan just to give 
time for the evacuation of Kermanshah. The Russian commander informed 
the inhabitants of the city that if they resisted, the Russian troops 
would destroy the city. Some of the =' and leaders of the 
community met the Russian commander and welcomed him to the city. 
The Russians occupied Kermanshah on 27th February 1916. They announced 
martial law and issued a proclamation on the city's and region's 
affairs. 
l 
The Russian forces immediately followed the Muhäjirin. Once 
more, the i-Iuhäjirin had to stand all the difficulties of a journey, 
but this time food was in fact very scarce. They withdrew as far as 
Kirind, 99 Ica from Kermanshah; they stayed there one or two days and 
1. One of the Russian proclamations may be found in Appendix I. 
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then proceeded to aasr-i Shirin. This time they fortified Pataq, a 
stronghold between Kirind and Sarpul-i Zahäb on the Kermanshah- 
Qagr-i Shirin road. Now the situation had become very serious for 
the Turks too. They tried to spare some forces and despatched 
them to Iran. A few divisions arrived in Iran, hoping to deter the 
Russians' advance for some time. 
Qasr-i Shirin was the last point for the Muhäjirin in Iran. The 
city was overcrowded and a shortage of food threatened both the 
Muhäjirin and the inhabitants of the city, The leaders of the SanjAbi 
tribe endeavoured to assist and supplied food for some weeks. Later 
on, on the recommendation of the 'ul of Najaf, the governor of 
Pusht-i Küh sent some caravans of provisions to Qaqr-i Shirin, which 
helped the inhabitants of the city a great deal, 
Meanwhile, the last group of Muhäjirin from Isfahan, after some 
weeks of very bad conditions, arrived in Qagr-i Shirin. Shähzädah 
Sulaymän Mlrza, the leader of the Democrats, Mudarris and some other 
nationalist leaders were in this group. 
The Iranian New Year passed without much enthusiasm. The political 
discord between the parties increased day after day. Nizäm us-Saltanah 
was blamed for being inactive. There was even an attempt on his life. 
Everyone was depressed and worried. The future seemed as dark as 
ever. A broadsheet was distributed in the city, indicating the 
attitude of some of the MuhAjirin. It was entitled "Logical Statements", 
and started with a question, "For whom and for what? " It criticised 
the Muhäjirin bitterly. It looked at the whole story of the Muhäjirat 
and stated that a group of people had been waiting to find an opportunity 
to take revenge on their old enemies and to do something for their 
country's future; then the war started and the enemies became involved. 
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Meanwhile, the Germans, Austrians and Turks used any persons, parties, 
nations and governments for their interests. These simple people 
thought their enemies would be defeated, but they were wrong and had 
been deceived. The writer referred to the condition of the country 
and what the Muhäjirin had achieved. Hundreds of youths had been 
killed, the country's only force, the gendarmerie, was disorganised, 
the Muhijirin had left their families and jobs and tolerated horrible 
conditions and now they were observing the annihilation of their 
country. The writer repeatedly stated that people had the right to 
ask "For whom and for what? " Was it for the independence of the 
country? If so, by what treaty and who had guaranteed it? Or was it 
for the sake of the Germans and Turks? Had they made any convention? 
The writer complained bitterly and alluded to the Central Powers' 
promises and asked which of their promises had been fulfilled; where 
was their financial assistance? Where were the German officers and 
armaments? Why did the gendarmes not have proper uniforms? Why did 
they have to clean Colonel Popp's house or pick up stones from the 
roads? He addressed the 'ulamä' and members of the Majlis and pointed 
out that it was time to find an answer; if those people were not able 
to serve their country, then they should not be used only for the 
interests of two or three persons.? 
The broadsheet was unexpected and shocked the Muhäjirin. It 
openly attacked the leaders of the Muhäjirin and Germans. However, 
it created a new wave of activities and resulted in an agreement 
between parties and also a general agreement between all groups and 
individuals. Some of the IIuhä jirin, such as I11rz1 Karim Khän Rashti 
1. Daulatäbädi, III, 366-67. 
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and Yahyä Daulatäbädi, acted as mediators and brought about the means 
of an alliance between the Muhäjirin. Although the latter person 
was discouraged, on 21st Jumädä ul-Avval 1334/26th March 1916 an 
agreement was signed between the leaders of the Democrat and Moderate 
Parties. The introduction referred to past experiences and the importance 
of the present situation of the country. It was necessary for all 
political parties to join together as a national power for as long 
as the war continued and Iranian territory was being violated by the 
enemy. The members would take an oath to fulfill their national 
duties. The agreement consisted of seven points, the most important 
of which were as follows: 
0 
1) The purpose of this holy alliance is to protect 
the independence and integrity of Iran, to detain the 
influence, domination and violation of the enemy, and 
to safeguard the foundation of Islam. 
2) The agreement will last until six months after the 
general war and the release of the territory of Iran 
from enemy hands. 
3) From the signing of this document until the expiry 
of the agreement all organisations of both the Moderate 
and Democrat Parties should be dissolved and the establish- 
ment of any parties or committees under any name by these 
parties is forbidden. All former parties or committees 
which have been organised should be disbanded and all the 
members of both parties and other parties or groups will 
unite under the name of "Defenders of the Homeland" party. 1 
The agreement was general and was approved by other groups. 
Nizäm us-Saltanah also was under pressure to conclude a treaty 
with the Germans and Turks, in the name of the National Government of 
Iran. Consequently he had to form his cabinet as soon as possible. 
NizAm us-Saltanah rearranged the candidates for ministries several 
1. Aäji ! 'Erz! 'All Muhammad Daulatäbädi, "ýürat-i Musähidah-i 
Hizbayn", "Vapid; Nos. 250-251, March 1979,78-83. 
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times, The final form of the cabinet, which in fact was formed when 
the Muhäjirin returned to Iran later on, was as follows: Niz. m 
us-Saltanah, leader and commander-in-chief; IIIlrzä I uhanmad 'Ali Khän 
Kulüb (Farzin), Finance; Adib us-Saltanah (Sami'i), Interior; Sayyid 
Hasan Mudarris, Justice; Mirzä Qäsim Khan Tabriz! (Sur-i Isräfil), 
Post and Telegraph; 'Izz ul-Mamalik Ardalän. Trade and Public Utilities; 
Nlrzä Muhammad 'Ali Min Mäfi, Foreign Affairs. Sayyid Muhammad 
§ädiq TabAtabä'i, the leader of the Moderate Party, and Vapid ul-Mulk 
were appointed as the National Government's representatives in Istanbul 
and Berlin. Each man was responsible for his post; although they did 
not officially use the title "minister" , in general they were called 
thus. The German and Turkish representatives reassured the Muhäjirin 
that their governments would assist the nationalists to defend their 
country as mach as possible. 
It was obvious that the military situation at Pataq was not 
satisfactory. Sufficient military assistance did not arrive. The 
Germans also were not able to cope with the financial demands of 
affairs. They allowed some of the tribal groups to leave the city 
for their own regions. The Swedish officers were permitted to leave 
for Sweden. The German and Turkish representatives informed Piizäm 
us-Saltanah that it would be better for the Muhäjirin to be prepared 
to leave the city for Baghdad. 
The military operation at Pataq overshadowed the political 
activities at Qasr-i Shirin. The Russian troops had been hold at 
Pataq for nearly a month. All available forces had taken part in the 
fight; the Sanjäbi tribes in particular had shown remarkable resistance. 
The Turks could not send reinforcements and the army lacked ammunition. 
Consequently they had to retreat. Qagr-i Shirin was not safe any 
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longer. The IMZuhäjirin hastily left their country sadly, The Turkish 
representatives indicated that the Muhäjirin would be guests of the 
Turkish Government and would receive financial assistance. 
The city was in a panic. The destiny of the I-Iuhäjirin was 
unknown. The tribesmen left the city for the mountains; many of the 
gendarmerie forces preferred to be scattered around until they could 
find a way back to their cities. The entire National Government, 
both military and civil administration, was disbanded. The leaders, 
members of the Majlis, and high-ranking nationalists, whose lives 
would be in serious danger if they were captured by Russian forces, 
left the city for Baghdad. Many of the nationalist leaders joined 
tribal nomads for better opportunity. On 3rd May Russian troops 
occupied Sarpul-i iahäb, 30 km from Qagr-i Shirin, and on 7th May 
Qa r-i Shirin was occupied by them. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RETURN OF TEE NATIONAL GOVERMENT TO IRAN 
Allied Domination in Tehran 
Everything seemed in favour of the Allies in Tehran. In fact, 
as Mr. Marling reported, "Russian troops were in practical occupation 
of the Capital. "' There was no opposition in the capital to counter 
the Allies' desires. The Majlis was closed and hostile newspapers 
were suspended. Farman Parma did his best to please the Allies. He 
instructed the governors in the provinces that by order of the Shah, 
the Russian troops were pursuing the rebels and there should not be 
any hostile attitudes against them. 
2 The next step against the 
Muhäjirin was taken on 29th January; the Prime Minister was instructed 
to discharge Nizim us-Saltanah from his position. He was the Governor- 
General of Burüjird, Luristan and Iuzistan (Arabistan). 3 
Although the Iranian Government inclined towards the Allies, the 
Allies themselves paid little attention to the government. As a 
matter of fact, the government's proposal for an alliance did not 
receive much attention from its two powerful neighbours. There was 
no reason at that time to offer Iran considerable advantages, as the 
country was totally in their hands. Therefore, the question of an 
alliance as such was not pursued at the time. 
The prestige of the Iranian Government was let down by its 
friendly neighbours, especially in the incident of the Turkish Ambassador. 
1. F. O. 416-66. No. 105. Aug. 26,1916. Gulhak, Marling to Grey. 
2. I'zäm Qudsi, Is 322. 
3. Sipihr, 320. 
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As opposed to the German Minister, Prince Reuss, who did not return 
to the capital, and in spite of the Iranian Government's assurances, 
the Turkish and Austrian Ambassadors returned to the capital on 
24th November 1915, and took charge of their legations. 
On 11th February, the capital was shocked by the news that the 
Turkish Ambassador, 'Ägim Bey, and his companions the Austrian 
military attache, a German professor and an Austrian dentist, who 
had been hunting in the suburbs of Tehran, had been captured by 
Russian troops. It was a matter of serious anxiety and it grew worse 
when the Russians identified them and announced that they had no 
intention of releasing them. The Turkish and Austrian Legations 
strongly protested to the Iranian Government, which was responsible 
for the safety of foreign representatives as it was a neutral country. 
Diplomatic communications passed between the belligerent legations 
and the Iranian Government. Finally, the Russians declared that 
they would despatch the Ambassador via Russia to Sweden. 
"Rusks Slov" reported the incident and wrote that the Russian 
Government had instructed its representative in Tehran to inform the 
Iranian Government that the Turkish Ambassador had been captured in 
circumstances which would leave no reason for the Iranian Government 
to protest. Firstly, they were in the Russian military region; 
secondly, his companions had been escaped prisoners from Russian camps; 
thirdly, one of his companions was a military envoy of a hostile 
country. 
l 
"The Near East" also commented on the incident and, with disregard 
for the neutrality of Iran, stated: "The capture of Assim Bey, the 
Turkish Ambassador to Persia, and Austrian military Attache will 
1. Sipihr, 325. 
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deprive the insurrection of at least one figurehead and possibly of 
a useful leader. "' 
Concerning Iranian public opinion, the Russian action was 
extremely unpopular, but due to the presence of Russian troops, there 
was no strong reaction. The capital's newspapers considered it a 
regrettable incident; even the pro-Allied newspaper "'Agr-i Jadid" 
considered it as astonishing, something which had not happened before 
in diplomatic history. The writer expressed his regret and stated., 
"Nowadays things have gone beyond international regulations and the 
foundation of all activities is force. "2 
Although Farmän Farmä's cabinet had no opposition, nevertheless 
the Russians were not satisfied with him and brought about the means 
for his resignation. Apparently, the discord between Farman Farmä 
and the Russian Minister concerned the negotiations of Mazandaran 
Petroleum and Pir-Bäz&r Rasht's railways, about which Farman Farm! 
seemed not to have a friendly attitude. 
3 
About 200 men and women took bast (sanctuary) at the Russian 
Legation. They demanded the government's arrears. It was said that 
they had been paid to protest against Farnän Farmä's cabinet. 
4 
However, the main reason for the fall of Farmän Farmä, as Mr. Marling 
reported, was "his Highness's boundless rapacity., 
5 He indicated that 
there were grounds for the Russian Minister's suspicions, for "the 
Prime Minister [had been] spreading abroad accounts, unfortunately 
well founded, of his Highness's malpractices. "6 The British Minister 
1. "The Near East", Feb. 18,1916. 
2. ""Asr-i Jadid", No. 57, Feb. 12,1916/Rabid us-Säni S. 1334. 
3. F. O. 416-64. No. 36. Tehran, March 24,1916. Farling to Grey. 
4. Ibid. 
5. I bid. 
6. _. 
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personally warned Farman Faraä about his attitude but it was totally 
useless and he continued to ask the Russians for the same request' 
which he had received from the British; but it was not pleasant for 
the Russian Minister. At any rate, Mr. Marling believed that, 
concerning Farman Farmä's efforts in the Allied interests, particu- 
larly during the previous summer and autumn, the Russian I1inister's 
justification was not right. Later on, after the fall of Farmän, 
both ministers were agreed that Farman Parma "is a far more capable 
instrument with which to achieve the aims of two Powers. "2 However, 
the fall of Farman Farmä was inevitable. Being aware of that, on 
29th February 1916, after almost two months, he submitted his 
resignation to the Shah. It was accepted immediately. The Tehran 
newspapers commented on the resignation and considered it a misfortune. 
"Ra'd" stated that Farman Farms. was an experienced politician and 
admired his activities and opinions, especially during the war. 
3 
Sipahsälär's Cabinet 
It was not surprising that Sipahsälär was asked to form his 
cabinet immediately after the fall of Farmän Farmä. Although Sipahsälar 
was the Minister for War in Farman Farmä's cabinet, from the beginning 
he had showed disagreement with the Prime Minister. Apparently the 
differences between them occurred over the finance of the Ministry 
for War, as Sipahsälär required much more than the government could 
afford, Therefore, Sipahsälär did not take part in cabinet sessions. 
M. Kozminski, the Russian commercial agent, and Shähzädah Kashif 
1. See Chapter III, 276. 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 36. Tehran, :,. arch 24,1916. Marling to Grey. 3. Sipihr, 326; "'Air-i Jadid", No. 65, March 2,1916/Rabi' us-Sani 27,1334. 
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us-Saltanah were two persons who brought about the means of Farmän 
Parma's fall. The former increased the suspicions of the Russian 
Minister in Tehran against Farmän FarmA and, with the co-operation 
of the latter, managed the bast of a group of people at the Russian 
Legation. Consequently, Farmära FarmA realised that he no longer had 
Russian support. 
Muhammad Vail In Tunkibuni, Sipahdär A'zam, had recently been 
honoured with a higher title by the Shah, that of Sipahsälär A'zam. 
On 3rd March 1916, he was instructed by the Shah to form his cabinet. 
Two days later he introduced his cabinet as follows: Sipahsälär 
A'zam, Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior; Särim ud-Daulah, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Sardär Kabir, Minister for War; Sardir 
Mansur, Minister for Post and Telegraph; 'Ali' ul-Hulk, Minister for 
Justice; Mumtaz ul-Mulk, Minister for Sciences; Iäji Yamin ul-Mulk, 
Minister for Finance; 4äji Mushir A'zam, Minister for Commerce and 
Public Utilities; Käshif us-Saltanah was also installed as the deputy 
for the Ministry for the Interior. The British Minister at Tehran 
reported that "Sipahsalar, as Minister of the Interior used position 
and power solely to further his personal interests and those of his 
entourage. "1 
""Aqr-i Jadid" published a long flattering article about Sipah- 
sälär and the members of his cabinet. The ministers were individually 
admired for their ability and patiotism. 
2 "The Times" wrote: 
"Sipahsalar Azam as Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior ... 
is a Russophil. "3 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 104. Aug, 25,1916, Gulhak. Marling to Grey. 
2. ""Aqr-i Jadid", No. 68, March 7; 1916/Jumädä ul-Avval 2.1334. 
3. "The Times" s March 10,1916. 
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In fact, Sipahsälär relied absolutely on the Russians and did 
not pay much attention to the British. As long as he had the full 
support of the Russians, he was safe. This attitude was a matter 
of embarrassment to the British Minister at Tehran. The British 
requested the arrest of exile of some politicians and leaders, such 
as Mukhbir us-Salianah, Zähir ul-Mulk and Sardär §aulat Bakhtiyäri, 
and some others. It seemed the British expected too much from him. 
However, Sipahsälär ordered the arrest of 'Ali in Siyäh Kühe, one 
of the commanders of the National Army, at Rub .t Karim and he was 
held in the Prime Minister's house. Farm9Ln Farmä, the most implacable 
foe of Sipahsälär, was appointed Governor-General of Kerman in order 
to keep him far from the capital. Mr. Marling expressed his opinion 
about Sipahsälär as: "In spite of 70 years and great experience, 
Sipasalar is hopelessly ignorant, and is vain, capricious, lazy and 
easily influenced by those who have his ear. "1 Due to the Allied 
Legations' request the properties of Nizäm us-Saltanah were confiscated 
by the Iranian Government. 
2 
Sipahsälär openly threw in his lot with the Russians. As Mr. 
Marling wrote, "he was content to observe a blind obedience to Russian 
behests. "3 General Baratof invited him to visit Qazvin. He received 
a military reception and observed the Russian troops' manoeuvres. 
General Baratof also was a guest of the Iranian Government and had an 
audience with the Shah, at which General Baratof and some of his 
officers received decorations from the Shah. 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 105. Gulhek, Aug. 26,1916. Marlin to Grey. 
2. I. F. O. 1334., C. 26, f. 22, No. 2, dated Savar 2nd 
11295 
Shams! ], 
1134 H. Q.., No. 578. 
3. F. O. 416-64, No. 105_" Gulhek, Aug. 26,1916. Marling to Grey. 
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The Iranian New Year passed without excitement. The Shah received 
telegrams of greeting from the British king, Russian emperor, presidents 
of the United States, France and other countries. The Russians also 
released Iranian captives who had fought against the Russians, with 
a large amount of publicity. 
The country was in a state of total chaos; famine had already 
shattered the country. Azarbaijan was involved in a disastrous 
period; the region had been the battlefield of the Russian and 
Turkish armies, and conditions did not improve as killing, looting 
and destruction continued, and people wandered from one city to 
another. There was no hope. The north-east and south-east had been 
under Russian and British fire. In the south, General Sir Percy 
Sykes had organised the South Persia Rifles and had started his 
military operations against the opposition. 
The Mixed Financial Commission 
The political atmosphere in Iran was perfectly suited for the 
Allies to put demands to the Iranian Government. The presence of 
Russian troops at the gates of Tehran and the Iranian Government's 
devotion to the Allies had produced a satisfactory condition for the 
Allies to enact any plan. 
The proposals of Mustaufi ul-MamAlik and his successor, Parmän 
Farmä, for an alliance with the Allies was at the time out of the 
question. The British and Russian Governments saw no reason to offer 
Iran any advantages at all; on the contrary, it was an opportune 
time to receive some as well. 
The only Allied assistance to Iran was 200,000 tümäns, the credit 
of the moratorium. From the Iranian Government's point of view, it 
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was the sole income of the country, and consequently was vital to 
the government. The Allied Ministers at Tehran used this point as a 
key to control the Iranian Government, simply by ordering the bank to 
suspend the money. 
As long as there was a possibility that Iran would be dragged 
onto the Central Powers' side, the payment of the moratorium deterred 
the Iranian Government from further inclination to them. But now, 
nothing threatened the Allies' influence over the government. The 
Iranian cabinet had no alternative but to look forward to Allied 
assistance. Therefore, the Allies desired to obtain more privileges 
instead of their financial help. They informed the Iranian Government 
that they understood that there was mismanagement in the expenditure 
of their assistance; therefore, they suggested the formation of a 
Mixed Financial Commission composed of Iran-Allied representatives to 
control the expense of the sum of the moratorium. The British and 
Russian Ministers insisted on this request. 
' On 27th April the Iranian 
Government agreed to the Allies' demand, 
2 
"Novoye Vremya" commented on the formation of the Mixed Financial 
Commission and stated that the Iranian Government had spent a part of 
the money which it had received from both governments for necessary 
tasks, but the other part had been looted by government envoys. The 
writer tried to show that the hopelessness of the Iranian Government 
forced them to ask for both powers' supervision., which resulted in the 
formation of a Mixed Financial Commission. 
3 
1. British letter: I. P. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 42.1334 H. Q. Dated 
22 April 1916. Translation of the British Minister's letter to 
the Prime Minister. Russian letter: I. ß'. 0., C. 26, f. 16, No. 4. 
1334 H. Q. dated 22 April 1916. ITo. 1925. 
2. I. F. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 5.1334 H. Q. dated Savar 7 (1295); 
I. F. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 7,1334 H. Q. dated April 27,1916. No. 585. 
39 "Novoye Vremya", quoted in ""A§r-i Jadid", No. 95, May 18,1916/ 
Rajab 15,1334. 
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""Asr-i Jadid" considered the Commission as the direct result of 
mismanagement of the country's finances. 
1 
The Commission consisted of five members: Heynssens, chairman, 
from the Iranian Treasury, Belgian; Sardär Mu'azzam, Iranian; Amin 
ud-Daulah, Iranian; Model, Russian; Huson, British. The British member 
was later replaced by Maclean. The Commission had the authority to 
control the subsidy, 200,000 tümäns, and its expenditure. 
Return of the Muhäiirin to Kermanshah 
In company with Turkish troops, the gendarmerie forces and the 
other nationalist groups who had withdrawn to Baghdad returned to 
Iran with the Turkish army. Once more, they fought against Russian 
troops in all battles. The anti-Allied tribes joined the Turks against 
the Russians. The leaders of the Muhäjirin and members of the Majlis 
returned to Iran, but some of the high-ranking politicians went to 
Istanbul and Germany or other'countries. 
2 
As soon as Nizäm us-Saltanah and other members of his cabinet 
arrived at Kirind, his cabinet held a meeting and planned their 
program. 4äj! Nagir us-Saltanah, the Governor of Kermanshah, who had 
succeeded Igbäl ud Daulah, had to leave the city. The National 
Government received a warm welcome in Kermanshah. The ministers 
energetically took charge of their administration. The immediate 
family of Nizäm us-Saltanah received very important positions in the 
National Government. His oldest son, Muhammad 'Ali Khän, was appointed 
Minister for Foreign Affairs; the other son, Xganmsd Tag! Khän, 
became his father's secretary, and SAlAr Lashgar, his son-in-law and 
1. ""Asr-i Jadid", No. 96, May 20,1916/Rajab 17,1334. 
2. Daulatäbädi, IV, 32-33; Divänbaygi, OD, cit 70. 
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the son of Farmän Farmä, was in charge of the War Ministry, 
1 On the 
official papers of the National Government was printed the sign of 
the lion and sun (shir and khu rshid) and "In the name of His Majesty 
Sultän Ahmad Shäh Qäjär". The newspaper "Akhbär" was published. 
2 
Shir-i Khurshid-i Surkh was re-established and some hospitals were 
opened. Several schools were established. 
There was also a German military mission with the Muhäjirin. 
The mission consisted of several officers under the command of Captain 
von Loeben. The prupose of the mission was to organise a new Iranian 
gendarmerie force, for the security of the region which was under the 
National Government's authority. The Turkish officers undertook to 
organise a National Army according to the Turkish military system. 
Both military organisations began their duties vigorously in the 
cities. Some centres for training volunteers were organised. Post 
and telegraphic communications reopened. The roads, which during the 
war went from bad to worse, were improved; the Kermanshah-Qagr-i 
Shirin road was rebuilt. The stocking of markets was resumed and 
transportation between cities was safe. The finance administration 
and collection of taxes was formed and put into effect. Law and 
order improved in the region. The Germans opened a German bank and 
issued notes, backed by silver. The financial assistance of the 
Germans to the National Government was 360,000,000 `ns per month. 
3 
1. The presence of Salär Lashgar on the nationalists' side, opposing 
his father, Farmin Farmä, produced suspicions among the MuhAjirin. 
He was accused of reporting the riuhäjirin's affairs to his father. 
Blücher, 69; I'zäm Qudsi, 336; Safä'i, on. cit., II, 160; 
Divänbaygi, on. cit., 70. 
2. But as Pürdä'üd wrote: "The Turks also refused me permission for 
the publication of my journal 'Rastakhiz' as I did not support 
them in their scheme of Pan-Islamism, which to me appeared nothing 
more than a net of deception. " Pürdä'üd, Pürändokht 111mah (Bombay, 
1928), 6. 
3. D1v5nbayg1, on` cit., 64. 
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The Ldational Government appointed governors for those cities which 
had been released from Russian occupation. The governors had 
proceeded to their posts and taken charge of their affairs without 
problem. 
Dr. Vassel, the German Minister in Iran, was replaced by Nodolny, 
a German diplomat in the German Foreign Office, well-experienced in 
Iranian affairs. He arrived in Kermanshah and von Blücher was in 
his company as secretary. Nodolny had been informed in Istanbul by 
the German Minister in Turkey that the Turks did not have the same 
attitude towards Iran as the Germans had. 
1 The Turks preferred to 
take the Middle East under their influence, especially Iranian affairs. 
On the other hand, the Germans were well aware that the Iranian 
nationalists had always been suspicious of the Turks' attitude, and 
if they understood that there would be any problems in the future and 
the independence and integrity of Iran would be in peril, they might 
turn against the Central Powers. In fact the Iranian nationalists 
considered Germany as a guarantee against eventual Turkish aspirations. 
2 
From a political point of view, the implication of the Central 
Powers' policy in Iran was to re-establish the independence and unity 
of Iran and to suppress the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. From a 
military point of view, the aim was to drive the Allied forces out of 
Iranian territory. Nodolny assured Nizäm us-Saltanah in the name of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Germany had neither territorial 
nor political purposes in Iran or its neighbours to the east. The 
only aim of Germany was to establish relations with Afghanistan and 
to threaten India. 3 
1. Sipihr, 282-83. 
2. Blücher, 62-63. 
3. Sipihr, 283. 
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Fauzi Bey, the Turkish military attache, was the Turkish 
political representative in Kermanshah. The 
Turks' message to the 
Iranian people was through religion and the brotherhood of Islam. 
The 'ulamä' of Najaf and Karbala' encouraged the Iranian leaders to 
unite Islamic believers, The nationalists had been more sensitive 
about the Turks' attitude about Pan-Turanism, which had caused 
anxiety to Iranian leaders through some parts of Iran, especially 
in Azarbaijan where the people were Turkish speakers. The 
Turkish 
political representatives tried to convince the nationalist leaders 
that the Turks had no intention whatsoever about Iranian territory. 
As soon as the Turkish troops entered a city, they issued a 
proclamation that they cane for the sake of Islam and to release 
their 
Iranian brothers, and they assured the people that there would be no 
damage to anyone. In Hamadan the Turkish commander-in-chief issued 
a proclamation, stating: 
... the Islamic Turkish 
Government, for releasing of 
its Islamic neighbour Iran from the Russian oppression 
and for rescuing His Majesty Sultan Ahmad Shäh from 
captivity, and security of independence of Iran and for 
assistance of Iranian people, an Islamic army under the 
command of myself was despatched to Iran. 
The proclamation referred then to the fall of Küt al-'Amärah and the 
aim of Russian troops to occupy Baghdad. The statement alluded to 
the Turkish military operation from Khänagin to Hamadan and strongly 
rejected the rumours that the Turks had charged the inhabitants of 
Kermanshah a great deal of money. The proclamation indicated that 
those rumours were from the Turkish enemy, the purpose being to create 
a bad expression from the Turkish forces and to deter Iranians from 
co-operating with the Turks. The proclamation referred to the war and 
defeat of Russian troops and then addressed the Iranians: 
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Today is the day on which Islam is developing and will 
be released from the unbelievers' pressure. The infidels 
will be defeated. The khalifah of the Muslims and the 
ld. nd of believers has declared a Iingd. Taking part in 
iihäd is obligatory; therefore, join our victorious army 
under my command to hunt down the remaining unbelievers 
from Islamic countries and purify Iran from their existence. 
For the freedom of Iran, from the Commander of the 
Islamic army 
'Ali Ihsän 1 
But the chief of the Customs office in Kermanshah, in his report 
about Turltish activities in the city, wrote: "In a few days the 
amount of 3000 lirah and 800 kharvar of grain was imposed on the 
"2 inhabitants in the name of contributions. 
Sipahsälär's Treaty 
The formation of the Mixed Financial Commission was the beginning 
of further pressure for concluding a treaty between Iran and the Allies. 
It was the time to put in practice the Anglo-Russian convention of 1915. 
On 2nd August, 1916, the Iranian Government received a note from both 
legations in Tehran, indicating that: 
The British and Russian Governments desire to assist 
the Iranian Government in maintaining law and order in 
the country and to make reform in the financial admini- 
strations. The Representatives who signed this note, 
have been permitted to convey to Your Excellency the 
following proposal. 
A military force will gradually be organised, 
consisting of approximately eleven thousand men, for 
the above purpose, in the southern provinces of Iran. 
1. Sipihr, 379-81; four days later another proclamation was issued 
containing nearly the same statements: I. F. 0., C. 43, f. 10, 
No. 32. dated Sunday 27 Shavväl [1334]. Enclosure of C. 43, f. 10t 
No. 31, dated Zi Iii. j jah 11, I"1izan, 17,1334. Kärguzari ' azvin to I. F. O. 
2. I. F. O., C. 44, f. 6, No. 6,1135. dated Savar 10,1296/1. Tarch 25, 
1917. No. 5382. 
316 
His Majesty's Government will put at the service 
of the Iranian Government sufficient numbers of high and 
low ranking officers, doctors and so on, for organising 
and training the force, and will undertake the mobili- 
sation and maintenance of the force for at least the 
duration of the European war. 
The Russian Government also required the same plan for the north of 
Iran. The Iranian Government was also asked to present after the 
war a list of the sources of its income for maintaining the forces. 
The note continued and referred to the financial administration and 
finance of Iran and stated that: 
Both governments are willing to take under friendly 
consideration the Iranian Government's desires and 
they are certain that for improving the finances of 
Iran, it is necessary for the authority of the present 
Financial Commission to be extended considerably. 
According to the Allies' suggestion the extension of the Commission 
would cover the total sources of income, taxation and regulation of 
finances of the country. Both governments had pointed out that the 
continuation of the subsidy depended on the acceptance of the above 
proposal. 
1 
After a year or so negotiations for an alliance between Iran 
and the Allies turned out to be in three points, as follows: 
1- Formation for forces under British and Russian 
instruction in South and North respectively for 
preservation of order; 
2- Financial control; 
3- Susidy [for] the War. 2 
The Russians were not willing to agree with these terms and delayed 
a long time, haggling over the number of the troops fron 10,000 to 
1. I. F. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 37.1334. Translation. Aug. 2,1916. 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 105. Gulhek, Aug. 26,1916. Marling to Grey. 
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11,000. Mr. Marling complained about the Russians' delay, for "An 
alliance on the most favourable terms would have made our position 
perfectly safe. "1 The British and Russian Governments had the Iranian 
Government under pressure and demanded an answer in forty-eight hours. 
No one, not even the Allied Ministers, expected to received a 
satisfactory reply, perhaps even a protest. On 5th August 1916, the 
Iranian Government replied to the Allied proposals. After thanking 
the Allied Governments for their assistance and attention to the 
development of Iran, they informed the Allies that the Iranian Govern- 
went had considered the proposals attentively and "due to the present 
situation would under force majeure accept. "2 The statement alluded 
then to the military forces which would gradually increase to 20,000 
men under the supervision of the Ministry for Jar. Regarding finance, 
the government declared its concurrence with the financial reforms 
under the Mixed Commission, providing the Commission would not inter- 
fere in previous financial affairs. In conclusion, the government 
pointed out that according to Iran's constitution, the proposals 
should be approved by the Najlis when it was opened again. 
3 
There was an enclosure with the Iranian letter which contained 
four articles about the authority of the Mixed Financial Co=ission, 
The most important points were as follows: 
1. Ibid. 
2. I. F. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 43.1334, dated Asad 14,1334 (1295)/ 
Aug. 5,1916. 
3. It was said that Sipahsälär understood that Farman Parma had been 
asked to conclude the treaty before, but he refused and said, 
"It would be a disgrace to the grandson of Nä'ib as-Saltanah, 
'Abbas Mirzä to sign the document of the slavery of Iran, " This 
rejection of Farman Parma had been considered as the reason for 
his cabinet's fall. Ahrdr, o. cit., II, 756. 
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Article One. The options and duties of the Mixed 
Financial Commission from the date of this order, 
Shavväl 14,1334, to rectify the order of 24 Safar 
[1295/May 14,19161. 
1) Investigation and approval of total expenditure 
of the country. 
2 Arrangement of income and expenses of the budget. 
3 Precision and enactment of new taxation, which 
contains modification or reconsideration of the 
present taxation, either directly or indirectly, 
providing the country's customs, religious respect 
and conventions .. 
4) Liquidation of the loans which are due in a short 
time. 
5) Inspection and supervision of the total sources of 
the country's income ... 
6) Approval or reconsideration of the decision of 
discharging and appointing of the envoys of the 
Finance administrations. 
Article Two. The decision of the Commission will be 
adapted by a majority vote of the members. 
Article Three. The regulations of the Commission depends 
on the members' decision ... 
Article Foure The duration of the Commission is unlimited 
and could be cancelled by agreement of three parties. 1 
It was an astonishing reply and the conclusion of the agreement 
surprised the diplomats at Tehran. Mr. Marling stated: 
I must confess that even after Sarim ud-Daulah had 
brought me the Persia text of the proposed answer, I 
could scarcely bring myself to believe that the 
Cabinet would authorise its signature. The Agreement 
itself is virtually one for the administrative partition 
of the country, and the consideration given for this 
tremendous concession is no more than a monthly sibsidy 
[sic] of 200,000 tomans for duration of the war. It 
seemed to me incredible that the Cabinet, with its 
subserviency, could find the courage to execute so 
unpopular an instrument. 2 
1. I. F. O., C. 26, f. 16, No. 37. dated Shavväl 4,1334/Aug. 2,1916. 
2. F. O. 416-64. No. 105. Gulhek, Aug. 26,1916. Marling to Grey. 
319 
"The Near East" reported the conclusion of the agreement and 
explained the reasons: 
Persia's finances were in a hopeless condition, but it 
was evident that two interested powers could not come 
to her help until some security could be offered for 
the restoration and subsequent maintenance of law and 
order in the country. 1 
The writer indicated that on this point the agreement had already been 
put in practice by the Russians and British in the north and south of 
Iran. On 15th September 1916, the newspaper, in an article about the 
state of affairs in Iran, alluded to the Viceroy of India, whose 
"Government with Persia had never been more cordial. " Regarding the 
agreement the writer believed both governemtns had convinced the 
Iranian Government "of their solicitude for Persia's real interests, " 
and the Iranian Government agreed with that. The writer concluded: 
We need no longer think of the country as divided into 
three spheres, with the anomaly of the British being 
virtually shut out of the part which concerns them most. 
It is enough for the moment to think of Russia's interests 
being in the north, Great Britain's in the south. Any 
more definite demarcation can be settled at a later and 
more opportune time. 2 
The "Manchester Guardian" commented on the agreement: 
The first point in which the new Agreement is said to 
differ from 1907 one is that Persia is a party to it, 
not simply a victim of it. That is all to the good. 
The chief aims of the treaty are military and financial 
reform ... 
Persia may well regard the new Agreement as a distinct improvement on the old. In 1907 Russia and England were 
concerned only to peg out claims in Persia and at the 
expense of Persia. The whole arrangement contemplated 
1. "The Near East", Aug. 11,1916. 
2. Ibid., Sept. 15,1916. 
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the collapse of Persia and took no measures to avert 
it. The new Agreement -- though it is far from ideal -- 
does do something to strengthen the fabric of Persian 
society, and, if the Foreign Offices of Russia and 
England have wisdom, might prove the beginning of a 
regeneration of Persia. 1 
Starting with the report to Petrograd of Colonel Prozorkevich, 
commander of the Iranian Cossack Brigade in the north, Miroshnikov 
commented on the formation of the force mentioned in the treaty: 
"Only Sepahdar's cabinet which consisted of politicians 
who dared not oppose their premier who is in his turn 
worked on instructions of our (Russian - L. M. 
) and 
British diplomacy" could agree to the terms of the 
Anglo-Russo-Persian agreements concerning the creation 
of such police forces, 2 
The Iranian newspapers, in spite of strict censorship, expressed 
their agitation against the treaty. "Irshäd" wrote: "The whole Iranian 
undertaking and privileges which the Russians and British have received 
in Iran, practically [ensure that] Iran thenceforth is a protectorate 
of the British and Russian Governments. "3 "Ächigsüz", a Caucasian 
newspaper, commented on the treaty in an article entitled "Russia - 
Britain -- Iran", published on 10th August 1916. After referring to 
the recent treaty between Iran and both powers, in which the British 
and Russians would have supervision over military and financial affairs 
of Iran, the writer stated: "This news leaves no doubt that the 
Sipahsälär Government, as was well-known from the beginning, is 
sincerely pro Russia and Britain. " The writer continued that according 
to the treaty the Iranian Government should refer to the British and 
1. "Manchester Guardian" , Sept. 4,1916, quoted in "The (dear East", Sept. 8,1916; I. F. O., C. 24, f. 16, No. 29. 
2. IIiroshnikov, on. cit. , 63. 
3. "Irshäd", No. 126, Sept. 30,1916/21 Iiijjah 1,1334. 
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Russians if they wanted to borrow loans. If the government desired 
to increase the number of the country's forces, it had to ask its 
neighbours' opinion. If the government intended to employ foreign 
advisers, it must consult its "protectors". The writer alluded to 
the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 and stated that the British and 
Russians had always been endeavouring to pressure the Iranian Govern- 
ment to recognise the convention and in spite of their propaganda 
that the convention of 1907 was in the interests of Iran, nevertheless 
it had always been condemned by the Iranian Government and nationalists. 
Regarding the condition of Iran during the war the writer believed 
the attitude of the British and Russians was the main reason for the 
progress of German influence in Iran and agitation of the nationalists 
and parties against the British and Russians in Iran. In conclusion 
the writer indicated that after nine years, the British and Russians 
had finally achieved their purpose and pointed out that the SipahsAlAr 
treaty in fact was an official recognition of the convention of 1907 
by the Iranian Government. 1 
The translation of this article was published in "Ra'd" and created 
great tension in the capital. Sipahsälär was horrified and in a 
letter to the newspaper rejected the article, but that did not help. 
Amin ud Daulah, a member of the Commission, resigned. The treaty was 
considered a serious danger to the reign and independence of Iran. 
Meanwhile, in the west of Iran, Turkish troops had had a great 
victory and were able to push back the Russian troops as far as Sultan 
Bulägh pass, 200 miles from the Turkish border. The Russians had lost 
drastically their influence in the capital. The opposition raised 
1. "Ächigsüz", quoted in "Ra'd", Shavväl 1334, quoted in Sipihr, 367. 
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their voices in protest against the treaty. The Shah refused to sign 
the agreement and Sipahsälär was called to the court and recommended 
to resign. 
The National Government and Central Powers' Agreement 
The National Government realised that in spite of all negotiations, 
they had still not concluded any official agreement with the Central 
Powers. Therefore, the German and Turkish representatives in Kerman- 
shah were under pressure to conclude a treaty. Nizäm us-Sallanah, in 
his negotiations with Nodolny concerning political and economic affairs, 
referred to the treaty of Mustaufi ul-MMIamälik, which Germany would 
have undertaken in case the Shah had declared war against the Allies. 
The Germans admitted that the National Government was at war at that 
time; however, Nizäm us-Saltanah desired that the treaty should also 
include the case of the Shah remaining neutral. 
Vapid ul-Mulk, the National Government's representative in Berlin,, 
used his utmost efforts to bring about the means for concluding a 
treaty as soon as possible. The Iranian Ambassador in Berlin also 
co-operated indirectly with Vapid ul-Mulk. Tagizädah and other 
Iranians in Germany supported the treaty. Finally, on 29th August, 
both sides had reached the following agreement: 
1. ) Recognition of the Provisionary Government under 
H. S. Nizam as-Saltaneh as the continuation or rather 
the emanation of the Hostoufi-al-Mimalik Government 
which was legally constituted to carry on negotiations 
and conclude a treaty with the Imperial German Govern- 
ment and its allies. 
(The Turcs have accepted this). 
2. ) Non-conditional guaranty of the political 
independence and territorial integrity of Persia and 
a formal promise to allow her a seat in the peace 
conference, 
(The Tures have accepted this. ) 
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3. ) Formal cognisance of the Treaty concluded and 
signed at Teheran by Mostoufi-al-Mimalik and 
Mohtichmi-as-Saltaneh on the one side and the 
representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey on the other. 
(The Turcs have accepted this. ) 
4. ) Financial arrangements to be made in such a 
way to meet the ever increasing military and civil 
needs, expenditure to be entirely in the Persian 
hands under the surveyance of a German Controller. 
5. ) Necessity of founding and organising a military 
force after the old conscription system. 
This force to be trained and led by German and 
Turkish officers and be well provided with arms and 
ammunition and funds. 
6. ) German agents to treat the Provisionary 
Government with due consideration. 
7. ) Necessity of removing discords and frictions 
between military and non-military elements and the 
desirability to give supreme power to the Diplomatic 
Agent. 
8. ) Necessity of dispatching a German force to 
Persia and Turkish forces operating in Persia. 
9. ) Facilities be granted for establishing tele- 
graphic relations with Nizam-as-Saltaneh. 1 
Regarding Article Three, which referred to the agreement between 
Mustaufi ul-N mllik and the Central Powers and indicated that the treaty 
had been signed by them, there was strong doubt that the agreement 
actually had been signed by Mustaufi ul-NanAlik and Muhtashim 
us-Saltanah. Von Blücher stated that the negotiations between Prince 
Reuss and Mustaufi ul-Manälik did not arrive at any guarantee because 
the conditions posed by the Germans for the entry into the war had not 
been fulfilled by those in control of Tehran. 
2 
As a matter of fact, 
on 13th October 1916, there had been other negotiations on this ground, 
1. Gehrke, II, 358-59. 
2. Blucher, 101-02. 
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which indicates that the treaty had not been signed by Mustaufi 
ul-I7amälik and the German Minister. 
1 
The political friction between the Iluhä jirin had been reduced but 
never disappeared. The rivalry between the leaders created some 
problems. Shähzädah Sulaymän Mirzä, the leader of the Democrats, 
did not take part in the cabinet. During the time at Baghdad, there 
was a rumour that Nizäm us-Saltanah and Enver Pasha had concluded a 
secret agreement, which caused strong protests from the Nuhäjirin. 
Nizä. m us-Saltanah had, in fact, sympathy with the Turks, which from 
the Democrat point of view was undesirable. However, in a general 
meeting Nizäm us-Saltanah had to personally deny the matter but 
admitted that there had been some sort of negotiation. 
2 In Kermanshah 
the difference still remained. Therefore, it was decided to put an 
end to the discord and prevent any further friction. The high 
committee of the Democrats and Nizäm us-Saltanah signed an agreement 
on 26th August 1916. It consisted of an introduction and nine articles. 
The purpose of the agreement was the unification of forces and parties. 
The most important article was: 
1. Mr. Nizäm us-Saltanah and the Democrat Party 
believe in continuing their concordance with the 
Governments of Turkey and Germany and their allies 
till the policy of both governments and their allies 
are in agreement and in preserving the interest,, 
independence and integrity of Iran. 
The other articles were concerned with the reforms and re-establishment 
of the country's administration, the formation of military forces, 
supporting each other against opposition and so on. 
3 
1. "En ce qui concerne le desir exprime par Son Excellence Wahid-el-hulk, 
..., il est 
ä remarquer qu'il n'y a jamais eu de traits conclu 
avec Mustoufi-el-Memalek, mais qu'une declaration a et4 faite ä ce 
Ministre par les representants de l'Allemagne, de 1'Autriche- 
Hongrie et de la Turquie ä Teheran. " Gehrke, II, 360. 
2. I'zä. m Qudsi, 374. 
3. gafä'i, oops cit., II, 193-95. 
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The National Government and the central Government apparently 
had no connections, but when the Turkish troops threatened the capital, 
it is probable that the Shah asked Nizäm us-Saltanah to use his 
influence to deter the Turkish advance on Tehran. Nizim us-Sallanah 
had asked Sayyid Muhammad Tabätabä'i to put pressure on the Turkish 
Government to order the troops not to occupy Tehran. 
The relations between the Turkish Government and Nizäm us-Saltanah 
were encouraged when he received an ancient holy sword; it was 
despatched from Najaf by the 'ulamä' and was given to him in an 
enthusiastic ceremony at Kermanshah. 
There had been another unsuccessful attempt on Nizäm us-Sal$anah's 
life in Kermanshah and this time, again, a group of radical Democrats 
had taken part in it, 
The Evacuation of Tehran 
The unexpected advance of Turkish troops changed the political 
climate in favour of the Central Powers in Tehran. The German and 
Turkish Legations at Tehran attracted the attention of politicians and 
courtiers. Sipahsälär's cabinet, due to his treaty with the Allies, 
was trembling and the advance of Turkish troops speeded up his fall. 
After six months and twenty-one days, on 12th August 1916, he had to 
resign. His treaty was disregarded by the Shah, though the British 
and Russians had already put it into practice. In the north Russian 
troops controlled the region and in the south Sir Percy Sykes had taken 
charge of a British force and was involved in military operations 
against the confederated khäns in the region, The foreign forces' 
operations in Iran had never been officially recognised until Sipah- 
sälär's treaty. 
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Vusüq ud-Daulah was nominated by the Shah to form a cabinet. 
There was no protest from either Allied T-Iinister in Tehran against 
the replacement of the cabinet. Vusüq ud-Daulah, on 12th August, 
received instructions for being appointed Prime Minister. From the 
beginning he faced great difficulties. The election of his cabinet 
was the first step. The Allies expected to see a pro-Allied cabinet 
but the political situation required the opposite. On the other hand, 
the only government income was received through the Allies. Mr. 
Marling expressed his opinion about the Prime Minister: "Vosugh 
ed-Doulah is a man of good sense, and well disposed to the two 
neighbouring Powers. "1 The Central Powers' Legations kept Vusüq 
ud-Daulah under pressure to appoint Mukhbir us-Saltanah and Mustashär 
ud-Daulah as cabinet members. Therefore, Vusüq ud-Daulah preferred 
to delay the formation of his cabinet for a time. 
As Turkish forces approached the capital, the Allied organisations 
were disturbed by people's requests. A rush to change bank notes 
held the bank management in extreme difficulty. The Loan Bank 
(Bank IstiRhrä ) was the worst hit. Thousands of people hurried to 
the bank to get their collateral properties out. They were afraid 
of the confiscation or looting of Allied properties, and thus their 
properties, by Turkish troops or others. The bank management was not 
able to cope with the people's demands and had to close, but in a 
proclamation assured the people that there would be no damage to their 
properties. 
1. F. O. 416-64. No. 104. Gulhek, Aug. 25,1916. Marling to Grey. 
Miroshnikov, op. cit., 64-65, believed, "In any case, Vossug [ud-Daulah] can hardly be considered an Iranian patriot. " 
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The Armenian community in Tehran also were in a panic. Some 
of the families had left the capital for the north. The Armenian 
representative had a meeting with the Prime I-linister, Vusüq ud-Daulah, 
and expressed their anxiety about the arrival of Turkish forces in 
Tehran. The government issued a proclamation and indicated that the 
Armenians were Iranian citizens and were under the protection of the 
Shah; therefore, there was no cause for panic and anxiety. 
1 
Simultaneously, the Turkish Legation also issued a proclamation. 
After referring to the Turkish victory, it rejected the truth of the 
rumours in the capital and addressed the people: not only would the 
Turkish troops not harm anyone, but they would protect the people 
from any violation. The statement assured the people of the capital 
that there would be no problems from the Turkish troops. 
2 
The Turkish troops had reached Sullän Bulägh pass; if they seized 
the pass, Tehran would be in imminent jeopardy. Petrograd was under 
pressure to reinforce General Baratof, and the Russian Government 
tried to do so. A force consisting of 9,000 men was despatched to 
Iran. The Russian troops were, however, unable to resist strongly 
against the Turks. General Baratof confessed that the Russians had 
to retreat as far as the Turks advanced, anywhere, any time. He 
indicated that the capital was not safe. Later on he advised the 
Allied Ministers to evacuate Tehran and take precautionary measures, 
General Baratof pointed out that it was better for the Allied families 
to evacuate Tehran immediately. 
3 
The upheaval of the situation in 
Iran was a matter of annoyance to Petrograd and London. The British 
1. Sipihr, 373. 
2. Ibid., 372-73. 
3. F. O. 371-2724. No. 536. Aug. 16,1916. Decypher. 
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Viceroy in the Persian Gulf expressed the British anxiety and the 
consequence of the departure of the ministers from Tehran: 
This would have most disastrous effect not only on the 
whole Persian situation but also in Afghanistan where 
it would be regarded as definite confirmation of 
repeated assurance of German mission that Turco- 
German Army is advancing across Persia on India. 1 
The Viceroy suggested that the British Government should not agree with 
the evacuation of Tehran by the ministers. In fact the evacuation was 
most undesirable for the British Government; nevertheless, it instructed 
the minister at Tehran that they should stay in the capital as long 
as possible, but authorised him to take any necessary decision on 
the matter. Meanwhile, Sultänäbäd (Aräk) was evacuated by the Allies 
and the roads to the north became increasingly unsafe. On 17th and 
18th August 1916, the Allied colonies left Tehran but the ministers 
decided to remain until the last moment. Due to the incident 
concerning the Turkish Ambassador, the Russian Minister was very 
sensitive about the danger from the Turks and the legation was on 
the alert. 
From a political point of view, it was a crucial time in Tehran, 
The diplomatic relations between the belligerent countries and the 
court of the Shah were at their highest tension. The Allied Ministers 
were determined to press the Shah to accompany the ministers in case 
of their departure from Tehran. They frankly told the Shah, Mr. 
Marling reported, that: 
Ye told His Majesty that if we did not learn from him 
this morning that he would leave with us we must inform 
our Governments that he had virtually decided to throw 
in his lot with our enemies. 2 
1. F. O. 371-2724. Tole. No. 522. Aug. 11,1916. From Viceroy to Marling. 
2. F. O. 371-2724. No. 539. Aug. 19,1916. Decy. Marling to Grey. 
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Both ministers also kept Vusüq ud-Daulah under pressure to 
prepare the means for an evacuation of the capital. On the other 
hand, the Central Powers' Legations used their efforts to deter the 
departure of the Shah. The Majlis was closed. The cabinet had not 
yet been formed. Finally, it was decided to call a committee composed 
of former ministers, members of the Royal family, nobles, politicians, 
members of the AZajlis, 'ulamä' and merchants at the court to decide 
whether the Shah should leave the capital or not. The Allied 
Ministers were informed of the court meeting; therefore they despatched 
a letter to Vusüq ud-Daulah: 
Le 18 aoilt ý 1916, 
Mon Cher President du Conseil, 
Je viens d'apprendre que Sa Majeste le Schah a 
donne fordre pour co nvoquer demain une reunion des 
Princes de la Maison Imperiale, des Ministres et 
ex-Ministres et autres personnages marquants do 
1'Empire, qui dost donner ä Sa Majeste un conseil sur 
la question si, dans le cas oü les troupes turques 
menacent la capitale, Sa Majeste et le Gouvernement 
persan doit rester ä Teheran, ou se transporter dans 
un lieu sür hors de 1'influence ennemie. En la 
circonstance, nous croyons, mon collegue de Russie 
et moi, qu'il est de notre devoir d'exposer nettement 
1'importance capitale au'aura aux yeux de nos Gouverne- 
ments la decision ä prendre par cette reunion. A lour 
avis, il serait impossible pour la Perse daps le cas 
prevu de maintenir une neutralite bienveillante si le 
Gouvernement et la Cour Imperiale restaient ä Teheran; 
done une decision comportant le sejour de Sa Majeste 
dans la capitale apres le depart, dann les circonstances 
susmentionnees des deux legations, serait consideree 
comme portant atteinte ä la politique de neutralite 
bienveillante dent nous avons eu les assurances personnelles 
de Sa IIajeste le Schah a deux reprises. 
Afin de ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur la 
maniere de voir de nos Gouvernements, nous prions votre 
Altesse de vouloir bien nous rendre le service de 
soumettre a 11honourable Assemblee ce qui precede, et 
au besoin de lui donner lecture de cette lettre. haus 
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prevoyons que les consequences de l'attitude qu'on 
semblerait vouloir adopter envers nos pays hL ce moment 
pourraient Ctre fächeuses pour la Perse ä 1'avenir. 
Veuillez, etc. 
CHARLES 1 1. MARLII; G. 1 
The British note was sent to the government the day before the 
meeting, but it did not have any effect on the process of the meeting. 
On 19th August 1916, at the court of the Shah, 35 persons took part. 
Vusüq ud-Daulah described the situation and asked for a decision. 
The result of a secret vote was 33 to 2 against the departure of 
the Shah. Vusüq ud-Daulah informed the Allied Legations: 
August 19., 1916. 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to inform you that to-day at 
the Palace of Sahib Keranieh a Great Assembly of 
Princes, clergy, and former Ministers was convened, 
and, in accordance with His Majesty's orders, considered 
whether, in view of recent events, His Majesty should 
move to another place or remain at Tehran. After 
consideration, secret votes were cast, and by a majority 
of thirty-three votes against two it was decided that 
His Majesty should remain at Tehran. 
At the same time it was submitted unanimously to 
His Majesty that steps should immediately be taken to 
avoid the departure of the envoys of Great Britain and 
Russia and their Allies, and that the capital should not 
be brought into any lind of conflict, and should not be 
subjected to the incursions of foreign troops, so that 
all the foreign representatives and their subjects should 
be able to continue to remain at Tehran in security and 
honourably, and that the Persian Government and nation 
should as far as possible be freed from any difficulty 
on this account, 
The Persian Government authorities, in order to 
carry out this proposal of the Grand Assembly, have at 
1. F. O. 416-64. Enclosure No. 1 in No. 26. Gulhek, Aug. 25,1916. 
(No. 104). Marling to Grey. 
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once taken steps and measures, and will inform your 
Excellency of the result. 
I avail, etc. 
VOSUGH-ED-DOWUH. 1 
Simultaneously, it was decided that a mission composed of three 
politicians, Qaväm us-Saltanah, Muhtashim us-Saltanah and MushAvar 
ul-Mulk, would visit 'Ali Ihsän Plshä, the Turkish Commander at 
Hamadan. They tried to persuade him to avoid further advances 
towards Tehran. They indicated that Iran had always endeavoured to 
maintain its neutrality and in the case of Turkish troops advancing 
on the capital, the city would be a battleground between the forces; 
consequently, it might damage the friendly relations between the two 
Islamic countries. 
On the other hand, Nizäm us-Saltanah used his influence through 
Sayyid Muhammad Tabätabä'i, the National Government's representative 
at Istanbul, and Turkish and German diplomats at Kermanshah to ask 
the Turkish Government to detain the approach of Turkish troops 
towards Tehran. 
2 
As a matter of fact, the idea of an expedition to Iran, from 
the beginning, was considered as unwise and a big error; because, by 
sending a part of their Mesopotamian forces to Iran, the Turks weakened 
their front in Mesopotamia, Besides, as the Turkish troops penetrated 
farther into Iranian territory, they required more reinforcement. 
In fact, General Liman von Sanders, chief of the German military 
mission to Istanbul, had from the beginning been against the expedition 
to Iran. Enver Pasha had also been advised strongly by Hindenburg 
1. P. O. 416-64. Enclosure 2 in Ito. 26. Aug. 25,1916. Gulhek (I1o. 
104). Marling to Grey. 
2. Divänbaygi, on. Cit., 75. 
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and Ludendort to withdraw the available forces for defending Baghdadl; 
but the Turks disregarded the Germans' view. Some Turkish military 
officers, such as Khalil Pasha, shared the view of the English after 
their serious check at Kilt al-'Amärah and no longer had the temerity 
to turn back to Baghdad. 2 
However, the Turkish troops made their winter camp at Hamadan 
and built some barracks, There was a general idea that after the 
end of the season and receiving reinforcements, they would advance 
on the capital. The Turks several times showed their military strength 
and advanced as far as 40 miles forwards, via Suljänäbäd and Sävah, 
but they retreated to Hamadan. 
Meanwhile, the Russian troops withdrew from Suliänäbäd. The 
Allied Legations had taken necessary measures. Both legations asked 
the United States Legation to take under its protection the Allies' 
interests in the capital and other cities where necessary. The 
British Government instructed its minister at Tehran, in case he had 
to leave and the Shah remained at Tehran, that there should not be 
a formal declaration of a breach of relations between the Allies and 
3 Iran. 
The stoppage of the subsidy by the Allies since the fall of 
Sipahsalär produced a great deal of problems for the government. 
Vusüq ud-Daulah was not able to continue his responsibility without 
money. Therefore, on 19th August he resigned. "Alä' us-Saltanah was 
nominated, but he strongly refused. However, a few days later, on 
24th August, the Shah called Vusüq ud-Daulah and in spite of his 
1. Blücher, 96. 
2. Ibid., 95. 
3. F. O. 371-2724. No. 386. F. O. Aug. 20,1916. Marling. Tehran. 
E 
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refusal, the Shah insisted on his offer and Vusüq ud-Daulah had to 
accept. 
The formation of the cabinet was a complicated task. Vusüq 
ud-Daulah, in a few meetings with the representatives of the British 
and Russian Legations at Tehran, convinced them that the circumstances 
required having some politicians like Muhtashim us-Saltanah in the 
cabinet. The representatives disagreed, but finally accepted. 
Subsequently, on 28th August 1916, the entrance of Rumania into 
the war against the Central Powers changed the balance of power in 
the European war and produced difficulties in communications between 
Germany and Turkey. The immediate effect of the change in Tehran 
was that the Allies changed their minds and firmly asked for a pro-Allied 
cabinet. 0 
At any rate, Vusüq ud-Daulah, on 29th August, introduced his 
cabinet members as follows: Mirzä Iiasan Khan Vusüq ud-Daulah, Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Fatt; Alläh Khän SardAr 
IM. anýür, Minister for the Interior; Abü ul-Fath Khan Tabataba'i I ishmat 
ud-Daulah, Minister for War; V . irtiýä Xh n Mumtäz ul-Mulk, Minister 
for Education; Dr. Ismä'il KhAn Amin ul-Mulk, Minister for Post and 
Telegraph; Mirzä Fasan Thän MushAr ul-Mulk, Minister for Finance; 
Firüz Mirzä Nusrat ud Daulah, Minister for Justice; I"Iirzä Shukr Allah 
Khan Qaväm ud Daulah, Minister for Commerce and Public Utilities. l 
The government was involved in many difficulties and one of them was 
the problem of bread in the capital, which caused the bäzArs to close, 
and people gathered to ask for government intervention in the matter; 
they also requested the cancellation of SipahsälAr's treaty. Since 
1. As Colonel Petrozorkevich ; -rrote, "The members of his cabinet are 
almost entirely if not our friends then in any case not our 
enemies, " Miroshnikov, op. cit., 65. 
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the Iranian newspapers published the Russian newspapers' comments on 
Iran, Tehran was very tense. The people were reassured by the 
government authorities and denied the existence of such a treaty. 
On 29th September 1916, the Iranian Prime Minister, Vusüq 
ud Daulah, informed the Russian Legation at Tehran that he had read 
some articles in the Russian newspaper "Novoye Vremya" and "Rusks Siov" 
which indicated that a treaty had been concluded between the British 
and Russian Governments and the Iranian Government, and implied that 
the Iranian Government had concurred with the British and Russian 
protectorate, The Iranian Government had no knowledge of such a 
treaty and Mufakham ud-Daulah, the Iranian Ambassador at Petrograd, 
had been instructed to reject the truth of the articles and to inform 
the Russian Foreign Office of the matter, 
1 
Meanwhile, Kill us-Sultän, after visiting London and Petrograd, 
arrived in Tehran to use his influence for the British and Russian 
Governments in Iran. As he wrote to the British Foreign Secretary: 
I also take the occasion to assure you once more 
of all my sympathy and friendship for your Government, 
which dates from many years, and to offer you also all 
my personal services, in Persia in the present crisis. I have also telegraphed to my friends and sons at Ispahan 
and Tehran, to remain at the disposal of the British 
and the Russian Ministers at Tehran, and to do their 
best in helping them if they are wanted ... 2 
He was appointed as the Governor-General of Isfahan, Kashän, Yazd 
and Gulpäygän and Khunsär. 
General Sir Percy Sykes' forces had occupied Kerman and Yazd 
and joined the Russian troops at Isfahan. 
1o I0F. 0., C. 26, f. 16,1334. dated ft ', i'dah 30,1334. 
2. F. O. 371-2425. Nov. 22,1915. Villa Iarie, Bice. 
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The Fall of the National Government at Kermanshah 
In January 1917, the news from Mesopotamia indicated a heavy 
concentration of British troops there. At the beginning the Turks 
did not pay much attention to the matter, but later on they found 
out the Turkish troops were not able to prevail against the British. 
The superiority of the British in both numbers and mobilisation made 
the Turks retreat from their position in the south of Mesopotamia. 
Subsequently Kit al-'AmArah collapsed and the British forces advanced 
towards Baghdad. 
The change in the Mesopotamian situation produced a serious 
danger to the west flank of the Turkish troops in Iran. There was a 
possibility of their being cut off from the centre. 'Ali Ihsän 
Päshä received orders to withdraw to Baghdad as soon as possible. It 
was absolutely unexpected. 'All Ihsän Päshä retreated completely, 
without leaving behind anything or receiving serious damage. He was 
later promoted to general for his clean withdrawal. The Russians 
did not realise what was happening until the Turks were far away. 
On 26th February 1917) the German representative at Kermanshah 
received a message: "Türkisches Corps mit deutschen Formationen 
räumt Persien. Schliesst Euch Rückzug an. "1 Blücher wrote: 
Trotz der vorausgegangenen Andeutung traf uns dieser 
Funkspruch wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel und zwar 
wie ein Blitz, der das ganze Bauwerk, an dem wir unter 
Einsatz aller Kräfte gearbeitet hatten, plötzlich in 
Flammen setzte, 2 
1. Blücher, 106. 
2. Ibid. 
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For the National Government and the MuhAjirin, it was disastrous 
news. Their hopes vanished. The idea of leaving the country was 
absolutely intolerable. A cabinet session was immediately convened. 
The German explanation was: 
'-tir sind gezwungen, zeitweilig Persiens Gebiet zu 
räumen. In unserer,. Stellung zu Persien und in unserer 
Aktion tritt keine Anderung ein. Die Provisorische 
Regierung und die Abgeordneten lassen sich zeitweilig 
aus türkischem Gebiet nieder. Von den neugebildeten 
persischen Militärformationen sind wenigstens die Cadres 
geschlossen auf türkisches Gebiet zu überführen, um die 
Kontinuität der Aktion zu wahren. 1 
The National Government, after discussing the situation, decided to 
leave the Muhäjirin free to make their own decision, 
Hasty preparations started; the news in the city had the same 
effect. People rushed to the bank to change their notes and the bank 
worked from morning to evening to change notes for silver as long as 
was possible. The evacuation of the city started soon afterwards. 
All the administration collapsed, the forces were not willing to go 
to Turkish territory. The last stage was Qagr-i Shirin. About 400 
Muhäjirin preferred to stay in Iran rather than go to Iraq. They 
were welcomed by the Sanjäbi tribe. Their hosts were Sardär Pdagir, 
Sardär Mugtadir, and Sä15r Zafar, the sons of Samsam ul-I"iulk, the 
leader of the Sanjibi tribe. Nizäm us-Saltanah and some of his 
ministers, gendarmerie officers and many of the Muhäjirin went to 
Istanbul via Kirkuk. They received a warm reception and stayed in 
Istanbul. Life went on, but it was very difficult. The memoirs of 
the Muhäjirin indicated a period of hardship; even I1iz5m us-, Saltanah 
and his family had a hard time. 
2 
1. Blücher, 107. 
2. See Appendix I. 
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The Russian troops followed the Turkish troops as far as 
Qagr-i Shirin and through Turkish territory. The Russian Revolution 
disorganised the troops and they were instructed to withdraw from 
Iran. The Russian troops did not obey their officers any more. They 
did what they wished, and therefore the region was disturbed. Looting, 
killing and destruction dominated the west part of Iran as well as 
other parts. Subsequently, famine and epidemics killed hundreds of 
thousands of people. 
The news of the Russian Revolution was the most delightful 
news for the Iranian people. The black sky of the Iranian future 
suddenly brightened with hopes of keeping the independence of their 
country. Perhaps Iran was the first nation and country which 
received tremendous benefit from every political and economic aspect, 
particularly being spared from definite colonisation. 
CONCLUSION 
From a nationalistic point of view the importance of the Muhajirat 
and National Government of Kermanshah could be justified properly if 
the Russian Revolution had not occurred. In that case the I; uhäjirat 
might have been considered as the last general nationalistic effort 
of the Iranian people in defending the independence and integrity of 
Iran, It was the first time that the nationalists had used arms against 
the oppressive Russian and British policy in Iran. 
From the British and Russian points of view, the fate and future 
of Iran and its people, according to the revision of the Anglo-Russian 
convention of 1907 in March 1915, was perfectly evident and clear. 
There was not even a chance of Iran being regarded as a protectorate, 
though it had already been divided into two spheres and the Russifi- 
cation of the northern part had been started. The south of Iran would 
probably have the same fate as India or other parts of the Persian 
Gulf. 
Many of the inhabitants of the big cities, tribal chiefs and 
landowners were more or less aware of the prospect of Iran's future. 
Iran was on the edge of losing its independence. As far as the 
international experts and many of the Iranian politicians were con- 
cerned, it was just a matter of time before Iran would be engulfed 
by its powerful neighbours. 
But the outbreak of the war changed this attitude. The Iranian 
people considered the evil of the war as the angel of freedom. Hope 
glinted in the hearts of the disappointed nationalists. Here was a 
glorious opportunity to protect their country from definite annihilation. 
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The first effort appeared in the freedom of the press, the opening 
of the Majlis and the formation of the cabinets of two famous 
politicians, Mustaufi ul-Mamalik and Mushir ud-Daulah. Both Prime 
Ministers, one after the other, did their utmost to bring about an 
agreement between Iran and both powers by which the independence and 
integrity of Iran would be guaranteed and the Allies would assist 
the Iranian Government to maintain its neutrality. Both Prime Ministers 
endeavoured to show the importance of Iran's role concerning the 
Middle East and India in the war, and to convince them that it was to 
their benefit as well as Iran's to come to a compromise with Iran. 
Not only did the Allies not consider Iran's request, but they followed 
a harder and harsher attitude which was shown by the replacement of 
both Russian and British Ministers in Tehran with two hard-liners. 
They immediately put the Shah under pressure to form a completely 
pro-Allied cabinet under the leadership of Sa'd ud-Daulah, increased 
the number of Russian troops in the northern part of Iran and disembarked 
British forces in the south. The formation of such a cabinet was 
opposed by the nationalists and this resistance was successful. 
Because of these circumstances, the first cabinet of Mustaufi 
ul-Mamälik and susequently that of Mushir ud-Daulah had no alternative 
but to choose the policy of neutrality. The maintenance of neutrality 
was the greatest problem which they had to confront. They received no 
friendly replies to their appeals. The Allies had underestimated 
Iran's role in the war and neither paid much attention to the hatred 
of the Iranian public opinion against themselves nor to the Iranian 
Government's request. Especially for Mistaufl ul-14amälik, who presented 
the policy to the Majlis, there might have been a possibility of 
pursuing a harder line in order to put pressure on the Allies for a 
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mild attitude towards Iran. For instance a general call to maintain 
the neutrality seemed possible because the atmosphere of the country 
required a positive policy and the government's appeals to the people 
would have received considerable support. Mustaufi had also popularity 
in the country to unite the people. He was able to increase the 
central government's authority and to receive complete support from 
all over the country. In the extraordinary situation created by the 
war and with the Majlis' support he could. have passed any law concerning 
foreign interests in Iran or internal affairs. On the contrary, he 
decreased the government's authority and allowed the Germans and Turks 
the same freedom to interfere that the Allies had. 
Whatever the Turko-German policy was, they found a suitable ground 
for their propaganda and tried to get the most out of it. German gold 
had undoubtedly considerable attraction for some groups but it would 
be unfair and unjust to consider that all the inclinations of the 
Iranian people and nationalists towards the Germans and Turks and 
against the British and Russians were just for the sake of gold. The 
tendency of the nationalists towards the Central Powers was not 
because of their attraction but due to the Russian and British policy 
in Iran. 
Mustaufi ul-Mamälik, in his second cabinet, used the growth of 
Turkish and German influence and public agitation as two factors to 
push the Allies to come round to the table of negotiation. Due to 
the government's financial problems and the conservative attitude of 
Mustaufi ul-MMtamalik, the Allies followed the old policy of the carrot 
and stick, depending on the ebb and flow of the war in favour of or 
against the Allies. They also had realised that the importance of 
Iran was much more than they had anticipated. The basic aims of the 
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Allies in Iran concentrated on three points: firstly, to deter Iran 
from joining the opposition; secondly, to keep Iran in a state of 
instability; thirdly, to gain time. Eventually they were able to 
obtain all three. 
Although Mustaufi ul-Mamälik had the intention of concluding an 
alliance with the Central Powers he spent a long time before he 
understood that they were not able or did not desire to commit them- 
selves in their undertakings. Time passed without any result, 
exactly as the Allies wished. There was enough time for the Russians 
to despatch adequate troops into Iran to deal with any opposition 
forces. 
As the Allied activities had no limitation, the Germans and 
Turks had the same privileges, in addition to the support of public 
opinion, which enabled them to bring under their influence most of 
the important cities of Iran, and to threaten the capital. The 
reaction of the Allies to the German-Turkish menace was the advance 
of Russian forces towards Tehran, and this produced the I"Iuhajirat. 
It seems that the founder of the Muhijirat was Mustaufl ul-Mamälik, 
but there has been some speculation as to whether or not he achieved 
his purpose, whether he wanted just to deter Russian troops from 
occupying the capital or to get rid of pro-Central Power groups. It 
was evident that Mustaufl was in favour of joining the Allies in his 
last days in office and he used the Muhäjirin to persuade them to come 
to an agreement with Iran, but the Muhäjir1n went beyond his control. 
The situation was indeed very complicated. Although the British and 
Russian Governments took Mustaufi's proposal into consideration, it 
was obvious that they would not consent to all the conditions. The 
main purpose of the Allies in negotiating with the Iranian Government 
I 
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was to gain time, as later on, when they were confident of their 
superiority, they disregarded Farmära Farmä's request for an alliance. 
However, Mustaufi had no chance. The situation would have had to have 
become extraordinarily important and vital to the Allies to bring 
them to some sort of agreement in favour of Iran, and the Iranian 
Government was too cautious to take any risk and create such conditions 
for the Allies. The idea of an alliance at the time was unfortunate, 
Firstly, the Allies had the ability to deal with any opposition; 
secondly, the enmity of people and the activities of anti-Allied 
groups had gone too far to be appeased by a government request without 
having any assurance. 
There was another option; the result of the war was not yet known; 
the Iranian Government had planned to have friendly relations with the 
belligerent countries, and therefore Iran could at any rate be on the 
winning side. 
The declaration of the Shah and his government, in which they 
stated that they would leave the capital as a protest against the 
advance of Russian troops on Tehran, was the main ground for the 
Ijuhäjirat, which caused the participation of many people from all 
classes of the community in the capital. The 7th of I"Iuharram 1333/ 
15th November 1915 is a unique day in the history of Iran. A remarkable 
demonstration of the characteristic movement of the Iranian nationalists 
took place against the violation of the Russian troops and the 
oppressive policy of both powers in Iran. 
The change of the Shah's decision left the I"Iuhäjirin on their 
own. The establishment of the National Committee at Qom was the first 
step in organising their affairs. They expected the Iranian Govern- 
ment to reach an agreement with the Allies in which the independence 
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and integrity of Iran would be guaranteed. The Russian troops would 
be immediately withdrawn from Iranian territory and the Allies would 
assist the Iranian Government to maintain its neutrality. As far as 
Tehran was concerned, the second point was out of the question at 
the time. The first point apparently might be obtained if Iran 
joined the Allies, but the third point would be disregarded. Conse- 
quently the friction between Qom and Tehran increased and now Iran, 
on the one hand, was on the German side, but on the other tended 
towards the Allies. It was neither neutral nor at war, but received 
all its disastrous consequences. 
The total inclination of the Muhäjirin towards the Germans and 
Turks was inevitable. They needed their assistance from every aspect, 
money, arms and advisers, and expected the German or Turkish army to 
arrive. The r4uh9Ljirin were accused of being a tool in the Turkish and 
German hands. They were criticised for many years afterwards and the 
basic reason for all the accusations was that they were on the losing 
side in the war. 
Without any agreement between Tehran and Qom, the Iranian Govern- 
ment succumbed to the British and Russian domination. The Allied 
Ministers almost took control over the Iranian Government's affairs. 
Farmän Farm. 1's cabinet, and subsequently Sipahsälär's and his 
agreement with the Allies, left no hope in the Tehran government for 
the future and the independence of Iran. 
In general the Muhäjirat and their supporters were composed of 
very odd and heterogeneous groups and individuals. They had many 
different sorts of interests, but most of them shared one attitude: 
to rise against the Russian and British exploitation. They fought, 
were wounded, suffered and died together. 
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Contrary to the claims of the Allies and the government of 
Tehran, the Muhäjirin tried to prove that not only did they not have 
any intention against the sovereignty of the country, but they were 
in fact determined to protect it. 
Despite the fact that the 14uhäjirin relied on the Germans and 
Turks completely, nevertheless they tried to keep their principles 
in every respect. 
Prom the political point of view, the Muhäjirin were well aware 
of the importance of the situation in the country. They endeavoured 
to show their ability to control the country's affairs and acted as 
responsible authorities. In their agreements with the Central Powers, 
such as those between the Moderate Partysand Germany, Nizäm us-Saltanah 
and Count Kanitz, and the Provisional Government and the Central Powers, 
all indicated that the independence and integrity of Iran had been 
assured, and Iran would have received considerable privileges. More- 
over, Nizäm us-Saltanah required all the privileges in the treaty, 
even if the Shah remained neutral. 
From the military point of view, the Huhä jirin fought with the 
least military equipment to their utmost ability. In the battles of 
Aväj, Rub. t Karim and especially Bid-i Surkh, the National Army 
demonstrated remarkable resistance. The bravery and resistance of the 
gendarmerie forces in all the battles against the Russian troops 
indicated their determination to defend their country and their 
nationalistic attitude. 
Public opinion, which should be considered as the most powerful 
factor of the Iranian political spirit, was in favour of the :: uhäjirin 
and gave them tremendous sympathy, even though the government of 
Tehran was acting against the MMiuhäjirin and there was fear of 
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chastisement by the Russian troops for any help or assistance to the 
Muhajirin; but nevertheless, the Iranian people responded to the 
Muhäjirin's request for support quite enthusiastically. 
Due to the military superiority of the Russians and the inability 
of the Turks and Germans to despatch adequate military assistance for 
the Muhäjirin, the National Army tolerated frequent defeats and had 
to retreat as far as the Turkish border; this ended with the disorgani- 
sation of the army. Some groups of the National Army, in company with 
many of the Muhäjirin, left the country, going to Turkish territory, 
hoping for another opportunity to return. 
They returned in company with Turkish troops and reorganised the 
Provisional Government and re-established its administration. Although 
some gendarmerie forces and western tribes participated in the battle 
with the Turkish troops against the Russians and the Provisional 
Government did their utmost to reorganise the National Army, they were 
not able to gather their previous support. But as to political and 
administrative aspects, under those circumstances, the Provisional 
Government was reasonably successful. Besides the conclusion of a 
treaty with the Central Powers, they used their influence in Istanbul 
to deter the occupation of Tehran by Turkish troops. 
Despite some criticism, Nizgm us-Saltanah was the only reliable 
person who accepted the responsibility for the leadership of the 
Iiuhäjirin and the Provisional Government. As far as the treaties were 
concerned, his government obtained considerable advantages for Iran. 
Apparently, they tried to do their best in the circumstances. 
The importance of the Muhäjirat and the National Government of 
Kermanshah,, which in fact revealed the spirit of the Iranian nationalists, 
could be better understood if the result of the war had turned out 
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differently or if the Russian Revolution had not occurred. However., 
the Muhäjirin movement showed that it would not be easy for the 
British and Russians to take over Iran with no resistance from the 
Iranian people. The I! uhäjirin movement was followed by other 
nationalistic movements in Iran. In the north, there were uprisings 
led by Mirzä Küchik Khan, I irzä Muhammad Tag! Khä. n Pasiyän in 
Khurasan and Shaykh Muhammad Khiyäbäni at Tabriz. In the south, 
tribal agitations against British forces indicated a current 
nationalist movement in Iran. Afterwards the Muhäjirin were able to 
insert one article in favour of Iran in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
signed on 3rd March 1918, by which the Russians and Turks should with- 
draw their troops from Iranian territory. The Muhäjirin took part 
in activities of the Iranian Government and other nationalists for 
Iran to take part in the peace conference, but the British Government 
was opposed to this. They also took the hardest line against the 
Anglo-Iranian agreement of 9th August 1919. However, as Ahmad Shah 
stated, the IMiuhäjirin were his rebellious patriots of the country. 
Ný. s. +3d,. -. 
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APPEILITDIX I  
PERSONAL INTERVIEJS 
The first step in these interviews was to explain thoir purpose 
and what kind of information was desired. It was pointed out that 
they were required to talk only about the events which they had wit- 
nessed or in which they had taken part. The main points of each 
interview can be divided into three parts: 
1. Personal information about the person and his position 
at the time of the interview and during the war. 
2. General information about his place of residence during 
the war, such as the names of governors, 'ulam', nobles, 
khäns, Majlis deputies; an explanation about his living 
conditions during the war. 
3. Incidents which had happened during the war. 
a) Had he heard of the declaration of iihäd; if soy 
what were the reactions of him and other inhabitants 
of the area? 
b) Was he a member of a political party; if so, why 
and what were his activities? 
c) what was his opinion of the Muhijirat, the condition 
of the country, various leaders, parties and 
governments? 
d) what was his opinion of the belligerent countries' 
policies in Iran, especially when his place of 
residence was occupied by foreign troops? 
Due to the circumstances in Iran at the time of the interviews, 
most of the people were very careful and cautious, if not auspicious, 
although most consented to having the entire interview taped. Many 
tried to avoid answering questions which might have been interpretod 
as having some connection with the present day. In general, those who 
lived in small towns or villages did not like talking about questions 
3(a)ß 3(b)ß and to some extent 3(0); those who lived in cities were 
hesitant about 3(d) and sometimes 3(c). 
I would like to thank all the pooplo I interviewed for their 
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